ΑΝΑΛΕΚΤΑ ΒΛΑΤΑΔΩΝ
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MARGARET AMY SCHATKIN

JOHN CHRYSOSTOM AS APOLOGIST

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO

De Incomprehensibili, Quod Nemo Laeditur,
Ad Eos Qui Scandalizati Sunt,
and
Adversus Oppugnatores Vitae Monasticae



ΠΑΤΡΙΑΡΧΙΚΟΝ ΙΔΡΥΜΑ ΠΑΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ ΜΕΛΕΤΩΝ
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MARGARET A. SCHATKIN, *John Chrysostom as Apologist*

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TO
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PREFACE

The purpose of this study is to explore the apologetics of the Greek church father, John Chrysostom (344/54-407). Apologetics is defined as the explanation of the reasonableness of Christianity given to those within and without the community. Hitherto the apologetics of Chrysostom were rarely the subject of investigation. Therefore it was necessary to break new ground.

The writings of Chrysostom comprise eighteen volumes and contain a total of 11,221 pages, almost all of which contain apologetic references[1]. Thus it was necessary to make a selection among the prolific writings of Chrysostom. The choice was made on the basis of the availability of critical editions: *Incomprehens.*, *Laed.*, and *Scand.* have been edited by Anne-Marie Malingrey in the series Sources Chrétiennes, and *Oppugn.* is available in Didot's series, edited by Johann Friedrich Dübner. Each of these works is an apology which contains a representative, in some cases a definitive, statement of a particular problem.

An investigation has been made of the historical background and circumstances that elicited the composition of each work, including the identity of the opponents, to whom each discourse was directed; and of the content, sources, literary form, and apologetic method of each discourse. The method used in this investigation has been objective and historical. An effort has been made not to impose modern categories of thought.

The results of the analysis reveal certain common features of apologetics in the several discourses. (1) Chrysostom's apologetic method is threefold: logical (rational demonstration), pragmatic (posture of reasonableness, civility, and restraint), and spiritual (need for grace combined with moral obligation to compose apologetics). (2) In terms of content, the comprehensive nature of Chrysostom's apologetics is remarkable

1. Ed. B. Montfaucon; reprinted in J. P. Migne, *Patrologia Graeca,* vols. 47-64.

and noteworthy: he defends the three major areas of patristic thought *(theologia, oikonomia, praxis)*, and places equal, if not greater,emphasis on the practical part of theology (ethics). (3) He employs a variety of literary genres, including sermon, diatribe, and apologetic treatise. (4) Probable sources of Chrysostom's apologetic thought include Scripture, extra-Biblical tradition, Josephus, Eusebius, Athanasius, the Cappadocians, and the liturgy. He is also indebted to classical Greek thought, Plato and the Stoics.

The author had the privilege of meeting Prof. Pan. C. Christou in 1982, on the occasion of Prof. Christou's Athenagoras Lecture at Hellenic College, Brookline, Massachusetts. That 1982 meeting was a fruitful one for at that time Prof. Christou kindly agreed to read the manuscript of the present volume, and made many suggestions, which proved to be of great value.

The author would be remiss if she failed to note her genuine appreciation to Prof. Christou and the Patriarchal Institute for Patristic Studies for their invaluable skill in the difficult editorial work involved. The author is gratified and honored to have this volume included in the prestigious series, Analecta Vlatadon.

August 19, 1987 Margaret A. Schatkin

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INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

EXPLORATION OF CHRYSOSTOM'S APOLOGETICS

The purpose of this work is to explore the apologetics of the church father, John Chrysostom. The writer's Ph. D. dissertation having been a critical edition of an apologetic treatise of Chrysostom, namely, *Babylas,* it was suggested to me that I prepare a Th. D. dissertation on the subject of the apologetics of John Chrysostom, including an examination of the earlier sources of Chrysostom's apologetics[1].

Subsequent research disclosed that there was a paucity of material on the subject of Chrysostom as apologist. The only independent study is over one hundred years old, and it is a mere sketch: T. Förster, "Chrysostomus als Apologet", in *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie* 15 (1870) 428-54. Chrysostomus Baur, *John Chrysostom and His Time,* has chapters on Chrysostom as a polemicist and as an apologist[2]. There is also a chapter entitled "La defense de la foi contre l'erreur" in Anatole Moulard, *Saint Jean Chrysostome: sa vie—son oeuvre* (Paris, 1941). Christian apologetics of the fourth century is analyzed systematically by Anton Seitz in *Die Apologie des Christentums bei den Griechen des IV. und V. Jahrhunderts in historisch-systematischer Darstellung* (Würzburg, 1895)[3].

The apologetics of John Chrysostom, it seems, has rarely been the subject of discussion or writing. In order to compose this work, it was necessary to break new ground in a hitherto unexplored area.

1. The wisdom of the latter suggestion, namely, that I search for the earlier sources of Chrysostom's apologetics, was confirmed by C. Baur, *John Chrysostom and His Time,* translated by M. Gonzaga (Westminster, Maryland, 1959) 1:352: "It would be a praiseworthy task to ascertain how many of these [apologetic] ideas already existed among the older apologists before the time of Chrysostom."

2. Op. cit., vol. 1, chaps. 26 and 27.

3. For the earlier material consult Joseph-Rhéal Laurin, *Orientations maîtresses des apologistes chrétiens de* 270 *à* 361, Analecta Gregoriana 61 (Rome, 1954).

TO DEMONSTRATE THE ENDURING VALIDITY OF CHRYSOSTOM'S APOLOGETICS

An additional purpose of this work is to demonstrate the enduring validity of Chrysostom's apologetics. By studying the historical background of the period, and in particular determining who were the opponents to whom Chrysostom was directing his apologetics, and by setting forth what has been discovered concerning the method, content, sources and literary form of Chrysostom's apologetic thought, it is the writer's devout wish that this work will not only be a contribution to the history of patristic theology, but also will be of profitable interest to contemporary Christian apologists. Unlike Chrysostom, numerous Christian apologists have not been theologians of first rank. An apologist of the stature of Chrysostom had a message not only to Christians and non-Christians in the fourth century, but also has a significant message to Christians and non-Christians in today's world.

APOLOGETICS DEFINED

Apologetics may be defined as the explanation of the reasonableness of Christianity given to those within and without the community.

Apologetics (also referred to as fundamental theology) is that branch of theology whose purpose is to justify Christian religion, doctrine, institutions and Scripture, and to defend these against their critics. In other words, apologetics is that part of theology which strives to prove that which one ought to believe. Faith is the basis and *sine qua non* of Christian life: to justify faith by the exercise of reason and logic is the purpose of apologetics. Christian faith is based on certain historical and rational factors which are the subject of apologetics. Thus apologetics deals with the content and nature of faith, e.g., confidence in the veracity of Scripture. Christianity makes certain claims as to basic truths; apologetics presents the evidence of those truths, including empirical evidence (physical facts, historical data, personal authentication) and Scriptural testimony[4].

4. G. Rabeau, "Comment se pose le problème de l'apologétique," in *Apologétique: nos raisons de croire, réponses aux objections,* ed. Maurice Brillant (Paris, 1948), pp. 4-10. Avery Dulles, *A History of Apologetics* (New York, 1971), pp. xvi-xviii. Already in the second century Justin Martyr states that Christians alone offer

Apologetics is not a dead or static issue; rather, it is a living force, and similar to other living forces, within or without the church, it is constantly developing and evolving. Apologetics must confront the exigencies of every age; therefore, the exigencies of different ages must be met by a developing apologetics to meet those exigent circumstances.

A definition of apologetics in the second century is given by Pellegrino:

> Apologetics is therefore in concrete terms the exposition of Christian doctrines, theoretical and practical; a call to the individual and social life of the Christians, in which appears the practical demonstration of the effectiveness of such doctrines; a polemic against pagan worship and inclination, in the first place against idolatry and polytheism; an interpretation of the rational principles of the Christian message to show its harmony with the most valid conquests of Greek thought, accompanied by the effort in the major apologists to persuade the pagans that in responding to the Christian call they would sacrifice nothing of the patrimony of cultural and moral values of which they were proud[5].

This definition of second-century apologetics could be applied in general to Christian apologetics from its beginnings to the sixth century.

Johannes Geffcken, "Die altchristliche Apologetik", in *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* 1 (1905) 626, defines Christian apologetics as "literary argumentation of Christianity with its enemies" ("der literarischen Auseinandersetzung des Christentums mit seinen Feinden"). Geffcken's definition is useful because it emphasizes that apologetics is not only a theological discipline, but must also be viewed within the context of early Christian literature[6].

proof: μόνοι μετ' ἀποδείξεως, (*Apol.* 1.20.3). Aristotle *An. Post.* 81a40 defines ἀπόδειξις as inductive reasoning, opposed to ἐπαγωγή, deductive reasoning.

5. Michele Pellegrino, *Studi su l'antica apologetica* (Rome, 1947), p. VI.

6. "Indeed both the reading and writing of texts which are devotional, or apologetic, or satiric, require, perhaps in the first instance, not the accident of revelation, or the aegis of ecclesiastic sanction, but raw verbal skill. The incontrovertibly literary meaning of Classic, Humanist, Renaissance, and Reformation is precisely generic: textual fidelity and formal discrimination for the purpose of intellectual enlightenment." Robert A. Kantra, "Jerome and Erasmus: Holy Orders, Literary Talent and Intellectual Revolution," in *The Papin Festschrift,* ed. Joseph Armenti (Villanova, Pennsylvania, 1976) 2:425.

In the history of early Christian literature it is customary to place together the apologetic literature, especially of the second and the beginning third centuries, as "the Christian apologists". However, within the name "apologists" one does not comprehend the whole circle of writing of apologetic tendency. It is necessary to bear in mind how much the entire early Christian literature was combined with apologetic tendencies. For example, the *Church History* of Eusebius cannot be characterized better than by saying that Eusebius represents the historical events from an apologetic point of view. "All ancient Christian literature is affected by apologetic tendencies and no small part of it from the first to last could be assigned to the apologetic *genre*..."[7].

EARLY CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS

The guidelines of apologetics were early laid down in the New Testament[8]. In Titus 1:9 apologetics is said to be the duty of the bishop (τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας ἐλέγχειν). With this one may compare the requirement of the bishop to be διδακτικός, skillful in teaching[9]. Another New Testament writer says that apologetics is the duty of all Christians: ἕτοιμοι ἀεὶ πρὸς ἀπολογίαν παντὶ τῷ αἰτοῦντι ὑμᾶς λόγον περὶ τῆς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐλπίδος[10]. Likewise in Jude 3 apologetics is said to be the task of the community: ἐπαγωνίζεσθαι τῇ ἅπαξ παραδοθείσῃ τοῖς ἁγίοις πίστει. Other compounds of the same verb (ὑπερ-, ἐναγωνίζεσθαι) are used by Eusebius to refer to apologetics[11]. The simple form of the verb is used by Clement of Alexandria with reference to apologetics: ἀποδυ-

7. JAMES MARSHALL CAMPBELL, *The Greek Fathers* (New York, 1963), pp. 21 f.

8. It is not possible to estimate exactly the effect of the command "not to prepare a defense" (μὴ προμελετᾶν ἀπολογηθῆναι: Luke 21:14). In the acts of Apollonius (180-185) the martyr Apollonius delivers an oration, which Harnack calls "the noblest apology of Christianity which came down to us from antiquity" (quoted by JOHANNES QUASTEN, *Patrology* [Utrecht-Antwerp, 1966] 1:183 f.). There are other examples of speeches by martyrs which borrow from written apologies. But these are purely literary works. SERAFINO PRETE, "Some *Loci* in ancient Latin hagiography," in *The Heritage of the Early Church,* Orientalia Christiana Analecta 195 (Rome, 1973), p. 312. In this connection it may be significant that Chrysostom emphasized the need for the grace of the Spirit in apologetics (cf. Matt. 10:19 f., Mark 13:11, Luke 21:15).

9. 1 Tim. 3:2 and 2 Tim. 2:24 f.

10. 1 Peter 3:15.

11. *Hist. Eccles.* 4.7.5, 11.8.

σάμενοι δ' οὖν περιφανῶς ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀληθείας σταδίῳ γνησίως ἀγωνιζώμεθα[12], and also by Chrysostom[13]. In this regard it is significant that some major apologists of the early church, including Justin Martyr and Lactantius, were laymen.

The preaching of Paul provided a pattern for early Christian apology. Chrysostom defended Paul's use of Greek literature as the best way to put pagans to shame by citing witnesses from their own culture. Chrysostom also justifies the use of Greek material in his own sermons by referring to the Pauline example[14].

In the early second century Aristides of Athens, borrowing from Philo, developed the standard form of the Christian apology[15]. Aristides' apology is divided into (1) λόγος ἀπελεγκτικός: an attack upon the position of the opponents; (2) λόγος ἐνδεικτικός: a statement of the excellence of Christianity; and, following Paul's sermon[16], (Acts 17:31), reference to judgment at the end.

This bipartite form is evident in a number of apologies of the following period, including Justin, *Apology* 1[17]; Tertullian, *Apology*[18]; Cyprian, *Quod idola dii non sint*; Constantine, *Ad coetum sanctorum*[19]; Eusebius of Caesarea, *Praeparatio evangelica*[20]; Athanasius, *Contra gentes, De incarnatione verbi*[21]; Chrysostom, *Adversus Iudaeos homiliae;* Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones*[22]; Augustine, *De civitate Dei.*

12. *Prot.* 10; GCS 1, p. 70.20.

13. *Sac.* 4.4.; SC 272, p. 254.

14. ANTON NAEGELE, "Johannes Chrysostomos und sein Verhältnis zum Hellenismus," *Byzantinische Zeitschift* 13 (1904):102.

15. JOHANNES GEFFCKEN, "Die altchristliche Apologetik", *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* 1,9 (1905): 636. The two parts of apologetic (refutation of the adversary and edification of the community) seem already to appear in Titus 1:9.

16. Acts 17:31.

17. QUASTEN, 1:199 f.

18. The structure of TERTULLIAN's *Apologeticum* is ἀπολογία (chaps. 1-16) and ἐπίδειξις (chaps. 17 to the end). The positive teaching is called "demonstratio religionis nostrae" (*Apol.* 16.13). R. BRAUN is mistaken in considering σύγκρισις an integral part of the structure. "Observations sur l'architecture de l'*Apologeticum,*" in *Hommages à Jean Bayet,* ed. M. RENARD and R. SCHILLING, Collection Latomus 70 (1946):114-21.

19. QUASTEN, 3:325.

20. Ibid., 3:329.

21. Ibid., 3:24.

22. Ibid., 2:396 f.

Paul's saying that the Greeks seek after wisdom[23] is confirmed by the development of early Christian apologetics. The cultural level of Greek Christians who wrote in behalf of the faith gradually rises from Tatian and Athenagoras, whom Geffcken characterizes as sophists, through Clement and Origen, up to the highest cultural level with Eusebius of Caesarea. All the arguments of ancient Christian apology are found in his great apologetic works, *Praeparatio evangelica* and *Demonstratio evangelica,* which contain an enormous amount of source material from pagan literature, and were utilized by later writers, including John Chrysostom[24].

Coming to the fourth century one realizes that apologetics cannot have the same meaning it had in the preceding centuries[25]. Apologies composed in the fourth and fifth century have a more sophisticated nature than the early apologies. A good example of the sophisticated nature of post-Constantinian apologetics is Augustine, *De civitate Dei,* written between 413-426. In this work Augustine defends Christianity against certain interpretations of it by Christians (not heretics)[26].

APOLOGETICS WITHIN THE THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM OF JOHN CHRYSOSTOM

THEOLOGY AS UNDERSTOOD BY CHRYSOSTOM

Like other church fathers, Chrysostom divided theology into two two parts, dogma and ethics[27]. The same division into two parts is also found in Chrysostom's sermons, most of which are divided into an exposition of Scripture (dogmatic), followed by moral exhortation on

23. 1 Cor. 1:22.

24. GEFFCKEN, p. 658.

25. Cf. C. ANDRESEN, "Frühkirchliche Apologetik," *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (3 ed., Tübingen, 1957) 1:480.

26. ERNEST L. FORTIN, "Augustine's *City of God* and the Modern Historical Consciousness," *The Review of Politics* 41 (1979):323-343.

27. *Sac.* 4.8 (SC 272, p. 278). *Opp.* 1.6 (p. 10, l.32). *Compunct.* 1.9 (PG 47, 408); 1.10 (PG 47, 410). *Anom.* 12.5 (PG 48, 811). *Res.* h.1.1. (PG 50, 417 ter.). *Pan. Lucn.* 3 (PG 50, 526). *In illud, Pater, si possibile est, transeat, etc.* 1 (PG 51, 31) and 4 (38-39). *De verbis apostoli habentes eundem spiritum* 1.9 (PG 51, 280) and 2.7 (287). *Exp. in Ps.* 8.9 (PG, 55, 121). *In Matt.* h. 64.4 (PG 58, 614-615). *In Eph.* h.12.1 (PG 62, 89). *In 1 Thess.* h.9.3 (PG 62, 450). *In Heb.* h.6.2 (PG 63, 55) and h.34.1 (231-232).

various ethical topics, which may bear no relation in subject matter to the preceding exegesis[28]. Obviously the combination of dogmatic and ethical material in his sermons was not only a rhetorical method, but also reflects a theological system.

For Chrysostom Christian *praxis* (βίος, πολιτεία) is equally as important as dogmatic faith. Thus in *Opp.* 1.6 he says καὶ τί τῆς πίστεως ὄφελος, εἰπέ μοι, βίου μὴ ὄντος καθαροῦ[29]; Indeed ethical practice can be more important than adherence to dogmas:

> Wherefore I entreat you let us use much diligence both to stand in the *right faith,* and to show forth an *excellent life.* For unless we add also a *life suitable* to our faith, we shall suffer the extremest punishment. ...And Christ declared it even in the evangelists, when He brought in some that had cast out devils and prophesied, and are led away to punishment. And all His parables also, as that of the virgins, that of the net, that of the thorns, that of the tree not bringing forth fruit, demand virtue in our works. For concerning *doctrines* He [Christ] discourses seldom, for neither doth the subject need labor, but of *life* often or rather everywhere, for the war about this is continual, wherefore also so is the labor. (*In Matt.* h. 64.4; PG 58, 614-615. NPNF p. 395).

According to Chrysostom, Christ himself emphasized the ethical part of theology in his teaching.

The ethical (practical) part of theology is called by Chrysostom "philosophy"[30]. According to Bezdeki, in Chrysostom's thinking "philosophy" equals ethics[31].

Scholars agree that Chrysostom placed more emphasis on the practical (ethical) part of theology. Again according to Bezdeki: "S. Joannes

28. ADOLF MARTIN RITTER, *Charisma im Verständnis des Joannes Chrysostomos und seiner Zeit* (Göttingen, 1972), pp. 110 f. Cf. *Stat.* h.16.2 (PG 49, 164). The homilies *De incomprehensibili* are divided into dogmatic teaching and moral *parainesis* (SC 28bis, pp. 130, 182, 214, 254, 308). Also see NPNF 11 (Chrysostom: Homilies on the Acts): xii.

29. *Opp.* 1.6; p. 9, l.45 f., ed. DÜBNER.

30. ANNE-MARIE MALINGREY, *Philosophia: Étude d'un groupe de mots dans la littérature grecque des Présocratiques au ive siècle après J.-C.* (Paris, 1961), pp. 281 f.

31. STEPHANUS BEZDEKI, "Chrysostomus et Plato," *Ephemeris Dacoromana* 1 (1923):331.

enim ethicae dumtaxat efficacissimus fuit magister"[32]. Otto Seeck, the great historian of late antiquity, states that:

> der Antiochener Johannes ... gehörte zu der sehr geringen Zahl von Christen, die mit den sittlichen Forderungen ihrer Religion, wie sie damals verstanden wurde, unerbittlich Ernst machten[33].

In *Stat.* h. 16.2 Chrysostom says:

> Show me not the wrestler in the place of exercice, but of actual contest; and religion not at the season of hearing, but at the season of practice. (PG 49, 164)

Sometimes he says that only monks practice the doctrines of Christianity; worldly Christians renounce God "by their deeds" (διὰ τῶν ἔργων)[34]. Chrysostom's critique of Plato was based on the argument that everything he wrote was in theory only, and never able to be put into practice[35].

Thus the question "theologian or moralist?" is a false one to pose in regard to Chrysostom: ethics is an integral part of theology[36]. Those who deny this are classed with the heretics[37]. Ὁ Χριστιανισμὸς καὶ τὸ τῆς τῶν δογμάτων ὀρθότητος καὶ πολιτείαν ὑγιαίνουσαν ἀπαιτεῖ[38].

The two parts of theology are closely related in Chrysostom's thought. Their relationship may be exemplified by his treatment of ἡ περὶ τῶν μελλόντων or περὶ ἀναστάσεως φιλοσοφία. Faith in the resurrection, in eternal life, is not only concerned with intellectual adherence. It exerts influence on the conduct of life[39]. As a pastor Chrysostom never ceases to open to the faithful the perspectives of eternity so as to set before them the ethical actions which are appropriate for a

32. Ibid., p. 318 n. 5.

33. *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt* 5:337, quoted by A. J. Festugière, *Antioche païenne et chrétienne* (Paris, 1959), p. 210.

34. *Opp.* 3.15, p. 62, 1.45.

35. *In Matt.* h.33.4 (PG 57, 392). Bezdeki, p. 330.

36. The falseness of assessing Chrysostom simply as a moralist has already been noted by Malingrey (SC 272, p. 261 n. 2).

37. In homily 63.3 on John (PG 59, 352) Chrysostom gives a list of heretics, including οἱ δὲ λέγοντες ὅτι οὔτε δὴ βίος ὀρθὸς οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ, οὔτε πολιτεία ἀκριβής. Ἀλλ' οὐ καιρὸς ταῦτα ἐλέγχειν νῦν.

38. *In Jo.* h.28.2; PG 59, 164.

39. Cf. 2 Peter 3:11.

life to be continued after death[40]. Another interesting example of the relationship between doctrine and ethics is the way Chrysostom interprets Paul's teaching of the mystical body of Christ in terms of almsgiving[41]. Finally, the doctrine of providence contains both a theoretical and a practical element: one not only assents intellectually to the dogma, but also submits willingly to the external circumstances of life.

It may be added that Chrysostom mixes a discussion of the theoretical and practical parts of theology. In *Opp.* 3.10[42] he says that unphilosophic (i.e., unethical) people destroy belief in the doctrine of providence (τῆς προνοίας τοῦ θεοῦ) and establish belief in fate (εἱμαρμένης). In other words, lifestyle (conduct) can prove or disprove dogma on the practical level, though on the theoretical plane the truth is invincible[43].

CHRYSOSTOM'S CONCEPT OF APOLOGETICS

The Invincibility of Truth; Condescension (συγκατάβασις)

One of the most importan tpresuppositions of Chrysostom's apologetics is the conviction that the truth needs no defense for its own sake. For example, in *Pan. Bab.* 2.2[44] Chrysostom says: οὐδεμιᾶς γὰρ δεῖται βοηθείας ἡ τῆς ἀληθείας ἰσχύς. The Christian religion cannot be refuted because it is the truth:

> οὔτε γὰρ τὸ φῶς ἔσται σκότος ποτὲ ἕως ἂν ᾖ φῶς οὔτε ἡ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν πραγμάτων ἀλήθεια διελεγχθήσεται· ἀλήθεια γάρ ἐστι· ταύτης δὲ ἰσχυρότερον οὐδέν. (*Pan. Bab.* 2.4; PG 50, 539)

The truth about Jesus Christ cannot be hidden[45], and cannot be defeated by violence against the martyrs[46]. The truth is always distinguishable (διάδηλος); false Christs and false prophets make the real ones shine more brightly, just as disease makes health more plain, and

40. Malingrey, *Philosophia,* p. 279 n. 85.

41. Émile Mersch, *Le corps mystique du Christ*[3] (Paris, 1951) 1:468.

42. *Opp.* 3.10; p. 51, l.7.

43. At one point Chrysostom seems to say that even on the theoretical level Christian dogma may be called into question by the evil *conduct* of Christians (*Opp.* 2.2; p. 16, l.4-7). In h.3.5 on 1 Cor. (PG 61, 28 f.) he says that Christian life proves the dogmas.

44. PG 50, 536.

45. *Ep.* 7.4d.; SC 13bis, p. 150.

46. *Pan. Dros.* 2; PG 50, 686.

darkness light[47]. The church is more firmly established than the physical universe:

> ἡ γὰρ ἐκκλησία οὐρανοῦ μᾶλλον ἐρρίζωται. Ἀλλ' ἴσως ἀπόνοιάν μου καταγινώσκει ὁ Ἕλλην· ἀλλ' ἀναμενέτω τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν ἀπόδειξιν, καὶ μανθανέτω τῆς ἀληθείας τὴν ἰσχύν, πῶς εὐκολώτερον τὸν ἥλιον σβεσθῆναι, ἢ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀφανισθῆναι. (*In. Is.* h. 4.2; PG 56, 121 f.)

Finally, Chrysostom also says that the truth of Christ's predictions becomes progressively more manifest in the course of history:

> τοιαῦται γὰρ αὐτοῦ [Χριστοῦ] αἱ προρρήσεις αἱ πλείους· οὐ χρόνῳ περαιοῦνται βραχεῖ οὐδὲ εἰς μίαν συντελοῦνται γενεάν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῖς τε οὖσι τοῖς τε ἐσομένοις, αὖθις καὶ τοῖς μετ' ἐκείνους, καὶ τοῖς μετὰ τούτους πάλιν, καὶ ἕως τῆς συντελείας παρεκτείνοντας, πᾶσι παρέχουσαι καταμανθάνειν τῆς οἰκείας ἀληθείας τὴν ἰσχύν. (*Jud. et gent.* 16; McKendrick, p. 123)

It seems likely that the idea of the supremacy of truth goes back to the formula in 1 Esdras 4:41: μεγάλη ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ ὑπερισχύει[48].

In Chrysostom's opinion the truth is being, and will be manifested empirically, i.e., historically, in every generation "until the end of the world", (συντέλεια[48α]). This explains the place which Chrysostom gives to the pragmatic proof of Christianity *(demonstratio ex operibus)*, primarily for the unbeliever[49]. Truth manifests itself in action, in our lives, in history: αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ μεγάλη μάχη, οὗτος ὁ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἀναντίρρητος ὁ διὰ τῶν ἔργων[50].

Thus Chrysostom considers truth as invincible and self-manifesting. Why then the need for apologetics? The primary concern of apologetics is *not to betray the truth*, especially when it is attacked[51]. Truth may be made to appear insufficient by human ignorance and unpreparedness. And if truth is defeated in this way, either by the skill of the opponent or by the weakness and incompetence of the apologist, many will fall into error as a result[52].

Therefore the defense of the truth is made for the sake of those who are in error and ultimately for the purpose of their salvation.[53] Thus Chrysostom says that although the teachings of the Marcionites are contemptible, these must still be refuted for the sake of those who are easily deceived.[54]

It emerges here that apologetics is related to the concept of divine condescension (συγκατάβασις), which is so prominent in Chrysostom's theology.[55] Divine condescension is the model of Christian apologetics, because God humbled himself to defend his actions to man,[56] teaching

47. *In Ac.* h. 46.3; PG 60, 324.

48. Cf. Chrysostom, *Laud. Paul.* 4 (PG, 50, 493,495): τῆς ἀληθείας ἡ ὑπεροχή, τοῦ κηρύγματος τὴν ἰσχύν. The concept of the invincibility of truth occurs also in Justin. *Fr. res.* 1. Theodore of Mopsuestia,*Jo.* (cited by Rowan A. Greer, *The Captain of our Salvation* [Tübingen, 1975], p. 186), Lactantius, *Inst.* 5.13.

48α. Cf. Matth. 28.20.

49. T. Förster, "Chrysostomus als Apologet", *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie* 15 (1870) 432. Cf. *In Thess.* h.8.3 (PG 62, 443).

50. In 1 Cor. h.3.5; PG 61,5.

51. προδοῦναι τὴν ἀλήθειαν: *In Jo.* h. 58.4; PG 59, 320. τὴν ἀλήθειαν μηδαμοῦ προδιδούς: *In Rom.* h. 22.22; PG 60, 611.

52. *Sac.* 4.9 (SC 272, p. 280). For Chrysostom, who divides theology into two parts, the corollary to betraying the truth in the intellectual (dogmatic) realm, is betrayal of the truth in the practical realm by leading a bad life. Thus in homily 3.5 on 1 Cor. (PG 61, 29) Chrysostom says concerning apologetics directed to the pagans:

> For though we give ten thousand precepts of philosophy in words, if we do not exhibit a life better than theirs, the gain is nothing. For it is not what is said that draws their attention, but their enquiry is, what we do; and they say, "do thou first obey thine own words, and then admonish others. But if while thou sayest, 'infinite are the blessings in the world to come,' thou seem thyself nailed down to this world, just as if no such things existed, thy works to me are more credible than thy words. For when I see thee seizing other men's goods, weeping immoderately over the departed, doing ill in many other things, how shall I believe thee that there is a resurrection?" And what if men utter not this in words? They think it and turn it often in their minds. And this is what stays the unbelievers from becoming Christians. Let us win them therefore by our life. (NPNF p. 15)

If Christians live badly, they are guilty of other people's errors and will be punished. Joachim Korbacher, *Ausserhalb der Kirche kein Heil? Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung über Kirche und Kirchenzugehörigkeit bei Johannes Chrysostomus* (Munich, 1963), p. 72.

53. Cf. Plato, *Ap.* 30d: πολλοῦ δέω ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι ... ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν. Justin says that the martyrs' confession is for the sake of the opponents (1 *Apol.* 8.1).

54. *Comm. in Gal.* 1.6 (PG 61, 621).

55. Robert Carter, "The Future of Chrysostom Studies: Theology and *Nachleben*," in *Συμπόσιον. Studies on St. John Chrysostom,* Analecta Vlatadon 18 (Thessaloniki, 1973):131.

56. E.g., *In Gen.* 11:6.

us to be φιλάνθρωποι: ὁ δεσπότης τοῖς δούλοις ἀπολογεῖται.[57] The apologetic approach is to be adapted to the spiritual level of the audience; even as Moses spoke elementary things to the human race in its infancy, and Paul and John transmitted more perfect knowledge.[58] Finally, Chrysostom explicitly justifies Paul's use of pagan literature on the basis of συγκατάβασις or accomodation to Greek culture, just as God spoke to the magi through a star, and speaks to the Jews from the prophets and not the gospels.[59]

The Two Parts of Apologetics

In *De sacerdotio* Chrysostom teaches that the bishop has three functions: rule (ἀρχή), celebration of the mysteries (ἱερωσύνη), and teaching (διδασκαλία).[60]. In the same place he presents apologetics as a part of the teaching ministry of the bishop. He quotes certain New Testament texts, including 2 Tim. 2:24; 2 Tim. 3:14-17; and Titus 1:9, to prove that it was the apostle's intention that church rulers should be equipped as apologists. In addition, in order to show that Paul expected all Christians to be able to defend the faith, he quotes Col. 4:6: "Let your speech be always with grace, seasoned with salt, that ye may know how ye ought to answer every man".[61]

In *Sac.* 4.4-5 Chrysostom divides apologetics into two parts: (1) the battle against outsiders (pagans, Jews and heretics), and (2) the disputes within the community. He makes the same distinction between apologetics directed to without and to within the community in *Jud.* 3.1[62]:

> For the good shepherd does more than drive away the wolves [= heretics]; he also is most diligent in caring for his sheep who are sick. What does he gain if the flocks escape the jaws of the wild beasts but are then devoured by disease? The best general is the one who not only repels the seige engines of the

57. *Diab.* 1.4; PG 49, 250.

58. *In Gen.* h.2.3; PG 53, 29.

59. Naegele, pp. 102-105.

60. H. de Lubac, "Le Dialogue sur le Sacerdoce de Saint Jean Chrysostome," *Nouvelle revue théologique* 100 (1978) 822-31. The English translation of *De sacerdotio* used here is from NPNF 9.

61. *Sac.* 4.8; SC 272, pp. 274-276.

62. PG 48, 863.

> enemy but first puts down rebellion within his own city. He knows well that there will be no victory over an outside foe as long as there is civil war within. (trans. Harkins)

It is noteworthy that in this homily Chrysostom is speaking to "protopaschites," a group of Judaizers that he includes in the fold and contrasts with Arians (Anomoeans), who are considered enemies on the outside.

Returning to the discourse *De sacerdotio*, it is useful to examine more closely the two divisions of opponents, to whom the bishop must address his apologetics. In *Sac.* 4.4,[63] Chrysostom mentions the following as opponents "outside the church," against whom the bishop has to contend (ἀγωνίζηται): Greeks (i.e., pagans), Jews, Manicheans, and advocates of the belief in fate. These groups and countless more heresies must be refuted because the faith of the community could be destroyed by any one of these subgroups by itself.

Many dogmatic complexities are involved in this battle, says Chrysostom, and the apologist needs to steer a middle course (συμμετρία) between extreme positions (ἀμετρία), which are typically heretical. Also the apologist must reason precisely (ἀκριβῶς).[64] "He who has not much experience in such occurrences will get pierced, so to say, with his own sword, and become the laughing stock of friends and foes alike."[65]

In the next chapter Chrysostom discusses the apologetics directed to within the community.[66] The attacks which come from within the community are no fewer than the attacks from without, and demand more effort from the teacher. Within the community, Chrysostom says,

> you would find few anxious about faith (i.e., dogma) and practice, but the majority curiously inquiring (περιεργαζομένους), and investigating (ζητοῦντας), into matters which it is not possible to discover, and the mere inquiry into which provokes God.

These are members of the church who are unconcerned with orthodox

63. SC 272, pp. 252-260.

64. On the background of the concept of ἀκρίβεια in Greek thought see Dietrich Kurz, *Akribeia: Das Ideal der Exaktheit bei den Griechen bis Aristoteles*, Göttinger Akademische Beiträge 8 (Göppingen, 1970).

65. *Sac.* 4.4; p. 256.

66. *Sac.* 4.5; SC 272, pp. 260-262.

doctrine or the practice of Christian virtue, but instead exercise idle curiosity (πολυπραγμοσύνη) and question divine providence:

> Some out of an idle curiosity are rashly bent upon busying themselves about matters which are neither possible for them to know, nor of any advantage to them if they could know them. Others again demand from God an account of his judgments, and force themselves to sound the depth of that abyss which is unfathomable. "For thy judgments," saith the Scriptures, "are a great deep" (Ps. 36:6).

Chrysostom strongly condemns such idle curiosity concerning providence among Christians in his treatise, *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt ob adversitates* (below, chapter II, part 2). He also considers the Anomoean Arians guilty of impiously investigating God (below, chapter I). The one who opposes such impious searching may gain the reputation of ἀπόνοια and ἀμαθία. Therefore the apologist-bishop needs great intelligence to lead the flock away from such useless questions, without incurring the reproach of pride and ignorance. The only help which he has available for all these difficulties is λόγος. If he does not possess the power of λόγος, the souls of the weaker members of his flock will be shaken. He must therefore work to acquire this power.

In *Sac.* 4.6-7[67] Chrysostom demonstrates that Paul possessed the power of *logos* and was a great apologist. Paul's letters are a model for apologists of any age:

> His writings are not only useful to us for the overthrow of false doctrine and the confirmation of the true, but they help not a little towards living a good life. (*Sac.* 4.7; p. 274)

The example of Paul's life is valuable for Christian *praxis*—but not when there is a contest about dogmas and all fight from the same Scriptures.[68] An ethical life will not help, if by inexperience in intellectual combat one falls into heresy; just as faith cannot be healthy if one's life is corrupt. The apologist must be experienced in these contests. If he fails to answer the opponents, his flock will attribute his failure to the unsoundness of Christian dogma:

> For though he himself stands safely, and is unhurt by the gainsayers, yet the simple multitude under his direction, when they see their leader defeated, and without any answer for the gainsayers, will be apt to lay the blame of his discomfiture not on his own weakness, but on the doctrines themselves, as though they were faulty and so by reason of the inexperience of one, great numbers are brought to extreme ruin; for though they do not entirely go over to the adversary, yet they are forced to doubt about matters in which formerly they firmly believed, and those whom they used to approach with unswerving confidence, they are unable to hold to any longer steadfastly, but in consequence of their leader's defeat, so great a storm settles down upon their souls, that the mischief ends in their shipwreck altogether. (*Sac.* 4.9; p. 280)

Without apologetics the bishop will betray the truth of Christian faith and injure the community.

The division of apologetics into two categories in *De sacerdotio* is reflected in the apologetic discourses composed by Chrysostom. The first category, apologetics directed to outsiders, including pagans, Jews and heretics, is represented by the three major apologetic works of Chrysostom:

> *De sancto Babyla, contra Iulianum et gentiles* (PG 50, 533-572).
> *Adversus Iudaeos homiliae* 8 (PG 48, 843-942).
> *De incomprehensibilli contra Anomoeos homiliae* 5 (SC 28bis).

The second category of apologetics, directed to those within the community, is represented by Chrysostom's discourses in defense of providence:

> *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt ob adversitates* (SC 79);
> *Quod nemo laeditur nisi a se ipso* (SC 103);
> and also by his defense of the monks, entitled
> *Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae* (PG 47, 319-386).

It should be mentioned that Chrysostom obviously intended his apologetic discourses of both categories to be heard/read by all groups and to benefit everyone, within and without the church. For example, his eight homilies against the Jews were delivered in church for the sake of Judaizing Christians.[69] The Anomoeans listened to Chry-

67. SC 272, pp. 262-274.
68. *Sac.* 4.9; pp. 278-280.

69. Paul W. Harkins, trans., *Saint John Chrysostom: Discourses against Judaizing Christians*, FOTC 68 (Washington, D.C., 1979): xxxvii.

sostom's homilies *De incomprehensibili* preached in the orthodox community of bishop Flavian. The defense of providence was probably directed to pagans and Jews as well as to Christians. Finally, *Opp.* also contains an argument directed against a pagan father.

In certain cases both "insiders" and "outsiders" had raised common objections. For example, Chrysostom says:

> There are many among the enemies to the truth, as well as among those who belong to our own ranks, who make it a subject of inquiry, why it [the human body] was created corruptible and frail. Many also of the Greeks and heretics affirm that it was not even created by God. (*Stat.* h. 11.2; PG 49, 120 f.)

According to Förster, the greatest significance of Chrysostom for apollogetics is when he directs himself not against a special class of enemies, but in general against unbelieving people.[70]

The tendency to group together pagans, Jews and heretics as the "outside" opponents of Christianity was based upon theological considerations. The Jews, faithful to an uncompromising and rigid monotheism, were not the only ones to deny the divinity of Christ; they agreed on this point with the pagans. This is why an entire part of early Christian apologetics, especially from the time of Eusebius on, united Jews and pagans.[71] John Chrysostom was in accord with this tradition, as the title of another of his apologetic works indicates: *Contra Iudaeos et gentiles quod Christus sit deus* (PG 48, 813-838). In addition to Jews and pagans there were others who doubted the divinity of Christ, including the radical descendants of Arius called Anomoeans. In homily 1 *Adversus Iudaeos* Chrysostom says:

> Since the Anomoeans' impiety is akin to that of the Jews, my present conflict is akin to my former one. And there is a kinship because the Jews and the Anomoeans make the same accusation. And what charges do the Jews make? That he called God His own Father and so made Himself equal to God. The Anomoeans also make this charge—I should not say they make this

70. FOERSTER, p. 432.

71. E.g., *D.e.* 1.1.11-12. Under emperor Julian the Jews allied themselves with the pagans. CHRYSOSTOM, *In Mt.* h.43.3 (PG 57, 460 f.). Cf. emperor JULIAN, *Contra Christianos* p. 216, 16-p. 220, 4; ed. NEUMANN (Leipzig, 1880).

> a charge; they even blot out the phrase "equal to God" and what it connotes, by their resolve to reject it even if they do not physically erase it. (PG 48, 845; trans. Harkins)

To the consensus of the Anomoeans and the Jews corresponds the succession of the first homily *De incomprehensibili,* then the first discourse *Adversus Judaeos,* and finally the second homily *De incomprehensibili.*[72]

Finally, it may be added that Chrysostom's defense of the harmony of the gospels was directed towards Greeks, Jews and many of the heretics, "for thus all find fault with the evangelists as being at strife and variance".[73] Likewise, Chrysostom's apology in support of the philanthropy and goodness of God was addressed both to Greeks and heretics.[74]

The battle against "outsiders" (pagans, Jews and heretics) is formidable, but the darkness is not only on the outside.

> And in fact a deep night oppresses the whole world. This is what we have to dispel and dissolve. It is night not among heretics and among Greeks only, but also in the multitude on our side, in respect of *doctrines* and of *life.* For many entirely disbelieve the resurrection; many fortify themselves with their horoscope; many adhere to superstitious observances, and to omens, and auguries, and presages. And some likewise employ amulets and charms. (*In* 1 *Cor.* h. 4.6; PG 61, 38. NPNF p. 21).

Within the Christian community both parts of theology (*dogma* and *praxis*) are called into question and need to be defended. As an example of dogma, Chrysostom cites the resurrection, which is disbelieved in by many.[75] As an example of *praxis,* he cites the pagan superstitions

72. ANNE-MARIE MALINGREY, "La controverse antijudaïque dans l'oeuvre de Jean Chrysostome d'après les discours *Adversus Iudaeos,*" in *De l'antijudaïsme antique à l'antisémitisme modern* (Lille, 1979), p. 94.

73. *Paralyt.* 3; PG 51, 53.

74. *Stat.* h.7.2; PG 49, 93 f.

75. Chrysostom has an extended apology in behalf of the resurrection throughout his sermons. Examples are *Incomprehens.* 2.6 (PG 48, 716 f.). *Laz.* h.4.3 (PG 48, 1010 f.). *Diab.* 1.7 f. (PG 49, 255 f.). *Res. mort.* (PG 50, 417ter-432). *Res. Chr.* (PG 50, 433-442). *Cur in Pentec. Acta* 6 (PG 51, 105). *In princip. Act.* 4.6-8 (PG 51, 105-110). *In Mt.* h.43.2 (PG 57, 458). *In Jo.* h.62.4 (PG 59, 347) and h.63.3 (351-352). *In Ac.* h.1.2 (PG 60, 16): Book of Acts is a demonstration of the resurrection. *In* 1

which the mass of Christian people still observe. These superstitions are not merely erroneous practice, but are based upon serious theological errors: they accord undue power to the devil and assume that humanity is subject to fate, which governs the world. This fatalism is a source of impiety because it discourages all personal effort in the practice of virtue. These superstitions are therefore not merely ridiculous, but presuppose philosophical conceptions which are radically opposed to the essence of Christian life, liberty and free will. Chrysostom sees the great danger of superstitious practices, and combats them extensively.[76] He composed a series of six homilies against fatalism.[77] According to Paul Albert,[78] it is hardly possible to find a more convincing demonstration of free will.

CHOICE OF WORKS TO BE STUDIED

THE PROLIFIC WRITINGS OF CHRYSOSTOM

The writings of John Chrysostom are found in eighteen volumes in Migne (PG 47-64), and contain a total of 11,221 pages—the most extensive literary legacy of any of the Greek fathers.[79] There exist only a relatively small number of works by Chrysostom which are apologies

Cor. h.17 (PG 61, 141 ff.). *In Ep.* h.12.3 (PG 62, 91) and h.19.2 (PG 62, 129). *In 1 Thess.* h.7 (PG 62, 435). *Hom. dicta praesente imperatore* 1 ff. (PG 64, 473 ff.). In his apology for the resurrection Chrysostom was influenced among others by Eusebius, *De resurrectione libri* 2 (PG 24, 1069-1114), where Eusebius warns pagans and Jews, on the basis of the undeniable factual proofs of the divine power of Christianity, that Jesus continues to live in his disciples. Similarly Chrysostom argues that the resurrection is proved by the death of the martyrs. *Pan. Dros.* 2 (PG 50, 686). *Pan. Ign.* 4 (PG 50, 593). *Pan. Rom.* 1.4 (PG 50, 611).

76. Anatole Moulard, *Saint Jean Chrysostome: sa vie—son oeuvre* (Paris, 1941), pp. 133 f. Edward Nowak, *Le chrétien devant la souffrance: Etude sur la pensée de Jean Chrysostome* (Paris, 1972), pp. 54-57.

77. *De fato et providentia:* PG 50, 749-774. The authenticity of this work has been established by Thomas P. Halton, "St. Jean Chrysostom *De fato et providentia.* A Study of its Authenticity," *Traditio* 20 (1964) 1-24. To replace Migne one can now use the critical edition of Francis Bonnière, *Jean Chrysostome Sur la providence. Sur le destin. Introduction, texte critique, traduction, notes et index.* Thèse de 3e cycle. Université de Lille III, 1975.

78. *St. Jean Chrysostome considéré comme orateur populaire* (Paris 1858), p. 214.

79. Quasten 3: 429.

in the strict sense. But one meets apologetic statements of all kinds throughout the homilies. In view of all Chrysostom's practical duties once he became a priest (386), especially the obligation to preach, it is natural that he had little time to compose formal treatises. His apologetic treatises were all written either before he was ordained a priest, or during his exile (403-407). Instead, as a preacher he combatted the major opponents (Jews, Anomoeans) in a series of homilies delivered from the pulpit. This is in accord with Chrysostom's teaching in *De sacerdotio* that it is the duty of the bishop (priest), presumably in his sermons, to be an apologist and defend the faith of the community.[80].

The overwhelming majority of Chrysostom's works are sermons: exegetical homilies on the Old and New Testaments; dogmatic and polemical homilies; moral discourses; sermons for liturgical feasts; panegyrics; and occasional discourse.[81] There are two series of apologetic homilies, against the Jews and Anomoeans, which have been mentioned. Apart from these apologetic homilies, the remaining sermons of John Chrysostom contain numerous apologetic passages.

The apologetic character of Chrysostom's sermons may be explained not only by the reason that Chrysostom conceives of apologetics as the obligation of the minister towards the community, but also because the homilies were pronounced for catechumens as well as for the "initiated," i.e., baptized, Christians.[82] Indeed, not only catechumens, but pagans and heretics, could and did attend the first part of the service.[83]

80. Nevertheless as a priest Chrysostom said that apologetics directed to heretics could be less important than teaching Christian virtue (ἀρετή), if the heretics were intransigent:

> For when a man is perverted and predetermined not to change his mind, whatever may happen, why shouldst thou labor in vain, sowing upon a rock, when thou shouldst spend thy honorable toil upon thy own people, in discoursing with them upon almsgiving and every other virtue? (*In Tit.* h.6.1; PG 62, 696. NPNF p. 540)

This brings up the need for εὐγνωμοσύνη, i.e., rightmindedness, on the part of the opponent in apologetics. The opponent to whom the apology is addressed must be εὐγνώμων, i.e., willing honestly to acknowledge facts. (Cf. *Opp.* 2.2; p. 16, 1.8 ed. Duebner). The opposite quality is ἀγνωμοσύνη (*Jud. et gent.* 11; PG 48, 828).

81. Quasten 3: 433-459.

82. P. de Puniet, "Catéchuménat," in DACL 2,2: 2591.

83. Ibid., p. 2583. Chrysostom's homilies on incomprehensibility were spoken

The present work does not represent a systematic study of all apologetic references in the sermons of Chrysostom. Aside from the physical enormity of the task—which would require a team of investigators working through the eighteen volumes of Migne page by page—the text of the sermons is for the most part uncertain.[84] With the exception of the baptismal catecheses,[85] the homilies against the Anomoeans,[86] the six homilies on Isaiah 6:1,[87] and the panegyric of Paul (SC 300), there are no critical editions of the sermons.[88]

It was also decided not to make a systematic study of Chrysostom's homilies against the Jews for the following reasons. First, there is no critical edition of the Greek text, although a preliminary study has been published.[89] Second, after having read the eight homilies *Adversus Judaeos* in the text of Migne,[90] and having done some prior research concerning the historical background,[91] it appeared to the writer that a proper study of the homilies against the Jews would merit a volume in itself, and such an analysis could not be carried out within the scope of the work as conceived.[92]

Finally it was also decided to omit from consideration here the two apologetic treatises of Chrysostom against paganism: *Quod Christus sit*

for the benefit of the Anomoeans in the audience, as well as for the faithful. *Incom.* 1 (SC 28bis, p. 130, l.336-337).

84. QUASTEN 3: 433.

85. SC 50bis: Paris, 1970.

86. SC 28bis: Paris, 1970.

87. SC 277: Paris 1981.

88. However, preliminary investigations have been made. E.g., BLAKE GOODALL, *The Homilies of St. John Chrysostom on the Letters of St. Paul to Titus and Philemon: Prolegomena to an edition,* University of California Classical Studies 20 (Berkeley, 1979).

89. L. CANET, "Pour l'édition de S. Jean Chrysostome Adversus Judaeos," *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire de l'École Française de Rome* 34 (1914) 97-153.

90. PG 48, 843-942.

91. Some of this research was published in two articles. "St. John Chrysostom's Homily on the Protopaschites: Introduction and Translation," in *The Heritage of the Early Church,* Orientalia Christiana Analecta 195 (Rome, 1973), pp. 167-186. "The Maccabean Martyrs," *Vigiliae Christianae* 28 (1974) 97-113.

92. For a general introduction to Chrysostom's apologetics against the Jews see A. J. VISSER, "Johannes Chrysostomus als anti-Joods polemicus," *Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis* 40 (1954) 193-206.

deus,[93] and *De sancto Babyla.*[94] These two discourses have been translated and analyzed in volume 73 of the Fathers of the Church[95].

RELEVANCE AND MATERIALITY OF THE WORKS CHOSEN

It has already been mentioned that Chrysostom divides apologetics into two parts, and that his major apologetic works fall into these two categories:

1) apologetics directed to opponents outside the church: *Pan. Bab.* 2, *Jud.* 1-8, and *Incomprehens.;*

2) apologetics to within the community: *Scand., Laed.* and *Oppugn.*

For reasons set forth above, the treatise *Babylas* and the homilies *Adversus Iudaeos* have been excluded from this study. Thus there remain in the two categories of apologetics the following works:

1) apologetics directed to opponents outside the church: *De incomprehensibili homiliae* 5.

2) apologetics directed to within the community: *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt ob adversitates; Quod nemo laeditur nisi a se ipso; Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae.*

These works form the subject under investigation here. With the exception of the homilies *De incomprehensibili* against the Anomoeans, these works are all written discourses composed by Chrysostom, rather than sermons taken down orally by stenographers. The authority of a written text, carefully composed by the author, is by nature weightier than a homily delivered extemporaneously and recorded, and possibly published, by another party. The treatises therefore provide a better source for studying Chrysostom's thought than the homiletical works.

Furthermore, there are critical editions available in the series Sources Chrétiennes for *De incomprehensibili, Ad eos qui scandalizati*

93. Studies of *Jud. et gent.* include: MAX HAIDENTHALLER, *Johannes Chrysostomus, Nachweis der Gottheit Christi und Acht Predigten über atl. Gesetz und Evangelium* (Linz, 1951). PAUL W. HARKINS, "Chrysostom the Apologist: On the Divinity of Christ," in *Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten,* ed. Patrick Granfield and Josef A. Jungmann (Münster Westf., 1970) 1: 441-451.

94. The authenticity of this treatise is discussed in "The Authenticity of St. JOHN CHRYSOSTOM'S *De sancto Babyla, contra Iulianum et gentiles,*" in *Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten,* 1: 474-489.

95. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1985.

sunt ob adversitates, and *Quod nemo laeditur nisi a se ipso;* and there is a modern edition of *Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae,* edited by Johann Friedrich Dübner in Didot's series (Paris, 1861).

An additional reason for studying these particular works of Chrysostom is the importance of their subject matter. The subject matter of these four sets of discourses conforms to the main divisions of patristic thought: theology (nature of God), economy (suffering and providence), and practical philosophy (ethics), which is represented by monasticism, where justice is practiced in a more perfect way. It is not unnatural to find that Chrysostom's major apologetic discourses should be concerned with the defense of these three areas.

It has already been shown that Chrysostom divides theology into dogma and ethics. This corresponds to the regular patristic division of theology into two parts: theoretical and practical. The main categories of patristic thought appear in the outline below.

Theoretical (= dogma)
- *Theologia* (nature of God in Himself)
- *Oikonomia* (God in relation to the world)

Practical philosophy (ethics)

The division of the theoretical part of theology into *theologia/oikonomia* is discussed by G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought*,[96] chapters two and three. The notion of *oikonomia* in Chrysostom's thought is discussed by Edward Nowak, *Le chrétien devant la souffrance: Étude sur la pensée de Jean Chrysostome.*[97]

The division of theological science into two parts, theoretical and practical, follows the division of philosophy in the late Peripatetic and the Neoplatonist philosophers, and ultimately derives from Aristotle.[98] The opposition between dogmatic teaching of general principles (*decreta, scita, placita,* δόγματα), and moral precepts (practical counsels) concerning the details of everyday life (*praecepta,* παραίνεσις) goes back to the Stoics.[99]

96. London, 1959.

97. Paris, 1972, pp. 97-101.

98. W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary* (Oxford, 1924) 1:353.

99. A. Méhat, "Les ordres d'enseignement chez Clément d'Alexandrie et Sénè-

The fact that early Christian theologians took over the categories of Greek philosophy seems to have been recognized by the church fathers themselves.[100]

The division of theology into a theoretical and a practical part is prominent in the Cappadocians, especially Gregory of Nazianzus.[101] It also appears in the thought of Theodoret, whose apology (*Curatio*) is divided into a theoretical part (books 1-11) and a practical part (book 12).[102]

The concept of Christian doctrine (δόγμα) and ethical conduct as comprising the totality of theological science is found throughout patristic literature. For example, Cyril of Jerusalem says that the way of godliness consists of two things, pious doctrines and virtuous practice.

> Ὁ γὰρ τῆς θεοσεβείας τρόπος ἐκ δύο τούτων συνέστηκε, δογμάτων εὐσεβῶν καὶ πράξεων ἀγαθῶν· καὶ οὔτε τὰ δόγματα χωρὶς ἔργων ἀγαθῶν εὐπρόσδεκτα τῷ θεῷ, οὔτε τὰ μὴ μετ' εὐσεβῶν δογμάτων ἔργα τελούμενα προσδέχεται ὁ θεός. Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, εἰδέναι μὲν τὰ περὶ θεοῦ δόγματα καλῶς, καὶ πορνεύειν αἰσχρῶς; τί δ' αὖ πάλιν ὄφελος σωφρονεῖν μὲν καλῶς, καὶ βλασφημεῖν ἀσεβῶς; (*Catech.* 4.2; PG 33, 456)

It may be added that Gregory of Nyssa identifies the two parts of theology (dogma in relation to ethical conduct) in Matthew 28:19 f.:

> διαιρῶν γὰρ εἰς δύο τὴν τῶν Χριστιανῶν πολιτείαν, εἴς τε τὸ ἠθικὸν μέρος, καὶ εἰς τὴν <τῶν> δογμάτων ἀκρίβειαν, τὸ μὲν σωτήριον δόγμα ἐν τῇ τοῦ βαπτίσματος παραδόσει κατησφαλίσατο, τὸν δὲ βίον ἡμῶν διὰ τῆς τηρήσεως τῶν ἐντολῶν αὐτοῦ κατορθοῦσθαι κελεύει. (*Ep.* 24.2; ed. Pasquali, p. 75)

Even the Alexandrians, according to Harnack, divided theology into "knowledge and good conduct"[103]

que," in *Studia Patristica* 2, 2, Texte und Untersuchungen 64 (Berlin, 1957): 352-353 cites Seneca, *Ep.* 95.

100. William J. Malley, *Hellenism and Christianity: The Conflict between Hellenic and Christian Wisdom in the Contra Galilaeos of Julian the Apostate and the Contra Julianum of St. Cyril of Alexandria,* Analecta Gregoriana 210 (Rome. 1978), p. 400.

101. T. Špidlík, "La *theoria* et la *praxis* chez Grégoire de Nazianze," *Studia Patristica* 14, Texte und Untersuchungen 117 (Berlin, 1976), pp. 358-364.

102. Theodoret, *Curatio* 12.6 (SC 57, 419).

103. Clement of Alexandria, *Str.* 7.7.48. Cited by Adolf Harnack, *The*

As already stated, the main divisions of patristic thought are represented by the four writings of Chrysostom studied here:

Theoretical (= dogma):

Theologia (nature of God in Himself)

De incomprehensibili homiliae 5.

Oikonomia (God in relation to the universe, divine providence):

Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt ob adversitates,

Quod nemo laeditur nisi a se ipso.

Practical philosophy (ethics):

Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae.

Each of these writings is a representative statement, in some cases a definitive one, which contains a complete, or reasonably complete, treatment of the problem.

1) *Theologia:* The five homilies on incomprehensibility are a brilliant oratorical refutation, accessible to a nonspecialist audience, of the fundamental error of the radical Arians that God's essence is knowable. Under the influence of Philo, mediated possibly through Athanasius and the Cappadocians, Chrysostom develops a doctrine which constitutes one of the fundamental bases of his theology.[104] The incomprehensibility of God was a crucial doctrine which needed to be defended at the time, and remains a subject of great importance for theology today.[105]. The five homilies *De incomprehensibili* contain Chrysostom's most impressive statement on the nature of God, cast in the form of an apology directed against heretics.

2) Turning now to the subject of *oikonomia,* one recalls that according to Diogenes Laertius Plato first used the word πρόνοια in the sense of the providence of God.[106] The doctrine of divine providence

Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries, trans. James Moffatt, 2nd ed. (reprint, New York, 1962), p. 116. Also Origen, *In Jo.* fr. 45: ἐκκλησίαν ... τυγχάνουσαν ἁγνὴν παρθένον διὰ τὴν τῶν δογμάτων καὶ ἠθῶν ὀρθότητα (GCS 4, p. 520.16). Cyril of Alexandria, *Ador.* 5: διπλοῦν ... ἐν ἐκκλησίαις τὸ ... κήρυγμα· ἓν μὲν ... εἰς ὀρθότητα τὴν δογματικὴν ἀποφέρει τοὺς πεπιστευκότας ... ἕτερον δὲ πρὸς ἠθικὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν ξεναγεῖ.

104. Emmanuel Amand de Mendieta, "L'incompréhensibilite de l'essence divine d'après Jean Chrysostome," in Συμπόσιον. *Studies on St. John Chrysostom.* Analecta Vlatadon 18 (Thessaloniki, 1973), pp. 23-25, 40.

105. Ibid., p. 40.

106. Cited by Richard Bentley, *Dissertation upon Phalaris,* chapter XVII, nos. 523-524.

was developed by Plato,[107] Stoic philosophers[108], and in the fourth century A.D. continued to be an important area of philosophical speculation among the pagans (e.g., Sallustius,[109] Proclus[110]).

The church fathers wrote many works on providence[111]. The doctrine played an important role in Origen's system of thought.[112] In the fourth century there appeared a number of apologies in behalf of providence, including book two of Titus of Bostra's *Against the Manicheans* (after 363), which Quasten describes as "the most detailed treatise on theodicy in early Christian literature."[113] Diodore of Tarsus, Chrysostom's teacher, wrote *De providentia.*[114] Another Antiochene theologian, Theodoret, composed, in addition to the sixth book of the *Curatio,* ten discourses on providence.[115]

In light of the writings of Diodore and Theodoret, it is not surprising to find that providence was a major theme in Chrysostom's thought.[116] For Chrysostom, belief in the existence of providence is not mere intellectual assent, but involves on the practical level an absolute cooperative submission of self to the will of God.

> Il est symptomatique de remarquer que pour Chrysostome l'acte de foi se confond souvent avec celui de charité; plus exactement la vraie foi chrétienne se situe au-delà de la connaissance, dans une soumission totale à la providence, en une attitude qui est autant un acte d'amour qu'un acte de foi et dont la foi d'Abraham, qui se soumet aveuglément aux désirs de Dieu, est "le type même de notre foi." (*In Rom.* h. 9.1; PG 60, 467B) Chrysostome est l'apôtre de cette foi amoureuse qui

107. A. P. Bos, *Providentia divina: The Theme of divine 'pronoia' in Plato and Aristotle* (Assen, 1976).

108. Cf. Cicero, *De natura deorum* II, 73-168.

109. Ed. A. D. Nock, with Engl. transl. and prolegomena (1926).

110. *Opuscula,* ed. H. Boese, 1960, contains essays on providence, fate and evil.

111. E.g., Clement of Alexandria's lost work περὶ προνοίας. Cf. Otto Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur* (reprint, Darmstadt, 1962) 2:53.

112. H. Koch, *Pronoia und Paideusis. Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus* (Leipzig, 1932).

113. Quasten, 3:360.

114. Ibid., 3:400.

115. Ritter, p. 161. Quasten 3:544 f.

116. Johannes Stelzenberger, *Die Beziehungen der frühchristlichen Sittenlehre zur Ethik der Stoa* (Munich, 1933), pp. 92 ff. et passim.

> exécute sans comprendre les moindres désirs de Dieu.[117]

Chrysostom's own apologies in support of divine providence, *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt* and *Quod nemo laeditur,* illustrate his own total submission to providence and are in a sense an *apologia pro vita sua.* The practical application of the theoretical dogma is characteristic of Chrysostom's thinking.

In homily 8.4. on 2 Timothy[118] Chrysostom gives "rules" (κανόνες) for avoiding scandal in regard to the divine dispensation (τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ οἰκονομίας):

> Know this, however, that God dispenses all things, that He provides for all, that we are free agents, that some things He works, and some things He permits; that He wills nothing evil to be done; that all things are not done by His will, but some by ours also; all evil things by ours alone, all good things by our will conjointly with His influence; and that nothing is without His knowledge. Therefore He worketh all things. ...For as there is among calculators the number of six thousand, to which all things can be reduced, and everything can be divided and multiplied in the scale of six thousand, and this is known to all who are acquainted with arithmetic; so he who knows those rules, which I will briefly recapitulate, will never be offended. And what are these? That virtue is a good, vice an evil; that diseases, poverty, ill treatment, false accusations, and the like, are things indifferent; that the righteous are afflicted here, or if ever they are in prosperity, it is that virtue may not appear odious; that the wicked enjoy pleasure now that hereafter they may be punished, or if they are sometimes visited, it is that vice may not seem to be approved, nor their actions to go unpunished; that all are not punished, lest there should be a disbelief of the time of resurrection; that even of the good, some who have done bad actions are quit of them here; and of the wicked, some have good ones, and are rewarded for them here, that their wickedness may be punished hereafter; that the works of God are for the most part incomprehensible, and

117. J.-M. Leroux, "Monachisme et communauté chrétienne d'après saint Jean Chrysostome," in *Théologie de la vie monastique* (Paris, 1961), p. 163.

118. PG 62, 647-648.

> that the difference between us and Him is greater than can be expressed. If we reason on these grounds, nothing will be able to trouble or perplex us. If we listen to the Scriptures continually, we shall find many such examples. (NPNF 13: 507-508)

This passage is an accurate summary of Chrysostom's apology in support of divine providence. His emphasis upon the incomprehensibility of providence (τῷ ἀκαταλήπτῳ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ οἰκονομίας) is one respect in which Chrysostom extends the Stoic doctrine of providence, and answers the Academic objection that providence does not take care of good people.[119] The particular aspect of divine providence which Chrysostom defends in *Quod nemo laeditur* and *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt* is the unmerited sufferings of the just.

3) The third major category of patristic thought is the practical part of theology (Christian ethics). *Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae* is an apologetic treatise, in which Chrysostom defends the importance of ethics as an integral part of Christianity, and refutes the prevailing view that dogma alone constitutes the essence of Christianity, and that adherence to dogma guarantees one's salvation.[120] This was evidently one of the great misconceptions of the Christian community in Antioch, and resulted in the persecution of monks, who were following the teachings of Christ and living an authentic Christian life.

The analysis of *Opp.* reveals Chrysostom's great skill and sophistication as an apologist of the Christian life. He refutes a fundamental misconception of the Christian community of the time which stressed one part of theology (dogma) over another (ethics). He depicts the monks as practitioners of Christian virtue (*aretē*), and therefore as an integral part of the community, whose values represent true Christianity. The continuing persistence of the error which is refuted in *Opp.*, and the profundity of the apologetic response, in which Christian *praxis* is identified with the Hellenic ethical idea of *aretē,* make this work not

119. Cicero, *Nat. d.* 3.79-95.

120. In this connection one thinks of the work of Edwin Hatch, *The Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity* (reprint, New York, 1957). The title of chapter XII is "The Transformation of the Basis of Christian Union: Doctrine in the Place of Conduct." This transformation is exactly what Chrysostom is combatting in *Opp.* The patristic concept of the two parts of theology (dogma, ethics) also tends to disprove Hatch's theory that the early church substituted dogma for ethics as the basis of Christian community.

only an important example of apologetics in the fourth century, but also relevant to Christian apologetics of all times.

METHOD

The method chosen to investigate the subject, John Chrysostom as apologist, has been objective and historical. Robert E. Carter in "The Future of Chrysostom Studies"[121] states:

> Ultimately, in the order of value, all other studies serve and are subordinated to our knowledge of Chrysostom's thought. To know what he thought we must know what he said. Therefore we need critical texts. We also need to know whether in fact he said it. Therefore we need to determine the authenticity of the works attributed to him. Furthermore, a full and accurate understanding of what he said requires a knowledge of how and when he said it. Therefore we need studies of his language and style and a chronology of his works.

In another article, entitled "The Future of Chrysostom Studies: Theology and *Nachleben*," Carter again stresses the need for objectivity in dealing with Chrysostom's thought:

> Studies of Chrysostom's theological thought should be seriously historical and avoid all neo-scholasticism. ...We should not try to tailor his thought to fit some later system. Obviously we want to see the relation between different aspects of his thought and we want to make valid generalizations, but such relations and generalizations should emerge from his works themselves and not be imposed from without.

In the present investigation the procedure has been to determine objectively the method, content, sources, literary genre and rhetorical form of the four above mentioned discourse (*Incomprehens.*, *Laed.*, *Scand.*, *Oppugn.*).

The analysis of these writings has been presented in such a way as not to deform the material by imposing modern categories of thought. Chrysostom is allowed to speak for himself either in the form of

121. *Studia Patristica* 10 (Berlin, 1970):20.

122. In *Συμπόσιον*, Studies on St. John Chrysostom, Analecta Vlatadon 18 (Thessaloniki 1973):103.

summaries or by direct quotations from his writings. The approach to these texts is exegetical; according to J.-M. Leroux, such meticulous examination and comparison of texts is the only way to perceive the real thought of Chrysostom.[123]

In order to ascertain the apologetic thought of Chrysostom in its objective correctness, one must naturally have recourse to the Greek text, preferably to a critical edition. Critical editions in the series *Sources chrétiennes* are available for all the above mentioned works except *Opp.*

Chrysostom's style is rhetorical, and *what* he said and *how* he said it are closely, even inextricably, connected. The process of discovering *what* Chrysostom says by reading and translating the Greek text, is also simultaneously the process of discovering *how* he expressed his thoughts. Translating is often also the way one discovers Chrysostom's classical sources, which are betrayed by verbal echoes (e.g., Stoicism, Plato).

In line with the historical nature of the present study, the focus of the questions asked of the materials has been kept on Chrysostom's own questions, rather than the present writer's, who has been guided by the text in order to discover what the author's (Chrysostom's) questions are, and thus to come to understand the author. It might be said that the present writer's goal has been as far as possible "to understand the author (Chrysostom) as he understood himself."[124] To this end it has proved helpful to explain Chrysostom by Chrysostom, viz., to refer to other works by Chrysostom and compare what he says elsewhere in his writings. This is in accord with the method which the Chrysostom expert, J.-M. Leroux, suggests:

> C'est l'habitude de saint Jean Chrysostome de ne jamais traiter un sujet dans son ensemble. Il se limite chaque fois à un aspect

123. Leroux, p. 145: "...son oeuvre qui, par son ampleur et son caractère, rebute à toute analyse. Oeuvre d'enseignement populaire, elle ne comporte aucun développement didactique; aussi la pensée réelle de l'auteur ne peut être perçue qu'au prix d'une succession d'approches résultant de l'examen minutieux et de la comparaison de textes en apparence similaires."

124. The distinguished philosopher Kant in his important monograph, *Critique of Pure Reason* B370, states that it is possible to understand an author "better than he understood himself." For the history of that formula consult Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Das Verstehen: Drei Aufsätze zur Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften* (Mainz, 1949). Also H. G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York, 1975), pp. 169 ff. According to the new metaphysics it is only possible to understand an author differently from the way in which he understood himself.

du thème retenu. Cette habitude, due aux règles de la pédagogie catéchétique, impose de regrouper des textes disséminés dans son oeuvre pour saisir exactement sa pensée.[125]

It is also necessary to compare Chrysostom to other classical Greek and patristic writers to determine if there is any originality in what he is saying (i.e., use of sources).

125. LEROUX, p. 145 n. 4.

CHAPTER I

THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

About three years after the council of Nicea the emperor Constantine began to give in to the Arian side. At Antioch, the bishop Eustathius, an ardent defender of Nicene consubstantiality, was exiled and in his stead Euphronius, a partisan of Eusebius of Nicomedia, was at length elected. After Constantine's death, his son, Constantius, who took the eastern part of the empire, followed a policy of open opposition to the Nicene party, which he viewed as politically inimical. Upon the death of his brother Constans (350) and the defeat of the usurper Magnentius (353), he became sole ruler of the Roman world, and forced the western bishops to condemn Athanasius and to hold communion with the semi-Arians ("Eusebians") at the synods of Arles (353) and Milan (355). But the political victory of the eastern bishops was followed by the decay of their religious unity, which had been strengthened by western opposition and the battle with Athanasius; and strict Arianism, which had not been tolerated in the empire since 325, reappeared in a new, radical form—Anomoeanism—in which the trinitarian concerns of Arius were replaced by logical dogmatism and dialectics. Till then it had only been a matter of circumventing the Nicene symbol, but now a new creed was put forth, intended to replace it, which expressly denied the divinity of the Son and His resemblance to the Father (III Synod of Sirmium, 357).[1]

According to Basil, Aetius the Syrian was the first to state openly that the Son is unlike *(anomoios)* the Father,[2] and Eunomius the Gala-

1. A. FLICHE, V. MARTIN, *Histoire de l'Église* 3: *De la mort de Théodose à l'avènement de Grégoire le Grand* (Paris, 1937) 100-103 (Bardy). ADOLF VON HARNACK, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* 2⁴ (Tübingen, 1910; reprint edition, Darmstadt, 1964) pp. 239-40, 250-53.

2. The phrase ἀνόμοιον κατ' οὐσίαν is used earlier of the Son by Arius, as quoted by ATHANASIUS, *Or. adv. Arianos* 1.6 (PG 26, 24).

tian received the impiety from him and perfected it[3]. Gregory of Nyssa also considered Aetius to be the founder of Neo-Arianism.[4] Though the orthodox referred to Eunomius and Aetius as "Anomoeans," they themselves never use the term.[5]

Born at Antioch, which ever since Eustathius' exile had been a center of Arianism, Aetius (d. 367) was ordained a deacon by Leontius, the Arian bishop, though he was later forced to retire to Alexandria, when his sermons proved a scandal to Antiochene Christians.[6] When Eudoxius became bishop of Antioch, he subscribed to the Anomoean formula of Sirmium (357), and his chosen counsellors were Aetius and Eunomius.[7] Eunomius (d. ca. 393) was the literary apologist for the sect, and carried on a protracted debate with Basil and Gregory of Nyssa. The heresy survived condemnation by the council of Ancyra (358), and subsequent persecutions, including the loss of the right of assembly, and the "Eunomians" were anathematized in the first canon of the second ecumenical council (381).[8]

The extreme position held by Aetius and Eunomius had two important consequences for the Arian controversy. First, it induced the Homoeousians, led by Basil of Ancyra, to lessen their fear of Sabellianism, and to bring their views closer to those of Athanasius; and second, it produced an important discussion about the knowability of God, which is our concern here.

THE EUNOMIAN POSITION ON THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD

Aetius and Eunomius made the name "unbegotten" *(agennētos)* the exclusive name of God, and claimed that it was a complete and accurate description of the divine essence *(ousia)*. In his *Apologia* 7-8, Eunomius writes that the essence of God is "unbegotten", and "unbegotten" is the true and exclusive name of God. The term "unbegotten" expresses what is most characteristic about God *(physikē ennoia)*,

3. *Adv. Eunomium* 1.1; PG 29, 500.

4. *Contra Eunomium* 1.55; 1,41 JAEGER.

5. BERNARD CHARLES BARMANN, *A Christian Debate of the Fourth Century-A Critique of Classical Metaphysics* (Ph. D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1966).

6. FLICHE, MARTIN 3, 152, 151-61 passim.

7. Ibid., p. 156.

8. Ibid., p. 256.

and separates His essence from that of other beings.[9]

Thus he asserted that God was completely knowable through the name "unbegotten" *(agennētos)*. He strengthened his position by a theory on the divine origin of language. According to Eunomius there are two kinds of words: those which are the result of man's reflection *(epinoia)*, and those which God directly revealed to man at creation, which denote the essences of things as they are. This is why the Son, who is called "creature" *(gennēma)* and "creation" *(poiēma)* by Scripture, has a different essence from God. A difference in name proves a difference in essence, and the words "unbegotten" (of God) and "creature" (of the Son) belong to Eunomius' second category of words, and are thus true descriptions of the respective essences.[10] In view of his theory of language, Gregory of Nyssa suggests that Eunomius was acquainted with the *Cratylus* of Plato;[11] and Basil described Aetius as one who resurrected "an old sophism," viz., the theory of names, to defend the position of his sect.[12] In the opinion of Barmann, "this is the new element in Neo-Arianism; it focussed the classical doctrine of the divine origin of names on the trinitarian debates of the fourth century and spun out a systematic defense of Arianism which rested logically and ontologically on the *agennētos* as the first name and the first being."[13]

Hence the argument which Aetius and Eunomius used to prove that the Son was not divine, involved another question of the knowability of God. Indeed, by asserting God's knowability in a single name, "unbegotten," they were adhering to the Greek tradition, that mind *(nous)* can comprehend all being.

Both Plato and Aristotle considered God comprehensible and finite; indeed his finitude was deduced from his knowability.[14] In Plato's system the ideas, including the idea of the good, can be known,[15] as well

9. PG 30, 841-844.

10. BARMANN, pp. 168-71, 183-85.

11. *Contra Eunomium* 2.404; 1.344 JAEGER.

12. BARMANN, pp. 411-416.

13. Ibid., p. 416.

14. Ibid., pp. 314 f. and 524 n. 1. What follows on Plato and Aristotle comes from: H. A. WOLFSON, "The Knowability and Describability of God in Plato and Aristotle," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 56/57 (1947), pp. 233-49.

15. E.g., *Symp.*, 211c ff.; *Resp.* 6.505a and 7.517b; *Pol.* 6.504d, 505a; *Leg.* 643.

as the demiurge.[16] Assuming that the ideas, or the idea of the good, or the demiurge, represent the concept of God, then one must conclude that God is knowable according to Plato. In the second century A.D., Middle Platonism was outspoken in its contention that God is comprehensible to the mind. So Justin Martyr stated that the avowed goal of "Platonism" was a vision of God.[17] In Neoplatonism, on the contrary, the highest principle of the One is incomprehensible.[18]

Aristotle also held that God is knowable, since He is capable of being defined,[19] and definition is a rational formula, which expresses the essence of a thing.[20] Furthermore, the knowledge of a thing's existence inevitably leads to a knowledge of its essence.[21] Therefore, insofar as God's existence can be demonstrated—which Aristotle did on several occasions—his essence is known.

In Stoicism knowledge of the divinity is an essential part of philosophy and a rational science. Thus Seneca writes that true worship consists in knowing the gods.[22] Finally, the comprehensibility of God also seems to be a part of the Hermetic teachings.[23]

It is clear that Eunomius followed the classical conception of God as knowable. He further shows the imprint of Greek philosophy in his claim to know God's essence by the predicate, "unbegotten."[24] For the concept of the first being as unbegotten derives from Greek philosophy, not from Scripture, as Athanasius remarked.[25] In the fifth century B.C., Parmenides applied the term, unbegotten, to his first principle.[26] Later

16. Cf. *Ti.* 28c. On the varius later interpretations of *Timaeus* 28c consult H. A. Wolfson, *Philo* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962) 2, p. 112 f.

17. *Dial.* 2; cf. *Phd.* 65e-66a, *Resp.* 7.509b; Albinus, *Didasc.* 10.164 ff. Hermann.

18. Cohn, *Geschichte des Unendlichkeitsbegriffs,* pp. 59-60. Cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum* 6.63-64.

19. *Metaph.* 1074a35-37.

20. *Top.* 101b39.

21. *An. Post.* 93a28-29.

22. *Ep.* 95. 47-50. Jacques Dupont, *Gnosis: La Connaissance religieuse dans les épitres de St. Paul,* Universitas Catholica Lovaniensis Dissertationes, Ser. 2, Tom. 40 (Louvain, 1949), pp. 352 f.

23. Marguerite Harl, *Origène et la fonction révélatrice du Verbe incarné,* Patristica Sorbonensia 2 (Paris, 1958), p. 88.

24. Barmann, pp. 407 and 538 n. 24. Harnack, 2, 118 n. 3.

25. *Or. adv. Arianos* 1.30; Barmann, pp. 459-61 n. 13.

26. 8.3; DK 1:235.

on Plato and Aristotle do the same.[27] Plato's statement in *Ti.* 52a that God is "unbegotten and imperishable" is quoted by Clement of Alexandria.[28] Through Middle Platonism the term came into early Christianity, and was used by Justin and Clement of Alexandria[29] Thus the classical notion of God provided the substratum for the Anomoean heresy.

THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION ON THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF GOD

Before examining Chrysostom's own response to the Anomoeans, it is useful to follow the Judeo-Christian teaching about God and His knowability from Hellenistic Judaism through the fourth century A.D.

In its battle with idolatry, Hellenistic Judaism developed a large vocabulary of negative expressions about God, which would have a tremendous influence on subsequent theology[30]. These apophatic terms were designed to show the spirituality and self-sufficiency of God in contrast to the crude idol worship of popular paganism—and sometimes also the temple cult in Jerusalem.[31] Some of these terms are "uncontained" *(akhōrētos)* "in want of naught" *(anendeēs)*, unseen *(aoratos)*, uncreated *(agenētos)*.

Hellenistic Judaism also confronted the philosophers in the person of Philo of Alexandria, the first theologian of the transcendance of God.[32] Philo introduced the concept that God is incomprehensible *(akatalēptos)* to the human mind.[33] The following remarks are typical:

27. *Phdr.* 245b, *Metaph.* 999b7.

28. *Protr.* 6.68.3 and 12.120.2.

29. *Ap.* 2.13.4. *Str.* 5.12.82.3-4. See J. Lebreton, "*Agennētos* dans la tradition philosophique et dans la littérature chrétienne du IIe siècle", *Recherches de science religieuse* 16 (1926). P. Stiegepe, *Der Agennesiebegriff in der griechischen Theologie des vierten Jahrhunderts* (Freiburg, 1913).

30. The following material on Hellenistic Judaism derives from Jean Daniélou, *Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture, A History of Early Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicea:* 2, trans. John Austin Baker (London, 1973), pp. 321-328.

31. Cf. Marcel Simon, "St. Stephen and the Jerusalem Temple," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 2 (1951) 127-42, esp. 132-34. Idem, *St. Stephen and the Hellenists in the Primitive Church* (London, 1958), p. 89 and passim.

32. Daniélou, p. 326.

33. Cf. Wolfson, *Philo* 2, 110-26. Idem, "The Philonic God of Revelation and His Latter-Day Deniers," in *Religious Philosophy: A Group of Essays* (New York,

"It is impossible for God's essence to be known by any creature; for God is incomprehensible" (*Post.* 48.167, 169).
He can be comprehended only by himself" (*Praem.* 6.40).
"God is incomprehensible to the mind" (*Immut.* 13.62).

The term "incomprehensible" *(akatalēptos),* which he introduced, became the technical term in the fourth century to denote the unknowability of God.

The earlier Greek notion of divine incomprehensibility referred to the impossibility of physically apprehending God with the senses[34]. It originated in the philosophic notion of God's incorporeality[35]. It is possible to find traces of this more primitive concept of physical incomprehensibility in early Christian writings[36].

The source of Philo's doctrine of divine unknowability is the Old Testament. Here is proclaimed God's unnameability[37]; and the unlikeness of God to any other creature, as well as His incorporeality[38]. Thus he uses the predicates "ineffable" *(arrētos),* "unnameable" *(akatonomastos),* and of course "incomprehensible" *(akatalēptos)* to indicate divine unknowability—words philosophers before Philo did not apply to God, but which were used frequently about him afterwards.

Finally, Philo introduced the distinction between the knowability of God's existence and the incomprehensibility of his essence. With reference to Deut. 32:29, "Behold, behold, that I am [he]", he remarks that God does not say, "Behold me", for it is impossible for him to be seen by a creature— but, "Behold that I am," i.e., contemplate the fact of my existence.[39] In his essence God cannot be known; all that can be

1965), p. 6. WOLFSON holds that Philo also introduced the concept of God's infinity. But Barmann seems to be correct, that Philo did *not* draw the corollary of this premise of classical philosophy—that what is incomprehensible is infinite (p. 529 n. 17).

34. WOLFSON, *Philo* 2, 116f., citing Eduard Norden, *Agnostos Theos,* pp. 24-30.

35. WOLFSON, *Philo* 2, 126. R. RENEHAN, "On the Greek Origins of the Concepts Incorporeality and Immateriality," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 21 (1980):105-138.

36. E.g., MINUCIUS FELIX, *Octavius* 18; ORIGEN, *Princ.* 1.1.5; AUGUSTINE, *Conf.* 1.4.14 and 4.15.17; AMBROSE, *De Fide* 1.16.106.

37. *Mut.* 2.11 quoting Ex. 3.14 and 2.13 quoting Ex. 6.3.

38. *Mut.* 2.7 quoting Ex. 20.21 and 2.9 quoting Ex. 33.23.

39. *Post.* 48.167-168; cf. *Immut.* 13.62. For classical parallels cf. Melissos of Samos (DIOG. LAERT. 9. 24; DK I, 258); Epicurus (DIOG. LAERT. 10. 123); and EPICTETUS, *Diss.* 2. 14. 11-13 and 19-20.

known about him is the fact of his existence. This distinction was something new in Greek philosophy and was repeated by Athanasius, Chrysostom, the Cappadocians in their arguments against the Arians.

Let us leave Philo now, and turn to the gnosis of *Hellenistic Jews,* who lived in Syria in the first century A.D.[40] They made their own special contribution to divine incomprehensibility by developing a *gnosis* that centered on God's inaccessibility. Their terminology is used by St. Paul:

ἀνεξιχνίαστος, that cannot be traced out (Rom. 11:33)
ἀνεξερεύνητος, that cannot be searched out (Rom. 11:33)
ἀπρόσιτος, unapproachable (1 Tim. 6:16)
(Cf. ἀνεκλάλητος, 1 Pet. 1:8)

In this tradition is Theophilus of Antioch, who signals the "incomparable" character of God (*Autol.* 1.3):

ἀνέκφραστος, unutterable
ἀσύγκριτος, incomparable
ἀσυμβίβαστος, incommensurable
ἀμίμητος, inimitable
ἀνεκδιήγητος, indescribable

Later on these "Syrian" terms are repeated by both orthodox and heterodox gnosticism.

The theme of divine incomprehensibility was inherited from Hellenistic Judaism by the early Church. The predicate "incomprehensible" (ἀκατάληπτος) is applied to God in the *Preaching of Peter*[41] and the *Apology* of Aristides.[42] Athenagoras says that God is incomprehensible and known only to the mind and reason.[43] He seems to be using the word in its classical connotation of not being able to be apprehended by the senses. Irenaeus asserted that the incomprehensible God made himself comprehensible for the faithful in his Son.[44]

During the same period the Gnostics asserted that the supreme God is unknown (ἄγνωστος), and adopted the negative vocabulary of the Judeo-Christian tradition. They especially favored "incomprehen-

40. DANIÉLOU, p. 328.

41. Quoted by CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, *Str.* 6.39.3; GCS 15,451 STÄHLIN.

42. 1,4; p. 15 RUHBACH.

43. *Leg.* 10.1; p. 40 RUHBACH.

44. *Adv. haer.* 4.20.5; PG 7, 1035 and SC 100, 636-642.

sible" to designate the unknowability of the Father.[45]

Clement of Alexandria was the first Christian to develop Philo's doctrine of divine incomprehensibility.[46] He took up Aristotle's notion of the incomprehensible,[47] and made God's indivisibility the basis for his infinity and incomprehensibility. Because God is logically indivisible, and the categories of Aristotle cannot be applied to him, he is incomprehensible.[48] He cannot be known by reason; but only by grace and through his Son.[49]

Origen's view on the incomprehensibility of God has been much disputed. Apparently he repeats Philo's doctrine of his unknowability, but at the same time upholds the classical doctrine of his finitude.[50] In *Princ.* 1.1.5 he deduces God's incomprehensibility from his incorporeality.[51] Barmann notes that "the mere incorporeality of God did not lead philosophers before Philo to say that God is incomprehensible; Clement of Alexandria and Origen followed Philo's lead.[52]

In the fourth century, as we have seen, Aetius and Eunomius reasserted God's comprehensibility. According to Chrysostom, they claimed to know God as he knows himself.[53] Hence there was needed a refutation of this notion for the first time, since the issue of God's knowability

45. DANIÉLOU, pp. 36-37, 339.

46. H. A. WOLFSON, "Negative Attributes in the Church Fathers and the Gnostic Basilides," *Harvard Theological Review* 50 (1957) 147-48. BARMANN, p. 527 n. 10.

47. Cf. *Ph.* 204a8 ff.

48. *Str.* 5.81; GCS 15, 380 STAEHLIN; Cf. AUGUSTINE, *Conf.* 4.16.28-29.

49. *Str.* 5.82.4; GCS 15, 381 STAEHLIN; 2.2.5-6; GCS 15, 115f.

50. Cf. *Contra Cels.* 7.42; GCS 3, 193 KOETSCHAU and *Princ.* 2.9.1; GCS 22, 164 KOETSCHAU.

51. GCS 22,20; Cf. 1.1.6, p. 21. E. DE FAYE, *Origène* 3 (Paris, 1928) : 28ff.

52. BARMANN, p. 528 n. 12.

53. *De incomprehensibili* h.2. 158-159, p. 154. If no other indication is given, references to Chrysostom are from his homilies *De incomprehensibili* in the edition of ANNE-MARIE MALINGREY, *Jean Chrysostome : Sur l'incompréhensibilité de Dieu*[2], Sources chrétiennes 28bis (Paris, 1970). The German translation of Philipp Mayer did not come to the attention of the present writer until this chapter had been completed, namely, *Des Johannes Chrysostomus auserwählte Homilieen Uebersetzt und mit einer Einleitung über Johannes Chrysostomus, den Homileten, mit Vorbemerkungen und Anmerkungen versehen von Dr. Philipp Mayer* (Nürnberg, 1830). Pp. 167-232 of this work contain "Von der Unbegreiflichkeit Gottes: Fünf Homilieen wider die Anomöer." An English translation by Paul Harkins has appeared since this chapter was written.

had never before been raised in a direct and polemical fashion. It is in the context of the Christian apologetics against the Anomoeans that Chrysostom's homilies Περὶ ἀκαταλήπτου[54] are to be situated. The contrast between his manner of refutation and that of the Cappadocian fathers, who wrote a little before him and are generally considered to be the principal agents responsible for the defeat of this heresy, is marked. In his three books *Adversus Eunomium* (ca. 363) Basil the Great bases his refutation upon a minute analysis of Eunomius' theory of language in reference to Scripture.[55] Gregory of Nyssa in his *Contra Eunomium* (380-83) took a more philosophical approach. His argument is that God is incomprehensible because he is infinite. He rejects not only the knowability of God, but also the presupposition of this notion in classical Greek thought, namely, the finitude of God. Thus his lengthy treatise, *Contra Eunomium,* is largely a demonstration of the infinity of God, in order to prove his incomprehensibility.[56] Finally, Gregory of Nazianzus in his five *Theological Orations* (380) also played an important part in the rebuttal of the Neo-Arians, by providing an adequate and consistent nomenclature for the persons of the Trinity and their attributes, one of which (ἀγέννητος) had served as the cornerstone of the Anomoean heresy.[57] Our task here is to analyze the apologetic method of the homilies written against these heretics by John Chrysostom.

CHRYSOSTOM'S HOMILIES *DE INCOMPREHENSIBILI*

In A.D. 386-87, soon after he had been ordained a priest and begun his preaching ministry at Antioch, Chrysostom delivered a series of five homilies against the Anomoeans.[58] The fact that he felt constrained to give these sermons after the official condemnation of the sect by the Ecumenical Council (381) indicates that the Anomoeans continued to

54. *On Incomprehensibility.* The exact title of his homilies against the Anomoeans, which derives from the text of h.5 (line 28, p. 272), is περὶ ἀκαταλήπτου (de incomprehensibili, on incomprehensibility).

55. See the analysis of BARMANN, Chapter II, pp. 66-148.

56. Cf. BARMANN, Chapter V, pp. 313-60 and passim.

57. HARNACK, 2, 264-65.

58. JOHANNES QUASTEN, *Patrology* 3 (Utrecht, 1966) 451. Cf. NEANDER, *The Life of St. Chrysostom,* 1, trans. J. C. STAPLETON (London, 1845), 274-85, 425-29.

flourish in the city in which they originated. Part of the necessity which lead him to speak, he says, was that the city of Antioch had an ancient tradition of preserving the purity of Christian doctrine, as Acts 15 shows.[59]

In these homilies, whose arguments shall be detailed below, Chrysostom purposefully[60] overlooks the trinitarian heresy,[61] and deals with the problem of God's knowability. In the last homily he implies that he has not finished his teaching,[62] and in fact he does finally treat the trinitarian aspect of the heresy in four other homilies given in the same period at Antioch[63] as well as in another two homilies given ten years later at Constantinople.[64] But in the first series of five homilies his main concern is with what he considers to be the root and mother of all their evil beliefs, i.e., their claim "to know God as he knows himself".[65] The characteristics of the Anomoeans are that they say they know the essence of God,[66] and think they can subject God's essence to their own reasonings.[67] "A system marked by so much of cold intellectual pride was especially repugnant to the fervid and humble faith of Chrysostom" (Stephens).[68] Indeed, the orations which he directed against them are just the opposite of their unfeeling dialectics, and have been aptly characterized by d'Alès as "éloquence dedaigneuse et magnifique."[69]

As is his custom he does not treat a theological issue in the abstract. Whereas Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa wrote treatises for the scholarly world, he addresses his entire congregation, which formed quite a mixed group, with the overriding intention of being understood by all. Evidently, before delivering the sermons he had worked out in his mind a single, uninterrupted argument, which he calls ὁ λόγος περὶ

59. Hom. 2.37-39; p. 144.

60. Hom. 2.149-150; p. 154.

61. Except in Hom. 4.234-283; pp. 246-250 and Hom. 5.84-229; pp. 278-290.

62. Hom. 5.29-31.

63. *Contra Anomoeans* Hom. 7-8 and 9-10; PG 48, 755-778 and 779-796.

64. *Contra Anomoeans*, Hom. 11-12; PG 48, 795-812.

65. Hom. 2.152-159; p. 154.

66. Hom. 1.189-190, p. 116; cf. 168, p. 112.

67. Ibid. 196-198; p. 116.

68. W. R. W. Stephens, *St. Chrysostom: His Life and Times* (London, 1872), p. 115.

69. Adhémar d'Alès, "De incomprehensibili," *Recherches de science religieuse* 23 (1933) 307.

ἀκαταλήπτου, "the argument on incomprehensibility".[70] Throughout the five discourses he refers to this single argument.[71] Thus at the beginning of h. 5 he writes: "Where did we leave off the argument (λόγος) a while ago? For it is necessary to take it up again from there, since there is one sequence of teaching.[72]

In the presentation of this one argument, however, he was guided by the needs, abilities and reactions of his audience. He explains at the beginning of h. 5:

> When one is going to treat a more extensive subject (ὑπόθεσις), which requires many words and cannot be traversed in one day or two or three, but many more, I consider it a necessity not to impose all the teaching suddenly in one block upon the mind of the audience, but to divide the whole into many parts and make the burden of the argument (λόγος) light and easy to be grasped bit by bit (h. 5.1-8; p. 270).

Now Chrysostom delivered his sermons extemporaneously, and thus was able to maintain close contact with his audience. Sensing the feelings of his auditors, he determined the length of each discourse as he went along. For instance, the short attention span of his congregation forces him to conclude the argument in h. 1 and 4, because he fears that if he continues, he will cause them to forget what has already been said.[73] He ends h. 3 since his own mind is exhausted not by the length but by the awesomeness of what he has been discussing.[74]

It is thrilling to contemplate the tightly knit chain of argument which he forges throughout the five homilies, while yielding to the momentary needs of his audience in the determination of the exact length of each discourse. Thus the division into five homilies may truly be said to be owing to the participation of the Antiochene audience, who placed practical limits upon the flow of the argument.[75]

70. Hom. 5.80; p. 272.

71. Hom. 1.70, 329; pp. 100, 130. Hom. 2.271, 475; pp. 164, 180. Hom. 3.61, 76, 266; pp. 190, 192, 208. Hom. 4.7, 17, 54, 91, 160; pp. 228, 232, 236, 242. Hom. 5.8,80, 285, 406, 423; pp. 270, 272, 296, 306.

72. «Ἐπειδὴ μία τίς ἐστι διδασκαλίας ἀκολουθία, h. 5.32-34; p. 272.

73. Hom. 1.328-334; p. 130; h. 4.312-315; pp. 252-254.

74. Hom. 3.338-343; p. 214.

75. It should be recalled that it is Chrysostom's usual procedure in his sermons to accomodate his audience thus by spreading the matter to be taught over

He also uses other techniques to instill his teaching in the mind of his congregation. To make certain that more difficult aspects are understood, he engages in frequent repetitions.[76] Further, he keeps his doctrine on an experiential rather than a theoretical plane. Normally he takes quotations and concrete, detailed examples from the Bible, and with one brief exception does not do philosophical reasoning.[77] In this way he insures that he will be both comprehended and "enjoyed" and appreciated by his audience —as indeed he was.[78]

THE ANOMOEANS AS A HERESY

Chrysostom refers to the Anomoeans as a heresy, i.e., a dogmatic error, and not a faction or party,[79] though he does call them "outsiders" (τοὺς ἔξωθεν) in contrast to his flock.[80] Utilizing an image which goes back to Ignatius of Antioch,[81] he compares their heresy to dangerous plants which must be uprooted, so as to protect the other plants.[82] On the analogy of 1 Cor. 3:6 he gives three basic reasons for the genesis of the heresy:

1. Soil was provided for the heresy by the soul of the Anomoeans, which was not cultivated by the Scriptures;
2. it was planted by the "ultimely meddling of reasonings" (λογισμῶν ἄκαιρος περιεργία);
3. and it was watered by the mist of pride (ἀπόνοια), and the desire for glory increased it (h. 3. 18-24; p. 188).

These three causes are dealt with at length in his refutation.

several days, and not a special trait of his apologetic writings. Cf. *In illud, Vidi Dominum* h. 3.5 (PG 56, 119); *In Laz.* h. 3.1 (PG 48, 991).

76. E.g., h. 4.6-17, p. 228; 223-25, p. 246; 258, p. 248; 314-15, p. 254; h. 5.40-41, p. 274; 84ff., p. 278; 285, p. 296, and one extended summary, h. 4.16-92, pp. 228-36.

77. Cf. h. 5.240-250; p. 292. François Graffin et Anne-Marie Malingrey, "La Tradition syriaque des homélies de Jean Chrysostome sur l'incompréhensibilité de Dieu," *Epektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au Cardinal Jean Daniélou,* ed. Jacques Fontaine et Charles Kannengiesser (Paris, 1972), p. 604.

78. Cf. h. 1.406-407, p. 136; h. 3.475-476, p. 224; 479-480, p. 226; h. 5.592, p. 320.

79. Hom. 3.11, 13, 21; pp. 186-188.

80. Hom. 3.356-357, p. 216.

81. *Trall.* 6.1, p. 98 Camelot, 11.1, p. 102; *Philad.* 3.1, p. 122; *Eph.* 10.3, p. 66

82. Hom. 3.1-14, p. 186.

First, in contrast to their neglect of Scripture, Chrysostom *consciously* bases his arguments against them exclusively upon the Bible[83]. This will be apparent when we survey his arguments below.

Second, he writes a long polemic against the "untimely meddling of resonings" in h. 2 which he equates with unbelief and contrasts with the proper attitude towards God, which is faith. This argument, which I have entitled "The Impiety of Investigating God," is detailed below.

Third, he asserts emphatically that pride (ἀπόνοια) is the main source of the heresy,[84] which is after all the traditional patristic etiology of heresy since Paul[85] and Irenaeus.[86] In his related homilies, *In illud, Vidi Dominum,* he expatiates on the nature of pride in reference to King Uzziah, whose "heart was lifted up".[87] Whereas the other sins are related only to human nature, arrogance (ὑπερηφανία) threw down an incorporeal power from heaven, as Is. 14:14 and 1 Tim. 3:6 show.[88] A soul carried way by pride is like a refractory horse, which has thrown the bit from its mouth and the rider off its back, and is carried along more violently than the wind. When a soul has expelled the fear of God which bridles it, and has tossed away all reasoning which holds the reins, it heads towards the pit of destruction and throws its salvation down a precipice. It is necessary to restrain it continually with the reasoning of piety as if with a bit.[89]

Turning away from his threefold analysis of the cause of the heresy (neglect of Scripture, lack of faith and pride), one notices that the most frequent accusation which he makes againss the Anomoeans is "insanity" (μανία), usually "utter insanity" (ἐσχάτη μανία). For example in h. 2. 484-85, p. 180, he writes: "Do you still need a rational demonstration (ἀποδείξεως) to learn the insanity of those who say that they know God?" In h. 5.117, p. 280, he also calls another heresy (that of Sabellius)

83. Cf. h. 2.80, p. 148; h. 3.75 ff., pp. 192 ff.; 113, p. 196; h. 5.86-87, p. 278; 284-85, p. 296; 300, p. 296; 357, p. 302; 368, p. 302; 398-99, p. 304.

84. Hom. 2.493-495, p. 182; cf. 177, p. 156.

85. 1 Tim. 6:4.

86. G. Bardy, *La Théologie de l'église de saint Clément de Rome à saint Irénée* (Paris, 1945) 27 f.: whereas schism comes from the weakness of men, their jealousies, disputes, heresy is owing to intellectual pride and the refusal to adhere with humility to the traditional doctrine taught by the church.

87. 2 Chron. 26:16.

88. *In illud, Vidi Dominum* h. 3.3; PG 56, 116.

89. Hom. 5.1; PG 56, 130.

"insanity". As a synonym for μανία he uses παραπληξία and ἄνοια.[90]

It is important to realize that for Chrysostom and his audience the connotation of "insanity" is the dire one of demon possession. In fact he explicitly associates the heretics with the "possessed" (οἱ ἐνεργούμενοι). who constituted a special group within the church and had their own litany.[91] He urges his congregation to pray for the heretics as they do for the possessed: "If we are commanded to beseech God ... for those possessed, much more should we pray for these [the heretics] since the impiety of the demon is worse [in their case]. For the former insanity is forgivable, but the latter disease is deprived of all defense".[92] He speaks about the demoniacs, who were actually present at the service, as suffering from an "evil insanity"[93] just like the heretics. Thus by accusing the Anomoeans of insanity, and implying thereby that they are demon possessed, he continues the primitive Christian idea, that heresy is the product of the demons.[94]

METHOD OF CHRYSOSTOM'S APOLOGETIC

Logical

In these homilies Chrysostom distinguishes between two types of apologetic: (1) refutation of the errors of the heretics; and (2) instruction of the flock. The second stage, which is for the sake of the instruction or edification of the flock, is a further development of the argument, which removes the last vestiges of error. If we symbolize heresy by an evil plant, then the first stage of apologetics is to lop off its top, and the second stage is to draw up its roots from the earth and expose them to the sun.[95]

90. For the occurrences of these words in the text see MALINGREY's Index des Mots Grecs, s.v.

91. See FRANS VAN DE PAVERD, *Zur Geschichte der Messliturgie in Antiocheia und Konstantinopel gegen Ende des vierten Jahrhunderts: Analyse der Quellen bei Johannes Chrysostomos,* Orientalia Christiana Analecta 187 (Rome, 1970), p. 179-83: the "possessed" most certainly included epileptics.

92. Hom. 3.347-352, pp. 214-216.

93. Hom. 4.324, p. 254.

94. Cf. JUSTIN, *Ap.* 1.26.1-5; pp. 20-21 KRÜGER. ROBERT M. GRANT, *Gnosticism and Early Christianity* (N.Y., 1966), pp. 13-14.

95. Hom. 4.1-15, p. 228.

The division of apologetic into these two aspects had previously been made by Athenagoras in his treatise *On the Resurrection of the Dead* (ca. 177). He writes in chapter 1:

> It is therefore necessary, I think, to address two arguments to those who are in this perplexity, the one a plea for the truth, the other an exposition of the truth, the former being addressed to skeptics and doubters, the latter to those of good sense who receive the truth gradly. (p. 79 tr. Crehan; cf. chapter 11, pp. 93 f.)

His own treatise *On the Resurrection* is divided into these two parts: (1) a discourse against false opinions (1-10), and (2) an exposition of the truth (12-15).[96]

In the case of Chrysostom's sermons *De incomprehensibili,* h. 1-3 are devoted to a refutation of the errors of the Anomoeans, while h. 4-5 are concerned with the further instruction of the faithful.[97] The major arguments in favor of divine incomprehensibility are to be found in h. 1-3, the refutation. He states that his policy here is to pursue the argument relentlessly until his opponent is convicted of his error.[98] H. 4-5, which contain the exposition, are less impressive. They include some amplification of previous arguments, as h. 4. enlarges upon the argument of h.3. that God is incomprehensible to the heavenly powers; some new arguments, e.g., the divinity of the Son is discussed in h. 5;[99] and a rather "forced" exegesis of John 1:18 in the same h. 5.[100] The refutation of h. 1-3, which is devoted to proving that God is incomprehensible to men and to angels, seems more powerful than the exposition of h. 4-5, which argues positively that only the Son and the Spirit can comprehend God.[101]

Pragmatic

At the end of the first homily there is a rather full explanation of

96. LESLIE W. BARNARD, *Athenagoras: A Study in Second Century Apologetic,* Théologie historique 18 (Paris 1972), p. 128, does not realize that the treatise, *De resurrectione,* does contain both types of apology and is complete.

97. Cf. h. 4.1-15, p. 228.

98. Hom. 1.278-279, p. 124.

99. Hom. 5. 84 ff., pp. 278 ff.

100. Hom. 5.32-37, pp. 272-276.

101. Chrysostom also divides his apologetic against the Jews into these two stages, but the "exposition" is much more substantial.

Chrysostom's pragmatic apologetic tactics against the Anomoeans.[102] His first practical principle was to obtain the goodwill of his audience. Though he had wanted very much to argue against them long before, he had delayed, in order not to "scare away the quarry," since many of these listened to him with pleasure. He wished to have their complete confidence before broaching the subject. Only when they exhorted him to discuss it, did he take up the weapons "which cast down imaginations and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God"[103]

The apologetic sword has two blades, he continues, one which strikes the contentious, and the other which does not wound, but heals the sickness of those who listen with goodwill.[104] His primary use of the weapon will not be to lay low his opponents, but to raise up the prostrate. Thus the second pragmatic principle of his apologetics against the heretics is to aim not at their destruction, but their restoration.

Third and most pronounced is his principle of mildness towards the heretics, which also seems to have been advocated by his bishop, Flavian, whom Chrysostom praises in h. 1 for his great charity.[105] He urges his flock not to display anger or wrath towards them, but to speak to them with moderation (ἐπιείκεια) and mildness (πραότης). To support this view he quotes 2 Tim. 2:24: "And the servant of the Lord must not strive; but be gentle (ἤπιον) unto all men." He notes that Paul said "unto all men," and not just the brothers, i.e., the Christian community, as in Phil. 4:5: "let your moderation (τὸ ἐπιεικές) be known unto all men." He also alludes to Matt. 5:46: "for if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye?" Only if their friendship injures you and leads you to their impiety, should you sever yourself from them. Otherwise we should draw them to ourselves. If it is necessary to flee their friendship, flee but do not fight or war! He concludes by citing St.

102. Hom. 1.334, p. 130 to the end.

103. 2 Cor. 10:5.

104. εὐγνωμόνως, h. 1.348, p. 132. Cf. also h. 1.213-14, p. 118. The concept of εὐγνωμοσύνη is also prominent in his moral teachings (e.g., h. 5.506-07, pp. 312-14; 532, p. 314; 551, p. 316).

105. Hom. 1.32 ff., p. 96. For the same liberal point of view see *De anathemate* (PG 48, 945-52). The attribution of this homily to Chrysostom has been doubted by F. Cavallera, who ascribes it to Flavian (*Le schisme d'Antioche* [Paris, 1905], pp. 15-19).

Paul's advice in Rom. 12: 18: "If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men."

To show that it is proper to make apology to the heretics without rancor, he sets forth the example of the Lord, who always defended himself (ἀπολογεῖται) with mildness.[105a] The Christian is a servant of the God of peace, and should imitate the Lord's conciliatory answers to the Jews, who accused Him of being a demoniac (John 8:49), and to the abusive servant of the high priest (John 18:23). The latter verse will serve as a divine charm to soothe every inflammation, when one considers the dignity of the one abused, the vileness of the abuser, and the fact that he did not only insult Jesus, but also struck Him. Christ bore all this to teach us moderation (σωφρονεῖν).

The appeal for mildness is so striking that the Syriac translator incorporated it into his title of h.1, which reads: "On the incomprehensibility of God, and that it is necessary to be patient and sweet to the heretics."[106]

In h. 2[107] he continues to urge his flock to address the heretics with moderation (ἐπιείκεια) and kindness (προσήνεια), as if they were the mentally deranged. This represents a combination of the principle of mildness to the heretics, which in h. 1 was based simply upon Christian ethics, with the accusation of insanity, which is described above. Their views were born from arrogance, and their minds are swollen with conceit: just as inflamed physical wounds cannot bear the touch of a hand, but must be wiped only with a soft sponge, so we should try to repress their conceit with a gentle application of words. Since pride is a major factor in heresy, then it is psychologically justifiable to use mildness in dealing with the heretics.

Lastly, in the same homily, he advocates perseverance in treating them. One must not lose heart, even if they offer violent resistance to the "cure"—it is only natural to expect such behavior from the insane.

Spiritual

In addition to theoretical and practical principles of apologetics,

105a. Hom. 1.392; p. 136.

106. Graffin and Malingrey, p. 604. Contrast the more rigorous policy of St. John (Eusebius, *H.e.* 4.16.6-7); Ignatius (*Smyrn.* 4.1; 7.2); Polycarp, disciple of John (*Ep.* 6.3), and Chrysostom himself in h. 5.350-51, p. 300, For a more tolerant attitude see Justin, *Dial.* 47.2; 80.2-5.

107. 490-540, pp. 182-184.

Chrysostom also utilizes spiritual weapons in his battle against the heretics. He prays that God will send the grace of the Spirit to destroy the heresy, and make his own task easier.[108] Then he asks for the fire of the Spirit to loosen his tongue and sharpen his mind in order to annihilate the evil plant.[109]

Likewise he advocates that his congregation pray for them,[110] in the manner of Ignatius[111] and Justin.[112] In the last homily,[113] he writes that the ultimate armament against them is prayer, which is acceptable to our Savior, "who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth".[114] Finally, prayer is the only weapon of the weaker member of the congregation. Whereas the stronger Christian can personally associate with the heretics and influence them, the weaker brother must at his peril flee their company, and can only pray God for their salvation.[115]

CONTENT OF CHRYSOSTOM'S APOLOGETIC

Having reviewed the guiding methodological principles of his apologetic versus the Anomoeans, let us now consider the arguments (proofs, ἀποδείξεις),[116] which he uses in his demonstration (ἀπόδειξις)[117] of the unknowability of God. Although at one point he states that their impiety is so enormous as not to need refutation (ἔλεγχος) or demonstration (ἀπόδειξις), nevertheless he sets forth a number of arguments, which he draws from the Scriptures, to prove that it is impossible to know God's essence, and hence to name it, as the heretics do.[118]

108. Hom. 3.9-14, p. 186.
109. Hom. 3.25-31, p. 188.
110. Hom. 3.346-352, pp. 214-216.
111. *Smyrn.* 4.1.
112. *Dial.* 35.
113. Hom. 5.421-428, pp. 306-308.
114. 1 Tim. 2:1,3-4.
115. Hom. 2.509-33, pp. 182-184.
116. Hom. 3.75, p. 192.
117. Hom. 3.78, p. 192 and h. 5.368, p. 302.
118. Hom. 5.368, p. 302 and 334-356, p. 300.

The Eschatological Argument
(h. 1.69-153, pp. 100-110)

The first argument which Chrysostom advances against the Neo-Arians is based upon an exegesis of 1 Cor. 13:8: "but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge (γνῶσις) it shall vanish away (καταργηθήσεται)." He sees no difficulty in the abolition of prophecies and tongues, and uses the example of the church of his own day: though lacking both prophecy and tongues, it is not impeded. But it is altogether different with knowledge (γνῶσις). If knowledge ceases the human condition will become worse, for without it we are not even human.

He quotes Ecclesiastes 12:13 "Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is the whole duty of man,"[119] and says that the fear of God, which constitutes a man, comes from knowledge,[120] so that man is not human without knowledge. He then adds a Greek notion: without knowledge, man is much worse off than the beasts, for he is inferior to them in all else except this.[121]

What then does Paul mean by saying that "knowledge will vanish away?" The answer is that he is referring to partial knowledge (γνῶσις μερική), the abolition of which means progress to perfect knowledge (γνῶσις παντελής), just as the child vanishes and is replaced by the full

119. Elsewhere on the basis of this verse and of Job 1:1 Chrysostom explicitly rejects the pagan definition of man as one who has hands (ANAXAGORAS A102; DK 2, 30. Democritos B5; DK 2, 136,14) or feet or is a rational being (λογικός), and substitutes that of Scripture: man is one who practises piety and virtue with confidence (παρρησία) (*Cat.* 2.1; PG 49, 232). On the classical definition of man see G. M. DEDURAND, "L'homme raisonnable mortel: pour l'histoire d'une définition," *Phoenix* 27 (1973) 328-344. ROBERT RENEHAN, "On the Text of Leo Medicus: A Study in Textual Criticism," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 113, 1 (1970), p. 84.
120. Cf. Ps. 111:10.
121. The theme that man surpasses the beasts only in wisdom appears first in PLATO, *Protagoras* 320d-21e. The Epicureans and Sceptics objected that nature treated man "stepmotherly," since he was inferior to many beasts in bodily strength and sharpness of senses. The Stoics, who believed in providence, answered that this bodily weakness caused the *logos* to develop its own abilities (MAX POHLENZ, *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* [Göttingen, 1964] 2, 57 with interesting references). A development of the theme that man surpasses beasts in wisdom occurs in CHRYSOSTOM, *De stat.* 11.4 (PG 49, 124). Elsewhere Chrysostom says that virtue raises man above the beasts (*De poen.* 2.5; PG 49, 291).

grown man. In order to avoid the impression that knowledge will be destroyed, he added: "For we know in part and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away."[122] So the destruction is an increase and advance towards the better knowledge.[123]

Thus one must distinguish between an imperfect and a perfect knowledge, the former belonging to the present and the latter to the future. The next question is: "How much knowledge do we possess now?" Paul said, "we know *in part,*" not *a part.* Thus we know only part of the part.[124] The amount of knowledge in our possession now is very small—not even one ten-thousandth of the whole. The superiority of future knowledge over present knowledge is the difference between a full grown man and a suckling infant, according to 1 Cor. 13:11. In this verse Paul does not say, "When I was a child (παῖς)," because even one twelve years old is called a child (παῖς), but "When I was an infant (νήπιος)", which means one still sucking at the breast, as in Ps. 8:3 (LXX).

As if foreseeing the present heresy, Paul uses three illustrations to show the state of our present knowledge: the infant, as we have seen; the mirror in 1 Cor. 13:12, which symbolizes our present weakness and imperfect (ἀτελής) knowledge; and the riddle (enigma) in the same verse.

Chrysostom amplifies this argument in h. 2,[125] where he considers Paul's words in Phil. 3:13: "Brethren, I count not myself to have apprehended." This teaches us to be content with the measure of knowledge which has been given, and not to think that we have received everything now. If the heretics were not completely bereft of the Holy Spirit and His energy, they would not think that they had attained the whole of knowledge. He asserts that "apprehended" (κατειληφέναι) in this verse pertains to faith and knowledge, and not to moral virtue, as the context indicates,[126] and attests neither complete ignorance nor complete knowledge. Paul is still on the road, and has not attained the goal. And if there is any further knowledge to be had, reasoning (λογισμός) will not teach it, but God will reveal it.

Thus in refuting the rationalism of the Eunomians, which made

122. 1 Cor. 13:9-10.
123. Cf. Chrysostom, *In Ep. 1 ad Cor.* h. 34.1 (PG 61, 287).
124. Hom. 1.112, p. 106.
125. Hom. 2.380-472, pp. 172-180.
126. Cf. Phil. 3:9-10.

God fully intelligible, Chrysostom asserted that only a partial, revealed knowledge of God is possible in this life. He affirms that the Christian perspective is fundamentally eschatological, and opposes the philosophical quest of the Eunomians for intelligibility in this world alone. It is to the credit of his biblical scholarship that Chrysostom utilized as the basis of his argument two unique passages in St. Paul, where knowledge of God is made the object of eschatological hope—an idea which belongs to the realm of Jewish apocalyptic.[127]

The Limit of Human Knowledge
(h. 1.153-67, pp. 110-12)

In an endeavor to explain the riddle (enigma) of 1 Cor. 13:12, he now points out that the human faculty of reasoning (λογισμός) is inherently limited. Thus, he argues, I know many things, but I do not know their modality (τὸν τρόπον):

I know that God is everywhere and wholly everywhere: I do not know how.

I know that he is without beginning and everlasting: but I do not know how.

Reasoning (λογισμός) cannot know how an essence can exist, which has its being neither from itself or another.

I know that has he begotten a Son: how I do not know.

I know that the Spirit is from him: I do not know how it is from him.

Further on Paul's words, "we know in part",[128] are interpreted in similar fashion. Paul does not mean that he knows part of God's essence and is ignorant of the ther part for God is simple (ἁπλοῦς). He is distinguishing between knowledge of God's existence and ignorance of his modality. He knows that God exists, but does not know his essence. He understands that he is wise, but does not know how great his wisdom is, etc.[129]

The limitation of reasoning applies not only to the supernatural

127. Cf. Dupont, pp. 106-48 passim, especially 112 f., 146. See also *Incomprehens.* h. 5.320-33; p. 298.
128. 1 Cor. 13:9.
129. Hom. 1.291-301, p. 126.

knowledge of God, but also to the "scientific" knowledge of created things. It is madness to profess exact knowledge of the invisible God, when one cannot explain the physical nature of the sky[130]. Similarly in h. 5.278-83, he writes: "we know that the soul exists in our body, but we do not know how." God hid this knowledge from us, in order to persuade us to remain below, and not to meddle with things above us.

This argument concerning the limitation of reasoning had already been used against the Anomoeans by the Cappadocians, Basil,[131] Gregory of Nyssa[132] and Gregory of Nazianzus.[133] It is ultimately derived from Philo (see above). Elsewhere, Chrysostom applies this argument to the understanding of prophecy in the Old Testament. Concerning the vision in Isaiah 6 he writes: "how Isaiah saw this vision I do not know. That he saw, he said; but how he saw, he kept silent. If you want to learn how he saw God, become a prophet yourself!"[134]

The Concept of Measure
(h. 1.168-87, pp. 112-14)

This argument is closely related to the preceding, in that it sights definite boundaries in human nature. From the beginning God ordained limits (ὅροι) for humanity, and to overstep these is a great evil which entails much loss. Adam, for example, by seeking more honor lost that which he already possessed. By excessive greed men often lose the fortune with which they started out. So the Anomoeans, who are eager to possess all knowledge about God in this world, will deprive themselves of it in the next. For Paul states that the present knowledge will vanish away.[135] Thus their "complete" knowledge will disappear and be replaced by nothing; whereas our "incomplete" knowledge will be replaced by knowledge which is more perfect. The heretics, in their eagerness to possess the whole knowledge about God, have deprived themselves of any knowledge in this life and the next.

130. Hom. 2.473-489, pp. 180-182; cf. h. 1.164-167, p. 112.
131. *Adversus Eunomium* 1.12; PG 29, 540-541.
132. *Contra Eunomium* 2.71, 98; 1, 247 f., 255 Jaeger.
133. *Or.* 28.5, p. 72 Barbel.
134. *In illud, Vidi Dominum* h. 6.1; PG 56, 136.
135. 1 Cor. 13:8,12.

The concept of measure, which derives from ancient Greek moral teaching,[136] is also mentioned in h. 2.389, p. 174 and h. 4.18-20, p. 230, where it is combined with the equally classical doctrine of self-knowledge (σωφροσύνη): τῶν οὐκ ἐπισταμένων ἑαυτοὺς οὐδὲ ἀνεχομένων εἰδέναι μέτρα φύσεως ἀνθρωπίνης τὴν ἄκαιρον φιλονεικίαν καταλῦσαι σπεύδοντες. It had earlier been used against the Anomoeans by Gregory of Nyssa,[137] and Gregory of Nazianzus.[138]

God's Attributes are Incomprehensible to Men
(h. 1.188-301, pp. 116-26)

Chrysostom now proceeds to demonstrate from Scripture that God's attributes are incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτα) to men. He notes that the theme of the incomprehensibility of the divine essence is not stated but assumed in the Bible.[139] Thus the prophets are at a loss before the greatness of God, which is only a part of his essence.[140] Again, when the prophet says that he does not understand how God can be present everywhere,[141] it is folly for those who lack his grace[142] to inquire about God's essence. In Ps. 146:5 LXX we learn that his wisdom is unapproachable and incomprehensible. Is the wisdom incomprehensible to the prophet, and the essence comprehensible to us? Furthermore, Isaiah states: "who shall declare His generation?" (53:8); and by the use of the future tense shows that humanity has been forever debarred from such a description.

He now turns to the New Testament and inquires whether God's essence was known by Paul, as he enjoyed more grace. Again he cites 1 Cor. 13:9.[143] Paul also found even a minute part of God's providence incomprehensible, that by which he cast out the Jews and admitted the gentiles.[144] If, as this verse declares, his judgements are "unsearchable" (ἀνεξερεύνητα) and his ways "past finding out" (ἀνεξιχνίαστοι),

136. C. M. Bowra, *The Greek Experience* (New York, 1959), p. 47.
137. *Contra Eunomium* 2.70,96; 1:246, 254 Jaeger.
138. *Or.* 28.7; p. 74 Barbel.
139. Hom. 1.213-218, p. 118.
140. Ps. 138:6, 14 LXX.
141. Ps. 138:8 LXX.
142. Cf. Ps. 50:8 LXX.
143. And also at the end of his discussion, h. 1.279-290, pp. 125-126.
144. Rom. 11:13.

how can he be comprehensible? Paul also says that our rewards are incomprehensible,[145] and his gift[146] and his peace.[147]

The conclusion of the argument takes the form of an apostrophe to the Anomoeans:

> What do you say? His judgements are unsearchable; his ways are past finding out; his peace passes all understanding; his gift is unspeakable; the things which he has prepared for them that love him have not entered into the heart of man; his greatness has to limit; his wisdom has no number; everything is incomprehensible, and he alone is comprehensible? What excess of madness would this not be!
>
> (h. 1.272-77, p. 124)

So he demonstrates quite successfully from the Bible the Philonic doctrine of God's incomprehensibility to man. In his choice of scriptural texts he was possibly influenced by Basil[148] and Gregory of Nazianzus.[149]

The Impiety of Investigating God
h. 2 passim

Instead of proceeding to the next logical step of his argument, viz., that God is also incomprehensible to the heavenly powers (see below), he devotes his second homily against the Anomoeans to an entirely new theme: the evil of meddling (περιεργάζεσθαι) with God.

First, he accuses his opponents of being unbelievers and dishonoring faith.[150] God's revelation should be received faithfully, and not boldly meddled with.[151]

Second, he makes the disowning of secular culture a prerequisite of such faithful acceptance. It is necessary to "restrain our own reasonings, and empty our mind of secular learning, in order to provide a mind swept clean for the reception of the divine words".[152] In this light

145. 1 Cor. 2:9.
146. 2 Cor. 9:15.
147. Phil. 4:7.
148. *Adversus Eunomium* 1.12; PG 29,540-541.
149. *Or.* 28.5; p. 72 Barbel.
150. Hom. 2.1-8; p. 140.
151. Hom. 2.54-59; p. 146.
152. Hom. 2.70-75; p. 148.

he interprets 1 Cor. 4:10: "We are fools for Christ's sake." Foolishness for Christ is wiser than the pagan wisdom, for it drove away darkness from the world and introduced the light of knowledge (γνῶσις)—which the pagan wisdom did not accomplish.

Contrariwise, only a reckless soul meddles with the causes and investigates the modality of revelation.[153] Scripture supplies proof of this in the example of Zacharias, who did not believe the angel's words, and sought to learn the manner in which God would act, and was punished.[154] In the case of the divine oracles, one should not use reasonings (λογισμοί), inquire into the natural sequence of events (πραγμάτων ἀκολουθία) or bring forward the necessity of nature. For the power of revelation is above all these things. Is nature more powerful than the maker of nature? The works of God's word are powerful, which brought about creation and made angels. Though Zacharias was a priest, he was nonetheless punished, since the one with more honor should have more faith.[155]

The Anomoeans should realize that God is vexed when he is investigated (πολυπραγμονούμενος). If Zacharias was punished because he disbelieved in a mortal birth, how can these escape punishment, who meddle with the ineffable heavenly birth? While he only wanted to learn, they make positive affirmations about things unseen and incomprehensible, and so draw punishment upon themselves.[156]

Now Chrysostom turns to what he believes is the root of the Anomoean heresy: not the question of the divine generation of the Son, but that a human being has dared to say: "I know God as he knows himself." This claim does not stand in need of a formal refutation. The mere utterance of the words suffices to show their impiety. He now demonstrates how the mere names, God and man, are sufficient to prove the impiety. He addresses the Anomoeans directly:

> Consider who you are and whom you meddle with; a human being you investigate God. A human being!—earth and ashes, flesh and blood, grass and flower of grass, shadow and smoke and vanity, as Scripture says (Is. 40:6, 1 Chr. 29:15, Ps. 102:4; Eccl. 1:2), not to demean our nature, but to quell the pride of the foolish (166-89, pp. 156-58). The one whom you meddle with

153. Hom. 2.74-79; p. 148.
154. Luke 1:18,20.
155. Hom. 2.79-140; pp. 148-152.
156. 141-148; p. 154.

> is God, who is without beginning, unchangeable, incorporeal, incorruptible, omnipresent, surpassing all things and superior to the whole creation.

The entire creation fears and trembles before him.[157] Only the heretics are disdainful and despise the Lord of all.[158]

In order to chasten the heretics further Chrysostom uses two arguments. First he refers to the example of the heavenly powers, which he had already used in h. 1.[159] These do not converse about the divine essence; they glorify, worship and shudderingly offer up mystical chants to God.[160] Thus there is great fear above, great disdain below. The angels glorify, praise, cover their eyes; the heretics meddle, investigate and strive to stare at the unspeakable glory without shame.[161]

The other example he uses is that of the inanimate creation. The God whom they subject to the circumference of their own reasonings made the beautiful and starry heaven, and also the enormous earth. The power of God is shown not only by the size and beauty of the things which he made, but also by the ease with which he made them, as Is. 40:22-23 shows. Consider the multitude of the races of men, which are "as a drop of a bucket to God".[162] What part of this drop are you, that you meddle with the God, to whom "the nations are as a drop of a bucket?"

God also made the angels, archangels, thrones, dominations, principalities and powers, one of whom is worth more than the whole cosmos.[163] And to create them he needed only his will.[164]

Therefore the Anomoeans should lament that they have been lifted up to such arrogance. He whom man ought only to glorify and worship, they meddle with and investigate, as if one of the cheapest matters. Because of the incomparable transcendence of God and the vileness of human nature, Paul was vexed with those who meddle with God's economies: "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God?"[165]

157. According to Ps. 104:32, Job 9:6, Is. 51:10, 44:27, Ps. 114:3-4.
158. Hom. 2.109-205; pp. 158-160.
159. 308-327; pp. 126-128.
160. As in Luke 2:14, Is. 6:3, Ezek. 3:12.
161. Hom. 2.206-208; p. 160.
162. Is. 40:15.
163. Cf. Heb. 11:38.
164. Ps. 135:6.
165. Rom. 9:20. Hom. 2.208-303; pp. 160-166.

The heretics may object that man has free will and is not nothing before God. To this objection Chrysostom replies that God honored man with freedom not for disputation but for honor—in obedience to him who gave the honor. He gave man freedom not to abuse him but to glorify him. And one who meddles with his essence abuses. Now not to meddle with his promises is to glorify him, according to St. Paul: "[Abraham] considered not his own body now dead ... neither yet the deadness of Sarah's womb: he staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in faith, *giving glory to God;* and being fully persuaded that, what he had promised, he was able also to perform".[166] Thus one who is confident about what God reveals, glorifies him. Contrariwise, the one who does not believe, dishonors both God and himself.

He summarizes the entire argument by quoting Malachi 1:6; where God says: "If then I be a father, where is mine honour? and if I be a master, where is my fear?" Thus one who fears God does not meddle, but worships; does not investigate, but praises and glorifies.[167]

Περιεργία: Background of the Accusation

We have seen Chrysostom demonstrate that it is impious to "investigate" God as the Anomoeans do. He uses the words περιεργάζεσθαι (to meddle) and πολυπραγμονεῖν (to investigate) synonymously to signal vain activity with an object which exceeds the intelligence of man. The prefix πολυ- indicates the multiplicity of the questions posed, while περι- implies a variety of approaches to the subject.[168]

The accusation seems first to have been made against the natural philosophers (i.e., scientists) by representatives of the older, religious Greek culture. Pindar, for example, said that the natural philosophers "pick an imperfect fruit of knowledge";[169] and Socrates was accused of "meddling"[170] because of the erroneous belief that he pursued the natural sciences.[171] Justin Martyr, with an obvious reference to Socrates, writes

166. Rom. 4:19-21
167. Hom. 2.304-379; pp. 166-172.
168. MALINGREY, *Sur L'incompréhensibilité,* p. 129 n. 5 and cf. Index des Mots Grecs, s.v.
169. Fg. 197 BOWRA.
170. περιεργάζεσθαι: *Ap.* 19b4, cf. Phd. 70b10.
171. Cf. ARISTOPHANES, *Nub.* 144-152.

that the philosophers who lived before Christ were considered "impious" and "meddlers"[172]—which is exactly the accusation of Chrysostom against the Anomoeans. Likewise Justin defends the philosophic quest for God through inquiry (ζήτησις), which Chrysostom explicitly condemns.[173] So much for the classical Greek roots of the accusation.

The first Christian writer to make extensive use of the charge of "meddling with God" is Ephraem in his *Hymns on Faith,* also called *Adversus Scrutatores,* which were written around A.D. 370.[174] Here Ephraem castigates individuals, probably the same Anomoeans, who attempt to scrutinize the incomprehensible things of God and Christ. He rejects Greek wisdom and speculation, and states that what is handed down in Scripture should be accepted with docility.[175] He argues that creatures are unable to understand the how of the divine essence, and they should admire and accept with faith and love, rather than investigate.[176] Like Chrysostom he makes no use of Greek philosophy in his arguments.[177]

It is possible that Chrysostom had read these homilies, since Ephraem's writings were translated into Greek during his lifetime.[178]

In a recent article on the Syriac version of Chrysostom's homilies *De incomprehensibili,* Graffin and Malingrey point out that the Syriac translator had no trouble in rendering the Greek, since the writings of Ephraem supplied him with ample vocabulary. To explain the facility of the Syriac translation, the authors emphasize Chrysostom's own Syriac background. His city, Antioch, was the largest Greek speaking city in the region of Syria. It is likely that his homilies were immediately translated into Syriac, and that vice versa there were Syriac influences upon the Greek speaking church at Antioch. "Tout en étant un des représentants les plus brillants de la rhétorique grecque, Jean [Chrysostome] reste un syrien proche de son traducteur. Dans leur race et dans leur commune formation biblique on trouve les raisons de leur harmonie." This is the conclusion which Graffin and Malingrey draw from their study of the Syriac translation of the homilies. It gives further support

172. *Ap.* 2.10.4; p. 68 Krueger.
173. Cf. h. 1.309-310, pp. 126-128; h. 3.133, p. 198; h. 4.131, p. 238.
174. Critical edition by E. Beck, CSCO 154-55 (Louvain, 1955).
175. Ignatius Ortiz de Urbina, *Patrologia Syriaca*² (Rome, 1965), p. 65.
176. Graffin and Malingrey, p. 608.
177. Ortiz de Urbina, p. 65.
178. Photius, *Bibliotheca* 196; 3.89-92 Henry. Cf. also Ortiz de Urbina, p. 56.

to the hypothesis that Chrysostom drew the theme of "meddling with God" from Ephraem, who had utilized the notion extensively some fifteen years earlier.[179]

God is Incomprehensible to the Heavenly Powers
(h. 3 and 4)

In h. 4 he returns to his argument on incomprehensibility. Earlier he had argued that God is incomprehensible to man. Now he extends this argument, and asserts that the maker is above the apprehension of all the creatures. It is imposture to claim that the one who is incomprehensible to the heavenly powers can be circumscribed and encompassed by the weak reasonings of those who creep on the ground. In order to refute the false pretensions of his opponents, Chrysostom proceeds to demonstrate that the things which they claim to know are invisible to the incorporeal powers.

He begins his demonstration with a prayer to "the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords; who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto; whom no man hath seen, nor can see: to whom be honour and power everlasting. Amen."[180] This verse shows the apostle's piety, who at the mention of God adds a doxology,[181] as also at the mention of Christ.[182] First he pays the debt of praise to God, and then goes on to teach.[183]

Chrysostom now analyzes the phrase, "dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto." He notes Paul's exactness: he did not say: "Being the light which no man can approach unto," but "dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto." This way he indicates that if the house is unapproachable, so much more the inhabitant. Also, "unapproachable" means more than "incomprehensible"; it signifies something which cannot even be begun to be investigated. If one objects that Paul means that God is unapproachable to men and not to angels, the objection can be overcome by reminding the heretics that

179. Graffin and Malingrey, pp. 609, 608, 603. Cf. for the same theme John Calvin, *Institutes* 1.5.9 (1.62 tr. Battles).
180. 2 Tim. 6:15 f.
181. As in Gal. 1:3-5, 1 Tim. 1:17.
182. Rom. 9:5.
183. Hom. 3.63-112; pp. 192-196.

they are men, and not angels.[184]

But God is unapproachable to the heavenly powers, as Isaiah 6: 1-2 shows.[185] The seraphim here cover themselves, because they cannot bear the light of the throne.[186] Even so, they were not viewing the absolute light itself or the pure essence,[187] but the whole scene was a condescension (συγκατάβασις). Now a "condescension" is "when God appears not as he is, but as the viewer is able to see him, with an appearance conformable to the weakness of the viewer"[188] So the seraphim were not even able to bear a condescension of God. Moreover, the heavenly powers understand the divine incomprehensibility better than we, because they are wiser and purer, just as a sighted man knows better than a blind one that the sun's rays are unapproachable. Therefore, when the prophet says, "I saw the Lord"[189] he means that he saw the condescension, not the essence; and he saw it less distinctly than the powers.[190]

It is impossible for a man to see the essence of an angel without fear—let alone the blessed essence. To prove this Chrysostom cites the

184. Hom. 3.113-146; pp. 196-198.

185. Cf. *In illud, Vidi Dominum* h. 1.3 (PG 56, 100-01), where Chrysostom comments on Is. 6:1, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high (ὑψηλοῦ) and lifted up (ἐπηρμένου)." Chrysostom comments that the prophet added "lifted up," when "high" was enough to show the preeminence of his dignity in order to show incomprehensibility of the seat. "High" has a notion of comparison with more humble things, as the mountains are high in relation to the plains and valleys; but "lifted up" refers only to the incomprehensible nature, which it is impossible to think of (ἐννοῆσαι) or to put into words (ἑρμηνεῦσαι).

186. Cf. further Chrysostom, *In illud, Vidi Dominum* h. 1.3 (PG 56, 101): The seraphim cover their faces because of the terror of the sight and their inability to face the unapproachable glory. They cover their feet to show insatiate reverence toward the creator. Since even in this way they do not reach the desired state, they cover the deficiency by hiding on all sides (see also h. 2.2; p. 109). In h. 6.1 (PG 56 137-38) he adds that human beings also, when they are overpowered by astonishment, cover their bodies all around. And the soul, when it is astonished by a manifestation of God, withdraws and covers itself with the body.

187. Cf. *In illud, Vidi Dominum* h. 1.2 (PG 56, 100): The seraphim see the extraordinary beauty of the creator as in a mirror. They do not see it in itself for it is inconceivable (ἀκατανόητον), not to be seen (ἀθεώρητον) and without form (ἀσχημάτιστον), but insofar as they have the power to be illuminated by its ray.

188. Hom. 3.163-166; p. 200. Cf. Harl, p. 232, n. 47.

189. Is. 6:1.

190. 147-193, pp. 198-202; cf. h. 4.166-192, pp. 242-244.

example of Daniel.[191] Since Daniel was a holy and just man, it is clear that he was undone and torn asunder by the presence of an angel not because of his sins and a guilty conscience, but because of the weakness of human nature. Yet the heretics, who are so far removed from his virtue, claim to know with all exactness the highest essence, which created the myriads of angels, one of which Daniel was not strong enough to contemplate.[192]

After this digression Chrysostom returns to his original theme, and verifies that God is invisible, i.e., incomprehensible, to the heavenly powers. This has already been proved with regard to the seraphim, who thrust forward their wings as a symbol of their unknowingness. But it is also true for the cherubim, who though they are nearer to God and serve as his throne, also cover themselves with their wings.[193] Ezekiel's vision was also a condescension, for he says, "This was the appearance of the likeness of the glory of God",[194] and neither the prophet nor the powers saw the absolute essence. Although the powers are pure and wise, as their names indicate (the name cherubim means "complete knowledge;"[195] and seraphim means "mouths of fire"[196]) nevertheless they cannot look at even the condescension of God without fear. Therefore, where there is only partial knowledge, as Paul says,[197] it is great folly to think that things unseen by the heavenly powers are known and evident to man.[198]

In h. 4 against the Anomoeans, which was not given to refute the heretics, but to instruct the faithful, Chrysostom continues to develop this theme. No other created power, including principalities, powers, dominations and those whose names we may not even know,[199] has an exact concept of God.[200] The latter fact also shows the folly (ἀπόνοια)

191. Daniel 10:8,16.

192. 194-265, pp. 202-208.

193. Ezek. 1:28.

194. Ezek. 1:28.

195. This etymology, which has no semantic basis, is found in Philo, *Moses* 2.97 and Origen, *In Rom. Comm.* 3. 8 (PG 14, 948). See Jean Daniélou, Introduction to Malingrey, *Sur L'incompréhensibilité*, p. 42.

196. This etymology agrees with modern philology; cf. Jerome, *Ep.* 18 A. 6 ad Damasum (1.60 Labourt).

197. 1 Cor. 13:12.

198. 266-337, pp. 208-214.

199. Cf. Eph. 1:21.

200. Cf. Chrysostom, *De ferendis reprehens. et de mutat. nominum* h. 3.3 (PG 51,

of the heretics: we do not even know the names of the servants, and they meddle with the essence of the Master.[201]

It is not difficult to prove that the other created powers do not have an exact knowledge of God, for they do not know many of his dispensations (οἰκονομίαι). Actually, they learned some of these through us, as Eph. 3:10 shows: "to the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places might be known by the church the manifold wisdom of God." By referring to the principalities and powers "in heavenly places," Paul specifies that he does not mean that the ones who received this knowledge with us are demons. For these, whom he also calls "principalities and powers," are located *below heaven*—which is why they are called "the rulers of the darkness of this world".[202]

Chrysostom now offers the final proof of the argument that the principalities and powers do not know God's essence on the basis of John 1:18: "No one has ever seen God" (Jer. Bible). First he explains the apparent contradiction with texts like Is. 6:1, Dan. 7:9, 1 Kings 22:19 and Amos 9:1, which witness that a prophet saw God. These visions were condescensions, and none ever saw the pure essence of God. This is manifest, because each saw something different, whereas God is simple and without form. Whence the significance of Hosea 12:10: "I have multiplied visions, and used similitudes, by the ministry of the prophets." In this verse, on the contrary, John is referring to the impossibility of an exact conception (ἀκριβὴς κατάληψις) and distinct knowledge (τετρανωμένη γνῶσις) of God.[203]

Most important, the text, "No one has ever seen God," does not just refer to human knowledge of God, but also to that of the heavenly powers. For it was already known in the Old Testament that men could not see God.[204] This is the reason why John cites Jesus as the teacher of this dogma and not Moses, adding: "the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." Thus John's

137): it is a mark of God's power that he gives names to beings which will only be known by man in eternity.

201 Hom. 4.93-112, p. 238.

202. Cf. Eph. 6:12.—113-158, pp. 238-240. Chrysostom repeats the notion that God through the incarnation revealed his designs to the angels in *In Joh.* h. 1.2 (PG 59, 26), 15.1-2 (ibid., 98 f.); *In Ep. ad Eph.* c. 3 h. 7.1 (PG 62, 50). See also Gregory of Nyssa, *In Cant.* h. 8 (6, 254-57 Jaeger).

203. 159-192, pp. 242-244.

204. Cf. Hosea 12:10, Ex. 33:20.

meaning is that the heavenly powers also cannot know God.[205]

Finally, in this passage ("No one has ever seen God"), "seeing" should be understood as knowledge, since the incorporeal powers do not have eyes; but what seeing is for us, knowledge is for them. Similarly, in the case of the seraphim, "looking straight at God" would be equivalent to knowing him.[206]

If his exegesis of John 1:18 seems forced, when it is made to refer to the angelic powers, we should recall that the material in h. 4 was not an essential part of the refutation, but supplemental and designed to edify the flock.

God Is Comprehended Only by the Son and the Spirit, or by Himself, the Father (h. 5)

As part of the positive exposition to his flock, Chrysostom now argues affirmatively that only the Son and the Holy Spirit can comprehend God. At one point he states the theme philosophically, namely, that an essence cannot have a good knowledge of a superior (ὑπερέχουσαν) essence, even if the difference between them is small.[207] As the basis for this thesis he cites two Johannine texts:

> No one has ever seen God; it is only the Son, who is nearest to the Father's heart, who has made him known.
>
> (John 1:18)
>
> Not that anybody has seen the Father, except the one who comes from God: he has seen the Father.
>
> (John 6:46 Jer. Bible)

As before he recalls that "sight" is equivalent to "knowledge." If Jesus had simply said that "No one knows God", it would only imply that human knowledge is limited. By the mention of the Son, he excluded the entire creation from the knowledge of God—except the Son[208] and the Holy Spirit, who is also not a part of the creation.[209] The relation-

205. 192-216, pp. 244-246.

206. 217-233, p. 246.

207. Hom. 5.249-250, p. 292. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, *In Eccl.* h. 7 (5:414 Jaeger).

208. Cf. Chrysostom, *In Jo.* h. 15.1 (PG 59, 98).

209. Hom. 5.32-57; pp. 272-276.

ship of this argument with the previous one, in which the same text[210] is used to show the ignorance of the heavenly powers, is quite obvious.

Now possibly because the divinity of the Holy Spirit was only a newly won dogma of the church (A.D. 381), he feels compelled to digress and to verify that the Holy Spirit is not excluded from the knowledge of God. He does this exegetically, by quoting 1 Cor. 2:11: "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? Even so the things of God knoweth no man but the Spirit of God." Just as here "no man" does not exclude the Son, so in John 1:18 "no one" does not thrust out the Holy Spirit, or Paul would have written 1 Cor. 2:11 in vain.

The mention of one does not exclude the other, as the use of "one" in 1 Cor. 8:6 does not exclude the Father or the Son: "one God, the Father, of whom are all things ... and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things." For the Father is not expelled from lordship because there is said to be "one Lord Jesus Christ," and the Son is not expelled from the godhead because there is said to be "one God, the Father".[211]

He now enters into a long digression on the divinity of the Son, which is directed against the trinitarian errors of the Anomoeans.[212] Then he returns to his previous theme that the mention of the one God in the Bible does not exclude the Son and the Spirit, but is meant to show the distance between the Trinity and creation. Thus for example the text of Is. 40:13 LXX: "For who has known the mind of the Lord?" does not leave out the Son or the Spirit from such knowledge, as 1 Cor. 2:11 and Luke 10:22 prove.

Having established that only God, in the persons of the Son and the Spirit, can comprehend God, he now explains the reason for Christ's knowledge of the Father. According to John 6:46 Christ knows the Father because he is from him; and the evidence that he is from him, is his clear knowledge of him.[213] For he could not have a good knowledge of the Father's essence, if it transcended his own, even a little.

210. John 1:18.

211. Hom. 5. 58-63; pp. 276-278.

212. Hom. 5. 84-229; pp. 278-290.

213. There are strong reasons to believe that lines 244-47 of h. 5 (p. 292) are a gloss (perhaps based on h. 4.284-88, p. 250) and to be bracketed, since they directly contradict what he says later on at lines 292-94 (p. 296). Moreover, these lines (h. 5.244-47) are a duplication of the thought of the following lines 247-49, which fit perfectly into the context here and correspond to what he says below (lines 292-94).

Thus man does not know exactly the essence of angels, though he is only "a little lower".[214] Similarly, we do not even know the essence of our own soul, while the heretics strive to know with exactitude the Master of all![215]

It remains for Chrysostom to demonstrate that Jesus' knowledge of God is accurate (ἀκριβής); that he knows God as God knows himself. But Christ's own words suffice to make this manifest: "As the Father knoweth me, even so I know the Father".[216] The opponent must admit that the Father knows the Son accurately (ἀκριβῶς); and so, according to this verse, the Son's knowledge of the Father must be equally accurate. The text of Matt. 11:27 attests to the same fact: "no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him." Of course, Jesus does not reveal to us what he knows, but what we can contain.[217]

It is Impossible to Name God's Essence
(h. 5. 334-65, pp. 300-02)

Having completed his demonstration of the divine incomprehensibility, he now passes on to expose the quackery (σκαιωρία) of the Anomoeans, who assert that the name of God's essence is known in the predicate "unbegotten". Since God's essence is unknown—not that it exists, but what it is—it is insanity (μανία) to give it a name. Paul did not even dare to name the heavenly powers;[218] what defense is there for those who dare to do this with the essence of the Master?

That God is "unbegotten" (ἀγέννητος) is clear; but no prophet, apostle or evangelist ever said that this is the name of his essence. And quite naturally: since they were ignorant of the essence itself, how were they to give it a name?

But to refute such absurdity, it is not necessary to refer to the divine Scriptures. Bold and confident at the completion of his demonstration, Chrysostom momentarily abandons the Scriptures, which had served as the basis of all his previous arguments,[219] and seeks further verifica-

214. Ps. 8:5.

215. Hom. 5.230-283; pp. 290-294.

216. John 10:15.

217. Hom. 5.284-319; pp. 296-298.

218. Cf. Eph. 1:21.

219. Cf. Stephens, pp. 122 f.

tion from the pagan Greeks. He observes that not one of the erring pagans ever dared to put forth a definition of the divine essence, so as to comprehend it in one name. Indeed, they did not attempt so much as to define the nature of the incorporeals (τὰ ἀσώματα). We should observe that he does not envision the influence of pagan philosophy on the Anomoean heresy. Rather he holds that it is a new, unheard of form of impiety.[220] Similarly, in a related homily he affirms that the Anomoeans are worse than pagans of the past. Both of them worship creation, but by their claim to know God's essence, the Anomoeans go beyond pagans in impiety.[221]

In conclusion Chrysostom refutes one last objection by his opponents: "You do not know what you worship." This objection is the subject of Basil's *Ep.* 234,[222] which was written in A.D. 376 and may have provided the basis for the response here and even perhaps the objection itself.[223] While he does not have to answer the objection, since he has proved from Scripture that it is impossible to know God's essence, nevertheless he undertakes to reply to it in order to set his opponents straight. His reply takes the form of the thesis that to strive to know his essence is to be ignorant of God.

Whom do we say knows the size of the sky: the one trying to measure it with the span of his hands, or the one who says that it cannot be measured? If as regards the heavens he who gives way to the magnitude is the one who knows the magnitude, shall we not use this discretion (εὐλάβεια) in the case of God?

We are only required to know *that* God exists, not to investigate his essence, as Heb. 11:6 shows: "for he that cometh to God must believe that he is." Similarly, the prophet does not object that one does not know *what* God is, but *that* God is, in Ps. 14:1: "The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God." In other words, it does not make one impious to be ignorant of God's essence, but to be ignorant that he exists; and so it suffices for piety to know that God exists.[224] Thus in refuting the objection of agnosticism, Chrysostom has reverted to the earlier argument on the limitation of reason.

220. Cf. h. 2.162-165; pp. 154-156.

221. *In illud, Vidi Dominum* h. 2.2.; PG 56, 109.

222. *Ep.* 234; 3, 41-44 Courtonne.

223. On the later history of this objection see Wolfson, "Philonic God, "pp. 13-16.

224. Hom. 5.366-384; pp. 302-304.

CHAPTER II

PROVIDENCE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The choice of John, the ascetic preacher of Antioch, for the vacant archbishopric of Constantinople (A.D. 397) was made by Eutropius, chief minister of the emperor Arcadius, in spite of the ambitious prelate of Alexandria, Theophilus, who had wanted to place his own candidate on the coveted throne of the church, which now had precedence over his own. When John as patriarch gave asylum to the four "tall brothers," monks from Nitria whom Theophilus had persecuted for Origenism (401), the latter (Theophilus) was summoned to Constantinople by empress Eudoxia to be questioned about the matter. He came willingly, with a retinue of Egyptian bishops and sailors, and seized the opportunity to organize the opposition against the controversial and outspoken archbishop, including unworthy clerics, who had been restrained from corrupt and luxurious living by his reforming zeal, and members of the imperial court, who had taken offence at his uncompromising preaching and ascetic way of life. As a result, a council held at a villa "at the Oak" in Chalcedon deposed him, though not upon the alleged charges of immorality, treason and abuse of the clergy, but because he had refused to appear before it. The flaccid emperor Arcadius accepted the verdict and sentenced him to exile (403), which lasted only three days, however, because of an earthquake and public tumult. Nonetheless, less than a year later he was again banished, and the place of exile was designated as the city of Cucusus in Armenia secunda.

1. Edward Gibbon, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,* Modern Library edition (New York, n.d.) 2, pp. 207-14. Philip Schaff, *History of the Christian Church* 3: *Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity* (5 ed., 1910; Grand Rapids, 1964) pp. 702-4. J. B. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire* (New York, 1958) 1, pp. 138-60. *The Cambridge Medieval History* 1: *The Christian Roman Empire* (2 ed., 1924; Cambridge, 1967) 489-94.

On the night of his banishment from Constantinople, a fire destroyed the church of St. Sophia, which housed his episcopal throne. The fire was blamed on the adherents of John Chrysostom.[2] The prefect of the city unleased a harsh persecution against them, using the conflagration as a pretext as well as their refusal to recognize Arsacius as his lawful successor in the patriarchy. The Johannites, as they were called, refused to attend churches presided over by the usurpers. In the face of imminent retribution they assembled privately to worship in remote places.[3] Many of them underwent torture and abuse: Tigrius, a priest, was placed on the rack till his bones were dislocated; a lector named Eutropius perished from such torments. The deaconess Olympias withstood threats, and the ascetic Pentadia endured imprisonment for the cause.[4]

While his friends were being oppressed, Chrysostom miraculously arrived safely in Cucusus and lived there for three years, except when inhabiting the neighboring fortress of Arabissus to escape the marauding Isaurian nomads. Gibbon calls this period the most glorious of his life.[5] Though his body was captive, his mind and spirit were free, and he managed to write some 236 letters to his followers in Constantinople and Syria, consoling them and exhorting them to keep up their courage. He also continued to function as a pastor, concerning himself with the conversion of the Persians and the Goths, and the extermination of paganism and heresy in Palestine and Cyprus.

In addition to his large correspondence he wrote two treatises, which are the subject of this chapter: Ὅτι τὸν ἑαυτὸν οὐκ ἀδικοῦντα οὐδεὶς ἕτερος παραβλάψαι δυνήσεται *(Quod nemo laeditur nisi a se ipso)*[6] and Πρὸς τοὺς σκανδαλισθέντας ἐπὶ ταῖς παρανομίαις ταῖς γινομέναις καὶ τῇ τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ πολλῶν ἱερέων διώξει καὶ διαστροφῇ *(Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt ob adversitates)*[7].

2. Zosimus 5.24.6 Cf. Socrates 6.18. *Chron. Pasch.* 1, p. 568, ed. Bonn. (References from Gibbon, 2, p. 212).

3. Chrysostom, *Ep.* 212 (PG 52, 729). *Scand.* 19.1.1. Sozomen, H.e. 8.24.

4. Chrysostom, *Ep.* 94 (PG 52, 657-59), 104 (pp. 663-64).

5. *Decline and Fall,* 2, p. 213.

6. The text cited here is the critical edition of Anne-Marie Malingrey, *Jean Chrysostome: Lettre d'exil à Olympias et à tous les fidèles (Quod nemo laeditur),* Sources chrétiennes no. 103 (Paris, 1964). There have been several English translations of this work (listed by C. Baur, *S. Jean Chrysostome et ses oeuvres dans l'histoire littéraire* [Louvain, 1907], pp. 190-91); the most recent is by W. R. W. Stephens, NPNF 9: 269-84.

From a letter to Olympias written at the beginning of 407,[8] it appears that Chrysostom wrote his two works at the end of the year 406, at least before June of 407, when he was ordered to be removed to Pityus, on the eastern edge of the Black Sea. While on the march thither, he died at Comana in Pontus. These two writings, therefore, are the final theological statement of the church father on the road to martyrdom[9]. His topic in both cases is "one of the most difficult, one of the most pressing, problems that mankind has struggled with since its creation"[10] —the problem of evil and the suffering of the innocent.

The problem of evil has been characterized by Daniélou as a "limit problem," which lies on the threshold of reason but transcends it:[11]

> these limit-problems, the thresholds of reason, are not only characterized by the fact that they are placed somewhat beyond her reach and so cannot be neatly defined. Another feature that they possess is that they cannot be broached from the standpoint of straightforward discussion, but demand a total outlook, an existential conversion.

The approach of Chrysostom's final two works, written in the real moment of his sufferings, bears out these words. In the earlier one, *Quod nemo laeditur nisi a se ipso,* reason is pushed to its extreme limits in order to show that the good man can in actuality suffer no injury. Reliance on reason is manifest in the choice of a Socratic theme and of a classical literary genre (the diatribe) in which to develop it.

In the later work, *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt ob adversitates,* while attempting to give a rational justification of the action of providence, he asserts the incomprehensibility of providence and the economies

7. The critical edition of Anne-Marie Malingrey, entitled *Jean Chrysostome: Sur la Providence de Dieu,* Sources chretiénnes no. 79 (Paris, 1961) is used here. Malingrey provides a French translation; there is apparently no English version.

8. *Ep.* 17.4c (p. 384 in the edition of Anne-Marie Malingrey, *Jean Chrysostome: Lettres à Olympias²,* Sources chretiénnes no. 13bis [Paris, 1968]).

9. "Men wearing sheep's skins" unwittingly accomplished the martyrdom of Chrysostom according to Marytrius (PG 47, XLIII).

10. Edward John Carnell, *An Introduction to Christian Apologetics: A Philosophic Defense of the Trinitarian-Theistic Faith* (Grand Rapids, 1948), p. 275.

11. *God and the Ways of Knowing,* tr. Walter Roberts (New York, 1957), p. 63 and chap. 2 passim.

of God. Because of his intellect man can partially understand the action of God in the world, but because his intelligence is limited, he cannot have full knowledge and much has to remain unfathomable.[12]

In this chapter Chrysostom's apology for divine providence, as found in his last two writings, will be examined.

1. *QUOD NEMO LAEDITUR NISI A SE IPSO*

Chrysostom sent this work to Olympias at the beginning of the year 407 from Cucusus in Lesser Armenia.[13]

LITERARY GENRE

Both in literary form and in content the work exhibits characteristics of the diatribe, a literary form invented by Bion of Borysthenes, who "clothed philosophy with a flowery mantle."[14] Whereas the dialogue was a zetetic argument, in which several characters sought to reach a conclusion, the diatribe was an exposition, wherein the only character besides the speaker was a fictitious interlocutor, who brought up objections representing average opinion. As defined by Hermogenes the "diatribe is a moral exposition of some brief topic" (διατριβή ἐστι βραχέος διανοήματος ἠθικὴ ἔκθεσις).[15]

The aspects of literary form peculiar to the diatribe which are found in this discourse include:

1. *contradictio:* the use of φησί to introduce an imagined opponent (4.1,34; 10.23; 16.53);
2. insertion of brief snatches of dialogue (2.32-36; 4.30-33; 6.1-3; 10.23-25; 11.25-27);
3. *prosōpopoiia* or personification (1.34-36).

A complete analysis of these elements will be found in Malingrey's introduction, pp. 20-22.[16]

12. EDWARD NOVAK, *Le chrétien devant la souffrance. Étude sur la pensée de Jean Chrysostome,* Theologie historique 19 (Paris, 1972), pp. 93 f.

13. Cf. *Ol. Ep.* 17.4c; p. 384M.

14. DIOGENES LAERTIUS 4.52.

15. Quoted by DONALD R. DUDLEY, *A History of Cynicism from Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D.* (London, 1937), p. 111.

16. On the diatribe see EDUARD NORDEN, *Die antike Kunstprose vom VI Jahr-*

Since stylistic traits of the diatribe appear in the bulk of Chrysostom's writings,[17] they are not in themselves sufficient to show that this work is a diatribe. More important is the content of the discourse, which is really "moral philosophy in the mantel of rhetoric"—a distinguishing mark of the diatribe. The title of the discourse is instructive in this regard: ὅτι τὸν ἑαυτὸν μὴ ἀδικοῦντα οὐδεὶς παραβλάψαι δυνήσεται.[18] Its form indicates that Chrysostom is writing on a Stoic or pseudo-Stoic paradox.[19] One may compare the form of the titles of the following diatribes:

1. The longer, original title of Pseudo-Josephus (4 Maccabees): φιλοσοφία Ἰωσήπου περὶ τοῦ ὅτι αὐτοδέσποτός ἐστι τῶν παθῶν ὁ εὐσεβὴς λογισμός. This work demonstrates the Stoic thesis that reason is mistress over the emotions.[20]
2. The titles of Cicero's *Stoic Paradoxes* have the same form:

   Ὅτι μόνον ἀγαθόν, τὸ καλόν
   Ὅτι αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετὴ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν
   Ὅτι ἴσα τὰ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τά κατορθώματα
   Ὅτι πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται
   Ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς ἐλεύθερος, καὶ πᾶς ἄφρων δοῦλος
   Ὅτι μόνος ὁ σοφὸς πλούσιος

   Cicero states that these topics served as θέσεις for declamations in the schools of rhetoric: "Et degustabis genus hoc exercitationum earum, quibus uti consuevi, quum ea, quae dicuntur in scholis θετικά, ad nostrum hoc oratorium transfero dicendi genus" (Praef.). In the fourth-third centuries B.C. the Stoic themes had been absorbed into declamatory θέσεις.[21] Theon 2nd c. A.D.) in his *progymnasmata* used as topics for his declamations, whether the wise man should take part in politics, and whether providence exists, and transformed the Stoic argu-

hundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renaissance (1915: reprint Stuttgart, 1958), 1, pp. 128-30, 277. W. CAPELLE and H. I. MARROU, "Diatribe", RAC 3 (Stuttgart, 1957): 990-1009.

17. NOWAK, pp. 26 f.

18. The title is given by CHRYSOSTOM himself in *Ol. Ep.* 17.4c (p. 384 M.).

19. Cf. MAX POHLENZ, *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* (Göttingen, 1964) 2, p. 213.

20. NORDEN, 1, p. 417.

21. Ibid., p. 309.

ments into the language of rhetoric.[22]

3. The Greek titles of certain of Horace's *Odes* and *Satires*.[23]
4. The titles of Libelli 5-9 of the *Hermetic Corpus* show influence of this form, e.g.:
   ὅτι ἀφανὴς ... θεὸς φανερώτατός ἐστι (5)
   ὅτι ἐν μόνῳ τῷ Θεῷ τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἀλλαχόθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ (6)
   ὅτι μέγιστον κακὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἡ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγνωσία (7)
5. Philo's treatise, Περὶ τοῦ πάντα σπουδαῖον εἶναι ἐλεύθερον.[24]

Thus from the title it is possible to conclude that Chrysostom's discourse is a sophistic (declamatory) diatribe on a Stoic or pseudo-Stoic paradox, "that no man is hurt but by himself." Furthermore, he states at the outset that his argument is "new and paradoxical" (1.4).

To understand why he would choose to write on such a theme, it is helpful to recall briefly the origin and influence of the Stoic paradoxes.[25] In their ethics the Stoics distinguished between themselves and the rest of the world to the point of paradox.[26] The paradoxes, which applied especially to the "wise man,"[27] include that the wise man alone is free,[28] that all sins are equal,[29] that the wise man is the true king,[30] and that the sage is above evils,[31] which provides much of the subject matter for Chrysostom's diatribe.

Nascent Christianity did not find the paradoxes inimical, and Christian writers tried to show that the paradoxical traits of the Stoic *sapiens* were truly applicable to the devotees of Christ.[32] Specifically the role of the wise man was assumed by the monk, as Chrysostom depicts

22. QUINTILIAN, 3.5.5, 6, 12.

23. EDUARD NORDEN, *Die römische Literatur*[6] (Leipzig, 1961). pp. 66, 68.

24. Cf. LIBANIUS' diatribe on the same subject, Περὶ δουλείας (*Or.* 25 FÖRSTER).

25. Cf. EDUARD ZELLER, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (reprint, Hildesheim, 1963), 3, 1, pp. 255 ff.

26. POHLENZ, 1, p. 153.

27. *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta,* ed. VON ARNIM (hereafter SVF) 3:146 no. 544.

28. DIOG. LAERT. 7.121; Cicero, *Parad.* 5; HORACE, *Ep.* 1.1.106 ff. and *Sat.* 1.3.124 ff. This paradox originated with Zeno (see ZELLER, 3, 1, pp. 255-56 n. 6).

29. SVF 1, p. 54, nn. 224-25; 3, pp. 140-145, nn. 524-43. CICERO, *Pro Murena* 61 and *Parad.* 3. See Zeller, 3, 1, pp. 253 f.

30. ZELLER, 3,1, p. 255 n. 15.

31. SVF 3, pp. 150-53, nn. 567-81.

32. Pohlenz 1, p. 157.

it in his *Comparatio regis et monachi.*[33] He also applies the concept of the paradoxical loosely to the Christian religion as a whole[34] and to God's creation,[35] providence[36] and miracles.[37]

Having considered the widespread appeal of the Stoic paradoxes to early Christians and to Chrysostom in particular,[38] it is apropos to point out further dependence in the literary structure of the text under consideration. Eduard Norden has shown that the sophistic diatribe on a Stoic theme has a distinctive literary form. It consists of two parts: (1) theoretical proof, and (2) proof from history. For example, 4 Maccabees is a diatribe on the dogma that reason is mistress of the emotions. Chapters 1-3.18 contain the philosophic-dogmatic proof; and chapters 3:20-18:24 constitute the demonstration from history, the story of Eleazar, the seven Maccabee brothers and their mother. Likewise, each of Cicero's Stoic paradoxes contains a theoretical proof, and examples from Roman history. In *Paradox* 1.2 he distinguishes between the two types of proof thus.: "Sed haec videri possunt obscuriora, quum lentius disputantur [= philosophic proof]. Vita atque factis illustranda sunt summorum virorum haec, quae verbis subtilius, quam satis est, disputari videntur ... nam domesticis exemplis abundamus." Characteristically, Cicero uses his own experiences as an example (in *Paradox* 2), which Chrysostom scrupulously avoids doing in his discourse. As a final example of this structure, Philo's work, *Quod omnis probus liber,* may be cited. Here the Stoic proposition about the freedom of the wise man is theoretically proved in paragraphs 1-61, and illustrated with examples from pagan history in paragraphs 62-143 (paragraphs 144-61 are an epilogue). The following analysis of *Quod nemo laeditur* shows that it too follows the traditional scheme:

Proem (1)

Theoretical proof (2-11)

33. PG 47, 387-392. GEFFCKEN, *Kynika und Verwandtes* (Heidelberg, 1909), p. 38.

34. De stat. 6.2; PG 49, 83. Cf. ibid. 2.7; p. 44. *De Laz.* 1.9; PG 48, 974.

35. *Scand.* 4.1.

36. *Ad Stag.* 1.7; PG 47, 441.

37. *De S. Babyla* 13,16,17 Schatkin.

38. BRUNO H. ÈANDENBERGHE, *Chrysostomus, de grote redenaar* (Utrecht, 1939), Frech translation, p. 16: "C'est la pensée stoïcienne qui a exercé sur lui le plus d'influence. On la retrouve dans la forme de diatribe donnée à plusieurs traités, dans les lettres à Olympias, et dans plus d'un aphorisme de ses discours."

(starting at 3.33 ff. examples of biblical personages are given, as in the theoretical part of 4 Maccabees)

Historical proof (12.4-17.60)

(cf. 12.4-12 where "history" is equated with the narrative of Scripture, and 17.61-66 in which reference is made to "examples" from Scripture)

Epilogue (17.61-70)

The evidence of structure would therefore tend to corroborate our assumption that the work is a sophistic diatribe on a Stoic theme.

Assuming that the work is in literary genre a diatribe, one can explain certain aspects of its content and tone, which troubled the French editor, Malingrey. But first it is necessary to make some preliminary observations about literary genre (γένος) in ancient literature. It is hard to overestimate the importance of genre in classical and early Christian literature, insofar as it accommodated itself to the artistic forms of the day.[39] More than any other factor genre largely determined the character of a piece of literature. For one thing, an author's style was adapted to the genre in which he was writing, and his style could be completely different in different types of literature, e.g., Tacitus in the *Dialogus* and the *Annales*.[40] Broadly speaking, genre determined a work's entire contents. For example, we have referred to Philo's diatribe on the paradox, "that every good man is free."[41] Herein he uses a preponderance of examples from secular history, and only refers to the Pentateuch five times. Because he wrote on a Stoic paradox and used examples from pagan history, scholars have suggested that the work was composed in his youth, "when he still had the dialectic of the philosophical schools fresh in his mind."[42] Some critics have even denied the authenticity of the work for these reasons. In actuality, Philo elected

39. Hermann Jordan, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1911), p. 67.

40. Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa,* 1, p. 11-12, C. S. Lewis, *A Preface to Paradise Lost* (New York, 1961), chap. 1, "Epic Poetry." The early Greek writers wrote only in one literary genre; the first to write in more than one genre were the Hellenistic poets (Norden, *Röm. Lit.,* p. 13).

41. See Wilhelm von Christ, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*[6] 2,1 (Munich, 1959), p. 629 and n. 12.

42. Philo, tr. F. H. Colson 9 (Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 2.

to write a diatribe of this kind, and, as any ancient author would, adhered to the rules of the genre.

Another example is Chrysostom's own *Comparatio regis et monachi*,[43] which Ivo auf der Maur judges to be his earliest literary production because it is written in the form of a Stoic diatribe. In his opinion, its style lacks the fullness of his later writings: the thoughts are not developed, but follow upon one another abruptly.[44] In reality, this is the literary style of the diatribe—readily apparent in the analysis of *Quod nemo laeditur* given below—and should not be used as a criterion for dating.

There are many ways in which the diatribe, *Quod nemo laeditur*, shows the all pervasive influence of literary genre upon its contents. The folowing analysis depends upon that of Malingrey, *Lettre d'exil*, pp. 26-33. First, there is a striking absence of authentic Christian themes on suffering. Such typical material, which is found in his other writings, includes (a) thanksgiving in tribulation,[45] (b) joy in affliction,[46] (c) comfort from the doctrine of the resurrection,[47] (d) union with Christ,[48] and (e) divine παιδεία.[49] Contrariwise, a Christian theme, that suffering expiates sins, is summarily stated, and dropped without further development.[50]

Second, there are only passing references to Christ.[51]

Third, biblical quotations are cited in a manner that eliminates specifically Christian references.[52]

Fourth, Christian concepts are treated in a "pagan" manner. The

43. PG 47, 387-392.

44. Ivo auf der Maur, *Mönchtum und Glaubensverkündigung in den Schriften des hl. Johannes Chrysostomus* (Freiburg Schweiz, 1959), p. 16.

45. Cf. Eph. 5:20; Heb. 13:15. E.g. *Ad Stag.* 1.6-7 (PG 47, 440, 442), 9 (446). *In Eph.* h. 19.1-2, 4, 5 (PG 62, 127-30, 132-34). *Daemones non gubernare mundum* h. 1.8 (PG 49, 256). *Ol. Ep.* 3.1a (p. 112 M.), 4.1b (p. 118), 7.3a (p. 142), 8.11c (p. 204), 13b (p. 214).

46. Phil. 4:4. *De stat.*. h. 18.1 (PG 49, 186).

47. *De resur. mort.* 3 (PG 50, 425). *Ad Stag.* 1.8 (PG 47, 443). *Ol. Ep.* 8.8ef (p. 192 M.). Cf. Harry Austryn Wolfson, *Philo* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968) 2, p. 281.

48. *De ss. mart.* 2 (PG 50, 709c). *In Ep. 2 ad Cor.* 1.3 (PG 61, 387A). *Ol. Ep.* 13.4a-d (pp. 344-48 M.).

49. *Ad Stag.* 1.6 (PG 47, 440-41).

50. *Laed.* 4.62-64.

51. Ibid. 11.25-27 and 38-42; 12.7.

52. Matt. 5:11-12 at 4.51f.; Col. 1:24a at 5.51f.

perspective of eternity, for instance, which in other writings Chrysostom describes in biblical terms,[53] is here insinuated in classical imagery as one of the benefits of trial.[54] Also St. Paul's career is summed up with the words: τὴν εἰς οὐρανὸν φέρουσαν ἔτρεχεν ὁδόν.[55] Now the symbol of the "road" which leads to virtue was current in ancient Greek literature.[56] Eventually the destination of virtuous souls was transferred from earth to heaven, and the route by which they traveled was believed to be the milky way.[57] The application of this pagan image to Paul is outstanding, but consistent with the tone of *Quod nemo laeditur*.[58]

Fifth, Stoic themes abound in the discourse, most of which will be indicated in the analysis of the text below. Here it is enough to mention the general atmosphere of heroism, which recalls the writings of Epictetus,[59] and the concept of ἀρετή that plays so large a part.[60]

Malingrey speculates about why specifically Christian elements are missing, and pagan themes predominate.[61] She offers two explanations, which are helpful. First, Chrysostom takes up the pagan argument with complete fidelity, and ignores the Christian position as a result. Next, the ambivalence of patristic Greek vocabulary permitted Christians to use pagan terms in a Christian sense. Christian Greek had at its disposal a very rich profane vocabulary, derived in the realm of ethics largely from Stoicism.[62] Consider the definition of ἀρετή,[63] susceptible of two different interpretations by pagan and Christian, who under-

53. *Ad Stag.* 1.8 (PG 47, 443). *Ol. Ep.* 8.3b-d (pp. 166-70 M.), depict the last judgment, rewards and punishments.

54. *Quod nemo laed.* 11.5 ff.

55. Ibid. 11.31-32.

56. Hesiod *Op.* 289 ff; Xenophon Mem. 2.1.21 ff.

57. Herbert Weir Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets* (1899; reprint, New York, 1963), pp. 328-29. Franz Cumont, *After Life in Roman Paganism* (reprint, New York, 1959), pp. 150-53. Werner Jaeger, *Early Christianity and Greek Paideia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 8-9.

58. The same image is used by Chrysostom in *Ad Theod.* 1.17 (PG 47, 304).

59. *Lettre d'exil,* p. 26, n. 2.

60. On the Greek notion of ἀρετή see Werner Jaeger, *Two Rediscovered Works of Ancient Christian Literature: Gregory of Nyssa and Macarius* (Leiden, 1965), pp. 32-34, 78.

61. *Lettre d'exil,* pp. 28-29, 31 f.

62. M. Harl, "Remarques sur la langue des chrétiens à propos du Patristic Greek Lexicon", *Journal of Theological Studies,* new series, 14 (1963) 410, 419.

63. *Quod nemo laed.* 3.29-30.

stood different things by δόγμα and ὀρθότης τοῦ βίου: Τί οὖν ἐστιν ἀρετὴ ἀνθρώπου; ... ἡ τῶν ἀληθῶν δογμάτων ἀκρίβεια καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν βίον ὀρθότης. Malingrey also emphasizes that Chrysostom's thought is always fragmentary, responding to the needs of the moment. In this case, his persecuted followers in Constantinople, to whom the work is addressed, would expect assurance from him that none of their sufferings could hurt them.

The reasons which Malingrey offers are certainly viable. A simpler and more encompassing explanation, however, is available in the canons of ancient literature, which gave to literary genre its domination over style and content. When Chrysostom elected to write a sophistic diatribe on the pseudo-Stoic paradox, "that no man is hurt but by himself," he adhered to the rules of this genre, which meant not only adherence to an external form (logical proof followed by examples from history) but also affected the choice of arguments and general tone of the work. Hence exclusively Christian themes are missing and pagan concepts predominate.

With this understanding one cannot agree with the conclusion of Edward Nowak in his recent work, *Le chrétien devant la souffrance: Étude sur la pensée de Jean Chrysostom* (Paris, 1972). After showing the Stoic origin of thematic material in *Quod nemo laeditur* (and other works of Chrysostom), he asserts a large and *unconscious* influence of Stoicism upon the church father. A distinction is made between his personal attitude towards philosophy, which is negative, and the *unconscious* influence that it had on him (pp. 82-88, 224-25). In the case of our diatribe, however, this cannot be true, and the influence was conscious and quite specific, since it was written according to the rules of ancient rhetoric.

In addition, not only did Chrysostom consciously adopt a pagan theme and literary form, but he also skillfully fused a Christian element with these, by exclusively using scriptural examples in the proof of history, which constituted the second part of the sophistic diatribe. Truly, *Quod nemo laeditur* is a tour de force: a demonstration of the highest moral teaching of paganism from Scripture.

Through his other writings, including the contemporary letters to Olympias, we know that Chrysostom held other, wholly Judeo-Christian views on the nature and meaning of suffering. Nowak, however, in the above mentioned work, concluded on the basis of this text that his ideas

on suffering were determined in large measure by Stoicism.[64] His conclusion seems to be unjustified, since this diatribe is in a special category, as has been shown. Its composition does not imply that Chrysostom was a Stoic, but that he desired to reach and comfort his audience by means of a literary work, whose ideas enjoyed common acceptance by all cultured members of society. Thus his intent in this work is apologetic; the Stoic matter found herein should not be used so much as evidence for his own personal beliefs in Stoicism, as Nowak has done, but as proof of his consummate skill as an apologist for the Christian faith.

THEME

It has been shown that *Quod nemo laeditur* is a sophistic diatribe on a pseudo-Stoic paradox. Now it is necessary to examine in more detail the maxim, "that no man is hurt but by himself," which has heretofore been ambiguously labeled as pseudo-Stoic. Though this dictum circulated as a Stoic paradox in the time of Seneca, who wrote a diatribe on it, its origin is not Stoic but Socratic.[65]

That injustice cannot injure a virtuous man was asserted by Socrates at his trial:

> Nothing will injure me, not Meletus, nor yet Anytus—they cannot, for a bad man is not permitted to injure a better than himself (*Apol.* 30cd, tr. Jowett).
>
> Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer about death, and know of a certainty that no evil can happen to a good man, either in life of after death... (*Apol.* 41d).

This notion is related to another Socratic idea that "to do injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser, evil".[66]

This immortal concept was inherited by the Stoa, which applied it especially to the *sapiens*, who was immune from all injury. The Stoic sources are to be found in SVF 3 (Chrysippi Fragmenta), Cap. IX, par. 3, "Sapiens malis non afficitur" (pp. 150-53) and p. 71, no. 289. As an example one may cite par. 578 Stobaeus *eclog.* 2.7, p. 110W.: μήτε δὲ

64. Nowak, pp. 81 ff., 224 ff.

65. E. Amand de Mendieta, "L'amplification d'un thème socratique et stoïcien dans l'avant-dernier traité de Jean Chrysostome," *Byzantion* 36 (1966) 374-76.

66. *Gorgias* 509c, cf. 474b.

ἀδικεῖσθαι μήτε βλάπτεσθαι τὸν σπουδαῖον· ἀδικητικῶς μέντοι γέ τινας αὐτῷ προσφέρεσθαι καὶ ὑβριστικῶς καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο δικαιοπραγεῖν[67]. Thus one should translate: "The wise man cannot be injured or hurt. Some people, however, associate with him who are disposed to harm and insolence. Even in this situation he acts honestly." The pertinent text of Chrysostom explains that though many may injure, no one has to be injured.[68]

To the selections given by von Arnim one may add Epictetus, *Diatribe* 1.29.16-20, and, most importantly, Seneca's diatribe, *Nec iniuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem.* It would not be amiss also to cite *Quod nemo laeditur* as a source for this theme.

In Epictetus, *Diatribe* 4.1.123-27, is found a further development of this notion, i.e., that injustice not only does not injure the virtuous man, but also profits him. This idea is also found in our text.[69]

Chrysostom, however, does not mention Socrates by name as the source of this concept. This is not surprising, for according to J. Dumortier, "La culture profane de S. Jean Chrysostom,"[70] he never uses proper names when citing classical authors. In this way the ignorant man will not be scandalized by a profane reference in a Christian work, and the cultivated one will nevertheless recognize and appreciate such a reference. In thus using the Socratic theme, he belongs to the tradition of Greek apologists who saw Socrates as a common bond between paganism and Christianity.[71]

Chrysostom cites this Socratic dictum also in h. 80.4 on Matthew,[72] and develops it extensively in h. 51.4-5 on Acts.[73] In the second instance the difference in treatment from our diatribe is apparent. He avers that he would not hesitate to climb to a promontory and cry out the following words in a stentorian voice: τὸν Χριστιανὸν οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων τῶν οἰκούντων τὴν γῆν βλάψαι δυνήσεται ... οὐδὲ αὐτὸς ὁ δαίμων ... ἂν μὴ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀδικήσῃ. Unlike his exposition in the diatribe, here he applies the Socratic paradox to Christians only, whom he describes as

67. 'Αδικοπραγεῖν is an erroneous correction made by von Arnim, as *Quod. nemo laed.* 4.31-34 shows.

68. *Quod nemo laed.* 4.34.

69. Ibid. 4.9-10, 14.27-29.

70. *Mélanges de science religieuse* 10 (1953), 54.

71. E.g., Justin, *Ap.* 1.2.4; Clement of Alexandria, *Str.* 4.80.

72. PG 58, 729.

73. PG 60, 356-358.

angels on the earth, who cannot be injured because they cannot injure. Because in the sermon on Acts his development of the Socratic maxim is strictly theological and pointedly Christian, cne is led to think that the diatribe, *Quod nemo laeditur,* which is developed so differently, may also have been intended for pagans, as well as for his persecuted friends in Constantinople.

One last point arises in connection with his use of a pseudo-Stoic (Socratic) paradox as the theme of his diatribe, *Quod nemo laeditur.* It forces us to modify the traditional view of Chrysostom as an unqualified opponent of classical culture. This is the opinion of Gibbon (2, p. 209), who attributed to him "the judgment to conceal the advantages which he derived from the knowledge of rhetoric and philosophy." Similarly, Stephens writes: "with their [classical Greek authors'] ideas and modes of thought he had, so far as we can judge, abandoned all sympathy."[74] The first scholar to question this view was A. Naegele in an impressive article entitled, "Johannes Chrysostomos und sein Verhältnis zum Hellenismus."[75] He attempted to prove, with much success, that Chrysostom advocated a compromise between Hellenism and Christianity.

Most recently, Marius Soffray has written on this subject,[76] and has pointed out that although he condemned the errors and immorality of paganism, Chrysostom was by no means hostile to the refined culture of antiquity. He introduced reminiscences of classical literature, especially Plato, and used them to confirm the Christian verities. Soffray maintains, however, that he remained irrevocably opposed to one branch of Greek culture—sophistic rhetoric, and gives as a typical example his attitude towards Libanius, his former teacher and leading sophist of Antioch. In his apologetic treatise, *De S. Babyla,* he addresses the distinguished orator as μιαρέ and ἄθλιε καὶ ταλαίπωρε[77], and bitterly mocks the lament which Libanius has composed on the destruction of the temple of Apollo at Daphne. The reason why Chrysostom had so little respect for the profession of rhetoric, Soffray continues, was because the sophists were primarily interested in oratorical virtuosity at the

74. W. R. W. Stephens, *Saint Chrysostom: His Life and Times* (London, 1872), p. 447.

75. *Byz. Zeit.* 13 (1904) 73-113.

76. "St. Jean Chrysostome et la littérature païenne," *Phoenix* 2 (1947-1948) 82-85.

77. No. 104 and 105 Schatkin correspondingly.

expense of truth and virtue. They were also the official defenders of the pagan religion.

Nonetheless Soffray's overall evaluation of Chrysostom's attitude toward Greek culture is liberal: "Concluons donc que S. Jean Chrysostome n'était pas ennemi de l'Hellénisme, ainsi que certains critiques ont voulu nous le faire croire, mais qu'il était sensible aux beautés artistiques de la littérature païenne et favorable à l'emploi de la rhétorique profane dans l'exposition des vérités chrétiennes, toutefois sans dépasser les limites de l'utilité et de la nécessité...".[78]

To the evidence collected by these scholars in favor of Chrysostom's positive attitude towards Hellenic culture, one may now add the example of his sophistic diatribe, *Quod nemo laeditur,* on a Socratic theme. It should not cause surprise that he chose to write on a pagan philosophic paradox, because in h. 14.4 on Acts[79] he explains that he quotes moral maxims from pagan philosophers since these are more able to put his people to shame. In this particular homily he cites an anecdote about Socrates, without actually naming him. Previously, in h. 13.4, he had cited an epigram about Epictetus, illustrating the worthy character of a poor man.[80] Furthermore, in h. 80.4 on Matthew[81] he cites a line of iambic trimeter from a pagan writer on the subject that the virtuous man cannot be injured: Οὐδὲν κακὸν πέπονθας ἂν μὴ προσποιῇ.[82] Finally on one occasion, in an effort to demonstrate the nothingness of man, he recommends to this congregation the reading of pagan literature. If from pride (ἀπονοίας, misprinted in Migne as ἀπονίας), they scorn to read Christian literature, they should peruse the works of the philosophers, poets, rhetors, sophists and historians (λογογράφοι) for their accounts of ancient calamities, which will quell human pride.[83]

Thus in the work, *Quod nemo laeditur nisi a se ipso,* it is possible to see the same acceptance of the utility of Greek rhetoric and philos-

78. P. 85. Note that the text of *De Proph. Obs.* 1.1 (PG 56, 165) cited by Soffray on p. 84 is erroneously interpreted to refer to the artifices of pagan rhetoric, while it actually refers to the difficulties of scriptural language.

79. PG 60, 117-119.

80. PG 60, 111. Cf. *Anth. Pal.* 7.676. Chrysostom shows familiarity with the works of Epictetus, according to Michel Spanneut, "Epictète, Influence à l'époque patristique," DS 4,1 (1960) 831.

81. PG 58, 729.

82. Cf. Th. Camelot, "Hellénisme et spiritualité patristique," DS 7 (1968) 152.

83. *In Ep.* 2 *ad Thess.* h. 1.2; PG 62, 472.

ophy, at least on the apologetic plane. Detailed evidence for this conclusion will appear in the analysis of the discourse which follows immediately.

ANALYSIS

Proem (Chap. 1)

Chrysostom begins by stating that his discourse (λόγος) will seem to be new and paradoxical to the unphilosophically minded, i.e., those who are attached to physically perceptible objects and not concerned with intellectual things (νοερῶν). Similarly, Philo at the beginning of his diatribe, *Quod omnis probus liber*, affirms that his ideas are for the philosophically minded only, who are no longer slaves of opinion (δόξης) and the senses (1-15). The distinction between the sensible (αἰσθητόν) and the intelligible (νοητόν). which is the realm of philosophy, derives from Plato[84] in both cases.

For this reason, Chrysostom continues, he will approach the proofs (ἀποδείξεις) eagerly.[85] Then he addresses the reader directly (apostrophe), and urges him to hear out his pleadings and bring in an unbiased vote. The image of a judicial tribunal also occurs in Philo, *Quod omnis probus* 16.

The opposing rhetor in this case is public opinion (ἡ κοινὴ τῶν πολλῶν πρόληψις), who utters the objection that countless numbers of people are treated unjustly every day and injured: the weak by the strong, the poor by the rich. Allied to this common opinion that many *are* injured, is another accusation against the providence of God brought by the more miserable and foolish: τῶν ἀθλιωτέρων καὶ ἀνοητοτέρων,[86] when they see the good person (ἐπιεικῆ) mistreated, and the unworthy one (ἄτιμον) enjoying wealth and power[87]. This latter objection, which concerns the unmerited suffering of the just and the undeserved happiness of the evil, was the main one raised by the Epicureans against the Stoic notion of providence.[88] It appears earlier in Plato's *Leg.* 10.

84. E.g., *Prm.* 128e, 130f., 135a; *Phd.* 100b; *Resp.* 507b.

85. Cf. *Quod omnis probus* 16.

86. Cf. *Resp.* 360d ff., 344a; *Grg.* 473b.

87. Cf. *Quod omnis probus* 6-7 where these "urbane equivalents" of ἀγαθός and κακός also occur.

88. ZELLER, 3,1, p. 443. PHILO, *De prov.*, Fg. 2(458 LCL).

899d ff. In the Near Eastern tradition this complaint appears in an Egyptian text dating from the end of the third millennium B.C.: "the gentle man has perished, /(But) the violent man has access to everybody."[89] It is a recurrent theme of the Old Testament[90] and occurs in rabbinical writings.[91]

To these views Chrysostom's discourse is opposed, and undertakes to show that "no man can be injured by another, but suffers this from himself."

Theoretical Proof (chaps. 2-11)
Chap. 2

The section that comprises the theoretical proof begins with a definition of terms, according to the Stoic practice.[92] What is ἀδικία, what is human ἀρετή, and what injures it? What seems to injure it, but does not?[93] Chrysostom starts with the Platonic echo that everything has something that injures it: iron, rust; wool, moths; our flesh, diseases.[94] What then injures the ἀρετή of a man? First the erroneous opinions will be mentioned and refuted (2.21 f.).[95]

Those in error believe that many things can injure our ἀρετή, including poverty, bodily disease, loss of possessions, slander, death, imprisonment, exile, slavery, captivity.[96]

Chrysostom, however, will demonstrate that none of these things

89. *Ancient Near Eastern Texts relating to the Old Testament,*[2] ed. JAMES B. PRITCHARD (Princeton, 1955), p. 406.

90. E.g., Job 21:7 ff; Pss. 37:35, 73; 94:3; Jer. 12:1-2.

91. *Midr. Ps.* on 37.3 (MONTEFIORE and LOEWE, *Rabbinic Anthology* no. 564); *Pirke Aboth* 4,19 (pp. 113-115, ed. R. TRAVERS HERFORD).

92. POHLENZ, 1, p. 246. Stoic rhetoric was really a kind of dialectic (cf. CICERO, *Brut.* 309, *De or.* 1.83, 3.66).

93. Similarly after the Proem PHILO explains the terms δουλεία and ἐλευθερία (16-20).

94. Cf. *Resp.* 608e-609a.

95. As has been shown in Chap. I, it is Chrysostom's regular procedure first to refute erroneous views on a subject, and then to proffer the true explanation of it. For another example see *Ad. Stag.* 1.2 (PG 47. 427).

96. This is the traditional sequence of evils to which the Stoic sage is immune (cf. DIOG. LAERT. 7.102; SVF 3, p. 17, 20 f. and p. 60, 33 ff; CICERO, *Tusc.* 3.81 f., 5.103-118; EPICTETUS 2.15). In the Stoic system such things are ἀδιάφορα (indifferent), neither good nor evil (SVF 1, pp. 47 f.; 3, pp. 28-39).

injure the sober person (νήφοντα) or his ἀρετή. In order to do so, he must briefly define human ἀρετή.

One should recall at this point that the definition of human excellence belongs to the classical Greek tradition. Plato, for example, in the *Laws* reviews earlier definitions of ἀρετή such as courage and justice, and proffers his own definition of virtue as φρόνησις.[97] The Stoics, in turn, defined virtue as τελείωσις τῆς ἑκάστου φύσεως.[98] They taught that the concept of ἀρετή applied only to human beings:[99] alone the reasonable nature of man perfects itself in virtue and moral actions (κατορθώματα).[100]

Chap. 3

Following the Stoics, who divided every virtue into a theoretical and practical aspect,[101] Chrysostom defines human ἀρετή as ἡ τῶν ἀληθῶν δογμάτων ἀκρίβεια καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὸν βίον ὀρθότης. In Chrysostm's treatise, *Sac.* 4.6,[102] the prior theoretical aspect of the definition is applied to St. Paul. It seems to mean "exact knowledge of Christian doctrine." The practical demand, ὀρθότης τοῦ βίου couched in Stoic terminology,[103] implies probity in carrying out the ethical demands of Christianity. Further on, Chrysostom gives other definitions of ἀρετή, which sound authentically Stoic: τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ κατορθώματα and τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν.[104]

This then is the peculiar excellence of a man, which should be guarded carefully.

Now Chrysostom turns to Scripture to verify his definition.[105] He uses the example of Job, who suffered so much at the hands of the devil, but was not injured.

97. *Laws* 629e-631c6; cf. *Resp.* 613b.
98. Chrysippus, SVF 3, p. 63, 13 f.; cf. p. 48,6.
99. Cf. Cicero, *Leg.* 1.8.25.
100. Pohlenz, 1, pp. 123, 128.
101. Zeller, 3, 1, pp. 242 f. Cf. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 22.24 (BA 37, 662 f.).
102. PG 48, 669.
103. SVF 3, p. 49. 1.44.
104. *Laed.* 5.22, 5.24-25.
105. *Laed.* 3.33 ff.

Chap. 4

According to the method of the diatribe, an objection now is introduced: Did not the devil injure Adam when he was expelled from paradise? The response is that the devil did not injure him, but his own ῥᾳθυμία καὶ τὸ μὴ νήφειν μηδὲ ἐγρηγορέναι·[106] If the devil was unable to defeat Job with so many efforts, how could he have conquered Adam so easily, unless the latter had already betrayed himself through his own negligence (ῥᾳθυμία).[107]

Chrysostom now moves on to the next development of the argument (4.9 ff.). If one is slandered or has his property confiscated, he has not only not been injured, but also, if he is sober (ἐὰν νήφῃ), has profited.[108] The example of the apostles is cited, who continually wrestled with hunger and thirst, and for this reason became brilliant and won much help from God. Likewise Lazarus, Joseph, and Abel were not injured by their misfortunes, but won fame and glory. Thus the argument has demonstrated more than it promised. It not only showed that no one is injured by anyone else, but also that those who pay heed to themselves greatly profit from such things.

The imaginary opponent then raises another objection: why are there punishments and Gehenna, if no one is injured or injures? The response is to recall the original argument, which states that "no one is injured." not that "no one injures."

The opponent replies: how is it possible for none to be injured, when so many injure? Chrysostom responds that he already taught this. The brothers injured Joseph, but Joseph was not injured. God does not remove retribution because of the ἀρετή of the victims, but ordains punishments for the evil of the malefactors. The rewards of philosophy are prepared for the former; the penalties of evil for the latter.

At this time a series of scriptural texts are cited, in order to prove from revelation that the above mentioned evils are not to be considered such. The quotations, out of context and with any specifically Christian allusion excised, resemble the curt moral maxims that played a regular role in ancient Greek oratory.[109] The texts are John 1:21 and 1 Tim. 6:7

106. Cf. 1 Thess. 5:6.
107. Cf. *Daemones non gubernare mundum* h. 1.2 (PG 49, 247).
108. This is a favorite paradox of Epictetus; cf. *Diat.* 3.20; 4.1.123-127.
109. On maxims see Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2.21 (1394a19-95b20). Norden, *Antike Kunstprosa,* Register s.v.

on the loss of possessions; Luke 6:26 and Matt. 5:11-12 on calumny; Heb. 11:13 (echoed) on exile; 2 Cor. 4:16 on death, and the example of John the Baptist on a violent death.

Finally he refers brusquely to a truly Christian theme: such sufferings, when unjustly brought upon someone, loose sins and work justification. But this great advantage comes only to those who bear them nobly (γενναίως).

Chap. 5

Chrysostom has arrived at the next stage of the argument: to demonstrate that the ones who inflict evils upon others are those who are really injured and abused. This is also, like the main theme, a Socratic notion, as the following excepts show:

> Injustice is always an evil and dishonour to him who acts unjustly (*Cri.* 49b).
> Doing injustice is the greatest of evils.—But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?—Certainly not.—Then you would rather suffer than do injustice?—I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would rather suffer than do (*Grg.* 469b-c).
> To wrong me and mine is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer (*Grg.* 508e4).
> We affirm that to do injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice is a lesser evil (*Grg.* 509c).

It was such a popular opinion that it became a proverb in the ancient world (μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδικεῖν),[110] and was seized upon by philosophers as a topic for debate.[111]

Here (5.8 ff.) Chrysostom argues: who is more miserable than Cain, than Herodias, than Joseph's brothers, than the devil? Their victims endured no injury, and the whole evil action turned back upon the schemers.

The imagined interlocutor then asks: what if someone is injured

110. A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (new edition, Hildesheim, 1964), p. 175.

111. E.g., Cicero, *Tusc.* 5.19.56; Epictetus 4.1.127, 5.10; Marcus Aurelius 2.1 and 9.4.

with respect to the philosophy of his soul? Should one receive injury here, the church father responds, he is injured by himself. For instance, when one has endured some abuse, and utters blasphemous words, he has been injured—not by the one who abused him, but by his own μικροψυχία, meanness of his soul.

As proof of this contention the example of Job is cited, who was not tripped up by the demon because of his nobility of soul (εὐγένεια).

Here is evidence of Chrysostom's faithful adherence to Stoic thought. Μικροψυχία is the opposite of μεγαλοψυχία, an important concept in Stoicism. Originally a subspecies of ἀνδρεία,[112] μεγαλοψυχία replaced it as the cardinal virtue, and indicates the superior attitude towards outside things of the sage.[113] Likewise εὐγένεια, nobility of soul as opposed to nobility of birth, was a concept that originated in Stoicism[114].

Chap. 6

Now Chrysostom enters into an excursus, a tirade against the life devoted to wealth, luxury and power (6.17 ff.). Such a screed is a regular element of the diatribe.[115] The immediate transition to this tirade is made in answer to an objection raised by the fictional interlocutor, who asks: "should I not blaspheme, when robbed of my possessions? I cannot give alms."

First he shows that the mention of almsgiving is just an excuse. According to 1 Kings 17:12 and Mark 12:42 f., one is not injured by having little, but benefitted, since God measures the abundance of one's zeal (προθυμία).

Then he unmasks the specious beauty of the affluent life. It is unforgivable that such a life is desirable to men. One may sample his vigorous eloquence in the following quotation: "Just as a pig wallowing

112. SVF 3, pp. 64 ff., nos. 264, 265, 269 ff.

113. Cf. Epictetus 1.9.32, 12.30; 2.5, 16.41; 4.7.11; Cicero, *Off.* 1.61-92, esp. 66 (magnitudo animi.).

114. SVF 3, p. 155, nos. 594, 597; Philo, *De sobrietate* 11. 56.

115. E.g. Horace, *Sat.* 2.3.82 ff. Cf. Geffcken, p. 38: "Vollends spricht aus allem was Johannes über den Reichtum und die Reichen bemerkt, der reine Ton der hellenischen Diatribe." Also A. Puech, *Un réformateur de la société chrétienne au IVe siècle: St. Jean Chrysostome et les moeurs de son temps* (Paris, 1891), pp. 46-61 passim.

in a muddy trough and beetles continously rolling around dung enjoy themselves and luxuriate, so those who have been made captives of φιλαργυρία. Their situation is more disgusting and the mud more ill-smelling." (6.90-94).

Chap. 7

Men are zealous for wealth because of the pleasure, honor and respect that it brings to the possessor. It does not make one wiser, more temperate, more reasonable, or implant *any other part of* ἀρετή in the soul. And if it finds any goods in the soul, it injures or uproots them and introduces the opposite.

It is significant that Chrysostom presents the Stoic position about the unity of virtue (ἀντακολουθία), according to which all virtues are inseparably bound to one another.[116]

He next proves that wealth has no true pleasure or honor or power (7.32-c.8).

Chap. 8

(1) Wealth destroys pleasure, which may be defined as the enjoyment of a preceding desire. If there is enjoyment, but no previous desire, there is no pleasure.[117] Such is the case with the wealthy, who experience constant satiety and thus cannot enjoy true pleasure.

This argumentation, familiar to the diatribe,[118] is proved by reference to Scripture.[119] Ps. 80:17: ἐκ πέτρας μέλι ἐχόρτασεν αὐτούς, is interpreted as follows: when the Israelites, overcome by the toil of their journey, were extremely thirsty, they came upon cold streams, and wishing to show their pleasure, they called the water "honey", not because its nature had changed, but because their thirst made it rival the sweetness of honey. In *De stat* 2.7[120] Chrysostom discusses the same verse, and comments that nowhere in Scripture does it say that Moses drew honey from rocks, but everywhere that he made fountains

116. SVF 3, pp. 72-74, nos. 295-304; p. 76, no. 310.
117. Cf. XENOPHON, *Mem.* 2.1.30, 33.
118. Cf. TELES, pp. 7f. Hense; CICERO, *Tusc.* 5.97-99. CHRYSOSTOM, *De stat.* 2.7 (PG 49, 44).
119. Prov. 27:7 and Ps. 80:17 LXX.
120. PG 49, 44.

of clear water therefrom. Since Scripture cannot lie, the meaning in Ps. 80:17 LXX must be that the prophet (David, the psalmist) gave the name of honey to water, in order to express the pleasure which the Israelites took in it.

Thus it is undeniable, he concludes here, that pleasure is at the table of the poor, and unpleasantness (ἀηδία) with the rich.

Chap. 9

2) Second, he proves that wealth does not create honor for its possessor. Opulence nourishes the worst passions in us: anger, vainglory, arrogance, and substitutes flattery for honor. In reality nothing creates honor like aretή.

Chap. 10

3) Third, he shows that wealth cannot bring true power to its owner. If one's desire is to avenge himself on those who have pained him, for this very reason wealth is to be avoided. To avenge oneself (ἀμύνασθαι) is such a great evil that it revokes God's philanthropy.[121]

The fictional partner in this dialogue than interjects that poverty, too, has its evils, and leads us to discontent and blasphemy.

The response is that it is not poverty that leads to blasphemy but μικροψυχία. The excursus against wealth is over, and Chrysostom has returned to the subject matter at the end of chap. 5, where the example of Job was cited. Here Lazarus is shown to be one who, because he did not injure himself through blasphemy (10.59 f.) suffered no harm, although he was so afflicted. Here it should be noted that the injury which one can sustain in his soul is denominated as the utterance of "blasphemy." Clearly this concept derives from the book of Job, which influenced Chrysostom very much. Moreover, Geffcken points out that in his homilies on Lazarus,[122] the latter is portrayed as a Stoic sage.[123] Now the same can be said of his portrayal of Lazarus here and of Job in 3.51-55. This connection between Job and the beggar Lazarus explains why Job's avoidance of blasphemy[124] could also be attributed to Lazarus.

121. Cf. Matt. 18:35.
122. PG 48, 961-1054.
123. Geffcken, p. 38.
124. Cf. Job. 1:22, 2:10.

Chap. 11

None of the things Lazarus suffered, Chrysostom continues, injured his εὐτονία, but became the basis of a greater reward, because he bore them nobly (γενναίως) and with courage (καρτερία).[125] Contrariwise, Judas did not profit from the many advantages his mind enjoyed, since his mind (γνώμη) was not receptive to ἀρετή.

Chap. 12

On the basis of the example of Judas a further corollary to the main theme is drawn: no one can help another who does not himself wish to be sober (νήφειν) and to use his own powers (τὰ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ συνεισφέρειν οἴκοθεν). It is significant that this new inference is related to Chrysostom's own distinctive theology of grace, which is described below in the analysis of chap. 15. In this respect Gregory of Nyssa's treatise, *De instituto Christiano,* written in the last decade of the fourth century, offers an important parallel. In the words of Werner Jaeger:

> Gregory's treatise may be characterized as the work in which the theology of the Eastern Church reached the culminating point of its tendency to bring the two basic elements of the Christian religion, divine grace and human effort, into perfect balance. At the same time the treatise *[De instituto Christiano]* attempted a reconciliation of the Christian concept of grace with the Hellenic ethical tradition, the classical ideal of *aretē*.[126]

Jaeger's last sentence could be applied loosely to Chrysostom's intention at this point in *Quod nemo laeditur,* and below at cc. 15.54 f. and 16.28 f., 54 ff.

Historical Proof (12.4—17.60

Chap. 12

Chrysostom introduces the historical proof with the observation

125. Note the mixture of Stoic concepts, εὐτονία (Pohlenz, 1, pp. 126, 147 f.), γενναίως, καρτερία, with the Judeo-Christian notion of reward (Montefiore and Loewe, *Rabbinic Anthology* no. 1533; Chrysostom, *Ol. Ep.* 8.3d, p. 170; 12a, p. 208).

126. Jaeger, *Two Rediscovered Works,* p. 88.

that the amazing ἱστορία of the Scriptures contains the lives of the ancients (τῶν παλαιῶν) from Adam to Christ, and depicts those tripped up and those crowned, in order to teach that no one can injure any person who does not injure himself. It is remarkable that he refers to the Scriptures, using pagan Greek nomenclature, as ἱστορία τῶν παλαιῶν. As is well known, the concept both of history and of ancient history originated with the Ionians in the sixth century B.C.[127] The French editor, Malingrey, observes that this point of the diatribe marks the synthesis between the profane culture of Chrysostom, which supplied the theme of the discourse, and the Christian culture, from which he has drawn his examples.[128] His next statements provide further illustration of his synthesis of biblical and Stoic themes.

The main theme and the new corollary are repeated: no amount of evil can shake the person who is γενναῖον (Stoic) and νήφοντα καὶ ἐγρηγορότα (scriptural);[129] and, no attention can improve one who is negligent (ῥᾴθυμος) and betrayed by himself (= Chrysostom's own ethical theory). This is illustrated by the parable of the house built upon the rock,[130] which is interpreted as ἀρετή, and the sand as ῥᾳθυμία—another clear example of his consolidation of pagan and Christian matter.

Chap. 13

The corollary theme, that no one can benefit a person who is morally negligent (ῥᾴθυμος), is now applied to *the history of* the Jews and the Ninevites in accordance with the rule of the sophistic diatribe discussed above. Though the Jewish people enjoyed great providence, and were fed miraculously on manna, nevertheless, since they were undiscerning (ἀγνώμονες), they worshipped the golden calf.

Chap. 14

The Ninevites, on the contrary, though they shared in none of

127. J. B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians* (reprint, New York, 1958), pp. 8-18. On παλαιός = ancient cf. Thucydides 1.1.3, 4.1., 13.4, 18.1; 6.6.1 (but not always, cf. 3.86.3 and Classen's edition I⁷, p. 382). Cf. Chrysostom, *De. S. Babyla* 22 S.: παλαιὰ ἱστορία.

128. *Lettre de exil,* p. 116 n. 1.

129. Cf. 1 Thess. 5:6, 1 Peter 5:8.

130. Matt. 7:24-27; Luke 6:48-49.

these advantages, repented on account of mere words,[131] and traveled through repentance to virtue. The story of the Ninevites leads to the conclusion that the sober and vigilant are not only not injured by men, but also overturn divine wrath. The miracles did not benefit the Jews, nor did the lack of them injure the Ninevites. Though the latter were barbarians, ignorant of all the divine oracles and dwelling far from Palestine, they improved in an instant because they were discerning (εὐγνώμονες).

Chap. 15

The last illustration from history is that of the three holy children (Daniel 3). Though they lived at the royal court, they refused to eat at the king's table, which was impure, because they were above the things of this life and had made their wings light with philosophy.[132]

Here Chrysostom incorporates his theology of grace, as above at 12.1-19: since the three children contributed everything from their own moral resources, God also contributed his part. Their accomplishment (κατόρθωμα, a Stoic term) was owing to their noble and courageous mind (γνώμη), which won the grace of God and enabled them to perform what they set out to do.

Chap. 16

Since they did not betray themselves, they were not injured, but became more glorious in their affliction.

Chap. 17

Contrariwise, the Jews, enjoying the religious life of their homeland, did not profit therefrom, but set up idols in the temple,[133] and sacrificed their children.[134]

Epilogue (17.61-70)

The conclusion of the argument has an impassioned tone, which

131. Cf. Jonas 3:4.
132. Cf. Plato, *Phdr.* 249c.
133. Jer. 7:30.
134. 2 Kings 16:3-4 and Is. 57:5.

suggests that the entire work was not a scholastic exercise, but designed to serve as a real consolation to his persecuted followers in Constantinople and other readers:

> Knowing these things and culling similar examples from the Holy Scriptures (for it is possible to find many such, involving various persons), do not imagine that difficulty of times or events, or necessity and force and power of tyrants suffices for a defense when we sin. I shall conclude the argument with what I said at the beginning: if one should be hurt and injured, he suffers this from himself, not from others, even if there are myriads treating him unjustly. Therefore, if he does not suffer this from himself, even if all the inhabitants of earth and sea should attack, they will not be able to harm him even a little.

The only true evil for man is sin,[135] for which there is no defense (ἀπολογία).

2. *AD EOS QUI SCANDALIZATI SUNT OB ADVERSITATES*

The thematic relationship between the diatribe, *Quod nemo laeditur,* and the treatise, *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt,* is expressly affirmed by Chrysostom in the letter to Olympias cited above (Ep. 17.4c; p. 384 M.):

> The discourse [ὁ λόγος] which I despatch to your excellence now [*Scand*]. fights the same battle as the one which I sent to you recently, *That no man is hurt but by himself.*

He refers to the diatribe again in *Scand.:*

> Do not speak to me about those who are perishing [because of the scandal.] I said in the previous discourse [λόγῳ] that no man who does not hurt himself is ever hurt by others, even if his life is in danger (15.7).

The sentence is followed by a brief development of the theme, which occupies chap. 16. Accordingly, those who perish from scandal have no one but themselves to blame, and so the thesis of *Quod nemo laeditur* is upheld in another context. Evidently, the theme of the diatribe, though Greek in origin and apologetic in character, was not chosen

135. Cf. *De stat.* h. 5.2; PG 49, 70.

fortuitously, but coincided with Chrysostom's own conviction about the imperviousness of the good man to injury.

It is necessary now to advance to an examination of *Scand.*, his last literary production, which discloses much about his apologetic method, since, as has hitherto not been recognized, the work is an apology.[136]

LITERARY GENRE

In the past the literary genre of the treatise *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt ob adversitates* has appeared problematical both to Byzantine and modern editors. Thus the most recent editor, Anne-Marie Malingrey, writes:

> Déterminer la genre littéraire auquel appartient ce texte n'est pas aussi facile qu'on pourrait le croire a première vue, malgré la richesse des classifications établies par l'ancienne rhétorique et développées par la seconde sophistique.

She believes that the discourse belongs to no known genre of early Christian literature, but is the spontaneous witness of an interior experience.[137] Knowing the importance of genre in ancient artistic literature (cf. above), her suggestion seems unlikely. At any rate it is clear that a renewed effort to understand the literary classification of the work is in order.

The various aspects which facilitate a determination of the matter will be examined. (1) First, and most obvious, is that the text is a written discourse, and not an oration to be delivered, despite the presence of numerous rhetorical devices which might suggest this.[138] From external evidence it is known that Chrysostom wrote the work in Lesser Armenia and sent it to the deaconess, Olympias, in Constantinople. In a letter written to her at the beginning of the year 407, he refers to the work as a discourse (λόγος).[139] Of course, in the literature of the time the boundaries between written and oral discourse were very blurred. All writings of the so-called second sophistic (viz., the autumnal flowering of Greek

136. The latest translation of this treatise, *Om Guds Försyn: Inledning och översättning* by Maxim Mauritsson (Malmo, 1964), was not available to me.

137. Malingrey, *Sur la providence de Dieu*, pp. 11 f., 15.

138. Listed by Malingrey, ibid., p. 12 n. 5.

139. *Ep.* 17.4c; p. 384 M.

rhetoric in the imperial epoch[140]), were intended to be *read aloud*, and only secondarily to be *read* in the modern sense. Such literature was designed for instantaneous hearing and enjoyment in a circle of friends, rather than silent reading alone in one's study. According to the expert Rohde, this held true for the productions of poets, historians, philosophers, grammarians and letter writers.[141] Most interestingly, Chrysostom states specifically that he intended the work to be read aloud by Olympias:

> Go over it unremittingly. If you have the strength, also read it aloud (καὶ ἐπὶ γλώσσης φέρε) (*Ep.* 17.4c; p. 384M)

Thus one need not be surprised to find the orator at his best in this work, though it is ostensibly a written discourse. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated below, the work is an apologetic treatise. According to Jordan, the apology and apologetic treatise has a special sophistic-rhetorical character:

> Der Apologet fühlt sich mehr oder weniger als Redner vor einer grossen Versammlung. Redner war er wirklich oder fingierte er wenigstens zu sein in der "Apologie." ... Und der apologetische Traktat wiederum behält, wenn er noch nicht ganz zur Abhandlung verblasst ist, immer etwas von dem Charakter der lebendigen Rede...[142]

Since the same oratorical character marks Chrysostom's apologetic treatise, *De S. Babyla*, but is absent in his consolatory discourse, *Ad Stagirium a daemone vexatum*, further weight is lent to Jordan's statement.

2) Second, and less evident, is that our text is a treatise rather than a letter or epistle. True, the ancients hardly distinguished, if at all, a long letter from a treatise.[143] Dionysius of Alexandria, for example,

140. Erwin Rohde, *Der griechische Roman und seine Vorläufer* (1914; reprint, Hildesheim, 1960), pp. 310 ff.

141. Ibid., pp. 326 f. Cf. Jordan, p. 309: "Man kann ja manchmal nur sehr schwer scheiden [in early Christian literature] zwischen Predigt und Abhandlung; Tractatus war z. B. lateinischer Ausdruck für Predigt." Thus R. C. Jebb writes: "In Greek and Roman antiquity, that prose which was written with a view to being *spoken* stood in closest relation with that prose which was written with a view to being *read.*" (*The Attic Orators* [1875; reprint, New York, 1962] 1.lxxi).

142. Jordan, p. 211.

143. Malingrey cites H.-I. Marrou, "La technique de l'édition à l'époque patristique," *Vigiliae Christianae* 3 (1959) 221 f. (*Sur la Prov.*, p. 13 n. 2).

gave to his treatise, Περὶ φύσεως, the form of a letter, directed to his son Timothy.[144] Chrysostom, however, apparently did make this distinction, as Tillemont has sagaciously pointed out.[145] He does not call his letters, no matter how long, *discourses*, but rather *long letters*:

> Ἤδη σοι τρεῖς ἔπεμψα ἐπιστολάς ... πολυστίχους (Ol. Ep. 9.4d; p. 234 M.)
> συνεχεῖς σοι καὶ πυκνὰς καὶ μακρὰς πέμπειν ἐπιστολάς (Ol. Ep. 8. 11b; p. 204 M.).

Thus it is certain that our text is not a letter or epistle, since he refers to it as a λόγος.[146]

3) Third and most significant is to determine, if possible, the specific kind of treatise represented by our text. Now Malingrey has shown convincingly that the work is not a treatise on providence (despite the fact that she has chosen to retitle it, *Sur la Providence de Dieu*). Though certain passages of it resemble classical exposés on providence, the whole lacks the serene tone found in the classical works. For example, the *De providentia* of Seneca, which was also written in exile, contains no allusions to personal experience. This is because the practice of Stoicism was to raise oneself above individual cases and to consider problems in general.[147] Contrariwise, Chrysostome makes a number of references to actuality[148] and alludes to definite individuals under the veil of rhetoric:

> Those who hid under the mask of piety and whose meekness was feigned = perhaps Acacius of Beroea, Severian of Gabala, Theophilus of Alexandria (19.13-14). The evil priest who ravages the flock = the new patriarch Atticus, who attacked the partisans of John. The magistrate exhibiting much cruelty = Optatus, the prefect of Constantinople, who persecuted John's followers (20.1; cf. Sozomen 8.24).

In general, the French editor concludes, the emotion of the last chapters, which depict the suffriengs and courage of the church at Constantinople (22-24), show that the discourse, *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt,* cannot

144. Johannes Quasten, *Patrology* 2 (Westminster, Md., 1964), p. 103.
145. Lenain de Tillemont, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles* 11 (Venice, 1732), p. 621a (Note C).
146. *Ep.* 17.4c; p. 384 M.
147. René Waltz., ed., *Sénèque, Dialogues* (Paris, 1965), p. 6.
148. E.g. 11.4,5; 12.7.

be a classical treatise on providence, detached from historical contingencies.[149]

With this conclusion the present writer concurs, but believes that it is possible to demonstrate that the work is an apologetic treatise, as was recognized by an unknown Byzantine scholar, whose labors are recorded in codex Cantabrigiensis Coll. Trinitatis 192 (s. XI), in which the treatise is entitled ἀπὸ τῆς ἐξορίας ἀπολογία πρὸς τοὺς σκανδαλισθέντας κτλ. The following evidence is available to support the contention, that the work is an apologetic treatise.

THE TITLE

The earliest version of the title is given by George of Alexandria (ca. 620-630) in his biography of Chrysostom, printed by Henry Savile in his edition of Chrysostom's works.[150] As cited by Malingrey (p. 39 n. 1) it reads:

> (λόγον) πρὸς τοὺς σκανδαλισθέντας ἐπὶ ταῖς παρανομίαις ταῖς γινομέναις καὶ τῇ τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ πολλῶν ἱερέων διώξει καὶ διαστροφῇ.

With this contrast the title printed by Malingrey on the basis of the Byzantine manuscripts:

> 1 πρὸς τοὺς σκανδαλιζομένους ἐπὶ ταῖς παρανομίαις
> 2 ταῖς γινομέναις καὶ τῇ τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ πολλῶν
> 3 ἱερέων διώξει καὶ διαστροφῇ καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ
> 4 Θεοῦ προνοίας καὶ περὶ ἀκαταλήπτου.

On the basis of Malingrey's critical apparatus (p. 52), it is possible to make several observations. On line 1, though only one of the nine manuscripts cited in the apparatus has the present passive participle (σκανδαλιζομένους), she prints this reading in preference to the aorist passive participle (σκανδαλισθέντας), read by the remaining manuscripts and George of Alexandria.

In favor of her choice are Chrysostom's words in the Prologue 2: τοὺς κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην σκανδαλιζομένους θεραπεύειν ἐσπουδακότες, and his constant use of σκανδαλίζεσθαι in the present tense with reference to his audience.[151] Only once does he use the aorist tense of

149. Malingrey, *Sur la Prov.*, pp. 13 f.
150. Eton, 1612, 8, 157-265. Cf. Hans Georg Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich* (Munich, 1959), p. 460.
151. Prol. 2; chaps. 1.3; 4.3; 10.16; 11.2,4,5; 12.7; 14.16 f.; 15.3 f.; 18.1; 19.13; 20.1.

this verb, and then with regard to his persecutors, who *have scandalized* so many people (24.6). In letters to Olympias, however, he uses the aorist tense of the verb in a general sense: "the Lord is able to correct those who have been scandalized"; τοὺς σκανδαλισθέντας διορθῶσαι.[152] Otherwise, throughout this treatise the imperfect and aorist tense of σκανδαλίζεσθαι are reserved for events of past history, e.g., Abraham was not scandalized, when ordered to sacrifice his son (10.8).[153]

On the other hand, his constant use of the present tense of this verb in reference to the present scandal could have led a Byzantine scribe to change the tense of the participle in the title. For this reason plus the weight of the manuscript tradition plus the testimony of George of Alexandria, the present writer would prefer the aorist tense (σκανδαλισθέντας).

On lines three and four, the phrase καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ προνοίας, is read by only one (T) of the nine manuscripts cited by Malingrey in the apparatus, as this manuscript only employed the present participle σκανδαλιζομένους. In view of this fact, and because the title of George of Alexandria does not contain these words, they should not be included as part of the original title.

On line four, the phrase καὶ περὶ ἀκαταλήπτου is given by all manuscripts cited in the apparatus except one, codex Cantabrigiensis Coll. Trinitatis 192 (Δ).[154] In this case it seems necessary to follow MS Δ, which is a unique witness in other respects,[155] and to omit the phrase. It is easy to explain the presence of the phrase, since the constant tradition of tenth and eleventh century manuscripts presents our treatise as the ninth homily *De incomprehensibili.* Clearly these disparate texts were grouped together by ancient scholars because they share a common theme, divine incomprehensibility.[156] Similarly, MSS FVP, K, OX read καὶ περὶ ἀκαταλήπτου καὶ κατὰ Ἰουδαίων λόγος θ' apparently because in some manuscripts the homilies, *Adversus Judaeos,* follow the homilies *De Incomprehensibili,* and our treatise, as has been stated, was classified as the ninth homily *De Incomprehensibili.*[157]

152. *Ep.* 7.3b; p. 142 M. Also *Ep.* 7.5c; p. 154 M.

153. Also chap. 10.11,17,28,36,43; chap. 14.5 f., 8 ff., 16; chap. 15.6 (bis); chap. 24.4.6.

154. In the apparatus to the title on p. 52 read (5) ἀκαταλήπτου om Δ (cf. p. 37 n. 1).

155. MALINGREY, *Sur la Prov.,* p. 16.

156. Ibid., pp. 30 f.

157. Ibid., p. 37.

For these reasons it is likely that the earliest and, probably, the original form of the title is the one recorded by George of Alexandria, which contains no reference to providence or incomprehensibility, and makes it clear that we have not to do with a dogmatic treatise on providence. George's version of the title is more consonant with the work being an apology, addressed to a specific group at a definite point in history.[158] The present writer is led to think that this title was given by Chrysostom himself, because of the particular historical details given: πρὸς τοὺς σκανδαλισθέντας ἐπὶ ταῖς παρανομίαις ταῖς γινομέναις καὶ τῇ τοῦ λαοῦ καὶ πολλῶν ἱερέων διώξει καὶ διαστροφῇ. The circumstances which occasioned the scandal are, it is plain, here given from the modest point of view of Chrysostom.[159] Otherwise, the major cause of scandal, the deposition and exile of the holy patriarch, would surely have been mentioned—if the author of the title were any other than the victim himself, who also forebore (except for one subdued reference in 9.6) to mention his deposition and exile anywhere in the treatise.

THEME

The second indication that *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt* is an apologetic treatise is its theme: to defend God's ways to those who have been scandalized by the distressing events transpiring in the church at Constantinople.[160] In order to appreciate more fully that his theme, to "justify the ways of God to men," is apologetic, one must first examine the concept of scandal.

The word σκάνδαλον is purely biblical Greek. It occurs first in the Septuagint to represent the Hebrew word for "snare," and means a trap or anything which causes one to stumble.[161] Chrysostom defines τὰ

158. The use of πρός in the title implies that the work was addressed to someone. Many early Christian apologies (e.g., those of Tatian, Miltiades, Isidore of Pelusium) bore the title Πρὸς Ἕλληνας.

159. On his humility, see George of Alexandria in Photius, *Bibl.* 96 (2, p. 51 Henry).

160. Cf. Seneca, *De prov.* 1.1: causam deorum agam. John Milton, *Paradise Lost* 23-25: "That, to the height of this great argument, I may assert Eternal Providence, and justify the ways of God to men."

161. Joseph Henry Thayer, *A Greek English Lexicon of the New Testament,* s.v. Peter Stockmeier, *Theologie und Kult des Kreuzes bei Johannes Chrysostomus* (Trier, 1966), p. 142 lists additional bibliography.

σκάνδαλα of Matt. 18:7 as "hindrances from the right road".[162]

The notion of scandal in other works of Chrysostom

Throughout his writings the concept of scandal appears in two different senses. First is the meaning of "discredit to religion occasioned by the conduct of a religious person".[163] This kind of scandal is the subject of his work, *Contra eos qui subintroductas habent virgines* (A.D. 397), addressed to priests who kept consecrated virgins in their homes as housekeepers. Those clerics disclaimed responsibility when, as they thought, others were scandalized unreasonably thereby. To counter their negligence, Chrysostom cites the example of St. Paul, who urged us to refrain from an act, even when the concomitant scandal was owing to human weakness and not to the action itself.[164] He then gives a rule of thumb about scandal, based on the example of Christ: we shall not escape punishment for scandalizing others, except when the profit that comes from scandal is greater than the injury. Thus in Matt. 15:12 and 14, Christ is unconcerned with the scandalized, since a greater benefit is involved, namely, the higher, spiritual form of worship. On the other hand, in Matt. 17:24 and 27 he is anxious to avoid scandalizing, since no benefit would accrue and possibly injury to his mission.[165]

Furthermore, such scandal "opens the mouths of unbelievers" against the church, and gives every member of it a bad reputation.[166] In h. 25.2 on 1 Cor.[167] Chrysostom expatiates on this point. The one who scandalizes a brother in the church is despised and mocked as a hypocrite by the Jews and Greeks. Moreover, one should avoid scandalizing not only his Christian brothers, but also non-Christians. Since Christians are meant to be light and leaven and salt,[168] they should draw the unbelievers to themselves, not chase them away. The words of 1 Cor. 10:33, "Even as I please all men in all things, not seeking mine own profit, but the profit of many, that they may be saved," are interpreted

162. *In Matt.* h. 59.1; PG 58, 574.
163. *Oxford English Dictionary,* s.v.
164. 1 Cor. 8:13, 10:33.
165. *Contra eos qui sub. hab. virg.* 3-4; PG 47, 498-500. Cf. *In Matt.* h. 51.3; PG 58, 514. *Quod reg. fem.* 5; PG 47, 522.
166. Ibid., 4; p. 500.
167. PG 61, 208.
168. Cf. Matt. 5:14, 13:33, 5:13.

to mean that Christians are responsible for any injury of conscience to Greeks and Jews. Thus scandal within the church is seen to affect not only the Christian community, but also the "outsiders," pagans and Jews. This observation had already appeared in the *First Epistle* of Clement, where the effect of scandal in the church is viewed as twofold: occasioning the faithful to doubt and the pagans to blaspheme (46.9 and 47.7).

The second facet of scandal dealt with by Chrysostom may be defined as "something that hinders reception of the faith or obedience to the divine law; an occasion of unbelief or moral lapse".[169] The scandal that challenges faith is discussed in an exegesis of Rom. 9:33:[170] "Behold I lay in Sion a stumblingstone (λίθον προσκόμματος) and rock of offence (σκανδάλου): and whosoever believeth on him shall not be ashamed." Here, Chrysostom writes, to stumble is to disbelieve; "stumblingstone" and "rock of offence" are said with reference to the mind (γνώμη) and end state (τέλος) of those who have not believed. Stumbling comes from not paying strict attention to the object in hand; in the case of the Jews, stumbling was owing to their regard for the law.[171] The Holy Spirit gives the grace of knowledge which permits us to overcome our disbelief.[172] As for the cross, though it seems to be a thing of scandal,[173] nonetheless it does not scandalize but draws humanity to it.[174]

The most important aspect of this second type of scandal is for Chrysostom the problem of the sufferings of the just. His ideas on this subject are found developed in the first homily *De statuis,* where he writes that it is necessary to find the solution of why saints (ἅγιοι) encounter disease, poverty, hunger, bonds, torture, contumely, and slander, in order to have a precise and manifest defense (ἀπολογίαν) against those wishing to accuse God and his providence. Many people inquire why a good man suffers terrible things and God permits it. An explanation (λόγον) is in order for all these things, so that we ourselves may not be perplexed, and may not overlook others who are scandalized thereby.[175]

169. *Oxford English Dictionary,* s.v.
170. Cf. Is. 8:14 and 28:16.
171. *In Rom.* h. 16.10; PG 60, 564.
172. *In Matt.* h. 56.4; PG 58, 554.
173. Cf. 1 Cor. 1:23.
174. *In 1 Cor.* h. 4.3; PG 61, 34.
175. *De stat.* h. 1.5; PG 49, 23.

Note that the attempt to explain the sufferings of the just constitutes an apology (or defense) for God and his providence against those who accuse him and are scandalized on this account. It is in this sense that the treatise, *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt,* is an apology.

Chrysostom now proceeds to give a series of eight (really eleven) reasons for the affliction of the saints. Because there are so many discoverable reasons (προφάσεις) for the misfortunes of the saints, there can be no forgiveness or defense (ἀπολογία) for those who are scandalized therefrom. Below he adds that by finding reasons to explain the distress of the saints, we are not in the position of the many, who have to say οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν οἶδεν, a proverb referring to the inscrutibility of divine actions.[176] The causes which he will enumerate are not the invention (ἐπίνοια) of human reasonings but the revelation (ἀπόφασις) of Scripture. As such these will be illustrated from Scripture, so that his argument will be more trustworthy and more firmly rooted in the souls of his audience.[177]

The following are the reasons for the affliction of the just, together with the scriptural texts which embody them. (1) Such hardships teach moderation and humility. The origin of this notion is the text of 2 Cor. 12:7: "And lest I should be exalted above measure through the abundance of the revelations, there was given to me a thorn in the flesh ..."[178]. (2) The second reason is that the strength of God is shown in the weakness of his saints. Unbelievers hold that the God who permits these things is weak, and, unable to snatch his own from dangers, allows them to be afflicted continuously. But Paul says that these happenings do not convict him of weakness, but show his power the more: "my strength is made perfect in weakness".[179] As further proof, the story of Paul's imprisonment in Philippi is cited.[180]

(3) Thirdly, if the saints did not suffer these things, people would have suspected that they were above human nature. In illustration 2 Cor. 12:6 is quoted: "For though I would desire to glory, I shall not be a fool ... but now I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth me to be, or that he heareth of me." From accounts in

176. Cf. Euripides, IT 476-478. *De stat.* h. 1.10; p. 30.
177. *De stat.* h. 1.6; p. 23.
178. *De stat.* h. 1.6; p. 24.
179. 2 Cor. 12:9.
180. Acts 16:23 ff. *De stat.* h. 1.7; pp. 24 f.

Acts,[181] it is evident that the devil was persuading men to view the apostles as gods. In times past he created idolatry this way: men who performed good works (built cities, and/or won wars) received temples and altars and were worshiped as gods by the multitude. The entire catalog of Greek gods consists of such men.[182]. Not wanting this to happen in the case of the saints, God allowed them to encounter many tribulations, which persuaded the bystanders that those working wonders were human beings.[183]

4) Another reason the saints are subject to trials is so that it will be manifest that they do not serve God for a reward. This calumny, Chrysostom reports, is brought against the just by many profligates, when summoned to the toils of virtue. It is the accusation which the devil brought against Job.[184]

5) Again, the community of sufferings brings some comfort to all who encounter afflictions.[185]

6) Also such sufferings reinforce the doctrine of the resurrection. When a just man passes away, after having suffered many terrible things, one is constrained to think about the judgment in the next world. For scriptural proof verses 19 and 32 of 1 Cor. 15 are cited:

> If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.
>
> If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not? (*De stat.* h. 1.8-9; p. 27)

The next reason (7) seems to be a repetition of the third one. If Peter and Paul were not afflicted with sufferings, we would dismiss their virtue as superhuman. The conformity of sufferings shows the identity of natures.[186]

181. Acts 3:12, 14:11-13.
182. The Euhemerist theory, that the gods were human beings divinized after death, was held by other Greek Fathers: Clement of Alexandria, *Prot.* 30; Athenagoras, *Leg.* 29 (cf. J. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten,* pp. 225 ff.); Theodoret, *Cur.* 3.24-33 and 8.12-28.
183. *De stat.* h. 1.7; p. 25.
184. Cf. Job. 1:9 f., 2:3 LXX; *De stat.* h. 1.8; p. 26.
185. Cf. Matt. 5:11-12, 1 Thess. 2:14, Heb. 11:36-38; *De stat.* h. 1.8; p. 27. Cf. Seneca, *De prov.* 6.3 (p. 27 Waltz): "Quare quaedam dura patiuntur? Ut alios pati doceant: nati sunt in exemplar."
186. Cf. James 5:17 and Wisdom 7:1, quoted as Καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπός εἰμι ὁμοιοπαθὴς ὑμῖν.

8) By such sufferings we are taught to consider happy not those who enjoy repose, but those afflicted for the sake of God.[187]

9) Affliction makes the afflicted more approved (δοκιμωτέρους).[188]

10) Finally, in suffering we lay aside any taint of sin.[189]

11) We multiply our rewards (Rom. 8:18).

The exposition of so many causes for the distress of the saints precludes being scandalized when a virtuous and God-pleasing man suffers terrible things.[190] In conclusion Chrysostom urges man to take a doxological attitude toward suffering: we should not demand an accounting from God of these occurrences, but glorify (δοξάσωμεν) him in all things.[191]

From this discussion it is clear that the sufferings of the just play a large role in the second type of scandal, designated as the challenge to faith.

The Notion of Scandal in Scand.

From his contemporary letters to Olympias we learn that many were scandalized by his deposition and exile, and the ensuing persecution of his followers in Constantinople.[192] Other ancient sources relate the exact nature of the events, which caused the scandal. It was the oriental bishops, not the weak emperor, Arcadius, or the passionate empress, Eudoxia, whom Bury describes as "the instrument of unscrupulous ecclesiastics [rather] than the directress of a conspiracy against a man whose probity she certainly respected,"[193] who were responsible for these evils, including the frustrating of an investigatory council summoned by pope Innocent. The scandal resided in the fact that for the first time *catholic* bishops used secular power nakedly to achieve their ecclesiastical ambitions. "It is the one [controversy] in

187. Cf. 1 Cor. 4:11, Heb. 12:6, Ps. 144: 15 of which Chrysostom offers an original interpretation.

188. According to Rom. 5:3-5 and Sir. 2:5.

189. Luke 16:25. Cf. *Quod nemo laeditur* 4.62-65. Montefiore and Loewe, *A Rabbinic Anthology,* no. 1539.

190. *De stat.* h. 1.9; pp. 28 f.

191. *De stat.* h. 1.10; p. 29.

192. *Ep.* 7.3a, 3b (p. 142 M.), 4a (p. 146), 9.4d (p. 234).

193. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire,* 1, p. 159.

which it is least possible to find any reasons beyond motives of official ambition or of personal antipathy."[194] The pope recognized this, and broke communion with the leading opponents of Chrysostom (Theophilus, Atticus, Porphyrius, etc.), thereby dividing the Christian world for the first time into east and west. Though called upon by the pope to call an ecumenical council to reexamine the case, the western emperor, Honorius, took no decisive action, since he was preoccupied with fending off Alaric and the Visigoths.[195]

A literary memorial of these events is preserved in what Facundus of Hermiane.[196] calls the "enormous and horrible" book, written by Theophilus of Alexandria against Chrysostom and translated into Latin by St. Jerome[197] In this work the saint is described as a mangy, impious plague carrier and an insane tyrant, who has sold his soul to the devil in adultery.[198]

Thus the Machiavellian tactics and brutal actions of ambitious eastern prelates, which culminated in the death of the greatest Christian leader of the day, caused a scandal that shook the universal church:

> It dealt a blow to Christian morality and ecclesiastical discipline from which the Church at Constantinople never recovered, and which caused a throb of pain from one end of Christendom to the other; for in spite of all differences and divisions, Christendom was one then, so that, if one member suffered, all the members suffered with it; and what was done and said, and thought and felt, in the Church of Alexandria, or Antioch, or Constantinople, was not unknown or unregarded by the Churches of Rome or Milan, and through them made its impress on the Churches even of Gaul and Spain.[199]

This is the context in which Chrysostom wrote his treatise "to heal the scandalized throughout the world" (Prol. 2). Like other early Christian apologies, his work was called forth by life itself, and the actual resis-

194. Alice Gardner in CMH 1, p. 489.

195. Chrysostomus Baur, *John Chrysostom and His Time,* tr. M. Gonzaga (Westminster, Maryland, 1960), 2, chap. 35, pp. 396 ff.

196. *Pro defensione trium capitulorum* 6.5; PG 67, 767 f.

197. *Ep.* 113; 6, pp. 43 f. and 165 f. Labourt.

198. Baur 2, p. 329.

199. W. R. W. Stephens, *Saint Chrysostom: His Life and Times* (London, 1872), pp. 374 f.

tance of existing religious and political conditions.[200]

It has already been shown that Chrysostom deals with two types of scandal in his other writings:

1. "discredit to religion occasioned by the conduct of a religious person;" and
2. "something that hinders reception of the faith or obedience to the divine law; an occasion of unbelief or moral lapse," specifically the crucified Messiah (cf. Rom. 9:33) and the suffering of the saints.

Let us now consider his approach to scandal in our treatise. He does not concern himself with the first kind of scandal, viz., the disrepute into which unworthy ecclesiastics had brought the church, especially before pagans and Jews.[201] Rather, he emphasizes the positive results of the situation, and especially the affirmative benefits to the pagans (22.1-16). In fact, it is known that, as a result of the synod of the Oak and his first exile (June-July 403), his popularity with the Jews had increased. For in an extemporaneous speech delivered on his return, he remarked:

> Behold what great results have been wrought by the stratagems of my enemies. They have augmented your zeal, inflamed your affectionate longing for me, and procured me lovers in hundreds. Formerly, I was beloved by my own people only; now even the Jews pay me respect. My enemies hoped to sever me from my own friends; and, instead, they have brought even aliens into our ranks. (Socrates 6.16. Tr. Stephens, pp. 336 f.)

Certainly his positive approach in this treatise was also owing to his aim of curing the scandalized, rather than fomenting their wounds.[202]

He is, therefore, largely concerned with the second type of scandal, the affront to faith. His understanding of the genesis of such scandal, that it comes from the weakness of the scandalized, and not from the events themselves, is the same as in his other writings. Thus he discourses at length upon the scandal of the cross (15-17) and the sufferings

200. Jordan, p. 214.

201. As in *Ol. Ep.* 8.10c; p. 200 M. Bury, *History of the Later Roman Empire*, 1, pp. 156 f. Stephens, p. 356. Though this would seem to be the particular type of scandal at hand, he directly refers to it only at 24.4,6.

202. Many of his letters to Olympias, written at the same time, also aim to console and comfort (so *Ep.* 2.1b, p. 110. *Ep.* 5.1c, p. 124. *Ep.* 7.1a, p. 132. *Ep.* 8.1a, p. 158).

of the apostles (14), events which epitomize this aspect of scandal.[203] In justifying the afflictions of the saints, he relies mostly upon reason, as one would expect in an apologetic treatise, in contradistinction to his treatment of the same theme in the first homily *De statuis*.

STRUCTURE

The third element of *Scand.* which reveals that it is an apology in its structure. To facilitate the following remarks about literary structure, an outline of the treatise is appended below.

Outline of Scand.

A. Introduction (Prologue, chap. 1)
  1) Aim of the treatise: to heal those afflicted with the disease of scandal
  2) Method

B. Cause of the scandal: περιεργία (2-4)

C. Remedy (cc. 5-24)
  1) Belief in divine providence (5-8.13)
    a. Introduction (5)
    b. Demonstration from Scripture (6)
    c. Demonstration *ex operibus* (7-8.13)
      1. The cosmos (7.2-39)
      2. History (7.39-8.13)
  2) Other arguments to cure scandal, which presuppose belief in providence (8.14-24)
    a. One must wait for the end (τέλος) of events (8.14-11)
    b. The nature of scandal (12-18)
      1. Why God permits scandals (12)
      2. The source of scandal is subjective, not objective: it comes from the weakness of humanity and not from the events themselves (12.7-18)
        i. A noble soul is sufficient in itself for virtue, and does not need a teacher (13).

203. Also in *Ol. Ep.* 7.3b-5e, pp. 142-54.

ii. The example of the apostolic church (14-15.6) shows:
(a) That no man is hurt but by himself (15.7-16).
iii. The example of the cross (17)
iv. Conclusion (18)

c. The prize of martyrdom, and other positive results of these events (19)
d. The nature of suffering
1. Trials and sufferings are the hallmark of the apostolic life (20.1-7)
2. Ineffable reasons for suffering (20.8)
3. Παραδοξοποιία (20.8-10)
4. The *agōn* (21)
e. The benefit to pagans from these happenings (22.1-16)
f. The benefit to the church at Constantinople: these events are the sign of its approbation (22.17-23)
g. The punishment of the guilty (24)

As a glance at the outline will show, the work has an artistic construction (hitherto unrecognized), typical of certain apologies.[204] It ends with the customary conclusion of apologies "to the Greeks" concerning the rewards of the just and the punishment of sinners.[205]

Most significant, the medical theme of therapeutic (θεραπεία, θεραπεύειν) which, as the outline shows, constitutes the overall plan of the treatise, is common to other Greek apologies. Among these are the *Paedagogus* of Clement of Alexandria (1.1), Origen's *Contra Celsum* (8.51), the Πανάριον or *Medicine Chest* of Epiphanius of Salamis and Chrysostom's *Adversus Oppugnatores vitae monasticae* 1.2 f. and *Adversus Judaeos* 1.1. The motif was further developed during the pagan reaction in the fourth century. Porphyry speaks of Christianity as a disease,[206] while Julian the Apostate invoked the aid of the pagan god, Asclepius, to heal the Galileans, whom he considered pestiferous.[207] The

204. Jordan, p. 308.

205. E.g., Hippolytus, Πρὸς Ἕλληνας καὶ πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἢ καὶ περὶ τοῦ παντὸς (cf. O. Bardenhewer, *Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur* [1914; reprint, Darmstadt, 1962] 2, pp. 571 f.). Commodian, *Carmen apologeticum*. Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* 7. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 21-22. Theodoret, *Curatio* 11.

206. Apud Theodoret, *Cur.* 12.96.

207. P. de Labriolle, *La réaction païenne* (Paris, 1934), pp. 406 ff. The accusation of being "diseased" and noxious was made against Christians very early (cf. Acts 24:5. Pliny, *Ep.* 10.96.9: "superstitionis istius contagio").

accusation was then turned back against Hellenism by Theodoret of Cyrus, in his Ἑλληνικῶν θεραπευτικὴ παθημάτων ἢ Εὐαγγελικῆς ἀληθείας ἐξ Ἑλληνικῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπίγνωσις, which Tillemont called "la dernière et la plus belle apologie du christianisme.[208] This work undertook to heal the pagans of their incredulity and dispose them to the humble reception of the truth.[209] Theodoret makes extensive use of the theme of therapy in the Prologue (16 f.), Book 1 (1-9, 19, 87, 127), Book 4 (3 f., 28) and briefly at the end (Book 12, 95-98). Like Chrysostom in our treatise (Prol. 4), he affirms that the only cure for such sickness is that of the λόγος (*Cur.* 4.3). Since there are many Chrysostomic echoes in Theodoret's apology (e.g., 1.3, 5, 7), it may be that the notion of therapeutics is one of them. At any rate it is certain that the notion of θεράπεια which is used in our treatise belongs to Greek Christian apologetics.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the title, theme and structure, it has been shown that there is much in favor of (and nothing inconsistent with) considering the treatise, *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt*, an apology. At this point one may add that to the trained ear the general tone of the work is apologetic. In comparison with the letters to Olympias, which were composed at the same time and circumstances, though some of the same themes appear (e.g., scandal), there is a different tone and emphasis. Whereas Olympias, presumably, is persuaded of the verities of the Christian faith such as providence, in the treatise these points are systematically demonstrated. Malingrey writes aptly in this connection:

> Dans le texte que nous étudions, Jean discute plus qu'il n'exhorte. Il s'agit essentiellement de réduire à néant l'orgueilleuse suffisance de l'homme, de lui faire admettre l'utilité de la souffrance et de l'aider à en tirer profit. D'où vient ce ton passionné, cette force contraignante? D'une culture littéraire qui rendait habile à convaincre, sans doute, mais aussi d'une expérience personnelle quotidiennement renouvelée qui veut éclairer «tous ceux qui, de par le monde, souffrent du scandale."[210]

208. Quoted by Pierre Canivet, *Théodoret de Cyr: Thérapeutique des maladies helléniques*, Sources chrétiennes no. 57 (Paris, 1958) 1, p. 46, n. 1.

209. Idem, *Histoire d'une entreprise apologétique au Vesiècle* (Paris, n.d.), p. 115.

210. Malingrey, *Sur la prov.*, pp. 23 f.

The combination of a carefully arranged structure of sophisticated arguments, based largely upon reason, with an emotive and impassioned zeal in working them out, marks Chrysostom the apologist at his best. Recalling Aristotle's distinction[211] between λόγος and ἦθος as means of proof in rhetoric, it may be observed that while his rational arguments appeal to the mind, his flame and vehemence in defending them work on another level to convince us of the truth.

The treatise is directed to all the scandalized, which must include pagans (and Jews, one suspects) as well as Christians. There is internal evidence that pagans are also being addressed. For a large section is devoted to proving the existence of providence (5-8.13). From his treatise, *Ad Stagirium,* we know that the existence of providence was accepted *de fide* by Christians of the day.[212] Further, as has been already noticed, the chapters which deal with suffering (20-21) show a totally different approach from his treatment of the same subject in h. 1 *de statuis*. Finally, we note that he avoids mentioning the fall in chap. 8 and utilizes instead the Greek concept of natural law.[213] Other evidence intimating that pagans are being addressed is given below.

ANALYSIS

Chrysostom begins the treatise with a general statement of his purpose and method.

Purpose (Prologue)

When physicians desire to heal someone sick, they must visit him in person in order to practice their art. But Chrysostom, who aims to heal all persons scandalized throughout the world, does not need to go into their houses or to ask them to expend money on their cure. It does not matter whether they are rich or poor, or situated at the ends of the

211. *Rhet.* 1.2, p. 1356 a1-4.
212. *Stag.* 1.2; PG 47, 427.
213. Cf. Frans van de Paverd, *Zur Geschichte der Messliturgie in Antiocheia und Konstantinopel gegen Ende des vierten Jahrhunderts: Analyse der Quellen bei Johannes Chrysostomos,* Orientalia Christiana Analecta 187 (Rome, 1970), pp. 481, 485 f. Contrariwise, in h. 27.1 on Genesis (PG 53, 240 f.) the fall is mentioned in connection with original sin.

earth: he can, situated in one place, effect their cure without instruments or drugs.

The comparison of the physician, common to writers of the second sophistic,[214] goes back to the Stoics, who joined ethics and medicine and conceived of philosophy as "therapeutic of the soul."[215] Chrysippus, Galen and others wrote theatises on therapy for the maladies (πάθη) of the soul.[216]

The remedy which he will employ is that of λόγος, more effective than any other.[217] The eulogy of the curative power of λόγος that follows is in the Stoic tradition and recalls the verses of Aeschylus[218] cited by Cicero.[219] In *De sacerdotio* 4.3-5 Chrysostom had earlier expounded the important role of λόγος in Christian apologetics. Here λόγος is said to be able "to check the foul streams of evil reasonings (λογισμοί)" (Prol. 4). As usual, he depreciates the "reasonings" of man.[220]

Finally, he sends his work along to all, and trusts that all will enjoy therapy, who consider what is said with strict attention (ἀκρίβεια) and goodwill (εὐγνωμοσύνη), which, as we know from *In Gen.* h. 4.5,[221] are two necessary ingredients for the successful understanding of the Christian religion.

Method (Chap. 1)

In this chapter he explains his apologetic method more fully. The nature of his remedy is to heal the present disease, and to be a prophylactic against other πάθη.

For this notion, as for the image of the physician, he depends upon

214. Examples from the second sophistic are given by Malingrey, p. 54, n. 1.
215. Pohlenz, 1, p. 150; 2, p. 82.
216. SVF 3, p. 113, no. 461.9-11.
217. Gorgias of Leontini (d. 376 B.C.) is traditionally known as the discoverer of the power of λόγος. In his *Encomium of Helen* he wrote that λόγος is to the mind what drugs are to the body (*Hel.* 14; DK 2, p. 292). On the importance of λόγος in Greek culture see Jebb, 1, p. lxxviii.
218. P.V. 379.
219. *Tusc.* 3.31.76.
220. Sometimes, however, he speaks positively of λογισμοί: *Sac.* 6.12; PG 48, 687. *Stag.* 1.1; PG 47, 426 (cf. 4 Macc. 1:1); and λογισμός (= faculty of reason) as in *In Gen.* h. 4.5 (PG 53, 44 καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἀνατείνῃς) and here in *Scand.* 6.2.
221. PG 53, 44.

the Stoics, who held that the philosophic life depended upon the health of the λόγος, and when this was absent the person fell prey to passions (πάθη). To cure the diseased soul, the Stoics, beginning with Chrysippus, employed a double method: prophylaxis and de facto cure.[222]

Then he reiterates that his remedy will be effective only if the scandalized desire to learn and keep what is said. The cure cannot be worked by necessity and force (ἀνάγκῃ καὶ βίᾳ) upon one who does not want it and does not accept the divine oracles (Scripture).

Whereas in the Prologue the cure was described generally as λόγος, at this point it is specifically said to be composed of two elements: (1) the divine Scriptures and (2) empirical experience: τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀποδείξεως (1.5). In this way correction (διόρθωσις)[223] will be available to those who do not accept the Scriptures—if they desire it. Of these two components, the Scriptures are more important, because one must believe that the revelation (ἀπόφασιν) of God is more trustworthy than things empirically seen.[224] Hence, among those who are *not* corrected by this treatise, a heavier penalty awaits those who accept the Scriptures—but do not profit from them.

Thus Chrysostom defines the two bases of his apologetic λόγος (revelation and empiricism), the first aimed at Christians and the second at non believers. He thus envisions that his work will be read by both.

Cause of the scandal: περιεργία (2-4)

Just as in Plato's *Apology* Socrates' explanation of the causes (τὰ αἴτια) of the prejudice (διαβολή) against him constitutes the first part of his defense (20c-24b), so here Chrysostom begins his apology by explaining the cause (ἡ αἰτία) of the accusation against providence.

The cause of the scandal is ἡ πολυπράγμων καὶ περίεργος γνώμη, which wants to know all the causes of everything, and is contentious about the incomprehensible (ἀκατάληπτον) and ineffable providence

222. Pohlenz, 1, pp. 141 ff.; 2, p. 82.

223. Chrysostom more commonly uses διόρθωσις in reference to divine chastisement of sinners (cf. Heb. 9:10, Acts 24:2). For example, in h. 16.8 on Romans Chrysostom writes that God did everything in his power to bring about the "correction" (διόρθωσιν) of the pharaoh, who nevertheless remained ἀδιόρθωτος (PG 60, 560).

224. Cf. 4.7-8.

(πρόνοιαν) of God. In short, scandal results from meddling with (περιεργάζεσθαι) and investigating (πολυπραγμονεῖν) shamelessly the infinite (ἀπέραντον) providence, which is past finding out (ἀνεξιχνίαστον; 2.1).[225]

This is the same accusation leveled against the Anomoeans, who claimed to know the essence of God, and the argument is almost identical. Chapters two and there of *Scand.* are in fact a précis of *Incomprehens.* h. 1-5. One should not be surprised at this, for it was regular practice for an ancient rhetor to quote himself thus, as R.C. Jebb points out in his *Attic Orators*.[226]

The demonstration that God's providence is incomprehensible and should not be investigated commences with the familiar[227] citation of Rom. 11:33: "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God: how unsearchable (ἀνεξερεύνητα) are his judgments and his ways past finding out," (ἀνεξιχνίαστοι; 2.2-7). He concludes that it is μανία and ἀπόνοια to try to comprehend the unsearchable (τὰ ἀνεξιχνίαστα) and have an explanation of the entire providence of God.

He recalls that Paul states that our knowledge is limited;[228] most of it is stored up for the future.[229] Paul's advice in Rom. 9:20 should be obeyed: "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?"[230] The interpretation of this verse closely follows that of *Incomprehens.* h. 2: Paul demands obedience and silence from the one who is seeking to understand God's providence. He must not resist or meddle, but imitate the clay as it follows the potter.[231] Elsewhere, in his commentary on Romans, Chrysostom writes that the purpose of this verse is to repress excessive curiosity, and to teach that providence is incomprehensible and transcends human intelligence. Paul does not say that the questions raised by mankind are insoluble, but that it is

225. The incomprehensibility of divine providence is asserted by Chrysostom in similar terms in h. 16.7 f. on Romans (PG 60, 558-60) and in h. 19.4 f. on Ephesians (PG 62, 132-34).

226. Reprint, New York, 1962, 1:lxxii (cf. cxxiv).

227. Cf. *Incomprehens.* h. 1.255 ff. See also *Stag.* 1.7 (PG 47, 441). *In Gen.* h. 4.5 (PG 53, 44).

228. 1 Cor. 8:2 = *Incomprehens.* h. 2.468-472.

229. 1 Cor. 13:9-12 = *Incomprehens.* h.1.69-153.

230. Cf. *Incomprehens.* h. 2.294-308; 327-356, esp. 306, 352.

231. Cf. *Scand,* 2.17 with. *Incomprehens.* h. 2.166-178; *Scand.* 2.18 with h. 2. 190-193. Also see *Stag.* 1.7; PG 47, 442.

unlawful to raise them at all.[232]

Chapter two of *Scand.* is ended with a description of God in apophatic (negative) terms, which rivals any similar passage in the homilies *De Incomprehensibili.*[233] The chief of his negative attributes is, as we expect, incomprehensibility to men and angels alike.

In chapter three he proves that God is incomprehensible to the supernal powers, and known fully only to the Son and the Spirit, with the same arguments used in the homilies *De incomprehensibili.* The only new one is an exegesis of Sir. 3:21-23: "search not out the things that are above thy strength. But what is commanded thee, think thereupon ... for more things are shewed unto thee than men understand." He interprets: nature (φύσις) does not suffice for the knowledge of all things. Man does not learn by himself (οἴκοθεν), but receives knowledge of most things from above (ἄνωθεν), since they are too great to be comprehended by human intelligence. Why therefore does one strive "to search the deeper things" by himself, when most knowledge comes from another source and transcends reflection (φρόνησιν)? This is Paul's meaning in 1 Cor. 4:7: "and what hast thou that thou didst not receive? now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?" Chrysostom is apparently emphasizing man's need to receive both natural and supernatural knowledge from God, rather than to discover it himself. His final advice is to cease from such contention (φιλονεικία) and heed Sirach's advice: "A man need not to say, what is this? wherefore is that? for he hath made all things for their uses" (39:21).

In another place Chrysostom discusses the incomprehensibility of divine providence as evident in "scientific" knowledge.[234] The marvels of natural science, which cannot be explained, are the work of providence and point to its incomprehensibility. (Needless to say, the examples chosen reflect more the scientific ignorance of the time than actual unknowability; but it would not be difficult to find more valid arguments, e.g., why the powerful digestive juices of the stomach do not dissolve the stomach itself). For example, the earth reposes upon water; but it is not known whether the earth supports the sky, or the latter is borne by the water under the earth.[235] Why is man so small and placed

232. Hom. 16.7; PG 60, 558.

233. Hom. 2.190-193; h. 3.53-59.

234. *In Ep. ad Eph.* h. 19.3-4; PG 62, 131 f.

235. This example occurred earlier in Basil's h. 1.9B-10. *In Hexaemeron* (pp. 122-26 Giet).

so low beneath the heavens? Why are the regions of the north and south uninhabitable? Why are the nights longer in winter and shorter in summer? Whence comes excessive cold and heat? Thus what distinguishes providence as it appears in nature is that it contains something inexplicable in its designs: τοῦτο μάλιστα προνοίας ἐστί, τὸ τοὺς λόγους ἡμῖν ἀπορρήτους εἶναι. Indeed, if this did not check our confidence (διάνοιαν), some might have claimed that man was the author of the whole. Last, he advises men to refrain from vain curiosity about natural science, because the physical world was made for him, not he for it; and so reverts to the classical Greek sense of περιεργία as research into the natural sciences.

Chapter four of *Scand.* contains a discussion of Gen. 1:31 as a prophetic rebuke to περιεργία. Moses' statement, "and God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good," precludes the untimely judgment of foolish individuals, ready to attack the creation at its inception. For the *original* creation contained not only light, but darkness; not only fruits, but thorns, venomous snakes, hurricanes, man-eating animals, noxious plants, etc., from which men were to be scandalized and beget heresies.[236]

The existence of harmful animals and plants and the detrimental actions of nature were an Epicurean objection against the Stoic doctrine of providence.[237] The Stoics dealt with the evil in creation by showing the utility of seeming evils.[238] Plotinus tried to show the utility of insects.[239] Origen pointed to snake poison as a means of healing.[240] In *De stat.*[241] Chrysostom argues that these disturbing elements are good because they prevent man from divinizing nature.

Here in chap. 4 of *Scand.* the Epicurean objection against providence is met by Moses' account of the creator (δημιουργός) praising his creation part by part and as a whole,[242] designed to prevent anyone

236. Note that Chrysostom makes no reference to the fall, and asserts that there were evils in the first creation.

237. Cf. Phipo, *De prov.* Fg. 2.43-68 (9:486-504 LCL). Lucretius 5.195-234.

238. Cf. Pohlenz, 1, p. 100; 2, p. 57. Also Eznik of Kolb, quoted in Canivet, *Histoire,* p. 97 n. 6.

239. *De prov.* 2.9.

240. *In Gen. Comm.* 1.28; PG 12, 26. Cf. Nemesius, p. 62, 14.

241. Hom. 10. 4-5; PG 49, 116, 118.

242. Gen. 1:4 and 31.

from meddling with the physical world. Again we see Chrysostom reverting to the original connotation of περιεργία as fruitless research in the natural sciences.

Now the apologetic value of this verse is shown: having heard that God approves of his creation thus, one need not seek another test (βάσανον) or demonstration (ἀπόδειξιν) of its beauty, or ask: How is it beautiful? The decree (ἀπόφασις) of the creator is clearer than a pragmatic demonstration (τῆς διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἀποδείξεως). Here Chrysostom refers to the two elements of his argument as revelation (ἀπόφασις) and rational demonstration (ἀπόδειξις), and asserts that the former carries more weight than the latter (as in 1.4).

The same concept was earlier used by Basil in his homilies on the *Hexaemeron* (ca. 370). The certitude of revealed truth is here opposed to the probability (πιθανόν)[243] of science, which deals in theories.[244] The faith of believers must be stronger than the logical demonstrations of science: τό γε ἁπλοῦν τῆς πίστεως ἰσχυρότερον ἔστω τῶν λογικῶν ἀποδείξεων.[245] This point of view excluded the scientific explanation of nature in the tradition of Posidonius.[246]

Chrysostom now adds that Moses' statement in Gen. 1:31 by itself constitutes an ἀπόδειξις, in the sense that an inexperienced person buying drugs will first show them to a physician, and upon his approval requires no further ἀπόδειξις of their usefulness. Thus by the statement of divine approval Moses wished to eliminate all shameless περιεργία of those who were to enjoy the creation afterwards. If Moses' witness (μαρτυρίαν) does not satisfy one, and he wishes to make a philosophical inquiry (ζήτησις) about created things, he will be shipwrecked in a strait of reasonings (λογισμῶν) and, unable to find an explanation for each created thing, will stander many that he now thinks good.

The reasoning faculty of man (λογισμός) is so weak, that people have opposite views about the creation. The Greeks admired it beyond measure and believed it a god.[247] The antipodal view was held by Manicheans and other heretics, who said that it is not the work of a good god, or else cut off a part of it, which was assigned to a spontaneous matter and said to be unworthy to be made by God. Thus Chrysostom shows that man's reason cannot obtain the truth about the cosmos; it must be quelled and be made to cling to Moses' words, "And God saw everything that he had made, and, behold, it was very good."

Chapter four ends with an analysis of real and apparent goods and evils. Are luxury, laughter and pleasure good? But Solomon says, "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to go to the house of feasting" (Eccl. 7:2). The [Manicheans] say night is evil, and Chrysostom counters with a eulogy of night. Similarly, disease, affliction, poverty have positive spiritual results, as Matt. 7:13 f. shows. All these examples manifest the weakness of human judgement.

In conclusion he recommends that in the face of God's economies (οἰκονομιῶν)[248] and his creatures, one should maintain the silence of clay.[249]

Remedy (5-24)

Belief in divine providence (5.-8.13)

Before analyzing his argument here, it is instructive to examine his general apologetic method concerning providence, which is found in his early treatise, *Ad Stagirium*. In an effort to console Stagirius, a monk who has become possessed by a demon (which perhaps signifies epilepsy), he writes:

> If I were writing to one of the unbelievers (ἄπιστοι), either those who think that all things happen by chance (αὐτομάτως) [i.e., Epicureans],[250] or those who entrust the providence of

243. The concept of probability may derive from Carneades (cf. Émile Bréhier, *Histoire de la Philosophie* [Paris, 1967] 1,2, p. 342).

244. Hom. 1.10 f., p. 130 Giet; h. 3.8, pp. 232-234 Giet.

245. Hom. 1.10D, p. 130 Giet.

246. Pohlenz, 1, p. 453. Cf. Augustine, *Encheir.* 9.

247. Cf. Plato, *Tim.* 37d. Chrysostom expresses the same view in *De stat.* h. 10.3 (PG 49, 114). *In Ep. 2 ad Cor.* h. 21.4 (PG 61, 546). *De diab. tent.* h. 2.3 (PG 49, 261). It also occurs in the Clementine liturgy (Brightman, LEW, p. 18, ll.9 f.).

248. The Greek patristic use of the term "economy" (οἰκονομία), referring to the entirety of God's providential order, is best explained by G. L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (London, 1959), pp. 57 ff.

249. Cf. Rom. 9:21.

250. Cf. Aristotle, *Ph.* 196a24 (DK 2:101; = Demokritos A69). Eusebius, P.e. 14.23.1 f. (DK 2:95; = Demokritos A.43). For further references consult Eduard Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (1923; reprint, Hildesheim, 1963) 3,1, pp. 442 f. This Epicurean belief was combatted by Dionysius of Alexandria in his Περὶ φύσεως. It also seems to be referred to in the Clementine liturgy: παραφθειράντων δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν φυσικὸν νόμον καὶ τὴν κτίσιν ποτὲ μὲν αὐτόματον νομισάντων (Brightman, LEW, p. 18, 11.8 f.).

> the cosmos to evil demons,[251] I would need much diligence first to expel the erroneous view and then to persuade them of the true providence of the whole. Then I would turn my λόγος to comfort.[252] But since by the grace of God you know the Scriptures from infancy, and have accepted the true and saving doctrines (δόγματα) from infancy, you therefore believe accurately (ἀκριβῶς) that God cares about everything, and especially about those who believe in him.[253] Thus I shall omit this part, and make a beginning at another point (*Ad Stag.* 1.2; PG 47, 427).

Thus he distinguishes two parts in the argument concerning providence: (1) the proof that there is a providence, consisting of the refutation of false ideas and demonstration of the truth, which is directed to unbelievers; and (2) an argument addressed to Christians, which presupposes belief in providence and attempts to understand it more profoundly and justify its ways. Essentially the same distinction was made by Seneca in *De prov.* 1.4: "tu non dubitas de providentia, sed quereris".[254]

251. CHRYSOSTOM combats this doctrine in *Daemones non gubernare mundum* h. 1.6 (PG 49, 253 f.) where he writes that some dare to say that demons govern (διοικοῦσι). (The verb διοικεῖν was associated with the Stoic doctrine that fate rules the world [see SVF 4, s.v.]). To refute this belief he shows how demons actually govern. For example, God let the demons go into a herd of swine, which then were drowned, in order to teach that the demons are mad. Another indication of this is the way the demon despoiled Job. What disorder existing in the world leads people to believe that our affairs are governed by demons? Then Chrysostom turns to arguments in favor of providence. The same aberrant doctrine, that demons govern the world, is also mentioned by him in h. 1.1 *De fato et providentia* (PG 50, 751) and h. 18.3 *in Ep. 1 ad Cor.* (PG 61, 148). In the latter passage he writes: "others refer the fashioning (δημιουργίαν) of the cosmos and providence to demons." This sentence suggests that he is referring to the gnostics. There was, however, a doctrine among the Stoics concerning three providences (πρόνοιαι), the third of which belonged to the demons (POHLENZ, 2, p. 174).

252. Note that the prelude to consoling the sufferer is removal of an erroneous intellectual point of view. This was the traditional method of consolation employed by philosophers, expecially the Stoics (cf. *Cicero, Tusc.* 3.76. POHLENZ, 1, pp. 150-51; 2, p. 82).

253. Here Chrysostom espouses the doctrine of universal and individual providence, which first appears, it seems, in Philo (HARRY AUSTRYN WOLFSON, *Philo* [Cambridge, Mass., 1968] 2, p. 293).

254. *De prov.* 1.4; p. 11 WALTZ.

It corresponds to the arrangement of arguments found in our treatise, where the so-called remedy consists of two parts: an argument in favor of the existence of divine providence (5-8.13), and other arguments, which assume this belief and attempt to deepen our understanding of the actions of providence (8.14-24).[255]

Chrysostom's method of proving the *existence* of divine providence is seen in chapters 5-8.13 of our treatise.

Chapter five begins with an imagined response to his previous admonition not to investigate divine providence. In the manner of the diatribe someone queries, "are you not desirous for me to know distinctly and believe that God oversees everything?" He replies that there is a set limit to investigation, which is faith: "if you know and have persuaded yourself, do not inquire (μὴ ζήτει)." If, on the contrary, you have not persuaded yourself and doubt, it is easy to ascertain the existence of providence.

That God's providence is manifest to all is Chrysostom's consistent view in his writings. If one doubts that a power presides over the cosmos, he is more foolish (ἀνοητότερος) than all.[256] Similarly in *Daemones non gubernare mundum*[257] he writes: "Could anything be more mad or senseless than those living in such good order (εὐταξία) to say that we are bereft of the providence of God? If someone contends that the sun is dark and cold, he proves by the opinion his extreme derangement. So if one doubts the providence of God, he is more liable to the accusation of madness. The sun is not as bright as the providence of God is plain".[258]

The argument of chapter five continues in this vein: everywhere one goes in nature he will find clear reminders (ὑπομνήματα) of providence, whose voice, referred to in Ps. 19 (18):3, is more distinct than a human voice: "There is no speech or language, where their voice is not heard." Thus the cosmos in itself is a persuasive demonstration of providence.

Demonstration from Scripture (6)

According to his principle enunciated at 1.4 and 4.7, revelation

255. The argument concerning the existence of providence is not necessarily directed only to pagans, for eleswhere Chrysostom separates pagans, who are convinced that the world is governed by something (διοικεῖσθαι), from Christians and pagans, who despair of this fact (*In Ep. ad Eph.* h. 19.3; PG 62, 131).

256. *In Ep. ad Eph.* h. 119.4; PG 62, 132.

257. *Daem. non gub. mundum* h. 1.6; PG 49, 253.

258. Cf. MINUCIUS FELIX, *Octavius* 17.3; 35.4 f.

is a more valid proof than pragmatic demonstration. Here he states that the declaration (ἀπόφασις) of God suffices for those of goodwill (εὐγνώμονες) even before empirical demonstration. He proceeds to show from Scripture not only God's providence, but also his intense love (σφοδρὸν ἔρωτα) for us.[258a] In this connection he discusses biblical hermeneutics, and argues that it is incorrect to understand the scriptural images about God's love in the literal sense—which is insufficient. Other instances in which Chrysostom did not advocate a literal interpretation of the Bible have been collected by Foerster, who tried to show that he disagreed with the canons of strict literal interpretation laid down by the Antiochene school.[259]

The argument in chapter six is that Scripture uses images and examples (εἰκόνας, ὑποδείγματα, παραδείγματα) of human love (ἔρως), providence and kindness (κηδεμονία) to show God's unquenchable love for humanity. We are not merely to understand the examples, but to transcend them by reasoning (6.2). Further on Chrysostom calls this a rule (κανών) for the correct interpretation of Scripture (6.8). The use of such images does not mean that they are adequate to show God's love, but that they are *able* to show it more than anything else because they are familiar to people (6.2): Οὐδὲ ὡς ἀρκοῦντα δεῖξαι τὸ φίλτρον παράγει ταῦτα, ἀλλ' ὡς γνώριμα τοῖς ἀκούουσι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μᾶλλον δυνάμενα δεῖξαι τοῦτο. With almost the same words the rabbis discounted the anthropomorphisms in Scripture: "we describe God by terms borrowed from his creations in order to cause them to sink into the ear".[260] Philo, *Immut.* 2.54 gives the same explanation: such anthropomorphic expressions "are introduced for the instruction of the many," and, according to *Somn.* 1.40.237, to aid "the ways of the thinking of the duller folk."[261] One could cite Chrysostom, *Stag.* 1.5,[262] τοῦτο, ὅσον ἀκοῦσαί σε δυνατόν, εἴρηται, and *Berakot* 31b, "The Torah speaks according to the language of men."[263]

258a. The same argument is developed in *Stag.* 1.5; PG 47, 436-437.

259. Th. Foerster, *Chrysostomus in seinem Verhältniss zur antiochenischen Schule* (Gotha, 1869), pp. 23 ff. Theodore of Mopsuestia also rejected the anthropomorphisms of the Old Testament (Robert Devreesse, *Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste* [Vatican City, 1948] pp. 66-68).

260. Mekilta, Bahodesh, 4, F. p. 65a; W, p. 73b; HR, p. 215; L, II, 221. Quoted by Wolfson, *Philo,* 1, p. 135.

261. Ibid., 1, p. 116.

262. PG 47, 437.

263. Ibid., 1, p. 135.

Here, the passages which are adduced to show God's providence and love for humanity include:

> Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the son of her womb? yea, they may forget, yet will I not forget thee (Is. 49:15).
>
> Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear him (Ps. 103:13).
>
> If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask him (Matt. 7:11)?

With such images one must transcend the given measure in order to see the ineffable excess (ἄφατον ὑπερβολήν) of his love.

In addition to the gauge of nature used in the above quotations, the measurement of distance is also employed—not that his love is commensurable, but because the interval was known to the audience:

> For as the heaven is high above the earth, so great is his mercy toward them that fear him. As far as the east is from the west, so far hath he removed our transgressions from us (Ps. 103: 11-12; also Is. 55:8-9).

Another grosser image is used in Hosea 11:8: "mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together." This anthropomorphic image is resorted to, not that one should have human thoughts about God, but to show how indissoluble his love is. Other gross images of divine love[263a] must also be transcended.[264]

263a. Is. 62:5, Jonah 4:10 f., Is. 45:11.

264. It is possible to detect the influence of Origen in Chrysostom's habitually negative attitude towards the anthropopathisms and anthropomorphisms of Scripture, which he characterizes as "very gross" (παχυτάτη) or "very heavy" (βαρυτάτη) expressions (*Scand.,* 6.11-13). Cf. *Incomprehens.* h. 1.317-20 (p. 128 M.), 364-72 (pp. 132-34). h. 2. 121-23 (p. 196). h. 3. 122 (p. 196), 167-81 (pp. 200-02), 274-76 (p. 210), 316-27 (pp. 212-14). h. 4.217-33 (p. 246), 271-80 (p. 250), 288-308 (p. 252). In the Origenist controversy, as mentioned above, Chrysostom sheltered the Nitrian monks, known as the tall brethren, "who embraced Origen's doctrine of a purely spiritual Deity, and were determined adversaries of the more sensuous and anthropomorphite school" (Stephens, p. 307). He refused to join Epiphanius and Theophilus in the official condemnation of Origen's writings (see Malingrey, *Jean Chrysostome: Lettres à Olympias,* pp. 26-28).

Of course, the rejection of all human predicates of God in their literal sense had been made before Origen by the translators of the Septuagint (cf. C. T. Fritsch,

In these texts the doctrine (ὑπόδειξις) of God's ineffable providence shines brighter than the sun:

> Look! He has exhibited the father (Matt. 7:9 f.), the mother (Is. 49:15), the bridegroom (Is. 62:5), the interval of heaven and earth (Ps. 103:11 f.), the gardener toiling on vegetables (Jonah 4:10 f.), the architect of future creations (Is. 45:11), the violent lover who is disturbed if he pains the beloved even with words (Hos. 11:8)—and he showed that the goodness of God surpasses all these with the interval between goodness and evil (Matt. 7:11; 6.22).

With this characteristic rhetorical summary the scriptural proof for the existence of providence is completed.

Demonstration ex operibus (7-8.13)

Chrysostom now turns to the empirical demonstration: ἀπόδειξις διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν (7.1). The demonstration "from works" was Socratic in origin, and originally referred to the proof of the existence of the gods through the works of creation: ἐξαρκῇ σοι τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν ὁρῶντι σέβεσθαι καὶ τιμᾶν τοὺς θεούς.[265] This argument was inherited by the Stoics, who emphasized the cosmic harmony as source for the knowledge of God.[266] Christians, as will be shown, extended the works of God to include not only the physical universe, but also God's benefits to man in history.

The pragmatic demonstration, Chrysostom writes, is intended for the unspiritual (πήλινοι), stubborn (δυσπειθεῖς) and materialistic (αὐτόσαρκες), since those of good will (εὐγνώμονες) are satisfied with the demonstration from Scripture. The demonstration is necessarily in-

The Anti-anthropomorphisms of the Greek Pentateuch [Princeton, 1943]), by Philo and the rabbis (cf. Wolfson, *Philo,* 1, pp. 116, 135), by the (Jewish-Christian) Ebionites (cf. Hans-Joachim Schoeps, *Jewish Christianity,* tr. Douglas R. A. Hare [Philadelphia, 1969], pp. 92 f.) and by other church fathers, including Justin (*Dial.* 56.1; 60.2,5; 114.3; 127.3,5; 128.1. See E. R. Goodenough, *The Theology of Justin Martyr* [Jena, 1923] pp. 122-38, esp. 126), and Clement of Alexandria (*Str.* 6.11. 68). For later references see Walter J. Burghardt, *The Image of God in Man according to Cyril of Alexandria* (Woodstock, Md., 1957), chap. 2.

265. Xenophon, *Mem.* 4.3.13.

266. M. Spanneut, *Le stoïcisme des Pères de l'Église de Clément de Rome à Clément d'Alexandrie* (Paris, 1957), pp. 255-57.

complete, since it is impossible to represent even the least part of divine providence, which is infinite (ἄπειρος) and ineffable (ἄφατος) in things seen and unseen. Elsewhere he states that it is a proof of the infinity (ἀπειρία) of providence, that we do not sense it in all that happens.[267] The proof will be made from things visible (7.1).

At this point it is expedient to mention that his empirical proof for the existence of providence has two parts: (1) the cosmological, and (2) the historical.[268] These two aspects of providence were earlier mentioned by Tertullian, *Adv. Marc*: "Enimvero, prius est, ut eum probes esse per quae deum probari oportet, *per opera,* tunc deinde *per beneficia.*"[269] Their true origin seems to lie in the liturgy, specifically in the great prayer of thanksgiving of the anaphora with its laudatory narrative of God's kindnesses towards humanity. According to A. Baumstark, paraphrase of this prayer played a large, not as yet thoroughly explored, role in the preaching and teaching of the early church.[270] Particularly, the anaphoric prayer of thanksgiving influenced the early Christian notion of providence, under which was subsumed all of history.[271] In the so-called Clementine liturgy, contained in the eighth book of the *Apostolic Constitutions,*[272] which were compiled at Antioch or its environs ca. A.D. 350-80 and represent the Syrian liturgy,[273] it is explicitly stated that the theme of the thanksgiving prayer of the anaphora is providence, πρόνοια.[274]

In a homily delivered at Antioch around A.D. 390, Chrysostom describes the contents of the thanksgiving as follows:

> The fearful mysteries are called thanksgiving (εὐχαριστία) because they are the recollection of many kindnesses (εὐεργετη-

267. Cf. *Stag.* 5; PG 47, 437.

268. Cf. Nowak, p. 106.

269. *Adv. Marc.* 1.17.1; 1, 458 CC.

270. Quoted by Paverd, p. 475. On the early history of the thanksgiving, consult Gregory Dix, *The Shape of the Liturgy,* (Westminster, 1945), pp. 214 ff.

271. Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition,* The Christian Tradition (Chicago, 1971) 1: p. 38.

272. A.C. 8.5-15.

273. F. E. Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western,* Vol. 1 (Oxford, 1896), pp. xxviii-xxix. Also Quasten, *Patrology,* 2, pp. 184 f. Schaff, 3, pp. 526 f. A. Harnack, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur bis auf Eusebius* (1904; reprint, Leipzig. 1958), 2, 2, pp. 484-88.

274. Cf. Brightman, p. 15, l. 9 and p. 19, l.9.

μάτων), and the crown (τὸ κεφάλαιον) of the providence of God is displayed: for if birth from a virgin is a great wonder, where shall we place the slaughter?[275] Thus the priest orders us to give thanks: for the created world (οἰκουμένης)[276] and for earlier things, things now, and things which will be ours in the future. (*In Matt.* h. 25/26.3; PG 57, 331)

Paverd explains that this presupposes a twofold division of the prayer, in which thanks are given for:

the cosmos, and acts of salvation history:
past (O.T.)
present (N.T.), including death and resurrection of Christ, and future, e.g. of the kingdom.[277]

Elsewhere Chrysostom also distinguishes two separate aspects of the thanksgiving:

for the created world (οἰκουμένη), and
for the common goods (*In Ep.* 2 *ad Cor.* h. 2.5; PG 61, 398)

—which, Paverd comments, are to be understood as the goods of salvation.[278]

Chrysostom's allusions to the prayer are vague, perhaps because it was given extemporaneously within certain set guidelines, as the great number of west Syrian anaphoras witnesses.[279] At any rate the structure of the anaphora as described by Chrysostom corresponds to the contents of chapters seven and eight of *Scand.* Indeed, Brightman cites these chapters as evidence for the thanksgiving prayer of Antioch and Constantinople,[280] and is followed in this by Lietzmann,[281] pp. 139-40. Paverd, on the contrary, argues that these chapters could have been composed simply on the basis of Scripture, without any dependence upon the anaphora. Nonetheless, he admits that there are strong similarities: "tatsächlich muss man gestehen, dass man in der Reihenfolge die Chrysostomos einhält, leicht die Struktur namentlich der Anaphoren

275. Cf. *Scand.* 8.5: τέλος τὸ κεφάλαιον τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰργάσατο καὶ τὸν Υἱὸν ἀπέστειλε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ.

276. On the special sense of οἰκουμένη see *Paverd*, p. 214.

277. Paverd, pp. 267 f.

278. Ibid., p. 273.

279. Ibid., pp. 270 f.

280. Brightman, pp. 479, ll.22-40 and 533, ll.24-28.

281. *Messe und Herrenmahl*, Bonn, 1956.

von Basileios und den AK erkennen kann."[282]

The analogous elements of *Scand.* and of the thanksgiving of the Clementine liturgy (and of other anaphoras) are listed below.

Scand.	F. E. Brightman, *Liturgies Eastern and Western*
7.2-39: the cosmos	= A.C. (p. 15, l.8; p. 16, l.19)
7.39-8.13: salvation history	= A.C. (p. 16, l.18; p. 20, l.12)
Old Testament 8.1: ὁμοῦ πλάσας τὸν ἄνθρωπον... τὸν ἔμφυτον ἐναπέθετο νόμον	= A.C. (p. 16, l.31): κἀν τῷ ποιεῖν νόμον δέδωκας αὐτῷ ἔμφυτον
8.2: Καὶ ὅμως οὐδὲ οὕτως αὐτὸν ἐγκατέλιπεν, ἀλλὰ πεσόντα καὶ ὑποσκελισθέντα ἐπηνώρθου ...	This sentiment often appears in west Syrian anaphoras—always in connection with original sin.[283]
8.3: Ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοσοῦτον προὔδωκαν δῶρον οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς φυσικῆς διδασκαλίας λέγω ὠφέλειαν, οὐδὲ οὕτως αὐτοὺς κατέλιπεν ... ἀλλ' ἔμεινε κτλ.	= A.C. (p. 18, ll.7-10): παραφθειράντων δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸν φυσικὸν νόμον ... οὐκ εἴασας πλανᾶσθαι ἀλλὰ ἀναδείξας κτλ.
8.4: καὶ οὐ διέλιπεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἕως τέλους πάντα ποιῶν καὶ πραγματευόμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ γένους τοῦ ἡμετέρου.	= Liturgy of Chrysostom (p. 322, ll.9-11): καὶ οὐκ ἀπέστης πάντα ποιῶν ἕως ἡμας εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνήγαγες.
New Testament 8.6: quotation of Ps. 106:2	= Liturgy of Basil (p. 322, ll.13-17)

282. Paverd, pp. 474-97, esp. 487, 489 f.

283. Ibid., p. 482.

8.7: ταῦτα ἅπαντα ὑφίστατο διὰ σέ ... ἵνα τμηθῇ τοῦ θανάτου τὰ νεῦρα ... ἵνα παιδευθῇς καρτερίαν, ἵνα μηδέν σε τῶν τοῦ παρόντος βίου λυπῇ	= A.C. (p. 20, ll.3-7): πᾶσαν ἀτιμίαν ὑποστὰς ... ἵνα πάθους λύσῃ καὶ θανάτου ἐξέληται τούτους δι' οὓς παρεγένετο[284]

Having noted the parallels between chapters seven and eight of *Scand.* and the thanksgiving of the contemporary Syrian anaphora,[285] from which, apparently, comes the twofold division of his proof of the existence of providence *ex operibus*, it is time to examine more closely the first part of this proof, the cosmological.

Proof of the Existence of Providence from the Physical Cosmos (7.2-39)

Origin

The demonstration of the existence of providence from the order and beauty of the cosmos penetrated early Christianity from Stoicism. The teological explanation of nature was from the first an important part of the Stoic teaching, which received canonical form through Panaetius and Posidonius, who taught that nature had created the world purposefully for the usufruct of man. Thereafter this argument was cherished in unbroken scholastic tradition and became an indispensable source for any defender of the belief in providence, including Basil, Gregory of Nyssa and Nemesius of Emesa.[286] In addition, the proof was, as we have seen, incorporated into the great eucharistic prayer of thanksgiving, as early as the *First Epistle* of Clement.[287]

284. The results of Christ's death in both documents are the destruction of death and of suffering (πάθος) in human life, as in the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus, DIX p. 157.

285. In the previons two pages.

286. POHLENZ, 1, p. 99, 430 f. SVF 2, pp. 328-35, nos. 1132-67. On the pre-Stoic doctrine see W. THEILER, *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles* (Zürich, 1925).

287. Cf. 1 *Clement* 20 and SPANNEUT, pp. 373 f. Also the Clementine liturgy (BRIGHTMAN, p. 15, l.8; p. 16, l.28). See A. BAUMSTARK, *Vom geschichtlichen Werden der Liturgie* (Freiburg i.Br., 1923), p. 29, as quoted by JOHANNES STELZENBERGER, *Die Beziehungen der frühchristlichen Sittenlehre zur Ethik der Stoa* (Munich, 1933), p. 93.

Analysis of the cosmological proof

God made the marvelous creation for man: for the nourishment of his body and the philosophy of his soul, as a road to the knowledge of God (θεογνωσία).

This anthropocentric view of the cosmos, which Nemesius calls a "dogma of the Hebrews,"[288] but also corresponds to Stoic teleology, is frequent in Chrysostom.[289] Here he combines this notion with the old Greek belief that the cosmos is a teacher of God's existence and attributes.[290] For the Stoics God was revealed especially in the immutable order of the cosmos.[291] In this vein Clement of Alexandria wrote that the stars are a road given to the pagans by which they can ascend to God.[292] Tertullian states that the purpose of creation was that God might be known,[293] which is similar to Chrysostom's statement here that the abundance of wisdom displayed in creation is a proof of God's ability to work miracles (7.8).

As proof that the cosmos was created for man, Chrysostom recalls that the angels existed beforehand, according to Job 38:7, and thus did not need the world. This belief, which also appears in the thanksgiving of the A.C.,[294] may have become controversial and needed to be defended.[295]

First the beauty and usefulness of the heavens are praised at length (7.4-16).[296]

In addition, the marvels of the earth and everything on it teach the existence of divine providence, including seeming evils such as toil (πόνος), depression (ἀθυμία), disease. Quoted as proof is Ps. 104:24: "O Lord, how manifold are thy words! in wisdom hast thou made them all:

288. Quoted by POHLENZ, 2, p. 56.

289. E.g., *In Ep. ad Eph.* h. 19.3; PG 62, 132.

290. E.g., XENOPHON, *Mem.* 1.4; 4.3.

291. SPANNEUT, p. 275.

292. *Str.* 6.111.1.

293. *Adv. Marc.* 1.10. Spanneut, pp. 280-285.

294. BRIGHTMAN, p. 15, ll.11-15.

295. PAVERD, p. 476.

296. The eternal order of the stars was, of course, one of the two sources for justifying belief in God, according to PLATO, *Leg.* 12.966d; ARISTOTLE, Fg. 12a ROSE; the Stoics (WERNER JAEGER, *Aristotle,* 2nd ed., Oxford, 1948, pp. 161 ff. Paideia 3, Oxford, 1961, p. 262); and the early Christian apologist, ARISTIDES, *Ap.* 1.1-2.

the earth is full of thy riches." Special objects are singled out for praise: the winds (8.22-25), night (26-29). It is impossible, Chrysostom concedes, to enumerate all the creatures on earth (30-32). The whole cosmos (and death) was made for man, and will be made better for him, according to Paul in Rom. 8:21 (33).

Having concluded his empirical proof of the existence of providence, he recommends the proper attitude towards it. Providence should not be an object of investigation, but of admiration and worship. The doxological attitude, previously advised in regard to God's essence, is now shown to be the proper disposition towards God's operations in the world.

Proof of the Existence of Providence from History (7.39-8.13)

The second section of the proof *ex operibus* consists of an enumeration of God's beneficient acts toward mankind in history. First of all, he gave man *being,* for no other reason than his own goodness, not having need of his service; his philanthropy alone brought us into being, (7.39).[297]

Now Chrysostom lists the benefits from God in history, according to the scheme of the anaphora, shown above: (1) Old Testament, (2) New Testament, (3) future. He reveals that he is using this scheme at 8.10: Τοσαῦτα οὖν ἔχων δείγματα αὐτοῦ τῆς προνοίας, τὰ ἐν τῇ Καινῇ, τὰ ἐν τῇ Παλαιᾷ, τὰ ἐν τῷ παρόντι βίῳ, τὰ ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι ...

1) Old Testament: as in the thanksgiving of the *Apostolic Constitutions*[298] Chrysostom begins with the Stoic doctrine of natural law. When God created man, he implanted in him the natural law (ἔμφυτον νόμον), and set it over his reasoning (λογισμοί) like a pilot over a ship (8.1). Both Abel and Cain knew and recognized its sovereignty. When most of humanity betrayed the benefit of the teaching of nature, God nevertheless continued to educate them, through the creation, through miracles, and through just men, whom he transferred from place to place[299].

In addition to all this, God gave the law, sent prophets, dispatched

297. Cf. *Stag.* 1.2; PG 47, 427.

298. BRIGHTMAN, p. 16, l.31.

299. E.g. Abraham into Palestine, Jacob into Syria, Moses into Egypt, etc. In h. 32.4 on Genesis Chrysostom explains that theirs was not a mere change of location, but God purposefully removed Abraham from the land of the Chaldeans, so that he could lead those in Palestine and Egypt, dwelling in the darkness of error, onto the road of truth (PG 53, 297).

the Jewish race into captivity. He was not satisfied with the creation as a means to θεογνωσία, and especially since many because of their own ἀγνωμοσύνη did not benefit from it, he opened other roads (i.e., revelation).

2) New Testament: at the end he sent his Son, the crown of goods. Being of the same nature as God, he became a human being, and lived with men among whom he worked miracles, made promises and gave the promised things. Or rather, some things he has already provided here, some he reserved for the future. It is certain that he will give the latter on account of (a) the miracles that he performed while on earth, and (b) the subsequent accomplishment of all that he prophesied.

The ineffable kindness of God is shown in that he delivered over his Son to a disgraceful death: Christ was impaled on a high scaffold for your sake.[300] The advantages which accrue to mankind from his sufferings are:

A. Redemptive:
    destruction of the tyranny of sin
    destruction of the fortress of the devil
    destruction of death
    destruction of the curse and earlier condemnation
    opening of the gates of heaven
B. Exemplary:
    teaching of endurance (ὑπομονή), and courage (καρτερία) so that one will not be pained by anything in the present life, such as death, arrogance, abuse, scoffings, scourges, plots.[301]

Furthermore, when Christ went up to heaven, he gave freely of the

300. Καὶ ἐφ' ὑφηλοῦ τοῦ ἰκρίου ἀνεσκολοπίζετο (8.7; cf. 8.9) is possibly an echo of PLATO, *Resp.* 361d-62a, where the fate of the just man is said to be torture and impalement (ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται). Educated Christians of the first centuries understood this passage from Plato as a pagan prophecy about Christ. The apologists, in particular, saw in it a promise of the coming of Christ in Greek philosophy (*Act. Apoll.* 42 [ca. A.D. 185]. Cf. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, *Str.* 5.14.108.2. f.; 4.7.52.1. EUSEBIUS, P.e. 13.13.35. THEODORET, *Cur.* 8.50). According to ERNST BENZ, the charismatic thinking of martyrs and apologists displayed in this messianic exegesis of Plato has revealed a deep insight into the inner connection between the classical and Christian image of man ("Der gekreuzigte Gerechte bei Plato, im Neuen Testament und in der alten Kirche," *Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur in Mainz, Abhandlungen der Geistes und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse,* 1950, no. 12, p. 1072).

301. NOWAK, pp. 114-25, 125-29.

ineffable grace of the Holy Spirit, and sent apostles who would minister with it. Out of concern for man he bore it, when these heralds of life fared badly and daily lived with death.

3) Future: for you Christ prepared a kingdom, unspeakable goods and blessedness, which cannot be expressed in language.

So many proofs proclaiming God's providence therefore dispel any doubt, and persuade you that he oversees the world. Therefore cease to meddle, having at least an idea of the nature of God's love for you—since his kindness is incomprehensible, His goodness ineffable, and his philanthropy unsearchable (ἀνεξιχνίαστος). Most important we know that his wisdom is infallible (ἀδιάπτωτος), and that all things that come from him to us meet with a good end.[302]

Having established by his twofold (scriptural and empirical) proof that divine providence exists, Chrysostom now approaches the further arguments of his remedy, intended especially for those, Christians, pagans and perhaps Jews, who already hold the belief in providence.

One Must Wait for the End (τέλος) *of Events* (8.14-11)

This argument, also used in his letters to Olympias,[303] has its roots in classical thought. It is explicitly ascribed to Solon (d. 560 B.C.) by Herodotus: σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ πάντος χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῇ ἀποβήσεται, "in every matter we must mark well the end."[304] Chrysostom's words are ἀνάμενε τὸ τέλος καὶ σκόπει ποῦ ταῦτα ἀπαντᾷ (9.1). He uses the noun τέλος instead of τελευτή perhaps under the influence of Matt. 10:22, Ὁ γὰρ ὑπομείνας εἰς τέλος, οὗτος σωθήσεται, cited at 9.6. A similar maxim, «Call no man happy before death,» was also ascribed to Solon by popular tradition,[305] and occurs in Sir 11:28. A related classical theme is that the τέλος (end, accomplishment) of all events is in the hands of the gods.[306]

302. On God's infallibility one recalls Chrysostom's words in *Stag.* 1.7; PG 47, 441: τὸν δὲ Θεὸν τὸν τοσοῦτον ἡμῶν ἀφεστηκότα ἐν ἅπασι, τὸν αὐτοσοφίαν ὄντα, τὸν οὐδέποτε διαμαρτάνοντα, πολυπραγμονήσομεν;

303. *Ep.* 7.1b, p. 134 M. and 2bc, p. 138.

304. *Hist.* 1.32.9.

305. Herodotus, 1.32.7. Juvenal, *Sat.* 10.274 f. See Jebb's note on Sophocles, O.T. 1529.

306. Hesiod, *Op.* 669. Semonides 1. Pindar, O. 13.104 f.; N. 10.29 f. Aeschylus, *Supp.* 525 f. and especially Euripides, *Or.* 1545: τέλος ἔχει δαίμων βροτοῖς τέλος ὅπα θέλει.

One aspect of the pagan Greek teaching on providence was that divine justice is often delayed, and when it finally comes, does not affect the actual evildoer.[307] Plutarch wrote a treatise on this subject entitled Περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου βραδέως τιμωρουμένων.[308] This work, heavily influenced by Stoicism, is divided into three parts:

Divine punishment may take place late for several reasons:

> to restrain men from rash and vengeful penalties against each other by the example of divine leniency;
> to give the evildoer time for correction (1-8).
> Anyhow, punishment begins immediately in reality within the guilty conscience (9-10).

Proof that the execution of punishment on the descendants of the evildoer is just (11-16).

Proof that belief in personal immortality is required, if divine punishment is to be completed (17-21).

Chrysostom accepted many of the ideas found here on the delay of divine punishment,[309] as well as the classical notion of τέλος as final determinant.[310] His development of this theme in *Scand.* is analyzed below.

He begins by linking the classical notion with the biblical doctrine of God: God's wisdom is infallible, and it is certain that everything which comes to us from him meets with a good end (πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀπαντᾷ χρηστόν),[311] provided that our actions do not interfere.[312]

One should not investigate God's providence at all; but if one is such a busybody (περίεργος), he should at least wait for the end, and observe where matters wind up. In the manner of the diatribe everyday examples are used for illustration: goldsmiths, who first melt the gold and mix it with ashes; and farmers, who scatter seed and expose it to

307. E.g., Solon Fg. 13.25 f. Bgk. Theognis 743 ff. Sophocles O.C. 1536. Euripides Fg. 909 N. Theodectes Fg. 8. Euphorion, *Chiliades,* a collection of examples on this theme (Christ, p. 149). Horace, *Odes* 3.2.32; 4.5.24.

308. *De sera numinis vindicta.* Cf. Christ, p. 149

309. References in Nowak, pp. 158 f. Also *In Act. Ap.* h. 12.4; PG 60, 104.

310. E.g. *Opp.* 1.1, PG 47, 319: those who oppose God can meet with no good τέλος. Also *In Rom.* h. 16.7; PG 60, 557.

311. Cf. Rom. 8:28.

312. 8.14; Cf. Plato, *Resp.* 10.613a.

moisture. If one condemns such acts, he only shows his own inexperience and that he bases his opinion upon the beginning, without waiting for the finished product.

For human beings the τέλος is located not only in the present life, but in the life to come. The economy (οἰκονομία) of both these lives looks to one τέλος, which is our salvation and approbation (εὐδοκίμησιν). Though divided in time, the lives are joined by one goal; just as there are different seasons, but one aim for the entire year—the maturity of the fruits.

Similarly, in h. 3.1 *dicta praesente imperatore*,[313] Chrysostom writes in more biblical terminology that God divided human life into two ages.

Here he applies the familiar eschatological perspective to the afflictions of the church at Constantinople: the flogging of brilliant lights in the church, the removal of the president (πρόεδρον) far away. These facts must not be considered alone, but also the resulting rewards. In the Old Testament, when the doctrine of the resurrection was not yet known, both affliction and the resultant reward occured in the present life. In the New Testament epoch, however, this is not always so: sometimes this life contains painful things, and good things await our departure from here.[314]

For the very reason that in the Old Testament happiness was expected in this life, the figures of that epoch who did not enjoy such rewards are especially to be admired. Ignorant of the doctrine of the resurrection, although they witnessed events opposed to the promises of God, they were not scandalized, but yielded to his incomprehensible providence. They awaited the end (τέλος), aware of the readiness (τὸ εὔπορον) and inventiveness (τὸ εὐμήχανον) of his wisdom. Indeed, even before the end, they endured everything that happened to them thankfully, glorifying God who permits these things.

The same theme is developed in *Stag.* 1.6,[315] where Chrysostom writes that one should not doubt about the τέλος of the promises of God. For it is especially a mark of the power of God to find a way through difficulties (πόρον ἐκ τῶν ἀπόρων εὑρεῖν).

Chapter ten of *Scand.* consists of examples drawn from the Old

313. PG 63, 473.
314. Cf. *Stag.* 1.8; PG 47, 443 f.
315. PG 47, 438 f.

Testament to illustrate this theme. First Abraham: God promised to make him a father when he was old and his wife was both old and barren. Though there were so many obstacles, he believed in the promise, for he knew that the promise of God is εὐμήχανος and εὔπορος, not bound by the laws of nature and advancing through obstructions towards fulfillment. He did not allow his reasonings (λογισμοί) to be stirred into confusion, but judged that the power of the one who had promised was sufficient to fulfill the promise. Finally, he did not ask how this would be, and why so late in old age. Romans 4:18-21 is quoted to show that Abraham glorified God by not meddling, and by yielding to the incomprehensibility of his wisdom and power.[315a].

Not even when God ordered him to slay his son was he scandalized, though there was much in the mandate able to scandalize one who was not sober and vigilant, including: (1) the command to murder one's own child, and the fact that it was desired by God; and (2) the tyranny of nature, since he was the loving father of a good son; and (3) the promise, which would be destroyed by the death of the son. Nonetheless, he did not react foolishly, saying he had been deceived, but fled to the power of the one who had promised—power which shines through obstacles, is above the laws of nature, has nothing which resists it—and fulfilled the command, at least mentally (γνώμῃ), with complete confidence (10.12).[316] A comparison of Abraham with those scandalized today, Chrysostom continues, shows the μικροψυχία and εὐτέλεια of these latter individuals, and that the only real source of scandal is not submitting to incomprehensible providence, and inquiring into the modality (τρόπον) of the economies.

The example of Joseph is now given (10.19-39). The events that befell him were opposed to the promises made in his dreams. But he waited for the end (τέλος), and not only was not scandalized, but gloried in these events. David also through all his trials waited for the end (τέλος) of the promises. One could mention many others, who, when they came upon difficult times, cleaved to the word (ἀπαγγελίαν) of God, and through their endurance won garlands.

315a. This description of Abraham resembles that of Zacharias in *Incomprehens.* h. 2.81-140, as well as that of the patriarch himself in the same homily, lines 312-26.

316. In the same way, "the rabbis held that God counted Isaac's willingness to die on the altar as though he had already died for God's sake" (*Tan.*, Toledet, n. 7, f. 46a = Montefiore and Lowe, *Rabbinic Anthology*, no. 784).

In the present circumstances it is necessary to await the end (τέλος), which will come either here or in the coming age. Submit to the incomprehensibility of divine providence, and do not meddle with the modality of the paradox working of God, asking, How will such evils be corrected?

In the typical fashion of ancient Ringkomposition, chapter eleven returns to the argument that all things reach the proper τέλος in the present or the future life. One should not be disheartened that it may come in the future age, for this is the true life: the present life is a road, the future life, the fatherland and scene of rewards and punishments. Furthermore, the scandal of some is made up for by the approbation of others; the former are hypocrites, being separated like chaff from the wheat, while the latter are like gold being purified.

The Nature of Scandal (12-18)

Why God permits Scandals (12)

Chrysostom now argues that if one will not submit to the inscrutability of divine providence, and insists on asking why such evils are permitted (συνεχωρήθη), he will become involved in the problem of evil in general—why heresies were allowed (ἀφείθησαν), why the devil, demons, evil men and the Antichrist.

In *Stag.* 1.4[317] an analogous link is forged between all the questions concerning evil: "now they inquire about the devil, then their argument continues in sequence to accuse and blame providence in many respects."

As usual,[318] he explains the existence of evil by the concept of divine "permission" (συγχωρεῖν), a notion which seems to come from the prologue to the book of Job.[319]

In response to the question here in chap. 12 of *why* God permits evils, he first repeats that one should not enquire into such things, but yield to the incomprehensibility of God's providence. But if one also seeks for a rational explanation (λόγον), there are such available. Chrysostom offers the explanation known to him, while affirming that many others are clear to the one who economizes our affairs (12.2).

317. PG 47, 433.

318. Cf. 9.7 and 12.3.

319. Nowak, pp. 41-44. Prestige, p. 68. Malingrey, *Lettre d'exil*, pp. 70 f., n. 3, *Lettres à Olympias*, p. 187, n. 4.

In general, he is chary of definite rational solutions of theological problems. This he writes in h. 23.4 (PG 60, 183) on Acts: "Do not accustom yourselves only to seek a solution, but also not to seek. For we shall never stand still as long as we seek. If I solve this problem (i.e., why some are blind from birth), I exhibit a myriad of other enquiries (ζητήματα) ... Nor when we solve, have we solved completely, but according to human reasoning..." He expresses the same ideas in *Stag.* 1.8:[320] "Let the clear explanation of these things be entrusted to him who knows everything before it happens. But if I must think of a solution and consolation from what is already known to us for the sake of those investigating overmuch, I say...".

The reason given by Chrysostom in 12.3 f. as to why scandals are permitted is "so as not to diminish the prizes of the virtuous (γενναίων).[321] Below (12.7) he gives the same explanation in more detail: "it was not right for those able to bind up many crowns for themselves as a result of the scandals to be diminished in the recompense of rewards through negligence of others. These would have been abused (ἐπηρεάζεσθαι) if they had not engaged in the combats, whereas those injured thereby can only blame themselves." As scriptural support are cited God's words in Job 40:8 (LXX): Ἄλλως με οἴει σοι κεχρηματικέναι ἢ ἵνα ἀναφανῇς δίκαιος.[322] Paul's statement in 1 Cor. 11:19 is also invoked: "For there must be also heresies, that they which are approved may be made manifest among you." The phrase, "there must be heresies," does not mean that he is ordaining these things, but announcing in advance both the future and the profit that would come from it to the sober, viz., their ἀρετή will appear more clearly.

Earlier, Chrysostom had given the same explanation of why God permits the devil to act:[323] "so that man, who had previously been defeated by the devil, might lay him low. It is fairer for the virtuous (γενναῖοι) to have occasion (ἀφορμάς) to show their free will (προαίρεσιν), and for those not such to be punished by their own negligence

320. PG 47, 443.

321. The noble are virtuous, according to the Stoic concept: ὅς ἂν ᾖ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καλῶς γεγονώς, τοῦτον προσήκει γενναῖον λέγεσθαι: Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 15.31; SVF 3, p. 89, no. 365. See pp. 85-89 ("De nobilitate et libertate") and SVF 4, s.v. εὐγένεια. (*Lettres à Olympias*, p. 63.)

322. Cf. *Ep.* 8.8 f. to Olympias for a similar citation of this verse.

323. *Stag.* 1.4; PG 47, 432.

(ῥᾳθυμία), than for the good (σπουδαῖοι) to be abused (ἐπηρεάσθησαν) on account of the worthless (φαύλους). For the former would not have had anywhere to show their courage (ἀνδρεία)—if the devil had not been permitted to act." In this passage Stoic influence is apparent by the distinctive terminology (cf. SVF 4, s.v. γενναῖος, ἀφορμή, προαίρεσις, σπουδαῖος/φαῦλος).

Another reason is now suggested as to why evil men were allowed (ἀφείθησαν): so that they would not be deprived of a change of heart by reason of an early departure, as, for example, Paul, the good thief, and many others.[324]

As for the Antichrist, his purpose is given in 2 Thess. 2:12: "That they all might be damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness." In this verse, Chrysostom interprets, Paul cuts off every defense from the Jews, since they will accept the Antichrist, though he claims to be God, but did not accept Jesus because he said that he was God.[325]

The Source of Scandal is Subjective (12.7-18)

Scandals come from the weakness of humanity, not the events themselves, as those who are not scandalized, or even become better thereby, reveal.[326]

A Noble Soul Is Sufficient in Itself for Virtue and Does Not Need a Teacher (13)

This argument, I believe, is directed against the faintheartedness of certain of Chrysostom's flock in Constantinople, who, without their bishop and his teaching, considered themselves helpless and unavoidably prey to scandal. This is to be inferred from one of his letters to Olympias containing this passage:

> I think that you also grieve ... because you are separated from my nothingness. You continually lament over this and say to everybody: We do not hear that tongue, nor do we profit from the accustomed teaching, but are beleaguered with famine. We now undergo what God once threatened against the Hebrews:

324. This idea occurs earlier in PLUTARCH, *De sera numinis vindicta.*

325. John 10:33.

326. 12.7, cf. 14.7.

> "not a famine of bread, nor a thirst for water, but a famine of divine teaching" (cf. Amos 8:11). (*Ep.* 8.11a; p. 202 M).

The words of Nicephorus Callistus concerning the dependence of the deaconess, Olympias, upon Chrysostom, could well be applied to his many followers in Constantinople: Ὅλη τῆς ἐκείνου καὶ ῥοπῆς καὶ γλώσσης ἑαυτὴν ἐξαρτήσασα.[327]

In this context Chrysostom tries to show that a teacher is not necessary to produce a soul strong enough to withstand scandal (13). The figure of Abraham, popular in patristic catechesis,[328] is cited first: "from what priests did Abraham draw profit? from what teachers? from what catechesis? from what exhortation and advice?" (13.1) Abraham practiced all the Christian virtues long before these were taught: ἀγάπη, scorn of possessions, the ascetical life. He is praised by Chrysostom for rejecting the "relaxed life" in terms reminiscent of Heraclitus.[329] Likewise, Noah became just with no priest, no bishop teacher (καθηγητήν), whereas his son, Ham, though enjoying all these benefits, was a knave (13.9-10). Finally, by a careful scriptural analysis Job is shown to have practiced all the New Testament virtues—without having had a teacher (13.11-21).

The Example of the Apostolic Church (14)

> "Scandalous" events were common in the apostolic church, as Paul tells us (2 Tim. 1:15, Acts 20:29 f., 2 Tim. 4:14). The teachers dwelt in prison, Stephen was stoned to death, Jacob was executed by Herod. Many were scandalized by these events, but many stood firm, as, e.g., Phil. 1:14 shows. Christ warned us about such happenings:
>
> In the world ye shall have tribulation (John 16:33).
>
> And ye shall be brought before governors and kings (Matt 10:18).
>
> The time cometh, that whosoever killeth you will think that he doeth God service (John 16:2).

327. H.e. 13.24; PG 146, 1012.

328. On the importance of Abraham in patristic catechesis, consult *Cahiers Sioniens* 5 (1951), esp. DANIÉLOU, "Abraham dans la tradition chrétienne."

329. Cf. 13:2 τὸν ὑγρὸν καὶ διαλελυμένον διεκρούσατο βίον with Heraclitus B 77 = DK 1, p. 168; B 117 = p. 177.

> Thus it is vain to speak of those being scandalized everywhere, for these things have always happened (14.1-7).

Here Chrysostom makes no distinction between the situation of the pre-toleration church of the apostles, and the post-toleration church of his own day. He establishes the same parallelism in his letter 7 to Olympias.[330]

> At the crucifixion many were scandalized by the cross, as Scripture records:
>
> > Thou that destroyest the temple, and buildest it in three days; He saved others, himself he cannot save. If thou be the son of God, come down from the cross, and we will believe in you (cf. Matt. 27:40,42).
>
> But those scandalized by the cross have no defense (ἀπολογίαν). The thief accuses all such, who although he saw Jesus condemned and crucified, was not scandalized, but transcended all human things and rose up on the wing of faith to philosophize concerning the future (14.8 f.; cf. Lk 23:40-43).

It is therefore faith which enables the good thief to transcend the scandal and view the whole in eschatological perspective. The same view is expressed by Chrysostom in h. 1.2 *de cruce et latrone*,[331] where he says of the good thief: οὐκ ἐνενόησε τὴν φαινομένην εὐτέλειαν τοῦ σταυρουμένου, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τῆς πίστεως ὀφθαλμοῖς ἅπαντα ταῦτα παραδραμών ...

> He confessed his own sins, and philosophized about the resurrection without having seen any miracles. The Jews, on the contrary, who enjoyed his teaching both in word and deed, were led to destruction by crucifying him. Thus the ἀγνώμονες and ἠμελημένοι do not profit from benefits, while the εὐγνώμονες and νήφοντες benefit from things by which others are scandalized (14.11-13).

At this point the theme of *Scand.* becomes identical with that of the diatribe, *Quod nemo laeditur*. That the morally lax cannot profit from any external advantages was stated in *Laed.* 11.25 ff. and illustrated by the example of Judas, also used here in 14.13-15 to prove the same

330. 5a-d, pp. 152 ff. M.
331. PG 49, 402.

notion. A little later on, a brief résumé of the paradox, that no man is hurt but by himself, is given in 15.7-16 of *Scand.*, with reference to the scandalized, who have only themselves to blame for their destruction.

But before that, he analyzes the scandal of the cross, based on the text of 1 Cor. 1:23 f.: "But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block (σκάνδαλον), and unto the Greeks foolishness: but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God."

> Should there have been no cross, since it was to be a scandal to "them that perish" (cf. 2 Cor. 2:15), then, afterwards and forever? Rather one must consider "them that are saved" (2 Cor. 2:15), who profited from such wisdom. The scandalized have only themselves to blame.
>
> The scandal was not owing to the nature of the cross, but to the folly (ἄνοια) of the scandalized. Should there be no sun, because it may injure the eyes of the weak? And no honey, since it is bitter to the sick? Should there have been no apostles, since to some they are "the savour of death unto death" (2 Cor. 2:16)? The very appearance of our Lord deprived many of any defense (ἀπολογίας): "If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin: but now they have no cloak for their sin" (John 15:22). In addition, the Scriptures scandalized many and begat many heresies, but they still had to be given for the sake of those who would profit from them. The latter would have suffered a great loss, if deprived of the Scriptures on account of the ἀγνωμοσύνη and ῥᾳθυμία of others (15.2-6).

With the example of the cross Chrysostom shows that scandal, an integral part of Christianity from its inception, lies in the consciousness of the beholder rather than the events themselves. The cross in reality was a good, which procured many benefits for humanity, discussed at length in 17.1-13 (cf. 15.1).

Conclusion (18)

> Thus when you see certain people being scandalized by what has happened, remember the following facts. First, they owe their scandal to their own weakness, not to the events themselves; this is clear from those who have not suffered scandal. Second, many have shone more brightly as a result of these

events, glorifying God and thanking him earnestly even for these things. Finally, those who have stood firm are more numerous than those who have been shaken. But even if the latter were more numerous, a single person who does God's will is better than ten thousand transgressors.

With this summation Chrysostom turns from his analysis of scandal to a series of arguments designed to show the gains which have resulted from these seemingly unfavorable events. In his attempt to demonstrate the moral profits which come from ostensibly evil occurrences, he was preceded by Socrates[332] and principally by Epictetus.

The Prize of Martyrdom and Other Positive Results of These Events (19)

[One has no reason to be scandalized, and rather should rejoice,] seeing so many winning the prize of martyrdom as a result of these events. The company (δῆμος) includes men, women, youths and is a great treasure to the church (19.1-3).

The argument which follows proves that his adherents are truly martyrs, though they did not die or suffer for refusing to sacrifice to idols (19. 3-10). At 19.11 the argument returns to a description of the great profit that has issued from this affliction:

One sees so much wealth, so much profit, so much merchandise gathered into the church, so many treasures stored up, those who were previously slack now more zealous than fire, those who were addicted to the theater going out into solitary places and making the glens and mountains into a church. Since there is no one to lead the flock, the sheep enter the rank of shepherds and the soldiers that of the general because of their confidence and courage. Thus all celebrate the liturgies (συνάξεις) with proper warmth, zeal and harmoniousness (ἐμμελείας).

Are you not astonished and filled with admiration at the great result (κατόρθωμα) that has ensued from these events (19.11)? Another positive result is that those whose piety is only feigned have been exposed at the present time (19.14).

332. Cf. *Apol.* 28b ff., 40c ff.

The Nature of Suffering (20 *f.*)

Trials and sufferings are the hallmark of the apostolic life (20.1-7)

The evil priest or savage government official of today should not cause scandal to anyone. Worse than this happened in the time of the apostles. At that time the world ruler was one whom Paul called "the mystery of iniquity" (2 Thess. 2:7). Also the wickedness of the Jewish priests was such that Christ advised the people not to imitate their deeds (Matt. 23: 2-3).

One should not be astonished at what is happening. Everywhere trials (πειρασμοί) have been conjoined upon the sober (νήφουσιν) both by outsiders and their own. Thus Paul wrote: "I sent Timothy to you, that no man should be moved by these afflictions: for yourselves know that we are appointed thereunto" (1 Thess. 3:2).

By the phrase "we are appointed thereunto" (εἰς τοῦτο κείμεθα), he means that just as merchandise is produced to be sold, so the apostolic life is there to be reviled and to suffer evil without respite. Those who are sober are not injured thereby, but profit, as texts like 1 Thess. 3:6-9 and Phil. 1:14 show.

The theme that suffering is the mark of the apostolic life was earlier developed by Chrysostom in his treatise, *Ad Stagirium.* Here he affirms that no one who ever counted with God was free from affliction—even if it does not appear so to outside observers.[333] Half of this treatise is devoted to an examination of the lives of prominent figures in the Bible, who had confidence (παρρησία) in God because of their afflictions.[334]

Ineffable Reasons for Suffering (20.8)

There are many other ineffable explanations for these things. For we cannot know everything.

In *Stag.* 1.6[335] he says that it belongs to the wisdom of God that

333. 1.6; PG 47, 441.
334. 2.5-3. See 2.5; p. 454.
335. *Stag.* 1.6; PG 47, 441.

we do not understand everything about providence clearly. We are reminded that suffering is a mystery, and are cautioned against rationalizing the mystery of God's operations away.

Παραδοξοποιΐα (20.8-10)

> Another discernible reason for these afflictions is that they provide more opportunity for the wonder-working (παραδοξοποιΐα) of God. This was true for Joseph and in the case of the cross, where the entire accomplishment (κατόρθωμα) did not blossom in the beginning, but scandal preceded. There were a few miracles (σημεῖα) at the time of the crucifixion to correct those who had dared the deed, and then everything passed unnoticed. The tearing of the veil of the temple and the solar eclipse happened in one day and were soon forgotten by most. Afterwards the apostles preached in flight and persecution. So too with Paul: his eventual transformation shone brighter than the sun, and encompassed the whole world.

This curious argument asserts that God is able to use his miraculous powers more fully in an affair that commences in weakness and scandal. The transformation from a scandalous beginning to a succesful end serves to focus man's attention on God's actions. Elsewhere he gives the same explanation of why God permits things to happen apparently opposed to his promises: because he thus supplies indisputable proof (τεκμήριον) of his power and ability to bring the promises to accomplishment from circumstances despaired of by men.[336]

The Agon (21)

> The reason why there are so many trials in the Old Testament and New Testament is that the present life is a gymnastic school and an athletic contest (ἀγών), a smelting furnace of virtue. Like a gymnastic master God tries to make the soul fit for virtue (ἀρετή).

In *Stag.* 1.6[337] he also uses the image of God as gymnastic master

336. *Stag.* 1.6; PG 47, 439.
337. PG 47, 440.

(παιδοτρίβης), who exercises human beings with different types of afflictions. Here he justifies this agonistic picture by a Greek proverb, ἀνὴρ ἀπείραστος, ἀδόκιμος, and the comparable Pauline text, ἡ θλῖψις ὑπομονὴν κατεργάζεται, ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ δοκιμήν.[338]

The agonistic motif[339] was of course a part of Christianity from St. Paul on, and was often employed by Chrysostom to justify human suffering.[340]

The benefit to pagans from these happenings (22.1-16)

> Even those who are not Christians profit greatly from what has happened, if they are sober. At the sight of people being treated unjustly, reviled, imprisoned, executed, burned, drowned, not yielding, then and now pagans go away marveling at these athletes. To sober pagans, therefore, the present events do not scandalize but become the basis of instruction (22.1).

As examples from Scripture he cites the reaction of Nebuchadnezzar to the burning of three young men, and of Herod to the death of John the Baptist, and concludes: "Learn to philosophize and you will not be injured by such things, but profit greatly" (22.10). In the light of "philosophy,"[341] he examines the life of Joseph:

> How did the Egyptian women injure him, then or now, although she accused him and threw him into prison? The fame of that youth rests upon the calumny, not upon the throne in Egypt. Πανταχοῦ γὰρ τοῖς πάθεσιν αἱ δόξαι καὶ αἱ εὐδοκιμήσεις καὶ οἱ στέφανοί εἰσι συγκεκληρωμένοι (12). This is the principle revealed by philosophy: that everywhere glory, approbation and crowns are the inheritance of sufferings. The images of Joseph's excellence (ἀρετή) are established more lastingly in human consciousness than are the imperial images (22.11-13).

338. Rom. 5:3 f.
339. Cf. Carl Schneider, *Geistesgeschichte des antiken Christentums* 1 (Munich, 1954), pp. 498 ff.
340. Nowak, pp. 160-72, 185-89.
341. On φιλοσοφία in Chrysostom, see A. M. Malingrey, *Philosophia*, chap. 8.

He advises the scandalized not to be disturbed, but to profit from what has happened:

> Let the endurance of the athletes be a teacher of strength. Perceiving that the entire life of virtuous men (γενναίων) is woven from such sufferings, do not be troubled either by personal or common trials: in fact the church was nourished on them from the beginning and grew this way. There is no reason for astonishment, since nothing improbable (ἀπεικός) has happened (22.16).[342]

With this argument Chrysostom is making new use of the old observation, that the sufferings of the martyrs affected many conversions to the church. The physician Galen (d. 199) was the first pagan to remark with admiration on the endurance of the Christian martyrs.[343] Shortly afterwards originated the aphorism, "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church" (Tertullian, *Apol.* 50). Here again a parallel is drawn between the situation of the church in the apostolic age and in Chrysostom's own.

The benefit to the church at Constantinople: these events are the sign of its approbation (22.17-23)

> The present events may be interpreted as a sign of the accomplishments (κατορθωμάτων) of the church of Constantinople. Just as in the secular world, pirates and robbers are only a danger where gold and pearls are involved, not chaff and grass, so in this case the devil attacks when he sees gold heaped up in the soul and an abundance of piety (17. Cf. *De stat.* h. 1.11; PG 49, 31 for the same idea).
>
> So when the evil demon saw this church flourishing and the entire world being taught by this city, he ignited internecine wars within it. The Constantinopolitan church may be compared with Job, in the variety of machinations which the devil used against her. But she was not shaken, but made brighter.
>
> Now she teaches the world, as she could not when untroubled, to be steadfast under affliction. The entire congregation (λαός) teaches both by words and deeds; by what they suffer and endure, not by shaking weapons or declaring war (23).

342. Note the use of the argument from probability (εἰκός), which Aristotle, classifies as a fallacious enthymene (*Rhet.* 1402a3-28. Cf. Jebb, 1: cxx, cxxii).

343. Quoted by Philip Carrington, *The Early Christian Church* (Cambridge, 1957) 2, p. 257.

Thus he praises his followers for adhering to the evangelical principle of passively suffering evil and not offering warlike resistance. At the same time, according to the Greek moral principle enunciated in *Laed.* 5, they put to shame their abusers: τῷ πάσχειν κακῶς τοὺς ποιοῦντας ἐκ πολλοῦ τοῦ περιόντος καταισχύνοντες (23.4).

The Punishment of the Guilty (24)

According to his usual practice, Chrysostom affirms that God punishes the wicked both in the present life and after death in hell.[344]

> As to this world, while those who have suffered injustice live confidently with clear countenance, the evil-doers have a bad conscience (συνειδός) and live in fear and trembling. Those who have been conspired against have the world as their partisans to praise and admire them; whereas the conspirators have just so many who hate them, and wish to see them punished.
>
> As concerns the next world, no words can describe their punishment. If it were better for the indivudual who has scandalized one person, "that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea" (Luke 17:2), then what punishment awaits those who have troubled the whole world, upset so many churches, warred upon such great peace, and place ten thousand scandals everywhere? (24.1-4)

In the same vein he writes to Olympias: "if to scandalize one person entails such great punishment (Matt. 18:6), then what will be the punishment of those who have scandalized so many churches and have made our doctrine contemptible to Jews and pagans?".[345]

> On the contrary, those who suffered of them will stand with the martyrs and apostles, and, shining with their achievements, will see them punished, but will be unable to rescue them (cf. Luke 17:26; 24.5-6).

344. Cf. Nowak, pp. 146-149.

345. *Ep.* 8.10c.

Chrysostom concludes by urging his followers to stand firm and use what he has written in the treatise and whatever else like it that they may cull from Scripture as a bulwark for themselves and a remedy for the weaker brethren, confidently awaiting a recompense infinitely greater than their pains.[346]

As mentioned above many early Christian apologies conclude with a description of the last things, punishment of the evil and reward of the just. Chrysostom himself writes in h. 7.2 *De stat.*[347] that "when arguing with pagans and heretics concerning the goodness of God, it is necessary to demonstrate (ἐπιδείκνυμεν) his goodness not only from his benefits to us, but also from his punishments. The threat of Gehenna no less than the kingdom shows his goodness. For if he had not threatened Gehenna and prepared punishment, many would not have reached the kingdom. The promise of goods does not incite to virtue so much as the threat of evils constrains by fear."

346. 24.7-8. Cf. *Ol. Ep.* 8.3b-3d; pp. 166-170 M.
347. PG 49, 93 f.

CHAPTER III

THE CHRISTIAN LIFE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION: JOHN CHRYSOSTOM AND MONASTICISM

THE SURROUNDING ENVIRONMENT: MONASTICISM IN ANTIOCH

It is not known whether monasticism in Syria developed independently from the dominant ascetical movement of the early Syrian church or was transplated from Egypt. It is clear, however, that in the period after Constantine the church in Syria was informed about the example of the monks of Egypt.[1] Chrysostom, in a homily delivered in Antioch about 390, refers to the monks of Egypt with admiration; he describes Anthony as "he who even until now is in the mouths of all men—he whom, even after the apostles, Egypt brought forth, the blessed and great Anthony." He also advises his audience to read the life of Anthony by Athanasius, which he indicates that he has read.[2]

Theodoret[3] states that the environs of Antioch and Mount Silpius were heavily populated by monks during the reign of Valens:

> In the neighborhood of Antioch, Marianus, Eusebius, Ammianus, Palladius, Simeon, Abraames, and others, preserved the

1. Hubert Jedin and John Dolan, gen. eds., *History of the Church,* vol. 2: *The Imperial Church from Constantine to the Early Middle Ages,* by Karl Baus, trans. Anselm Briggs (New York, 1980), pp. 362 f.

2. *In Matt.* h. 8.4-5 (PG 57, 87-89). Chrysostom evidently refers to Athanasius, *Vita Antonii* 82, Anthony's prophecy about the danger of Arianism. It is possible that Chrysostom had visited Egypt, since he seems to be describing things he had seen. The *Vita Antonii* of Athanasius was translated into Latin at Antioch by Evagrius about the year 370. The Syriac version may belong to the same time. (Louis Meyer, *Saint Jean Chrysostome maître de perfection chrétienne,* Paris 1933, pp. 14 f.).

3. *H.e.* 4.25, PG 82, 1189.

> divine image unimpaired; but of all these the lives have been recorded by us.[4] But the mountain which is in the neighborhood of the great city *(Mons Silpius)* was decked like a meadow, for in it shone Petrus, the Galatian, his namesake the Egyptian, Romanus, Severus, Zeno, Moses, and Malchus, and many others of whom the world is ignorant, but who are known to God.[5]

According to Schiwietz, solitary monks appeared in the neighborhood of Antioch perhaps in the sixth decade of the fourth century; and *coenobia* or associations of monks appeared later.[6]

THE CHURCH AT ANTIOCH

Emperor Valens (364-378) favored Arianism, and persecuted the orthodox and Nicene Christians throughout his realm. In Antioch, at the beginning of his reign, the Christians were divided into three communities under the leadership of Euzoius, an Arian; Meletius, an orthodox bishop; and Paulinus, a priest who was loyal to Eustathius, an earlier bishop of Antioch faithful to the Nicene creed.[7] John Chrysostom, born in Antioch ca. 345, belonged to the community united around Diodore and Flavian, under the direction of bishop Meletius, who was often in exile.[8]

It is important to ascertain the ascetical ideas of this group, which nurtured and spiritually formed young John Chrysostom. In the absence of sufficient historical sources, one can only speculate on the distinctive ideas of the *ascētērion* of the city of Antioch.[9]

4. In the *Historia religiosa* of THEODORET, written about 444. Chapters 1-13 of this work concern the most ancient eremites, most of whom were associated with Antioch and personally known to Theodoret. The text is found in PG 82, 1283-1496; new critical edition and French translation in SC volumes 234 and 257. An excellent study of this work and of the monks of Syria is contained in A. J. FESTUGIÈRE, *Antioche païenne et chrétienne: Libanius, Chrysostome et les moines de Syrie* (Paris, 1959).

5. Translation from *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,* Second Series, 3: 128-129.

6. S. SCHIWIETZ, *Das morgenländische Mönchtum* 3: *Das Mönchtum in Syrien und Mesopotamien und das Aszetentum in Persien* (Vienna, 1938), p. 306.

7. BAUS, p. 60. GLANVILLE DOWNEY, *A History of Antioch in Syria from Seleucus to the Arab Conquest* (Princeton, 1961), pp. 396 ff.

8. DOWNEY, pp. 401-402.

9. MEYER, pp. 9 ff. (Author's Note: in the author's view the writings of Meyer are significant and therefore the author has cited and referred to Meyer in depth.)

Meletius (d. 381) was originally from Melitene in Armenia minor. Before becoming bishop of Antioch, he took part in the synod which deposed Eustathius of Sebaste from the episcopate (358) and was familiar with the Eustathians and their ascetical excesses, which were condemned at the council of Gangra. Meletius was also personally acquainted with Basil the Great. According to Palladius,[10] Meletius "with a prophetic eye" befriended young John Chrysostom and invited him to be his disciple.

Meletius's successor, Flavian, incarnated the authentic ascetical tradition of Antioch. He was a native Antiochene who belonged to a rich family, but renounced his fortune early and led an austere life. Under the Arian bishops of Antioch (Leontius, Eudoxius, Euzoius), he maintained the traditional faith, along with Diodore, a layman like himself. Between 361 and 365 the two were ordained priests by Meletius. In 381 Flavian succeeded Meletius as bishop of Antioch. Chrysostom, in his first sermon, which was in praise of bishop Flavian, states that Flavian was moderate in his practise of abstinence (ἐγκράτεια) and practised fasting in a way that would not render his body unfit for ministry.[11] Like Meletius, Flavian viewed the ascetical movements with caution. He intervened in the affair of the Messalians or Euchites, who flourished in the monasteries of Syria. These monks condemned physical labor and devoted themselves to constant prayer.[12] In this context Meyer characterizes Flavian as "anti-mystical" and as concerned with suppressing all pseudo-mystical manifestations.[13]

Diodore was a prolific writer, but most of his works have perished. In addition to his other teachings on exegesis, apologetics, polemics, dogma, cosmology and chronology, he doubtless espoused an ascetical doctrine. Sozomen describes him, along with Carterius (who is otherwise unknown) as Chrysostom's teacher in the spiritual life:

> ταύτης δὲ τῆς φιλοσοφίας διδασκάλους ἔσχε τοὺς τότε προεστῶτας τῶν τῇδε περιφανῶν ἀσκητηρίων, Καρτέριόν τε καὶ Διόδωρον. (Sozomen, H.e. 8.2; PG 67, 1516. Cf. Socrates, H.e. 6.3; PG 67, 665, 667)

10. *V. Chrys.* 5, PG 47, 18.

11. *Ordin.* 3; SC 272, p. 412, l. 241.

12. THEODORET, *H.e.* 4.10; NPNF pp. 114 f.

13. Ibid., p. 15.

Chrysostom calls Diodore "father" in his homily *Diod.* 3-4.[14] It is doubtful that Diodore was head of a monastery in the Syrian mode. Rather, he was evidently the leader of a group of ascetics preparing themselves for the clergy.

The ascetic group inspired by Diodore did not have any precise institutional structure. All that can be said with certainty is that Diodore was a spiritual guide who practiced a rigorous asceticism,[15] and a mode of life admitting all the attributes of monastic life. It appears, however, that the *ascētērion* of Diodore rested on a spirit completely different from that of monasticism, if one identifies monasticism, as the contemporaries of Chrysostom did, with cenobitism and eremitism. While these diverse forms of monastic life constitute a response to new demands and derive from a relatively new impulse, of which the first symptoms do not go beyond the first years of the fourth century, the *ascētērion* is to be placed in the line of traditional asceticism nearly as ancient as the church itself.[16]

During the first three centuries, there were ascetics (men) and virgins (women) who lived with their families. This conduct continued, when, beside them, solitaries and cenobites began to inhabit the desert. Sometimes sister and brother adopted the ascetical life and occupied the same house, as did bishop Flavian and his sister. Some ascetics and virgins without family sought mutual support and began to live together in the same house. This abuse continued for a long time, despite the opposition of certain bishops, and condemnation by the councils. As a deacon at Antioch (382-383), Chrysostom wrote two stern works against these illicit cohabitations.[17]

Certainly, the way of life of the city ascetics was influenced by desert monasticism. From the middle of the fourth century, in a number of cities, the ascetics grouped themselves around the bishop. These groups of ascetics lead by Basil at Caesarea, Ambrose at Milan and Augustine at Hippo, among others, seemed to have formed nurseries

14. PG 52, 763, 764.

15. Cf. emperor Julian, *Ep.* 90, ed. J. Bidez (Paris, 1960), p. 175. Chrysostom, PG 52, 765.

16. J. M. Leroux, "Monachisme et communauté chrétienne d'après saint Jean Chrysostome", in *Théologie de la vie monastique* (Paris, 1961), pp. 148 ff. (Author's Note: in the author's view the writings of Leroux are significant and therefore the author has cited and referred to Leroux in depth.)

17. Ed. J. Dumortier, Paris 1955.

of individual ascetics, who were more docile to the call of bishops than the solitaries in the desert. In reality they continued the traditions of the ancient ascetics, but directed this renunciation to the common good, in the new forms of monasticism.[18]

The *ascētērion* of Diodore was one of the earliest such groups, if not the original one. Although Diodore was probably influenced by monastic practises, whether Syrian, Egyptian or Basilian, the principle of asceticism was radically different. Contrary to the monks, whose first aim was the rejection of the world and the flight to the desert, the ascetics of Diodore remained in the lap of the community and worked actively for its development. Their ascetic ideal consisted in virginity and total detachment from temporal goods; their solitude was interior and did not exclude apostolic work; they engaged in continual prayer and constant meditation on the Scriptures, which were the main object of study.

This conception of "the hermit in the world," which perhaps was not made explicit by Diodore but by his pupil, Chrysostom, is certainly the most original aspect of Diodore's teaching.[19] Christians could accomodate themselves readily to the existence of ascetics who withdrew from the world, but the conception of an "evangelical life" integrated into the city seemed to upset things and threaten the civil and ecclesiastical order. It was later one of the reasons for the condemnation of Chrysostom by the synod of the Oak.[20]

THE MONASTIC EXPERIENCE OF JOHN CHRYSOSTOM

According to Palladius, at the age of eighteen John abandoned the sophists for sacred studies.[21] Socrates states that around that time he abandoned the study of law for the contemplative (ἡσύχιον) life, and enrolled in the school of Diodore and Carterius.[22] He was ordained a lector, and seemed definitely committed to an ecclesiastical career. Then, evidently, he abandoned this intention and retired to the moun-

18. Meyer, pp. 19-25. Also cf. Robert Murray, *Symbols of Church and Kingdom: A Study in Early Syriac Tradition* (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 13-14.

19. Leroux, p. 149.

20. Ibid., p. 150.

21. *V. Chrys.* 5; PG 47, 18.

22. *H.e.* 6.3; PG 67, 665.

tainous environs of Antioch to live as a hermit. Only Palladius among the ancient sources records his monastic vocation.

Is it possible to explain this apparent change of mind on the part of John Chrysostom? He was already living an ascetical life in the city of Antioch along with other classmates in the school of Diodore. It is interesting to examine why he apparently changed his plan of service in the church as an ascetic for that of penitence among the anchorites of Syria.[23]

Chrysostom' monastic vocation does not seem to have been owing to the rash enthusiasm of youth, because later on he would confess the apprehension he felt upon entering the life of the solitaries. In *Compunct.* 1.6[24] he says that his concern, when he had determined to enter monastic life, was whether he would be supplied with fresh bread every day, whether he would have to use the same oil for his lamp and his food, and be forced to eat pulse; and whether he would be ordered to do menial labor and be a "hewer of wood and drawer of water." He states that his desire was for ἀνάπαυσις, i.e., rest, for contemplation. It was therefore a considered step: in spite of natural repugnance, he embraced this life so contrary to his social status, education and temperament.

Palladius[25] also says that Chrysostom was pricked by his conscience not to be content with his ascetic struggles in the city; and that he could not control his youth which was swelling with desire. "Youth", says Chrysostom in his first sermon, "resembles a raging sea filled with savage waves and evil spirits".[26]

In solitude John Chrysostom was out of danger. This is precisely the point of view which he took in *Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae,* where he says that it is necessary for youth to flee the corruption of the city in order to be saved.

This thought may have influenced him to choose solitude, as well as certain external circumstances. First, his mother, Anthusa, was

23. The main outlines of the following discussion derive from the work of Meyer, pp. 29 ff.

24. PG 47, 403.

25. *V. Chrys.* 5, PG 47, 18.

26. *Ordin.* 3; SC 272, p. 412. Cf. *In* 1 *Tim.* h. 9.2 (PG 62, 546): ἄγριον ἡ νεότης, πολλῶν δεομένη τῶν ἐπιστατούντων, διδασκάλων, παιδαγωγῶν, ἀκολούθων, τροφέων· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ μετὰ τοσαῦτα κατασχεθῆναι αὐτήν. Καθάπερ τις ἵππος ἀδάμαστος, καθάπερ τι θηρίον ἀτίθασσον, τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ νεότης. Also *In Eph.* h. 21.1 (PG 62, 150). *In Matt.* h. 55.6 (PG 58, 548).

probably dead by this time. This is to be concluded from *Sac.* 1.2,[27] where his mother requested him not to leave home until she died. Second, his bishop and spiritual father, Meletius, was in exile from 372-378,[28] and Diodore was frequently absent from Antioch. These factors, in addition to the persecution of the orthodox by emperor Valens during these years, could have induced John to leave Antioch.

Palladius states that John fell in with a Syrian elder practicing abstinence (ἐγκράτεια), imitated his asceticism, and spent four years with him.[29] For four years Chrysostom was penetrated by the ascetical doctrines and practices of Syrian monasticism. He fought the tendency towards pleasurable living (ἡδυπάθεια) in their manner—but not entirely. Palladius says that he conquered easily, not so much by effort (πόνῳ) as by reason (λόγῳ). Meyer states that this was characteristic of Chrysostom, whose preferred method in theology was rational persuasion.[30]

In the oriental tradition of monasticism, it is generally accepted that the cenobitic life is the best preparation for the eremitic (solitary state).[31] Chrysostom retired into solitude and went successively through the different steps of the ascetic life, each more rigorous. Aspiring, like many others, to be a monk in the most strict sense, and contradicting in part his own picture of the celestial and angelic life of the *coenobia* or monasteries, he retired to live totally alone in a cave. It was anchoritism brought to its extreme, and was held to be the greatest accomplishment which a monk could realize. According to Palladius, Chrysostom was desirous of obscurity (γλιχόμενος ἀδηλίας). This reflection of his biographer, Palladius, together with what Chrysostom tells us elsewhere of his combat with vainglory, suggests that he may have gained a great reputation among the monks, and may have been receiving much admiration and notoriety, possibly owing to certain writings which he had composed at this time, i.e., the two books *De compunctione.*

27. SC 272, p. 70, l.75 ff.

28. GLANVILLE DOWNEY, "The Shines of St. Babylas at Antioch and Daphne," in *Antioch on the Orontes* 2*: The Excavations* 1933-1936, ed. Richard Stillwell (Princeton, 1938), p. 47.

29. *V. Chrys.* 5.

30. MEYER, p. 38.

31. CLÉMENT LIALINE, "Erémitisme en orient," in *Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique* 4.1 (Paris, 1960): 940.

According to Palladius, *V. Chrys.* 5 (PG 47, 18):

> He (Chrysostom) spent thrice eight months there (alone in the cave), remained without sleep most of the time, learning by heart the testaments of Christ so as to banish ignorance. He did not lie down for the space of two years, neither at night nor during the day.[32] He mortified the parts closest to the bowels, and became ill from the cold in the kidneys, and on not being able to take care of himself, he took refuge in the harbor of the church anew. And it was the providence of the Savior, for the benefit of the church, to remove him, by means of illness, from the labors of the ascetic life, and that, impeded by his weakness, he should leave those caves.

John Chrysostom, his body permanently broken by the mortifications,[33] and no longer able to fend for himself, returned to Antioch —providentially for the church, Palladius says. Illness would have been a proper reason for no one to see him as a deserter[34]—which indeed he was not. He did not return to secular life, but, according to Palladius, for the next two years devoted himself to "serving the altar". Two years later he was ordained a deacon by Meletius (about 380), and later on a priest by Flavian (386).

The six years of solitude that preceded shaped the subsequent course of his life. He continued to lead an ascetic life of great strictness; and his theology remained "monastic."[35]

THE WRITINGS OF JOHN CHRYSOSTOM ON MONASTICISM AND RELATED TOPICS

Although Chrysostom wrote a number of treatises on various aspects of monasticism and asceticism, there is no systematic treatise which deals with the totality of monastic theology.[36] To gain a complete picture of his views, and to determine whether there was any change or development in them, one must turn to his other works, mainly his homilies, in which many utterances concerning monks are to be found. The volume by Auf der Maur contains many of the representative texts of John Chrysostom on monasticism.[37] The following is a survey of his treatises on monasticism, with the exception of *Opp.*, which, as the subject of this chapter, will be examined in detail below.

Comparatio potentiae, divitiarum et excellentiae regis, cum monacho in verissima et Christiana philosophia vivente
(PG 47, 387-92)

This brief work, "a naive Christian Stoic diatribe,"[38] is possibly Chrysostom's first literary production, written when he was in the school of Diodore. It recalls a school exercise which Libanius, Chrysostom's professor of rhetoric, would submit to his pupils in the form of the thesis, "comparison of the philosopher and the king."[39]

As will be demonstrated later on, Chrysostom identified monasticism with philosophy. He applied to the monk all the characteristics of the Cynic-Stoic philosopher. The *Comp.* presents an ideal picture of the monastic life such as also occurs in *Opp.*

Paraenesis sive adhoratio ad Theodorum lapsum
(= Ad Theodorum lapsum 1).
Ad eumdem Theodorum liber secundus
(= Ad Theodorum lapsum 2)[40]

Ad Theodorum 2[40] is really an epistle, which has a personal tone and is addressed to a certain Theodore, who lived an ascetical life in a com-

32. That is, he practices ἀγρυπνία and στάσις, the latter a form of austerity particularly in vogue among Syrian monks. (Hippolyte Delehaye, Les saints stylites, Subsidia hagiographica, no. 14, Brussels 1923, p. CLXXXIII).

33. Chrysostomus Baur, *John Chrysostom and His Time,* translated by M. Gonzaga (Westminster, Maryland, 1959), 1.136 f.

34. In *De sacerdotio* 6.5 (SC 272, p. 322) Chrysostom states that not everyone's body is fit to endure the ascetical exercises.

35. Leroux, p. 154.

36. Nor did he compose a rule, like Basil and Augustine. Even so, the monks after Cassian consider John Chrysostom as one of their spiritual fathers. Leroux, p. 190.

37. *Mönchtum und Glaubensverkündigung in den Schriften des hl. Johannes Chrysostomus,* Freiburg, 1959.

38. Baur 1:117.

39. D. Ruiz Bueno, *Tratados asceticos. Texto griego, versión española y notas (Obras de San Juan Crisóstomo)* (Madrid, 1958), p. 51. Fabricius has shown the literary dependence of this work on Libanius ("Vier Libaniusstellen bei Johannes Chrysostomus," *Symbolae Osloenses* 33 [1957] 135-36).

40. New critical edition by J. Dumortier, SC 117 (Paris, 1966). English translation by W. R. W. Stephens in NPNF 9:87-116.

munity of brothers before his defection from monastic life[41]. It is possible that this Theodore is actually Theodore of Mopsuestia, who, according to both Greek and Syriac sources, lived in Diodore's *ascētērion*, from the 370's to 392, when he went to Mopsuestia as bishop.[42] Sozomen[43] places the origin of the letter in the *ascētērion* of Diodore.[44] Chrysostom could have written this letter to Theodore, when they were both students of Diodore; but it appears more likely that he wrote it when he was a monk living outside the city of Antioch (about 372), since he does not seem to be living in the same community as Theodore. He states that he was urged *not* to write that letter by many, but wrote it anyway in the hope that, God willing, it would achieve something.[45] This is an indication of Chrysostom's faith in the power of *logos* to effect change in human behavior.

Ad Theodorum 1[46] is a long and impersonal treatise, probably not directed to a specific person. The original form of the title was lacking the name Theodore: πρὸς ἐκπεσόντα καὶ περὶ μετανοίας. It is an example of the phenomenon of a double treatment of the same theme by Chrysostom: (i) *Thdr.* 2, written first, on the occasion of a real occurrence; and (ii) *Thdr.* 1, the expanded treatise, which seems to have been influenced by Basil, *ep.* 46. The same is the case with *Ad viduam iuniorem*, which is directed to a concrete person, and the general treatment, *De non iterando conjugio*. The twofold exposition occurs also in the last writings of Chrysostom, which have been analyzed in chapter II: *Quod nemo laeditur nisi a se ipso* and *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt ob adversitates*. The contents of *Thdr.* 1 is *parainesis* or moral exhortation, as the title of the work reads in manuscript B: λόγος παραινετικός. Likewise the title of *Thdr.* 2 in manuscript B is: ἐπιστολὴ β' παραινετική.

41. PG 47, 309-316.

42. C. FABRICIUS, "Addressat und Titel der Schriften an Theodor." *Classica et Mediaevalia* 20 (1959): 81 ff.

43. *H.e.* 8.2.

44. PG 67, 1516.

45. *Thdr.* 2.6; SC 117, pp. 76 ff. Evidently it did have an effect, because Theodore returned to the ascetic life, according to Hesychius of Jerusalem and Sozomen. FABRICIUS, "Adressat und Titel der Schriften an Theodor," p. 82.

46. PG 47,277-308.

Ad Demetrium monachum de compunctione liber primus (PG 47, 393-410).
Ad Stelechium et de compunctione liber secundus (PG 47, 411-422).

Both were evidently written when he was a monk (372-376). Book 1.6 (p. 403) says that he had recently elected to leave the city and join the monks. He wrote at the behest of two monastic brothers, Demetrius and Stelechius. Book 2.1 contains a eulogy of the contemplative, i.e., monastic life, such as also occurs in *Opp.* Contrition (κατάνυξις) was one reason why Chrysostom decided to become a monk, according to Palladius, *V. Chrys.* 5:[47] νυττόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ συνειδότος. In these writings Chrysostom is called upon to deal intellectually with contrition, one of the primary spritual concerns of the Syrian monks.[48] He relates it to the Bible, and sees a good reason for contrition in the fact that most Christians living in the world do not obey the commandments of Christ or live a life of evangelical perfection.

Oratio adhortatoria ad Stagirium ascetam a daemonio vexatum libri 3 (PG 47, 423-494)

This treatise was written when he was a deacon, according to Socrates 6.3[49], possibly soon after he had returned from monastic life, since he mentions his present condition of bodily weakness.[50] Since Chrysostom is sick at home, in lieu of visiting and consoling his friend Stagirius in person, he writes a treatise to console him.[51] Book 1 is a demonstration by pious reasonings[52] that suffering is greatest proof of the providence of God (therefore an apology for providence); books 2 and 3 are true "Seelenleitung" in the Stoic tradition: an attempt, again by pious reasoning,[53] to remove ἀθυμία from the soul of Stagirius and substitute Christian παρρησία. As a deacon Chrysostom is evidently maintaining a close relationship with the monks in the mountains, and

47. PG 47,18.

48. FESTUGIÈRE, p. 307. Cf. CHRYSOSTOM, *De verbis apostoli, habentes eundem spiritum* 1 (PG 51, 279).

49. PG 67, 669. Cf. διακονίαν *Stag.* 1.1, p. 425; 1.3. διακονούμενον *Stag.* 1.1, p. 424.

50. *Stag.* 1.1, p. 425.

51. Τὴν διὰ ῥημάτων παράκλησιν, 1.1, p. 425.

52. Λογισμοὺς εὐσεβεῖς, 1.1, p. 426.

53. *Stag.* 3.14, p. 494.

ministers to the need of one of their community, who is suffering, by means of a *logos parainetikos.*

Ad viduam iuniorem. De non iterando conjugio.
New critical edition: SC 138, ed. G. Ettlinger (Paris, 1968)

Ad viduam iuniorem[54] (PG 48, 599-610) is a letter of consolation, addressed to the young widow of Therasius, in which Chrysostom celebrates the dignity of Christian widowhood. Chrysostom seems to have known the family of Therasius personally. The human warmth which one detects in *Vid.* is worthy of note: neither rhetoric[55] nor asceticism were able to submerge his human feelings. This writing exemplifies one of the most remarkable aspects of Chrysostom's genius, namely, the way he reconciled the impersonal rules of rhetoric with Christian faith and genuine human feeling.[55a]

De non iterando conjugio (περὶ μονανδρίας) (PG 48, 609-20) is evidently directed to a company of young widows, who are considering the ecclesiastical status of widowhood. The tone of περὶ μονανδρίας is close to that of a homily, and is more of a complement to περὶ παρθενίας (see below) than to the letter *Vid.* In περὶ μονανδρίας Chrysostom discusses in a didactic manner the problem of the choice, for the Christian widow, between consecrated widowhood and second marriage, just as in περὶ παρθενίας he poses the choice between marriage and virginity.

The letter *Vid.* can be dated rather exactly, because of its references to contemporary history, to the year 380-381, i.e., the first months of Chrysostom's diaconate.

The case of περὶ μονανδρίας is different: it does not manifest the same intransigence of his earlier ascetical writings; the psychological context appears different, as if John Chrysostom had begun to balance his ascetical ardor. The work is probably later than περὶ παρθενίας.

The resemblances between the two treatises (περὶ μονανδρίας and περὶ παρθενίας) are rather close: praise of widowhood and of virginity; the reservations expressed concerning marriage and second marriages; the references to Paul—all suggest that the two works were composed

54. PG 48, 599-610.

55. On the literary genre of the *consolatio* see Bernard Grillet, SC 138, pp. 87 ff.

55a. Grillet, pp. 95 f.

at approximately the same time. Both reveal the same apologetic preoccupation, and, finally, both appear to have been written for women ascetics. In contents and form both treatises owe much to the second sophistic. Grillet thinks that the literary genre of these two writings, a moral treatise in the form of an encomium, did not permit Chrysostom to develop his thoughts in a more personal way.[56]

De sacerdotio (πρὸς τὸν ἐγκαλοῦντα ἐπὶ τῷ διαφυγεῖν τὴν ἱερωσύνην).
New critical edition: SC 272, ed. A. M. Malingrey, Paris, 1980.

According to Socrates,[57] the dialogue *Sac.* dates from the time of Chrysostom's diaconate, i.e., from the years between 380 and 386.

The *Sac.* is in the first place an *apologia pro vita sua,* in which the author justifies to his friend, Basil, his evasion of an election to the priesthood (ἱερωσύνη), with which Basil reproaches him. Chrysostom defends his own conduct, and shows that no one should be blamed for fleeing, when he acknowledges that he is unequal to the task (= book 1). Further to demonstrate that he is unworthy *and unable* to handle the office, he presents a picture of the dignity and difficulties of the office. He magnifies the office and its difficulties, and in book six endeavors to prove that the active life (priesthood) is more difficult and higher than the contemplative (monastic) life.

Thus from the personal *apologia* develops a work of edification: the positive aspect of the apology, which occupies books two to six, becomes a treatise on pastoral theology.[58] In the words of Isidore of Pelusium,

> John, bishop of Byzantium, that wise interpreter of the divine mysteries, the light of the whole church, composed this work with so much skill and accuracy that those who wield the office of priest according to God, and those who administer it carelessly, will find their virtues and vices portrayed in it.[59]

This treatise is not a writing on monasticism, except insofar as Chrysostom here states that monasticism is not the highest profession of a Christian but priesthood.

56. Grillet, p. 14: "ce genre, qui d'ailleurs lui sied mal et où ses qualités d'orateur et d'apôtre sont trop à l'étroit pour s'épanouir."

57. *H.e.* 6.3, PG 67, 668 f.

58. H. Jordan, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1911) pp. 343 f.

59. *Ep.* 1.156; PG 78, 288. Quoted by Adolf Martin Ritter, *Charisma im Verständnis des Johannes Chrysostomos und seiner Zeit* (Göttingen, 1972), p. 73.

De virginitate, περὶ παρθενίας (SC 125, ed. H. Musurillo, Paris, 1966).

Chrysostom refers to this book in homily 19.6 on 1 Corinthians[60], which he delivered in 392 at Antioch. From the text of *Virg.* it appears that Chrysostom was already ordained a priest at the time he composed it.[61] Thus the book on virginity probably belongs to the period 386-392. The purpose of the book is to show the dignity (ἀξίωμα) of Christian virginity.[62] Interestingly, the treatise follows the classic form of the Christian apology: refutation of error followed by positive exposition of doctrine. Chapters 1-24 contain a refutation of errors concerning marriage and virginity; chapters 25-84 offer positive teaching on the worth of Christian virginity based on an exegesis of 1 Corinthians. To increase the worth of virginity, Chrysostom paints a contrasting picture of married life in the darkest colors. To disparage marriage Chrysostom made use of the familiar rhetorical *topos* "molestiae nuptiarum."[63] Typical of Chrysostom is the desire not to impose his point of view in an unreasonable fashion: his entire method in *Virg.* is one of persuasion, using all the devices of Greek rhetoric in the process.[64]

ADVERSUS OPPUGNATORES VITAE MONASTICAE

THE BACKGROUND

Antiochene Society in the Fourth Century

By the time of emperor Julian (361-363) the population of Antioch (approximately half a million) was largely Christian, and pagans were in a minority.[65] The urban populace, including all who were neither

60. PG 61, 160.

61. H. Musurillo, "Some Textual Problems in the Editing of the Greek Fathers," *Studia Patristica* 3, Texte und Untersuchungen 78 (Berlin, 1961): 93.

62. *De virginitate* 9.36, 11.15, 74.19. The phrase occurs earlier in Methodius, *Symposium* 1.15 (SC 95, p. 66).

63. Cf. Hieronymus, *Adversus Jovinianum* 1.13 (PL 23, 241): "Non est huius loci *nuptiarum augustias* describere, et quasi *in communibus locis rhetorico* exsultare *sermone*. ... Certe et Tertullianus, cum adhuc esset adolescens, *lusit* in hac materia." As Jerome indicates with respect to Tertullian, the use of this *topos* is a game ("lusit"), and the statements about marriage made in this context are not to be taken *literally*.

64. Grillet, p. 39 n. 4.

65. Paul Petit, *Libanius et la vie municipale à Antioche au IVe siècle après J.-C.* (Paris, 1955), pp. 206 f., 310. Jews constituted approximately ten percent of the population or about 65,000. (Carl H. Kraeling, "The Jewish Community at

curiales, bourgeois or civil servants, appear to have been thoroughly Christianized. The middle classes, i.e., *curiales*, liberal professions, and landowners, generally educated in the pagan schools, were less Christianized than the lower class. Most physicians and professors were pagans. As for the *curiales*, or members of the local senate, these were mostly Christians. Petit has established that the *curia* or local senate, was unquestionably Christian in the majority. Evidence for this comes from Libanius, *Or.* 16.47, which was addressed, though never delivered, to the *curia* of Antioch:

> You expect to be admired for your educational system, and you call epic poetry part of it, and yet on the matters of prime importance you employ other teachers: you turn your backs upon instruction when the road lies open to it, though when it was barred you should have been loud in your laments. So, whenever there is any mention of Plato and Pythagoras, you put forward the excuse of your mother, your wife, your housekeeper, your cook, and your lasting trust in doctrines like theirs, and you have no qualms about the qualms that such doctrines inspire, but you follow the lead of those you should command: your prolonged perverseness you regard as the strongest reason for its continuance, just as if, after prostituting yourself in youth, you were to maintain the vice for all the rest of your life.[66]

This passage shows that the *curia* of Antioch was Christian as a whole, and that their literary culture rendered the decurions more susceptible to pagan influences, or at least less hostile.

It appears that the Christian religion was based on the social strata least attached to municipal life (i.e., women, who were confined to themselves, and lower classes without political and legal competency). Pagan culture, on the other hand, survived in the educated classes di-

Antioch," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 51, 1932: 136 n. 40.) Libanius attests that the peasantry of the neighboring countryside was Christian (*Or.* 30, written between 381-391). See L. J. Daly, "Libanius' *Or.* XXX (*Pro templis)* and the collapse of Hellenism's Plausibility Structure," unpublished paper delivered at the Fifth Annual Byzantine Studies Conference, Oct. 26-28, 1979, Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D.C., pp. 7 f.

66. Libanius, *Selected Works with an English Translation, Introduction and Notes* by A. F. Norman, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969), p. 241.

rectly called to participate in public life, i.e., men in general,[67] senators in particular. Two factors were evidently at work here: (1) progressive Christianization during the fourth century from the lower levels of society upwards; and (2) different strata of the population were not equally Christianized or equally faithful to paganism.[68]

Libanius

The pagan members of the curial class in Antioch were the most distinguished families, including the Roman historian, Ammianus Marcellinus (ca. 330-395),[68a] and Libanius, who held the official chair of rhetoric in Antioch from 354 on. Gibbon calls Libanius one of "the two eloquent apologists of paganism."[69] The religion of Libanius is well known: it was essentially Hellenic and cultural, narrowly conservative and traditionalist, above all civic and Antiochene. Libanius' attachment to classical Greek religion issued directly from his passion for the idea of the city. Often Libanius defended the activities of the senate, which was predominantly Christian, to the emperor and the pagan prefect, because the cornerstone of his thinking was concern for the city, and therefore for the *curia*. Petit has shown the impartiality of Libanius where the good of the city was at stake and the negligible importance of the religious factor in municipal life.[70]

If the religious factor had dominated the life of individuals, it would be revealed in the letters of Libanius, of which some 1600 survive. But this is not the case—to the point that it is impossible to discern the religion of his correspondents. The reason is clear: Christians and pagans, living at Antioch, were closely intermixed. The example of Libanius is remarkable: his correspondence reveals that a good part of his family was Christian.[71] What Libanius objected to in the Christian

67. The discourse *Oppugnatores* is addressed to men, because "we" in book 3.19 (p. 70, l.54 - p. 71, l.3) are contrasted to "women". Cf. Chrysostom, *In Mat.* h. 73.4 (PG 58, 677) γυναῖκες ἐν θαλάμῳ τρεφόμεναι.

68. Petit, p. 200.

68a. Downey, *A History of Antioch in Syria,* p. 386.

69. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (New York, n.d.), 2: chap. xxviii, p. 63. The other was Symmachus.

70. Petit, p. 212.

71. Other families were equally divided, e.g., that of Pompeianus II, a great curial house of Antioch. Petit, p. 215.

members of his family was that they had deserted their post, and preferred service of the (Christian) empire to that of the city.

Libanius appreciated intellectual abilities in Christians which approximated those of pagans. He even admired his former student, John Chrysostom, as the following anecdote shows:

> When this sophist (Libanius) was on his deathbed he was asked by his friends who should take his place. "It would have been John," replied he, "had not the Christians taken him from us." (Sozomen, H.e. 8.2; PG 67, 1513)

The only culture of the times was literary, and the ancient classical education provided a junction between the two groups, Christian and pagan.

Libanius' tolerance came from an understanding of the true interests of a city where pagans and Christians lived closely together. According to Mazzarino, men of this era, at least those who belonged to the cultivated classes, were more attached to *civilitas,* considered as a style of life, than sensible to religious differences. Solidarity of class and culture were stronger than community of belief.[72]

It has been observed by A. F. Norman that Libanius connected the educational system, controlled by pagans and based upon rhetoric, with the structure of local government by the curial class.[73] Festugière has shown that Libanius saw a close relationship between Hellenic religion (ἱερά) and rhetoric (λόγοι).[74] In *Or*. 62, written after 366, Libanius linked together classical religion (ἱερά) and rhetoric (λόγοι), because the Christian emperors who attacked pagan religion also scorned Greek letters; and the common decadence of both indicated a cause-effect relationship: οἰκεῖα γὰρ οἶμαι, καὶ συγγενῆ ταῦτα ἀμφότερα, ἱερὰ καὶ λόγοι.[75] Libanius also states that:

> Emperor Constantius did not associate with philosophers and sophists, but had as advisors and teachers βαρβάρους ἀνθρώπους, ὀλέθρους τινὰς εὐνούχους (*Or*. 62.9; 4, p. 351 f.). These expelled rhetorical education, and made sure no educated person became the emperor's friend (*Or*. 62.10; 4, p. 351 f.)

72. Quoted by Petit, p. 216.

73. Libanius' *Autobiography* (*Oration* I), The Greek Text edited with Introduction, Translation and Notes (London, 1965), pp. xxi, 193.

74. Festugière, pp. 235-39.

75. *Or*. 62.9; ed. Foerster, 4, p. 350.

Thus in the opinion of Libanius, monks are barbarians who disparage rhetorical education and reject Greek *paideia.* They are also the enemies of pagan religion. In the *Oratio pro templis* (written between 381-391) Libanius protests that Christian monks have destroyed many rural temples.[76]

In sum: according to Libanius, the monks are the enemies of the city and of civilization. They also contribute to the ruin of the countryside, by having fled farming to associate with the creator in the mountains.[77] "Their crime is basically that of all Christians, but carried to an extreme: they have preferred the *civitas dei* to the *civitas terrena.*"[78]

Christian Aristocracy, Including Curiales

Unlike their homologues in the west (Paulinus and Ausonius),[79] the rich Antiochene Christians were more concerned about the adornment of their urban dwellings than living "in exile" on country estates. At Antioch the Christian aristocrats constructed rich private homes with golden ceilings and beautiful statues;[80] paintings and magnificent columns;[81] furnished with a bed of ivory and silver vessels,[82] and mosaics of gold.[83]

One does not perceive among these rich citizens any conflict between their Christian faith and their attachment to luxury. The anomaly, however, is pointed out by Chrysostom in homily 12.5 on Matthew:

> For this cause the very heathens disbelieve the things that we say since our doings, not our sayings, are the demonstration which they are willing to receive from us; and when they see us building ourselves fine houses, and laying out gardens and baths, and buying fields, they are not willing to believe that we

76. R. van Loy, "Le Pro Templis de Libanius," *Byzantion* 8 (1933) 7-39. Daly, p. 31 n. 1.

77. *Or.* 30.48; 3, p. 114 f.

78. Petit, p. 196.

79. Cf. C. Guignebert, "Les demi-chrétiens et leur place dans l'église antique," *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 88 (1923) 99. Ausonius (d. ca. 395) is a *demi-chrétien,* whose religion (pagan or Christian?) has been the subject of many disputes.

80. *Opp.* 3.7; p. 46, l. 14-16.

81. *Pan. mart.* 1.4; PG 50, 652

82. *In Matt.* h. 83.4; PG 58, 750.

83. *In Jo.* h. 82.4; PG 59, 446.

> are preparing for another sort of residence away from our city. (PG 57, 207 f.; NPNF p. 79)

Thus the behavior of rich Christians in Antioch manifested a kind of dualism by professing a faith which they did not necessarily seek to translate into action.

At the end of the fourth century the *curiales,* who were in great part Christian, continued to spend generously on the public festivals of the city. These contributions by private individuals were known as liturgies. The liturgies which supported the Olympic games at Antioch were one of the most striking signs of the persistence of the euergetic tradition of the classical Greek *polis.*[84] In *Opp.* 3.7[85] Chrysostom states: "you have many times emptied entire estates in view of the favor of masses." The search for local glory finds its best description in a passage of Chrysostom's commentary on Psalm 48:19:

> This is much sought after by the rich: flattery in the *agora,* attendance by the common people, public praise, eulogies filled with hypocrisy; in the theatre, at drinking parties, and in court, to be publicly extolled by all, to be envied. (*Exp. in Ps.* 48.11; PG 55, 240).[86]

In homily 3.5 on John[87] Chrysostom describes men involved in politics who under the tyranny of vainglory (κενοδοξία) spend huge amounts on the urban populace:

> If you will ask any of those men who mingle in state affairs and incur great expences, why they lavish so much gold, and what their so vast expenditure means; you will hear from

84. Olympic games were held at Antioch since the year 43. Downey, p. 440. Chrysostom refers to the Olympic games often and in positive terms. For example, in homily 1.1 on Romanus (PG 50, 606), he describes the festival of martyr Romanus in terms of an Olympic victory: εἷς 'Ολυμπιονίκης γίνεται καὶ ὁλόκληρος δῆμος εὐφραίνεται, καὶ μετὰ πολλῆς αὐτὸν δέχεται τῆς εὐφημίας. Εἰ δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν 'Ολυμπιακῶν ἀγώνων οἱ μηδὲν εἰς τοὺς ἱδρῶτας ἐκείνους εἰσενεγκόντες τοσαύτην καρποῦνται τὴν ἡδονήν, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἀθλητῶν τοῦτο γένοιτ' ἄν.

85. *Opp.* 3.7, p. 44, l. 41-43.

86. Compare the vivid description of a pagan who has bankrupted himself by funding a theatrical performance in *De inani gloria et de educandis liberis* 3-11, translated by M.L.W. Laistner, in *Christianity and Pagan Culture in the Later Roman Empire* (Ithaca, New York, 1951), pp. 87-91.

87. PG 59, 44.

> them, that it is for nothing else but to gratify the people. If again you ask what the people may be; they will say, that it is a thing full of confusion and turbulent, made up for the most part of folly, tossed blindly to and fro like the waves of the sea, and often composed of varying and adverse opinions. (NPNF, p. 14)

Thus municipal euergetism maintained itself in a city which was largely Christian.

The games and spectacles, which were the object of the liturgical system, lost their cultic character and tended to be laicized. The Christian crowd attended en masse the athletic games and theatre, ignorant of their pagan religious significance. Palladius writes in 408 that all the people of Antioch went to Daphne to view the Olympic games.[88] Even Chrysostom says that as a youth he was infatuated with the theatre.[89]

Thus the liturgical system was accepted by the rich Christians, among whom were the *curiales*, proud of their attachment to the traditional values of *paideia*. Evidently, these did not seek to Christianize the traditional institutions of the city. It appears that the aristocracy, adhering to the new faith, realized the incapacity of Christianity to be "civic cement", as were the ancient pagan festivals and especially the imperial cult. The Christians tried to safeguard the moral and political life of the city by maintaining the ancient forms of patriotism now laicized, while distinguishing in conscience between civic activity and Christian faith.[90]

Thus there existed beyond religious differences a true solidarity of class, a community of moral and cultural reflexes, which associated Christians and pagans in the service of the city. Both groups manifested the same taste for urban life, the same attachment to money. During the reign of Julian wealthy Christians did not hesitate to reduce their fellow-citizens to hunger and make themselves rich by speculating on

88. *V. Chrys.* 16.54; ed. P. Coleman-Norton, p. 96, l. 5 f.

89. *Sac.* 1.2; SC 272, p. 64.

90. Alain Natali, "Christianisme et cité à Antioche à la fin du IVe siècle d'après Jean Chrysostome," in *Jean Chrysostome et Augustin: Actes du colloque de Chantilly 22 septembre 1974*, ed. Charles Kannengiesser (Paris, 1975), pp. 56 f. (Author's Note: in the author's view the writings of Natali are significant and therefore the author has cited and referred to Natali in depth.)

grain at the expense of the poor (Christians)[91]. Similarly, in the sedition of 387 no religious solidarity can be perceived between the social classes: the rich Christians fled to protect their persons and their property.[92]

Pagans and Christians shared the same ambitions: in particular, the desire for wealth, honor and power by means of eloquence. In *Opp.* 3.5[93] Chrysostom says:

> You hear nothing except this when fathers converse with their children and exhort them about zeal for rhetoric: "A certain one, humble and from humble origins, who acquired the power of words, held the highest offices, acquired much wealth, built a magnificent house, is redoubtable and glorious to everyone." Again, another says: "a certain one was well trained in the language of the Italians and is illustrious in the court and is active in all domestic affairs."[94] And another points to someone else, and all point to the famous on earth. But no one even mentions once the illustrious in heaven, but if you attempt to mention them, you are expelled like a destroyer of everything.

Rhetoric was the exclusive form of higher education in the fourth century and the only way to prepare oneself for a career in the civil service or law.[95] It is typical that John Chrysostom himself, who came from a middle class Antiochene family, received, thanks to the financial skill of his mother, a literary education, which would have fitted him to become a secretary in the imperial chancery.[96]

An interesting example of the "blatant careerism" of the fourth century is found in the life of Augustine. According to the *Confessions*, the main concern of Augustine's parents was for him to excel in rhetoric. Augustine says:

> it was impressed upon me as right and proper in a boy to obey those who taught me, that I might get on in the world and

91. Petit, p. 207. Cf. Downey, p. 388.

92. Petit, p. 211.

93. *Opp.* 3.5, p. 42, l. 29-43.

94. Libanius said that rhetorical education suffered in comparison to the study of Latin and law (*Or.* 2.44; 1.1: 253 F.).

95. Laistner, p. 17. Cf. *Cambridge Medieval History*, 1:569 ff.

96. A. H. M. Jones, "St. John Chrysostom's Parentage and Education," *Harvard Theological Review* 46 (1953) 171-73.

> excel in the handling of words to gain honor among men and deceitful riches. (*Conf.* 1.9.14; trans. Sheed)
> Those others had no deeper vision of the use to which I might put all they forced me to learn, but to sate the insatiable desire of man for wealth that is but penury and glory that is but shame. (*Conf.* 1.12.19)
> My family took no care to save me from this moral destruction by marriage: their only concern was that I should learn to make as fine and persuasive speeches as possible. (*Conf.* 2.2.4)
> Everyone of course praised my father because, although his means did not allow it, he had somehow provided the wherewithal for his son to travel so far for the sake of his studies. Many a very much richer citizen did no such thing for his children. Yet this same father never bothered about how I was growing towards You or how chaste or unchaste I might be, so long as I grew in eloquence ... (*Conf.* 2.3.5.)

During adolescence this desire became his own:

> With these men as companions of my immaturity, I was studying the books of eloquence; for in eloquence it was my ambition to shine, all from a damnable vaingloriousness and for the satisfaction of human vanity. (*Conf.* 3.4.7)

From the evidence of the *Confessions* it appears that the attitude of "a poor citizen of Tagaste"[97] was the same as that of the rich Antiochenes described by Chrysostom.

Problem of Pederasty

The section of *Opp.* that deals with sodomy is one of the longest chapters in the work, which shows the relative importance of the subject in Chrysostom's mind.[98] Chrysostom says that he "intended" to attack the vice of sodomy in treatise, but had hesitated because of shame. It would, however, be great cowardice not to speak about it.[99] Chrysostom does not state this intention about any other topic in the treatise *Opp.* It seems that he took this occasion to attack homosexual

97. Augustine's father: *Conf.* 2.3.5.
98. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 46, l. 18 - p. 49, l. 19.
99. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 46, l. 19-25.

vice in Antioch, because it related to the cluster of ethical problems which he was treating in connection with his defense of the monks. The connection was between pederasty and education; boys were the particular desire of the sodomites. Very few youths at Antioch were not involved in sodomy.[100]

> Law courts, law, pedagogues, fathers, attendants, teachers, avail nothing. Some they (the sodomites) were able to corrupt with money, others only look to how they might get a fee. Some of the good (pedagogues) who care about the safety of those who have been entrusted to them are easily cozened and deceived, while others fear the power of the licentious. It would be easier to save someone who was accused of tyranny, than someone who tried to remove (young men) from these foul creatures. As if in a great wilderness, "men with men work that which is unseemly" (Romans 1:27) in the midst of cities. (*Opp.* 3.8; p. 46, l.54 - p. 47, l.11)

"Transgression has become law",[101] (p. 46, l.47). Those who opposed the sodomites were physically attacked.[102]

Chrysostom seems to believe that the evil of sodomy is new at Antioch: ἔρως καινός τις, παρανομία καινή τις.[103] Festugière denies this, but admits that it may have become more forceful at this particular time.[104] Festugière cites evidence from Libanius concerning the conditions at Antioch which seem to support this view. For example, Libanius[105] says that there were many older boys who debauched their comrades and made them sell themselves to lovers. Elsewhere,[106] he says that boys are seduced at the *symposia* which followed the Olympics and at all the other δεῖπνα.[107] These orations were written after 388. In general pagan moralism accomplished nothing except to point out the

100. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 47, l. 14.
101. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 46, l. 47.
102. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 46, l.52.
103. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 46, l.31-35.
104. There may have been a resurgence or increased militancy such as is occurring at the present time. On p. 47, l.27-34 Chrysostom says that since the destruction of Sodom those who practice this vice have become bolder (ἰταμώτεροι).
105. *Or.* 38.8-12; 3, p. 256 F.
106. *Or.* 53.8,10; 4:58 f., F.
107. *Or.* 53.11,18,26; 4:59,64,67.

hypocrisy.[108] Only Christianity truly attacked the evil.

Evidently, a large part of the Christian population of Antioch disapproved. Many wondered why Antioch was not punished like Sodom.[109] Chrysostom includes himself in a group which is incensed about the situation.[110]

Chrysostom sees the predominance of homosexual practices in Antioch, even among Christians,[111] as part of the demonic attack upon cities,[112] which he described at length in *Opp.* 1.7.[113] It is "the height of evil" and "the chief misfortune".[114]

Parents are unable to devise any solution to the problem.[115] They are concerned only with rhetorical education:

> How much anger do we deserve, how many thunderbolts, when we are eager to purify (our children's) tongues by pagan wisdom, but overlook the soul continually lying and decaying in the filth of licentiousness, and even hinder it when it wishes to rouse itself? (p. 48, l.37-43)

It is monks who wish to deliver the youths from the hands of the sodomites, and are being persecuted as "corruptors".[116]

It appears likely that such homosexual practices were confined to the prosperous and aristocratic levels of society.[117] The pederasty of teachers was a commonplace in Greek literature.[118] In the *Confessions* of Augustine, homosexual vice is associated with rhetorical study at Carthage (3.1).

Before such an irruption of evil Chrysostom's solution in *Oppugnatores* is radical: parents should withdraw young men from the city and send them to monasteries, where they are to be educated until moral

108. E.g., Lucian, *Amores* 23 speaks of Σωκρατικοὶ who pretend to love the soul, but only desire the body of their students. Also Cicero, *Nat. d.* 1.79.

109. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 47, l.23-27.

110. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 47, l.54.

111. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 48, l.15-19.

112. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 47, l.15-19.

113. *Opp.* 1.7; p. 11, l.22 ff.

114. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 46, l. 18-19.

115. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 48, l.24-26.

116. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 48, l.36-37.

117. Robert Flacelière, *Love in Ancient Greece,* translated by James Cleugh (New York, 1962), p. 62.

118. Festugière, pp. 195 f.

virtue is firmly established. Sodomy is an evil which those living in the world, specifically in the city of Antioch, cannot escape.[119]

Identity of the Opponents of the Monks in Oppugnatores

Chrysostom never identifies the opponents of the monks by name, but there is evidence in *Opp.* to make certain conclusions concerning their identity. The opposition consisted of both pagans and Christians, and the issue with the monks centered on their influences on youth. Recalling that education at this time still remained a privilege of the aristocracy, it seems likely that at least many of the youths who were being influenced by the monks were wellborn. From the preceding discussion of Antiochene society, which is based upon additional contemporary evidence, one sees how upper class pagans and Christians shared the same values, which were the traditional values of Greek culture. "Society was Christian only in name; the heart and mind remained pagan."[120] These nominal Christians were one with pagans in their estimation of the value of rhetorical education and material wealth, and their complete lack of sympathy and understanding for the ascetic lifestyle of the monks.

Chrysostom places the objections against the monks in the mouth of a pagan father, who makes the following speech in *Opp.* 2.2:[121]

> I begot, I reared, I endured hardship throughout the whole prime of life, doing and suffering everything, which is bound to occur from procreation: I had good hopes, I talked to pedagogues, I summoned teachers, I spent money, I lay awake many times thinking about decency (εὐκοσμία), about education, how he (the son) might lack nothing of his ancestors, so he might appear more brilliant than all. I expected him to help me in my old age. As time went on I was deliberating about a wife and marriage, about rule and power.
> But suddenly, just as a thunderbolt or hurricane from somewhere which falls upon a heavily laden merchant ship filled with many wares, which has finished its course over a large

119. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 48, l.44-51.

120. Count de Montalembert, *The Monks of the West from St. Benedict to St. Bernard* (London, 1896) 1:270.

121. *Opp.* 2.2; p. 16, l.47 - p. 17, l.42.

> sea, and was sailing with a fair wind and was finally at the harbor—would sink it a little before the entrance, and bring the fear of extreme poverty, most pitiful death and destruction on the head of the one who was formerly so wealthy, so has it happened to me now.
>
> The accursed corruptors and deceivers (πλάνοι: cf. Matt. 27:63. 2 Cor. 6:8)—let him say it, we shall not contest it—having snatched the support of my old age from such hopes, like robber chiefs led him away to their holes, and so bewitched him with their enchantments that he chooses to stand nobly against iron and fire and beasts and whatever rather than to return to the earlier wellbeing. What is worse is that having persuaded him, they pretend to perceive what is beneficial more than I. Empty are my houses, empty the fields. The peasants and servants are filled with dejection and shame. Enemies are glad at my evils, friends are ashamed. My only resort is to summon fire and burn everything: houses, fields, herds of oxen, flocks of sheep. How will these things be useful to me in the future, since the one who will use them is no more, but has become captive and endures slavery more bitter than death among savage barbarians.
>
> I clothed all my servants in a black garment, I sprinkled their heads with ashes, I appointed choruses of women, I ordered them to mourn more violently than if they saw him dead. Forgive me for doing it: this sorrow is much greater than that. I seem to be annoyed by daylight henceforth, and am on bad terms with the very rays, when I bring to mind the appearance of that miserable child, when I see him clothed more ignominiously than vile rustics, and betaking himself to more ignominious works. When I consider his stubbornness, I burn, I am torn apart, I am broken.

One sees how the speech of the pagan father in *Opp.* 2 resembles the objections of Libanius against the monks. Both say that monasticism destroys family and civic life. If the son and heir becomes a monk, who will inherit the family estate? The monastic lifestyle is opposed to the καλοκἀγαθία of Greek culture, and is depicted as a "banausic" occupation involving physical labor, hardship and poverty. The renunciation of the monks is interpreted as death and worse; the spirit of sacrifice and ethical message of the gospel are brought into question. The opponents of the monks are concerned only with their own families, and with glory, wealth and power in civic society.

DATE OF OPPUGNATORES

According to Tillemont, *Oppugnatores* was composed during the reign of emperor Valens (364-378), after the death of Valentinian I (364-375), when Chrysostom lived with the monks, probably in the year 376.[122] Substantially the same view is held by Montfaucon.[123]

Rauschen believes that this dating is false. In his *Jahrbücher der christichen Kirche,*[124] Rauschen argues as follows. Tillemont and Montfaucon assume that a persecution of the monks by the secular (Roman) government was the occasion for the composition of *Oppugnatores.* If this is true, one is forced to date the discourse to the last years of the reign of Valens, because the latter (Valens), after the death of Valentinian, promulgated a law, which forced the monks to do military service, and at the same time undertook a persecution of the monks in the Nitrian desert.

The persecution of Valens against the monks is recorded by Jerome:[125]

> Multi monachorum Nitriae per tribunos et milites caesi, Valens lege data ut monachi militarent, nolentes fustibus iussit interfici.

Valens was irritated by the cooperation lent by the monks of Nitria to the resistance of the Alexandrians against accepting the Arian Lucius as successor of Athanasius.[126]

Rauschen says that nowhere in *Opp.* does Chrysostom speak of a persecution of this kind by the secular power, and that, on the contrary, Chrysostom expresses astonishment that the persecution of the monks occurs τῶν βασιλέων ἐν εὐσεβείᾳ ζώντων,[127] and that the authors of the

122. *Mémoires* 11: 558-559 note 10 cited by GERHARD RAUSCHEN, *Jahrbücher der christlichen Kirche* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1897), p. 567.
123. PG 47,317-318.
124. Freiburg im Br., 1897, pp. 567 f.
125. *Chron.* ad ann. 375, p. 248 Helm.
126. RUIZ BUENO, p. 52.
127. *Opp.* 1.2; p. 3, l.9-10.

persecution call themselves pious, εὐσεβεῖς.[128] Rauschen also notes that the εὐσέβεια of the ruling emperors is mentioned in *Opp.* 2.9,[129] and that Chrysostom could not have said this about Valens, who was a fanatical Arian and persecuted orthodox bishops.

The eminent Chrysostom scholar, Baur, agrees with Rauschen and says concerning yet another scholar named Stilting:

> Stilting proceeds from the erroneous assumption that this work was composed on account of the proclamation of the emperor Valens, launched at the beginning of the year 376, by which monks could be compelled to do military service. But there is no mention of this in Chrysostom's treatise *(Oppugnatores)*.[130]

This statement of Baur, in fact, seems to be correct.

At least one reference to an official edict, however, occurs at *Opp.* 1.8:[131]

> Ἵνα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα παρῶ, αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ καταναγκάσαν ἡμᾶς εἰς τοῦτον καθεῖναι τὸν λόγον, οὐχ ἱκανὸν καὶ μόνον τῆς κατεχούσης νόσου τὴν κακίαν ἐνδείξασθαι; ... ποῦ τάξομεν τοὺς νέους τούτους νομοθέτας τῆς καινῆς ταύτης καὶ ἀτοπωτάτης νομοθεσίας, οἳ μετὰ πλείονος τῆς παρρησίας τοὺς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπελαύνουσι διδασκάλους...

Here Chrysostom says that what forced him to enter upon the composistion of *Opp.* were "the new lawgivers of this new and very strange law, who confidently drive away the teachers of virtue" (i.e., the monks). He is definitely referring to a law, either of imperial, provincial or local (Antiochene) origin. The official nature of the persecution is also shown by Chrysostom's statement that monks were brought before judges and put into prison.[132]

According to Legrand, Chrysostom could not be ignorant that the origin of the persecution was an imperial edict. In the opinion of the same scholar, Chrysostom makes a discrete allusion to this when he says by way of comparison that, during the reconstruction of the sacred temple, the enemies of the Hebrews (the Samaritans) had the Persian

128. *Opp.* 1.2; p. 3, l.12.
129. *Opp.* 2.9; p. 28, l.24.
130. Baur, 1:124.
131. *Opp.* 1.8; p. 13, l. 41-49.
132. *Opp.* 1.2; p. 4, l. 30-32.

king on their side.[133] Legrand also says that it is not without irony that Chrysostom affects to believe that Christian emperors could not approve of such evil.[134] When Chrysostom compares the persecution of the monks to Nero's persecution of Paul, it may suggest persecution by an evil emperor.[135]

As to the fact that Chrysostom calls the emperors "pious" (εὐσεβεῖς), it is hardly likely that he would call them anything else. Indeed at *Opp.* 2.9 Chrysostom distinguishes between pious emperors (εὐσεβεῖς) and "unbelieving" emperors (ἄπιστοι), who are identified as pagans (Ἕλληνες).[136] Montfaucon said that emperor Valens could be called "pious" in distinction to pagan emperor Julian and the Persian kings.[137]

It therefore seems probable that *Opp.* was written in response to a persecution of monks at Antioch unleashed by an official edict of some kind. In Antioch the proclamation may have found warm approval among certain segments of the population, especially the *curiales,* who then may have passed a local ordinance against the monks.

Rauschen believes that *Opp.* was composed after the death of Valens (August 9, 378) and at Antioch, *not* during Chrysostom's stay with the monks in the mountains. Rauschen thus places the composition of "dieser herrlichen Schrift" in the period of Chrysostom's diaconate (ca. 381-386).[138]

OCCASION AND PURPOSE OF OPPUGNATORES

Chrysostom makes known the immediate occasion and purpose of the discourse, *Adversus oppugnatores vitae monastice,* in book 1, chapters two through four. The following is a synopsis of the contents of these chapters, which will be followed by a commentary on the main items of interest.

Opp. 1.2 Chrysostom's friend informs him that there are certain individuals (τινας ἀνθρώπους) who persecute in every

133. *Opp.* 1.2; p. 3, l. 5-7.
134. *Opp.* 1.2; p. 3, l. 8-11.
135. 1.3; p. 5, l. 47 ff. P. E. Legrand, S. *Jean Chrysostome Contre les détracteurs de la vie monastique* (Paris, 1933), pp. 6, 10. The work of Legrand is of sufficient importance to be cited at length and in full.
136. *Opp.* 2.9; p. 28, l. 24-26, 27, 33.
137. PG 47, 317 f.
138. Op. cit., p. 568.

Text A way those who teach philosophy, and forbid them to teach anyone with many threats. Chrysostom asks who; and from whence, are those who dare this, and the reason why they are opposing God in this way. What rulers are supporting them? Our rulers want the opposite. Chrysostom says that he is filled with great perplexity that such a thing is dared in the midst of the cities, when the emperors are pious. His informant adds: "What is more paradoxical is that the people responsible profess to be pious and call themselves Christians. Many are even baptized. One of them said that he would apostatize from the church and sacrifice to demons—so vexed is he to see freeborn men, able to live in luxury, being instructed in this austere life." (p. 2, 1.28 - p. 3, 1.20)

Text B Chrysostom reacts by weeping for the world, knowing how many evils will come from this. He prays to be taken from the world, where "outer darkness" will receive him. But his friend says: "it is not the time (καιρός) for tears. You will not be able to recover those who have perished or are perishing by means of tears, and I think that the evil will not cease. It is necessary to see how we may do our part to extinguish the fire and halt the plague. Give up these lamentations. Compose a discourse (ἔργασαι λόγον) which contains advice (παραίνεσιν) to the sick and rebellious for their own salvation and the common salvation of all mankind. I shall take this book and immediately put it in the hands of the sick as a remedy. Many of my friends are sick in this way, and will permit me to visit them and read it once, twice or three times, and they will quickly be freed of the plague". (p. 3, l. 21-46)

Text C Chrysostom denies that he has any λόγων ἰσχύς. And whatever seeming skill he has, he is ashamed to use on such a theme, because it is especially to the Greeks (i.e., pagans), present and future, that he will have to explain our (i.e., Christian) evils—the Greeks, whom he always ridicules for the laxity of their lives and their opinions. If certain of the Greeks learn that there are certain among the Christians who are so hostile to virtue and philosophy

(ἀρετὴν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν) so as not only to withdraw from all effort on behalf of it, but not even to endure words concerning it; and that they (certain Christians) have reached the point of madness that if another person recommends or discusses it, they persecute him ... Chrysostom fears that if the Greeks learn of this, they will not consider the Christian human (ἀνθρώπους) but beasts, monsters, destructive demons and enemies of humanity. They will judge our entire race this way, not just the ones responsible. (p. 3, 1.46-p. 4, 1.11)

Text D His friend answers that everyone knows about this already, by deeds and not by words. In the marketplace, hospitals, in every part of the city where idlers gather, there is much laughter on the part of all. The subject of the laughter is the tale of what has been done to these saints (ἁγίους). One says that he hit [them], another says that he located their abode, another says he provoked the judge against them. Another boasts the prison, and to have dragged those saints through the marketplace. This in the gatherings of the Christians. The Greeks laugh at both the persecutors and the monks who suffer. Everything is filled with intestine war, only worse. It is waged against saints, who have done nothing wrong, and who do not know how to injure any one, but only how to suffer. (p. 4, 1.11-50).

Opp. 1.3 Chrysostom says he cannot bear to hear any more. He will do do what the unnamed visitor has enjoined. He

Text E asks his friend to go away and pray for him to overcome his discouragement and receive assistance (ῥοπήν) from God for the healing of those who are fighting him. God will surely give it, because he is φιλάνθρωπος and does not wish the death of a sinner, but his conversion (cf. Ezek. 18:23; 33:11). Having dismissed his friend, Chrysostom undertakes to write. He adds that he would not have undertaken it if the saints were merely being abused and taken into court—he would have laughed. But the abusers were injuring themselves and in danger of losing their salvation. He compares the persecutors to a little child who hits his mother in a fit of temper. As long as

he does not injure himself, the mother laughs, but if he pricks his hand on her broach, laughter stops immediately and the mother feels the pain more than the child and for this reason scolds him and shouts. It is this which Chrysostom is going to do now, although with more gentleness than the mother with the child. He will speak to these children (i.e., the persecutors) not with threats and arrogance, but with flattery (κολακεία) and mildness (προσήνεια), because the saints are not injured by this persecution, but receive a greater reward and more παρρησία. (p. 4, 1.51-p. 5, 1.41)

Text F If I mention the future rewards you will perhaps laugh. But you will not disbelieve in the present rewards. Even if you wish to, you will not be able to, since the facts themselves contradict you. Nero made the same accusations against Paul which you make against these holy men. Nero called Paul a corrupter and vagabond and the same things which you say. First he bound him and then killed him when he could not persuade him to break off association with his concubine. What injury came to Paul, who is praised as an angel throughout the world? What good came to Nero, whom all mankind reviles as a scoundrel? (p. 5, 1.42-p. 6, 1.12)

Opp. 1.4 Text G As for the future reward: even if you disbelieve, I must speak on accound of the believers. Yet you ought to believe in future rewards on account of the present rewards. Regardless of your disposition, I shall mention them and not hide them. Nero, full of darkness (ζόφου: cf. 2 Petr 2:17. Jude 13), will be led away to the "undying worm" and "unquenchable fire" (Mark 9:43,48. Cf. Is. 66:24). Paul will stand before the throne of God with much παρρησία, shining brilliantly. He will receive a reward fitting for one who gave his life for the sake of what pleases God. (p. 6. 1.13-26)

Text H There is a great reward to those who do good; it becomes greater when they go through danger and dishonor. Even if the deed (κατόρθωμα) is the same, the one who labored will receive greater honor than one who accomplished it without labor. If the Greeks honor those who died in

battle as σωτῆρες and προστάται, how much more will Christ do this, who conquers with recompenses those who face danger for him. He placed a great reward not only for persecutions, but also for ὕβρις alone (Luke 6:22-23). (p. 6, 1:27-p. 7, 1.2)

Text I If suffering and slander extend the reward of those who suffer and are slandered, the one who prevents this has benefited those who persecute. He injured the others by curtailing their reward. On this account one should be silent and permit these things to happen. But since we are members of one another (Eph. 4:25), even if these deny the grace, we must not care for one member and neglect another. The monks will have another reason for approval, even if they do not suffer now. The persecutors will not be able to be saved, if they do not cease from this battle. (p. 7, 1.2-17)

Text J I take your side and entreat you to believe me and not to kick against the pricks (Acts 26:14) or pain the Holy Spirit (Eph. 4:30), when you think you are injuring men. I know that you will praise my advice hereafter. I wish you to do so now and not in vain. (p. 7, 1.18-26)

Commentary:

A) Chrysostom was evidently living in retreat at the time in the city of Antioch. The information about what was happening "in the cities" was a complete surprise to him. One sees here that Chrysostom did not conceive the idea of writing *Opp.* himself, but the idea was suggested to him, and he was persuaded to write, as in the case of the two books *De compunctione*.

B) Chrysostom's own reaction to the news was despair. Indeed Legrand refers to book one of *Opp.* as "moins un anathème qu'une plainte et l'expression d'un douloureux étonnement."[139] But his unidentified interlocutor says that the proper attitude is to attempt to *recover* (ἀνακτήσασθαι) those in error. The goal of writing is the salvation of all mankind. Instead of retreating from the world, Chrysostom should try to influence the world by a literary work.

139. Legrand, pp. 10 f.

According to Schneider, ancient man was much more liable to be influenced by books than modern man; and the effect of literary propaganda was very great in antiquity.[140] By writing a discourse Chrysostom is to endeavor to influence public opinion and end the persecution of the monks. In this respect the purpose of *Opp.* is close to that of the second-century apologies, i.e., to stop violence directed against part of the Christian community.

C) The first objection that Chrysostom raised against writing a discourse was his lack of rhetorical ability. This, however, was probably a pretext, since it was traditional in Greek oratory to deny one's rhetorical skill.[141] It is likely that Chrysostom had already composed one or more of his ascetical treatises, and his reputation as a writer was established. In fact, his second objection to writing a discourse tends to confirm this theory: he envisions with horror that a discourse in defense of the monks will circulate among the Greeks, and expose to them the evils within the Christian community. In *Adv. Jud.* h. 8.4[142] Chrysostom says that he did not preach against Christians who fast with Jews in order to expose the church to scorn, but to save the Judaizers. Therefore he advises his audience not to speak about the Judaizers, but to cure them. Similarly, Gregory of Nazianzus states that it is necessary to abstain from theological discussions before pagans:

> For since their (i.e., the pagans') strength lies not in their own dogmas, they hunt for it in our weak points. And therefore they apply themselves to our—shall I say 'misfortunes' or 'failings'?—like flies to wounds (*Or.* 27.5; NPNF, p. 286).

At this time, to publish a work of literature meant to distribute a certain number of copies among one's friends. Once the copies left the library of the author, it was impossible to control the circulation of a literary work.[143]

Chrysostom's fear of having the work circulate among the Greeks

140. Carl Schneider, *Geistesgeschichte des antiken Christentums* (Munich, 1954) 2:20.

141. E.g., Antiphon, *Or.* 5.1. Plato, *Apol.* 17bc. H. M. Hubbell, "Chrysostom and Rhetoric," *Classical Philology* 19 (1924) 268.

142. PG 48, 933.

143. Paul Petit, "Recherches sur la publication et la diffusion des discours de Libanius," *Historia* 5 (1956) 484 f. cf. Cicero, *Ad Att.* 3.12: one of the discourses of Cicero, in the form of a *libellus*, was circulated among Cicero's political opponents against his will. (Cited by Petit, p. 485 n. 5).

points to the continuing tension between pagans and Christians at Antioch. Here in *Opp.* he states that he is always disparaging the lives and opinions of the Greeks—whether in a literary form or not is unclear: οὒς ἀεὶ τῶν δογμάτων οὐχ ἧττον ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου διασύρων ῥᾳθυμία.[144] His criticism could have been merely verbal, for in a sermon on the martyr Lucianus, delivered in Antioch in 387, Chrysostom tells his flock to defend the faith and to attack the evils of paganism even in gatherings of rich and illustrious pagans.[145] He also mentions an argument overheard between a pagan and a Christian as to who was superior, Paul or Plato.[146] There is also evidence of literary polemics between pagans and Christians at Antioch. Emperor Julian composed his three books against the Christians in the winter of 362-363 at Antioch. Here he also wrote, perhaps in January 363, the Ἀντιοχικὸς ἢ Μισοπώγων, a satire which is directed to the volatile people of the Syrian capital.[147] Chrysostom's treatise on *Babylas* contains an unveiled attack upon his old teacher, Libanius, and emperor Julian. Libanius' orations *De statuis* may answer Chrysostom's twenty-one homilies *Ad populum Antiochenum.*[148]

On this occasion Chrysostom's fear is that through his book certain of the Greeks (τινες ἐκείνων) will be informed about the persecution of monasticism by certain Christians, and, as a result, will condemn all Christians as enemies of virtue and philosophy. Further on Chrysostom says that the life-style of the monks, τὴν ἐν οὐρανοῖς πολιτείαν, is a witness to the unbelievers (ἀπίστοις) of the existence of the future goods and of the resurrection. Far from condemning the monks, these unbelievers criticize the fact that there are so few of them.[149]

E) In text E,[150] Chrysostom reveals some of the presuppositions of his apologetic method. He asks for assistance (ῥοπήν) from God—thus

144. *Opp.* 1.2; p. 3, l. 51 f.

145. *Pan. Lucn.* 3; PG 50, 526.

146. *In I Cor.* h. 3.4; PG 61, 27 f.

147. On the literary genre of the *Misopogon* see J. Geffcken, "Kaisar Julianus und die Streitschriften seiner Gegner," *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* 21 (1908) 185 n. 3. Geffcken compares a defense of his linen garment by Apollonius of Tyana, and Tertullian's *De pallio.*

148. A. Naegele, "Chrysostomos und Libanios," in *Chrysostomika* (Rome, 1908), pp. 126 f. Petit, *Libanius et la vie municipale à Antioche*, p. 238 n. 3.

149. *Opp.* 3.18-19; p. 69, l. 16-24.

150. Chapter 3; p. 5, l. 4 ff.

showing that apologetic writing is not solely the work of human reason. Chrysostom believes that God will assist because he is φιλάνθρωπος. According to the Chrysostom expert, Robert Carter, *philanthrōpia* is one of the two most important attributes of God for Chrysostom.[151] It is significant that the composition of an apology depends on divine assistance, which flows from the love of God for men, "who does not desire the death of a sinner but that he live".[152]

E-J) In texts E-J Chrysostom explains the reason why he decided to write the treatise. It is *not* the fact that the monks are being abused and suffering. Such suffering brings a greater reward and is not to be curtailed. Rather Chrysostom undertakes to write the apology for the sake of the persecutors, who are in danger of losing their salvation. This is an important point which must be emphasized. Chrysostom is writing his discourse primarily for Christians, i.e., for certain members of the Christian community who are persecuting other members, whom Chrysostom calls "saints" (ἅγιοι). Already in chapter 2[153] his friend informed him that the persecutors were Christians:

> ὅτι καὶ οἱ ταῦτα δρῶντες εὐσεβεῖς τε εἶναι βούλονται καὶ Χριστιανοὺς καλοῦσιν ἑαυτούς,[154] πολλοὶ δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ἤδη μεμυημένων εἰσί.[155]

Chrysostom's language in chapters three and four (= texts E-J) corroborates this entirely. He uses the image of the body of Christ to describe the relationship between persecutors and persecuted:[156]

> ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀλλήλων ἐσμὲν μέλη (Eph. 4:25), κἂν αὐτοὶ πάλιν ἀρνῶνται τὴν χάριν, οὐ χρὴ τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους ἑνὸς μὲν προνοεῖν μέρους, ἑτέρου δὲ περιορᾶν.

151. "The Future of Chrysostom Studies: Theology and *Nachleben*," in *Symposion: Studies on St. John Chrysostom*, Analecta Vlatadon 18 (Thessaloniki, 1973), p. 131. The pagan term φιλανθρωπία rivaled and in many instances replaced the Christian term ἀγάπη in the fourth century. (G. Downey, "Philanthropia in Religion and Statecraft in the Fourth Century after Christ," *Historia* 4, 1955: 199-208.)

152. Cf. Ezek. 33:11.

153. P. 3, l. 12-14.

154. Already Ignatius of Antioch speaks of "Christians in name only." *Magn.* 4.

155. I.e., both catechumens and baptized Christians. Cf. P. de Puniet, "Catéchuménat," in DACL 2,2: 2591: "Les homélies exégétiques et morales des pères grecs du IV siècle ont été pour la plupart prononcées aussi bien pour les catéchumènes que pour les fidèles. C'est surtout le cas des commentaires de saint Jean Chrysostome sur la Bible." Likewise *Opp.* would be addressed to both catechumens and baptized Christians, who were opposing the monks.

156. *Opp.* 1.4; p. 7, l. 12-14.

When Chrysostom says with regard to the persecutors that "we are members one of another",[157] he can only be referring to fellow Christians.

This point may be illustrated from homily 15.3 on John.[158] Here Chrysostom distinguishes the natural relationship between all human beings, who are "fellow slaves living together in the same universe," from the "bodily" relationship between Christians:

> ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, τῆς αὐτῆς σοὶ μετέχων φύσεως, τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχων δεσπότην, ὁμόδουλος καὶ ὁμόσκηνος· ἐν γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ γέγονε κόσμῳ. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τῆς πίστεως μετέχει τῆς αὐτῆς, ἰδού σοι καὶ μέλος γέγονε.

It is clear from this text and others that only another Christian can be described as a bodily "member" (μέλος).[159]

It has already been shown in the Introduction how Chrysostom divides apologetics into two parts: (1) defense of Christianity against outsiders (pagans, Jews and heretics), and (2) defense directed to within the community of Christians.[160] The discourse *Opp.* clearly falls into the second category, namely, defense directed to the community. A study of *Opp.* reveals an important dimension of such apology directed to the community, i.e., the ecclesiological dimension. It becomes apparent that Chrysostom's understanding of the church as the body of Christ is a basic presupposition of his apologetics directed to within the church. It is his dogmatic understanding of the church that renders such "internal" apologetics necessary.

One of the distinctive traits of Chrysostom's ecclesiology is that the connection of Christ with the church in one body is not static. The good or evil of one member extends itself to the others.[161] According to Korbacher, everything that Chrysostom teaches concerning the community of the church, especially the church as body of Christ, he teaches less

157. Eph. 4:25.

158. PG 59, 101.

159. Emile Mersch, *Le corps mystique du Christ*³ (Paris, 1951) 1:466-488. D. Greeley, *The Church as "Body of Christ" according to the Teaching of Saint John Chrysostom*, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1971, pp. 206-209.

160. *Sac.* 4.4-5. It is significant that his concept of apologetics in *Opp.* is the same as in *De sac.*

161. *In 2 Tim.* h. 7.1; PG 62, 637.

to mediate knowledge, than to incite action.[162] Chrysostom often makes dogmatic statements in order to have a basis for moral admonition. It would be a correct, though partial, definition of Chrysostom's concept of the church to say that the church is a community of those who *practice* the love of Christ. The love of Christians for each other should extend to body and soul. In the case of the body, Chrysostom lays great weight upon almsgiving as the practical expression of eucharistic communion. He places still greater emphasis on the love of our fellow Christians' souls. Every Christian is obligated to the care of souls. Tromp sees a double inner reason for this: conformity with Christ, and the social essence of the mystical body. No one is exempt from the duty of the care of souls.[163]

In homily 9.2 on Genesis (PG 54, 623) Chrysostom states that it is a mark of the true Christian to be concerned about the spiritual well-being of other members of the body of Christ.

> It is the chief point of our life, the distinguishing mark, not to be concerned exclusively with our own good, but to straighten out and "set" our twisted limbs. It is the greatest evidence of faith. "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another" (John 13:35). Genuine love is not shown by a common table or mere salutation, or flattering words, but by promoting and being concerned with the advantage of your neighbor ... This is genuine love.[164]

The interrelation between personal salvation and salvation of the community is striking in this text.

162. Joachim Korbacher, *Ausserhalb der Kirche kein Heil? Eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung über Kirche und Kirchenzugehörigkeit bei Johannes Chrysostomus* (Munich, 1963), p. 68. The material in this paragraph derives from Korbacher, pp. 67-71.

163. S. Tromp, "De corpore Christi mystico et actione catholica ad mentem S. Iohannis Chrysostomi," *Gregorianum* 13 (1932) 325, 355.

164. Τοῦτο κεφάλαιον τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς πολιτείας ἐστί, τοῦτο γνώρισμα, τὸ μὴ τὰ ἑαυτῶν σκοπεῖν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ μέλη ἡμῶν διεστραμμένα διορθοῦν καὶ καταρτίζειν· τοῦτο δεῖγμα τῆς πίστεως μέγιστον· ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ γνώσονται, φησί, πάντες ὅτι μαθηταί μου ἐστε, ἐὰν ἀγαπᾶτε ἀλλήλους. Ἀγάπην δὲ δείκνυσι γνησίαν οὐ κοινωνία τραπέζης, οὐδὲ πρόσρησις ψιλή, οὐδὲ κολακεία ῥημάτων, ἀλλὰ τὸ διορθῶσαι καὶ σκοπῆσαι τὸ συμφέρον τοῦ πλησίον. ... Τοῦτο ἀγάπης γνησίας. This stands in sharp contrast to pagan culture, where there is no concern for the common good, but only for individual glory (*Laz.* h. 3.3; PG 48, 994).

Chrysostom develops the same thought extensively in *Opp.* 3.2, the text of which is translated below.

> The judge demands from us our salvation and our neighbors' with the same scrupulousness. Thus Paul everywhere admonishes "not to seek our own, but our neighbors' wealth" (1 Cor. 10:24). And he rebukes the Corinthians not a little, because they did not take thought for and care for one who committed fornication, but neglected his inflamed wound (cf. 1 Cor. 5). To the Galatians he wrote saying, "Brethren, if a man be overtaken in a fault, ye which are spiritual, restore such an one" (Gal. 6:1). And to the Thessalonians he recommends the same, saying, "Wherefore comfort one another even as also ye do" (1 Thess. 5:11). And again, "warn them that are unruly, comfort the feebleminded, support the weak" (1 Thess. 5:14).
>
> In order that one may not say: "what does the care (προνοίας) of others mean to me? Let the one who is perishing perish, and the one who is saved be saved. Nothing of this pertains to me; I have been commanded to watch out for myself." In order that no one should say this, he (Paul) destroyed this bestial and inhuman thought, and set up these laws against it, ordering (us) to overlook many of our own affairs so as to establish our neighbors'. And everywhere (Paul) decrees this scrupulous rule of conduct. Writing to the Romans he orders them to have much concern about this matter, setting the strong over the weak like fathers, and persuading them to be concerned about their (i.e., the weak persons') salvation. (Rom. 15:1) But here (in Romans) he says that by way of exhortation and advice. But elsewhere he shakes the souls of his hearers with great severity. He says that those who neglect the salvation of their brothers "sin against Christ himself" (1 Cor. 8:12), and tear down God's building (cf. 1 Cor. 3:9).
>
> And (Paul) said what he learned, not from himself, but from his teacher. For the only begotten of God (cf. John 1:18), wishing to teach that this debt is necessary and great evil awaits them who do not wish to pay it, said: "But whoso shall offend one of these little ones, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea." (Matt. 18:6) And the one who

offered the talent is punished not because he overlooked any of his own affairs, but because he neglected the salvation of his neighbors (Matt. 25:15-28).

Therefore even if everything in our life is well done, it is no profit to us if this sin drowns us in the sea of Gehenna (cf. Matt. 18:6).

If no argument will deliver those who are unwilling to help their neighbor in material things, but even if they practice virginity they will be thrown out of the bridal chamber (cf. Matt. 25:1-13)—will not one who fails with respect to something much greater (the care of the soul is much greater) probably suffer everything terrible?

God equipped man to be sufficient not only for himself but also for many others. For this reason Paul calls the believers "lights," showing that they must be useful to others (Phil. 2:15). For a light, so long as it illuminates itself alone, would not be a light.

For this reason (Paul) says that those who neglect their neighbors are worse than pagans: "But if any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel" (1 Tim. 5:8). What do you wish "providing" to mean here? The supply of bodily necessities? I think he means the care of the soul. If you should dispute this, my (opinion) will hold good even so. For if he says this concerning the body, and delivered over to such punishment one who does not supply this daily food, and said he is worse than the pagans—where will one be who neglects what is greater and more necessary? (p. 34, l.35 - p. 35, l.47).

One sees how Chrysostom gives a practical turn to speculative theology. From the Pauline teaching of the mystical body he derives the duty of the care of the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλεια). It is a duty of the authentic disciple of Christ, for whom the loss of souls is the supreme and unique evil, and their salvation the supreme and only end of the spoken or written word.[165] Baur has written the following words about Chrysostom:

> his special spiritual make-up did not incline him to philosophical speculation, but rather to asceticism, ethics and homiletics.[166]

165. Ruiz Bueno, p. 53.

In addition to "asceticism, ethics, and homiletics," one could add "apollogetics," for Chrysostom evidently conceives of apology which is directed to the community as a practical application of the dogmatic teaching of the body of Christ, and even as a part of pastoral theology.[167] Another example of Chrysostom's "pastoral" approach to apologetics occurs in *Adv. Jud.*,[168] where he states that the goal of his apologetics against the Jews is to save the souls of the Judaizers.

At the conclusion of the discourse *Opp.* (3.21) Chrysostom states that he has written so as to remove all excuse (ἀπολογίαν) from those who are opposing the monks:

> It is impossible to take refuge in an excuse, and to say that there was no one who taught this. Nay, rather, this excuse has been abrogated even before my words, since nature has an exact criterion of the good and the not such, and this philosophy is everywhere available, and the evils of life are sufficient to drive to the desert even those who love life very much. So then even if I were silent, as I said, (your) excuse has been abrogated—but now much more so, after this long discourse, and such exhortation (παραίνεσιν) both from facts and, more clearly, from the inspired Scriptures. (p. 73, l.21-32)

Chrysostom conceives of it as his moral duty to have composed the discourse *Opp.*:

> We must fulfill everything on our part, even if others are not going to profit from us. Why? So that God may reckon no longer with us, but with them. This is what he said when he reproched the one who had done nothing with his talent: "You should have deposited my money with the bankers, and I would have come and demanded it back with interest." (Matt. 25:27) (p. 74, l.18-25)

166. Baur, 1:355.

167. Cf. the statement of E. Preuschen: "The history of dogma has scarcely any reason for devoting a chapter to Chrysostom: in the history of pastoral theology he deserves a whole book." Cited by Baur, 1:355.

168. Hom. 8.1-3; PG 48, 927-932. Also h. 8.9; PG 48, 941-942.

As in Stoic ethics, "intention, not achievement, constitutes success."[169]

> Just as the one who teaches philosophy, whether or not he persuades, has a complete reward (for he gave his all); so the one who wished to corrupt, whether or not he captures (his victim) will undergo the same punishment: for he too gave his all. (p. 74, 1.37-42).

There is a moral obligation to write the apology, so as to avoid condemnation by God at the last judgment.[170]

The same thought occurs earlier in Justin Martyr.[171] The moral obligation to do one's part, regardless of the outcome, is an important element of Chrysostom's thought.[172] It may have a relation to Stoic philosophy, where the concept of duty was developed.[173]

LITERARY GENRE OF OPPUGNATORES

Opp. is an apologetic treatise *(logos)* concerned with the defense *(apologia)* of the monastic life. Many traditional elements of early Christian apologies appear in this work, including: (a) medical imagery (theme of remedy); (b) theme of θεομάχος (opponents are depicted as enemies of God); and (c) eschatological conclusion (threat of divine vengeance). These three elements will be examined individually.

169. H. Rackham, trans., Cicero, *De finibus,* Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971), p. xxvi.

170. The same moral obligation is stated by Chrysostom as the reason why he wrote *Thdr.* 2 (SC 117, p. 78). Festugière has noted Chrysostom's preoccupation with judgment and responsibility. "Il croit éperdument au jugement de Dieu, au ciel et à l'enfer. Il vit dans la crainte et le tremblement. On trouve peu de pages, dans ses écrits et ses sermons, où ne revienne la considération des peines infernales et de la terrible responsabilité du chrétien." (Op. cit., p. 210) The article by Leduc, entitled "L'eschatologie, une préoccupation centrale de saint Jean Chrysostome," in *Proche-Orient chrétien* 29 (1969), actually contains very little about his eschatology.

171. 1 *Apol.* 3.4-5 and 55.8; 2 *Apol.* 15.4; *Dial.* 58.

172. E.g., *In* 1 *Cor.* h. 3.5 (PG 61, 30) = NPNF p. 15: "Though thou never persuade, thou shalt have thine own reward in full."

173. Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* (Göttingen, 1964), 1:134 f. The concept of duty may go back to Plato. See Albin Lesky, *A History of Greek Literature,* trans. by James Willis and Cornelis de Heer (New York, 1966), p. 529.

Medical Imagery (Theme of Remedy)

In *Opp.* the opposition to monasticism is designated as a "plague" (λοιμός), and the purpose of composition is to halt the pestilence. Opponents are "sick", and the book is a "remedy".

> Χρὴ δὲ ὁρᾶν ὅπως σβέσωμεν τὴν *πυρὰν* καὶ στήσωμεν τὸν *λοιμόν*, τό γε ἡμέτερον μέρος .... ἔργασαι λόγον παραίνεσιν ἔχοντα τοῖς *νοσοῦσι* καὶ στασιάζουσι, πρός τε τὴν ἑαυτῶν, πρός τε τὴν κοινὴν ἁπάντων *σωτηρίαν* ἀνθρώπων. Καὶ τὸ βιβλίον ἐγὼ τοῦτο λαβὼν ἀντ' ἄλλου τινος *φαρμάκου* τοῖς τῶν καμνόντων φέρων ἐνθήσω χερσί· καὶ γάρ εἰσί μοι τῶν τὰ τοιαῦτα *νοσούντων* φίλοι πολλοὶ καὶ ἀνέξονται ἐπελθεῖν καὶ ἅπαξ καὶ δὶς καὶ πολλάκις, καὶ οἶδα ὅτι ταχέως *ἀπαλλάξονται τοῦ λοιμοῦ*. (*Opp.* 1.2; p. 3, 1.36-46).

The stated object of the treatise is to heal the enemies of God: εἰς τὴν ἰατρείαν τῶν πολεμούντων αὐτόν.[174]

Opp. 3, which is the *logos* directed to a believing father, is likened to "preventive medicine":

> If it finds people sick with this disease, it will do its work. If, however, no one is snared by this disease, it is what I pray for. Thus physicians after preparing remedies for sick people need prayer that the sick one does not have need of them. I likewise pray that none of our brothers need this exhortation. (3.1; p. 33, 1.32-39)

Chrysostom compares his polemic against pederasty to surgery.

> Nor will a physician who is about to cleanse putrefaction refuse to handle the knife, or to let his fingers drop into the very base of the wound. Neither shall we refrain from a discussion of this, inasmuch as the putrefaction is more grievous. (3.8; p. 46, 1.26-31).

All of secular society is in need of healing, and unable to treat itself.[175] The persecution of monks is viewed more as a sympton of the illness of society than as an actual evil to be combatted. Accordingly, the scope of Chrysostom's apology is immense: not simply or even primarily a defense of monks, but rather a "diagnosis" and remedy of the sickness

174. *Opp.* 1.3; p. 5, l. 4.

175. *Opp.* 3.10; p. 50, l. 43-52.

of society, in the process of which the monastic life is shown to be the touchstone and to represent perfect health.

The origin and usage of medical metaphors in Greek Christian apologetics has already been discussed.[176]

Theme of Θεομάχος and of Divine Vengeance

Origin and Usage

Although the concept of "fighting against the gods" occurs in the *Iliad,* Euripides may be said to be the "originator" of the word group θεομάχος, θεομαχεῖν in his last work, the *Bacchae.*[177] The idea that men who specially act as despisers of God are punished by a terrible form of death is pagan.[178] Moreau gives many examples from Greek mythology and history.[179] The special punishment of the impious is to be devoured by worms: e.g., the queen Pheretima (Herodotus 4.205).[180] The gods also punish ἀσέβεια and ἀκολασία with φθειρίασις, louse sickness. Plutarch, *Sulla* 36, mentions the poet Alcman and the prose writer Pherecydes, along with Sulla, as having died of φθειρίασις.

Hellenistic Judaism adopted the idea of the destruction of the scorners of God, which notion corresponded to the Jewish concept that whoever offended God and his people was unfailingly punished. Thus, for example, Antiochus IV is described as perishing from worms, although he probably died an ordinary death.[181] Not only the theme, but the Greek expression θεομαχεῖν is also used.[182] The motif of σκωληκόβρωτος is used in connection with Apion,[183] and Herod.[184] The motif of *de*

176. Above, pp. 120-124.

177. W. Nestle, "Anklänge an Euripides in der Apostelgeschichte," in *Griechische Studien* (Stuttgart, 1948), pp. 229, 231.

178. W. Nestle, "Die Legende vom Tode der Gottesverächter," in *Griechische Studien,* p. 568.

179. J. Moreau, in SC 39, p. 61.

180. Thomas Africa, "Worms and the Death of Kings: A Cautionary Note on Disease and History", *Classical Antiquity* 1 (1982).

181. 2 Macc. 9.9; 1 Macc. 6.8 ff.

182. 2 Macc. 7.19.

183. Josephus, *Ap.* 2.143.

184. Josephus, *B.J.* 1.656. Eusebius, *H.e.* 1. 8.7. The view that blasphemers and other grave sinners are punished by being eaten alive by worms occurs also in rabbinic literature. Louis Ginzberg, *The Legends of the Jews* (Philadelphia, 1959), 4:213.

mortibus persecutorum appears in Philo's *In Flaccum.*

The concept was adopted by Christian authors either from Hellenistic Jewish literature or directly from classical sources.[185] The book of Acts depicts opposition to Christianity as opposition to God.[186] Early Christian literature offers many examples. The persecuting magistrate "boiled out in living worms" in Tertullian, *Scap.* 3.4. In the same tract Tertullian says:

> We would save all men if possible by warning them not to fight with God. (*Scap.* 4.1)

Lactantius developed this theme extensively in *Mort.*[187] Eusebius also narrates the deaths of the persecutors in the H.e.

Use of the Θεομάχος Motif in Oppugnatores

In *Opp.* 1.1 Chrysostom compares the opposition to monasticism to the attempt of the Samaritans to stop the rebuilding of the Jewish temple. The Samaritans are described as βάρβαροι καὶ ἀνήμεροι.[188]

> They (the Samaritans) attacked with a large cavalry, and were able to interrupt the work for a while. This attack was the beginning of their own misfortunes. The work on the temple was completed and ended well (λαμπρὸν τέλος. p. 1, l.25 f.). (The Samaritans) learned, and through them, all men, that they were not fighting men, but God, who is honored by them (i.e., the Jews). The one who fights God cannot ever come to a good end (χρηστὸν τέλος). At the beginning he may suffer no harm, as God is calling him to repentance. If he persists, not profiting from God's ἀνεξικακία, he will benefit others greatly, by his own punishment teaching them never to do battle with God. Immediately, terrible misfortunes overtook the Samaritans, which surpassed Greek tragedies. The earth was wet with the blood of Samaritans killed by the Jews. From

185. Robert Renehan, "Classical Greek Quotations in the New Testament," in *The Heritage of the Early Church,* Orientalia Christiana Analecta 195 (Rome, 1973), pp. 21-23.

186. Θεομάχοι: Acts 5:39, σκωληκόβρωτος: Acts 12:23.

187. See the introduction to *Lactance, De la mort des persécuteurs,* ed. J. Moreau (SC 39).

188. *Opp.* 1.1; p. 1, l. 9.

> the blood was formed mud. A large mass of worms was produced, so that one would say that it was not dead bodies lying there, but πηγὰς πολλάς (p. 2, l.13-14). This was (the Samaritans') punishment on earth; what will overtake them in the next world is worse. The animated bodies receive punishment for endless ages. Isaiah and Ezekiel have divided the punishment of these men. Isaiah described their punishment here (cf. Is. 8:4; 10:11); Ezekiel their punishment there.

Chrysostom is evidently using some extra-biblical source concerning a battle which took place in the time of Cambyses, 529-521 B.C.[189]

The Samaritans are given as an example of θεομάχοι who oppose God's will by attacking men who are doing something good; their immediate punishment is to have their land engulfed in worms. As "barbarians" they are the enemies of civilization. The scheme of the punishment of the θεομάχος in this life and in the next, which is used by Chrysostom here and elsewhere in *Opp.*[190] is found already in 4 Maccabees 12:18 and 18:5, 22.

In *Opp.* 1.2 Chrysostom draws a parallel between the Samaritans and the opponents of the monks.

> I mention this because someone has come and announced to me a bitter and grievous message, which contains much ὕβρις towards God. He said there are certain individuals who dare the same things now as these barbarians, or rather much more lawless. They persecute from every side those who educate in our philosophy; and forbid them to speak or teach anyone with many threats. (p. 2, ll.28-36)

Chrysostom says that the attack against the monks is more impious than the things dared by Mithridates and his fellow Samaritans against the Jews, inasmuch as this temple (i.e., that of the monks) is more august and holy than that of the Jews: ἁγιώτερος ὁ νεὼς οὗτος ἐκείνου.[191] The comparison of a monk to the Jewish temple also occurs in the beginning of Chrysostom's *Ad Theodorum lapsum* 1:

189. Cf. 1 Esdras 2:30; Josephus *AJ* 11.29. The account of this battle is not found in any Samaritan source known to Professor James D. Purvis.

190. E.g., Nero: *Opp.* 1.3, p. 5, l. 47 - p. 6, l. 21.

191. *Opp.* 1.2; p. 2, l. 46.

> For it is not the overthrow of a city which I mourn, nor the captivity of wicked men, but the desolation of a sacred soul, the destruction and effacement of a Christ-bearing temple. For would not any one who knew in the days of its glory that well-ordered mind of thine which the devil has now set on fire, groan, imitating the lamentation of the prophet; when he hears that barbarian hands have set fire to all things and burned them up, the cherubim, the ark, the mercy seat, the tables of stone, the golden pot? For this calamity is bitterer, yea bitterer than that, in proportion as the pledges deposited in thy soul were far more precious than those. This temple is holier than that: for it glistened not with gold, and silver, but with the grace of the Spirit, and in place of the ark and the cherubim, it had Christ, and His Father, and the Paraclete seated within. (SC 117, pp. 80 f., l.1-25; NPNF, p. 91)

In *Exhortation to Theodore* the reference is to the destruction of Jerusalem by Nebuchadnezzar. Obviously, the designation of the monk as a "holy temple" in both writings, *Thdr.* 1 and *Opp.*, is related to New Testament texts like 1 Cor. 3:16-17, Eph. 2:21, etc. The comparison of a monk to a "Christ-bearing temple" (ναὸς χριστοφόρος) in *Thdr.* 1.1[192] and *Opp.* 3.21[193] may depend on Ignatius, *Eph.* 9.2, where the word χριστοφόροι first appears.

Finally, Chrysostom uses the poetical device of "impossibility" *(adunaton)*[194] to show the folly of warring against the monks:

> διὰ τί, καὶ ἐκ ποίας αἰτίας, καὶ πρὸς τί βλέποντες τοὺς λίθους εἰς τὸ ὕψος βάλλουσι, καὶ πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀκοντίζουσι τὰ βέλη καὶ τῷ τῆς εἰρήνης πολεμοῦσι θεῷ; (1.2; p. 2, l.47-50)

Chrysostom also uses the device of the *adunaton* in his apologetic treatise on Babylas, where he compares those who deny the truth of the gospel narrative to someone "who tries to wound heaven by shooting arrows at it, or attempts to empty the ocean with his own hands."[195]

In *Opp.* 1.3 Chrysostom justifies his defense of the monks with reference to the biblical doctrine of persecution and suffering. Those

192. SC 117, p. 80, l. 12.

193. *Opp.* 3.21; p. 74, l. 49.

194. Barbara Price Wallach, *Lucretius and the Diatribe against the Fear of Death: De rerum natura* 3.830-1094 (Leiden, 1976), p. 26.

195. *Pan. Bab.* 2.4; PG 50, 539.

who are persecuted will be rewarded; persecution is a source of good for the monks both now and in the hereafter. The example of Nero and Paul is given: Nero accused Paul of the same things with which the opponents reproached the monks, and then killed him. Chrysostom employs the argument of *Quod nemo laeditur nisi a se ipso,* which is analyzed in chapter II, to demonstrate that Paul was not harmed by the malice of Nero *in this life:*

> Τί οὖν ἀπὸ τούτου γέγονε βλάβος τῷ παθόντι κακῶς; τί δὲ ὄφελος τῷ δράσαντι κακῶς; Τί μὲν οὐκ ὄφελος τῷ τότε ἀναιρεθέντι Παύλῳ; τί δὲ οὐ βλάβος τῷ ἀνελόντι Νέρωνι; οὐχ ὁ μὲν ὥσπερ ἄγγελος πανταχοῦ τῆς οἰκουμένης ἄδεται (τὰ γὰρ παρόντα τέως ἐρῶ)· ὁ δέ, ὥσπερ ὄντως λυμεὼν καὶ δαίμων ἄγριος πρὸς πάντας διαβέβληται; (1.3; p. 6, 1.6-12)

Moreover, in the next world Nero will be led away to "the undying worm and unquenchable fire";[196] whereas Paul will stand before the throne of God with much παρρησία.[197]

Persecution, therefore, is not a source of evil for the monks, who are actually benefitted, but for the persecutors, who will be punished and ultimately will lose their salvation.[198] The persecutors of the monks are acting against the will of God:

> I take your side and entreat you to believe me, and not to "kick against the pricks" (Acts 26:14), or "grieve the Holy Spirit" (Eph. 4:30), when you think you are injuring men. (1.4; p. 7, 1.19-22)

Clearly, for John Chrysostom monasticism is in accord with God's will for the church at this particular time in history. He compares the opponents of the monks to Dives in Luke 16:19 ff.:

> You are worse than Dives. Although he did not share his possessions with Lazarus, he did not prevent others from doing so, as you do now. Also, it is not the same thing to deprive of bodily nourishment, and, during a great famine for philosophy (cf. Amos 8:11) to prevent someone from being nourished by others. You surpass savage Dives in two ways: first,

196. Mark. 9:43,48. Isaiah 66:24.
197. *Opp.* 1.4; p. 6, l. 13-26.
198. *Opp.* 1.4; p. 7, l. 16-17.

> by preventing others from extinguishing the famine; then, by showing this inhumanity when the soul, rather than the body, is being suffocated. (*Opp.* 1.4; p. 7, 1.36-48)

Finally, Chrysostom compares the persecutors of monks to the Jews who forbade the apostles to speak about salvation.[199] He quotes Josephus, B.J. 6.192-214 concerning the punishment which overtook them.[200] The Jews suffered this and worse evils not only because they crucified Christ, but because they hindered the apostles from speaking about our salvation.

At this point Chrysostom has put the opponents of the monks on the defensive, so that they try to excuse themselves by saying:

> Καὶ τί ταῦτα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, φησίν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῆς πίστεως ἀπάγομεν οὐδὲ τοῦ κηρύγματος. (1.6, p. 9; 1.43 f.)

In order to prove to the opponents that, when they persecute the monks, they are indeed persecuting the Christian religion, Chrysostom introduces the distinction between faith and morals.

> καὶ τί τῆς πίστεως ὄφελος, εἰπέ μοι, βίου μὴ ὄντος καθαροῦ; (1.6; p. 9, 1.45-46)

He demonstrates from many sayings (ἀποφάσεις) of Christ that punishments are ordained for life (βίος, i.e., conduct, ethical or unethical life), and not just for faith and dogmas. The proof texts for his assertion that an unethical life will be punished include Matt. 7:21-23, 26-27; Matt. 13:47-40; Mark 9:47-48; Matt. 22:2, 11-13; Matt. 25:1-13 (virgins shut out because of ὠμότης and ἀπανθρωπία); Matt. 25:41; Matt. 12:37.

He implies that the opponents of the monks are persecuting those whose life is authentically Christian. In *Opp.* 3.14,[201] Chrysostom demonstrates that in Scripture there is no distinction between monk and lay person. The Scriptures wish everyone to live the life of monks, though lay people are permitted to marry. Except for celibacy, the monk's life is shown to be authentic, i.e., biblical, Christianity. The implication is that, whereas pagans and Jews persecuted men who preached the gospel, the opponents of the monks are Christians who have renounced God in the conduct of their lives,[202] and persecute those who are obeying the commandments of Christ.

199. Acts 4:18.
200. *Opp.* 1.4-6; p. 7, l. 48 p. 9, l. 43.
201. *Opp.* 3.14; p. 59, l. 41 ff.
202. Διὰ τῶν ἔργων: *Opp.* 3.15; p. 62, l. 45.

Harnack says:

> the more deeply she (the secular church of the third and fourth centuries) became involved in the world, in politics, and in culture, the more loudly and impressively had she preached what monasticism now practiced.[203]

It is noteworthy that in the context of the secularization of the "Reichskirche" and the spread of the monastic movement, Chrysostom has adopted the traditional theme of the θεομάχος and applied it to those who are "resisting God" within the Christian community, namely, to those who accept Christian dogma (faith), but reject Christian ethics (morals), as taught by Christ. He states that these opponents are worse than the Jews: "they acted as enemies, you put on the mask of friendship".[204] With this comparison between the opponents of the monks and the Jews, which, in view of Jewish-Christian relations in the fourth century, was hardly favorable, Chrysostom ends his development of the θεομάχος theme.

Eschatological Conclusions to Oppugnatores 2 and 3

It has already been mentioned in Chapter II that many early Christian apologies end with a reference to eschatology. In addition to the works cited in footnote 205 of chapter II, part two, the following early Christian apologies end with a reference to eschatology and judgment:

Aristides 17.8 (ed. Geffcken, p. 27).[205]
Athenagoras, *Legatio* 36.
Theophilus, *Ad Autolycum* 1.14.
Diognetus 10.
Hippolytus, *On the Universe, against the Greeks and Plato.*[206]
Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 34-35.
Tertullian, *Ad nationes* 1.29. *Apologeticum* 48. *De spectaculis. De corona* 15.

203. Adolf Harnack, *Monasticism: Its Ideals and History*, translated into English by E. E. Kellett and F. H. Marseille (London, 1913), p. 45.

204. *Opp.* 1.4: p. 7, l. 51-54. In *Adv. Jud.* h. 4.7 (PG 48, 881) Chrysostom calls the Jews θεομάχοι.

205. J. Geffcken, *Zwei griechische Apologeten* (Leipzig and Berlin, 1907), p. 96.

206. Hermann Jordan, *Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* (Leipzig, 1911), p. 221.

Cyprian, *Ad Demetrianum* 22-26.
Firmicus Maternus.[207]

Gregory of Nazianzuz, *Or.* 5.37-38 (PG 35, 712-716).

The end of the world and judgment was an idea mocked by pagans in the beginning.[208] John Chrysostom, however, states that in his time the belief in future judgment was held by pagans, Jews, and heretics, as well as by Christians:

> Μὴ τοίνυν μέχρι τοῦ παρόντος βίου τὰ ἡμέτερα συγκεκλεῖσθαι νομίζωμεν, ἀλλὰ πιστεύωμεν, ὅτι πάντως ἔσται κρίσις καὶ ἀνταπόδοσις τῶν ἐνταῦθα παρ' ἡμῶν γινομένων ἁπάντων.
> Τοῦτο γὰρ οὕτως ἐστὶ σαφὲς καὶ ἐναργὲς πᾶσιν, ὡς καὶ 'Ιουδαίους καὶ Ἕλληνας καὶ αἱρετικούς, καὶ πάντα ὁντιναοῦν ἄνθρωπον ὑπὲρ τούτων ὁμογνωμονεῖν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ μὴ καθὼς προσῆκε περὶ ἀναστάσεως φιλοσοφοῦσιν ἅπαντες, ἀλλ' ὅμως περὶ τῆς κρίσεως καὶ τῆς κολάσεως καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ δικαστηρίων ἅπαντες συμφωνοῦσιν, ὅτι ἔστι τις τῶν ἐνταῦθα γινομένων ἀντίδοσις ἐκεῖ. (*Laz.* 4.3; PG 48, 1101)[209]

In the fourth century reflection on the last judgment became a "protreptic" theme of monastic literature, e.g., *Thdr.* 1.10-13.[210]

In *Opp.* the conclusions to books 2 and 3 are both eschatological. Book 2, which is addressed to a pagan father, ends with a reference to the pagan conception of the underworld.[211]

> And finally: even if you are an unbeliever and a Greek, nevertheless you may accept this argument. You have surely heard of the rivers Cocytus and Pyriphlegethon, and the water of Styx and Tartarus "as far from earth as (earth) is from heaven" (Hesiod, *Theog.* 720), and many kinds of punishments. Even though the Greeks could not speak truly of these matters as they are, since they were moved by reasonings and false re-

207. Joseph-Rhéal Laurin, *Orientations maîtresses des apologistes chrétiens de 270 à 361* (Rome, 1954), p. 421.

208. E.g., Acts 17:31-32. Minucius Felix 11.2. Tertullian, *De spec.* 30.

209. An interesting corroboration of this occurs in homily *Carit.* 8 (PG 56, 290), a sermon in which Chrysostom cites pagan writers as proof of the existence of heaven and hell.

210. SC 117, pp. 128-156; cf. *Western Asceticism*, transl. Owen Chadwick, The Library of Christian Classics, Philadelphia, 1958, p. 44.

211. *Opp.* 2.10; p. 31, l. 32 - p. 32, l. 2.

> ports of our (doctrines)—nevertheless they received an image of judgment. And you find poets, philosophers, prose writers, and everyone, philosophizing about these doctrines.
>
> You have also heard of the Elysian field, the isles of the blessed, meadows, myrtles, delicate breeze, much beautiful scent, choruses spending time there, clothed in a white robe, dancing and singing some hymns: in short the recompense reserved for evil and good people after their departure from here.
>
> How do you think that the good and the not such live with such thoughts? Will they not turn this over in their minds—the ones, even if their present life proceeds painlessly and with much pleasure, driven, so to speak, by the whip of conscience and the expectation of the terrible things which will receive them? Do not the good, even if they suffer countless evils, have "nourishing hope," as Pindar says, which does not allow them to perceive the present evils?

The doctrine that the Greeks borrowed from the Bible goes back to Hellenistic Judaism (Aristobulus).[212] The idea that the pagans derived the idea of judgment from the Scriptures appears in Theophilus, *Autol.* 1.14,[213] and in the *Cohortatio ad gentiles* 26,[214] with the same reference to Pindar, also quoted from Plato, *Resp.* 330d.[215]

Opp. 3 is addressed to a believing father, and begins with a detailed description of the last judgment.[216] Book 3 also ends with a reference to future punishments, in which, however, there is a strong protreptic element, expressed by many hortatory subjunctives.[217] The protreptic theme is hortative: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you".[218] Spiritual

212. M. Friedlaender, *Geschichte der jüdischen Apologetik als Vorgeschichte des Christenthums* (Zürich, 1903), pp. 28-29.

213. SC 20, p. 90.

214. Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum 3, p. 90.

215. Anton Naegele, "Johannes Chrysostomos und sein Verhältnis zum Hellenismus," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 13 (1904) 111. Chrysostom knows of the old patristic idea that finds traces of revelation in the literature and culture of Greece, and in this search establishes the Mosaic origin of Greek wisdom.

216. *Opp.* 3.1; p. 34, l. 2-35.

217. *Opp.* 3.21. *Opp.* 3.5 (p. 41, l.34 - p. 42, l.2) contains a doctrine about future rewards, and functions as a protreptic exhorting to perfection. At this point Chrysostom admits that salvation is not the issue, but perfection.

218. Matt. 6:33.

wealth (= piety) is shown to be the greatest inheritance one can give to his children.[219] In addition to the exhortation, rewards and punishments are threatened:

> If you obey, it will bring you a great reward; but if you contradict and disobey, a worse punishment. (3.21; p. 73, l.19-21. Cf. Justin, 1 *Apol.* 19.8)

The parents who prevent their children from becoming monks will be punished, not only for their own sins, but also for those which will have been committed by their children.

> If it is expedient for a person who scandalizes one individual to be drowned in the sea with a millstone (cf. Matt 18:6), what punishment and torment will suffice for those who display such savagery and cruelty to their children. Therefore I beg you to cease from contentiousness and become fathers of philosophic children. (3.21; p. 73, l.47-52)

Chrysostom states that his treatise removes all excuse from those who oppose monasticism.

> To you (i.e., the opponents) the net result will be that you will gather infinite punishment for yourselves, and will praise what I have said when no benefit will accrue to you from the praise. (3.21; p. 75, l.1-4)

This is the final sentence of *Opp.*, which contains renewed comparison of the opponents of the monks to Dives in Hades, who disregarded the warnings of Scripture when he was on earth.[220] The same threa appears at the end of Theophilus, *Autol.* 1.14.[221]

APOLOGETIC METHOD

Use of Reason

In the discourse *Opp.* Chrysostom seeks to prove his case by reason and rational argumentation:

> ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ διὰ τῶν λόγων ἀποδείξαιμεν, τότε κατηγορεῖν, τότε

219. *Opp.* 3.21; p. 72, l. 49 - p. 73, l. 19.

220. Cf. *Opp.* 1.4; p. 7, l. 23-36.

221. SC 20, p. 90, l. 3-4.

διαβάλλειν ὡς ἀλαζόνας καὶ λυμεῶνας ὄντως καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης ἐχθρούς. (*Opp.* 2.1; p. 15, l.30-32)

The argument in *Opp.* is made in a "civilized" way:

διαλέξομαι προσηνῶς καὶ μετ' ἐπιεικείας πολλῆς. (*Opp.* 2.1; p. 15, l.9)[222]

The "non-polemical" stance of Chrysostom in his apologetic works has already been noted in connection with the Eunomian heretics (above, chapter I). The posture of ἐπιείκεια ("civility") is a traditional one in Greek rhetoric,[223] which Chrysostom has adopted for apologetic purposes.

If one compares *Opp.* with Jerome's *Adversus Jovinianum,* which is on a related subject, one clearly sees the difference between Chrysostom's ἐπιείκεια and Jerome's more polemical notion of apologetics. In *Ep.* 48 (49), Jerome defends himself against criticisms which had been leveled against *Adversus Jovinianum,* and at the same time reveals his understanding of apologetic discourse.

Legimus, o eruditissimi viri, in scolis pariter, et Aristotelia illa[224] vel de Gorgiae fontibus manantia simul didicimus, plura videlicet esse genera dicendi, et inter cetera aliud esse γυμναστικῶς scribere, aliud δογματικῶς. (*Ep.* 49.13; ed. Labourt, 2:133)

Jerome characterizes apologetics as "γυμναστικῶς scribere," and says that it is a literary genre where it is permissible to employ sophisms and fallacious logic in order to defeat one's opponent. In Greek Christian apologetics the same distinction is made by Basil, who excuses a statement made in a dialogue against the pagan Aelianus, as having been said οὐ δογματικῶς ἀλλ' ἀγωνιστικῶς.[225] Gregory of Nyssa uses the term

222. Cf. *Opp.* 1.3 (p. 5, l.38-39) where the opponents of the monks are compared to children: μετὰ κολακείας καὶ προσηνείας πολλῆς πρὸς τὰ παιδία ταῦτα διαλεξόμεθα.

223. RICHARD VOLKMANN, *Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer in systematischer Übersicht* (Leipzig, 1885), p. 563 f.

224. ARISTOTLE, *Rh.* 1413b9 refers to ἀγωνιστικὴ λέξις, "debating style", and in *Soph. el.* 165b11, ἀγωνιστικοὶ λόγοι, are "contentious" arguments (cf. ibid. 175a2 α. διατριβαί). According to Aristotle, agonistic style belongs to the law courts and real life, and is to be distinguished from written style to be read privately (D. A. RUSSELL, ed. and trans., *'Longinus' On the Sublime,* Oxford 1964, p. xxxiii).

225. *Ep.* 210.5; Loeb, 3, p. 208.

ἀγωνιστικῶς with reference to apologetics in *Or. catech* 38.[226] Chrysostom, *Exp. in Ps.* 8.10,[227] uses this same term to refer to an argument directed against Jews and against Paul of Samosata, in contrast to ordinary scriptural interpretation (ἑρμηνεία).

There are instances in *Opp.* of "agonistic" or "contentious" reasoning. One example occurs in *Opp.* 3.5, where Chrysostom seems to misinterpret Paul's statement in 1 Cor. 7:29, 31:

But if it seems good, let us see whether it is possible for one living in the world to receive even this (the least) portion (in heaven). The blessed Paul made a consise statement about this and denied that those who have wives can be saved unless they should have them as if not having them, and they should not misuse the world. (3.5; p. 42, l.3-9)

In another part of the treatise, however, he admits that married people can be saved.

"What," you say, "will all married people perish?"

I do not say this, but that they will need greater effort if they are to be saved, "on account of the present distress" (1 Cor. 7:26). For the one who is loosed will run better than one who is bound. (Cf. 1 Cor. 7:27).

"Therefore he will have a greater reward and brighter crowns."

No way; for he lays this necessity upon himself, when he does not have to. (*Opp.* 3.15; p. 63, l.6-12)

Nevertheless, at the end of the discourse he reiterates that the young men who remain at home will perish: ἀνάγκη πάντως ἀπολέσθαι.[228]

Perhaps the most striking example of "agonistic" reasoning is the way Chrysostom supresses almost all mention of the "counsels" of perfection (virginity, voluntary poverty), in order to respond to the objection that the monastic life renders one liable to a stricter judgment from God. Chrysostom's answer is that the commandments of Christ are for everyone: ἁπλῶς ἐνομοθέτησεν ἅπασιν.[229] The same punishments are ordained for all who disobey.[230] The admonitions (νουθεσίαι) of

226. Ed. SRAWLEY, p. 153.

227. PG 55, 119.

228. *Opp.* 3.21; p. 73, l. 38-39.

229. *Opp.* 3.14; p. 59, l. 33.

230. *Opp.* 3.14; p. 61, l. 7-32.

Christ are addressed to everyone.[231] Chrysostom makes only one veiled reference to the counsels (i.e., παρθενία;—ἀκτημοσύνη is not alluded to), which is cast in a negative form.

> When (Jesus) is not speaking or legislating for everyone, he makes it clear to us. When he was speaking about virginity, he went on to say, "He that is able to receive it, let him receive it" (Matt. 19:12). Neither did he add "every one," nor did he propose it in the form of a command. Thus Paul, who everywhere imitates his teacher, having lit upon this subject, said: "Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord" (1 Cor. 7:25). That it is necessary for the lay person and the monk to attain the same excellence, and that if they fall both will receive the same wounds, not even the very contentious and impudent, I think, will contradict from now on. (3.14; p. 61, l.45-p. 62, l.2)

While omitting all references to the "counsels," which might seem to constitute the specific character of the monastic ideal, he argues that the observance of Christ's commandments is much easier in the monastic life than in the world, and gives an equal recompense to the monk and the layman.[232] The only virtue it might be easier to achieve in the world is chastity.[233] In saying that there is no monastic ideal distinct from the evangelical ideal, Chrysostom is combatting the error of a double standard of Christian morality. It is an appropriate argument in the context of apologetics, but obviously does not do complete justice to monasticism when it is viewed outside of the apologetic context.

Form of the Agōn

Origin

The *agōn,* defined as a set debate between two parties, is a literary form which occurs in old comedy (Aristophanes, Epicharmus), tragedy (especially Euripides), and rhetoric (e.g., the *dissoi logoi*).[234] Aristo-

231. E.g. Matt. 11:28-29. Matt. 7:13-14. John 12:25.
232. *Opp.* 3.15; pp. 62 ff.
233. *Opp.* 3.15; p. 62, l. 5 f.
234. Wilhelm Schmid, Otto Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* (Munich, 1961), 3,1: 204-206.

phanes sometimes introduces an *agōn* between different abstract conceptions such as the just and the unjust argument, and between poverty and wealth.[235]

It may be mentioned in this connection that the influence of Aristophanes on John Chrysostom is a disputed question. John Milton wrote:

> that Plato commended the reading of Aristophanes, the loosest of them all (i.e., the old comedians), to his royal scholar Dionysius, is commonly known and may be excused, if holy Chrysostom, as is reported, nightly studied so much the same author and had the art to cleanse a scurrilous vehemence into the style of a rousing sermon.[236]

Cataudella says that the tradition on which Milton relied for this statement is a legend and a calumny.[237] Nevertheless, there are several verbal echoes of Aristophanes in *Oppugnatores,* including:

2.5 (p. 22, 1.5) εὐσωματεῖ καὶ σφριγᾷ.
Cf. *Nub.* 799.
2.6 (p. 31, 1.8 f.) κατὰ νοῦν προχωρείτο.
Cf. *Pax.* 940.
2.7 (p. 25, 1.21) ψόφος ταῦτα τὰ ῥήματα.
Cf. *Ran.* 492.
2.8 (p. 2, 1.23) Σὺ δὲ ἂν χᾶναι τολμήσης.
Cf. *Vesp.* 342.
3.1 (p. 34, 1.21) συμποδίσαι. Cf. *Ran.* 1512.
3.7 (p. 45, 1.39) δεινὸν παθεῖν. Cf. *Ran.* 252.
3.9 (p. 50, 1.18-19) λαμπάδας ... ἅψαντες.
Cf. *Thesm.* 655.
3.14 (p. 59, 1.40) ἀκούοντες κακά.
Cf. *Thesm.* 388.

Aristophanes was valued by Atticists as the purest source of the old Attic language.[238] The judgment of Wilamowitz in praise of Chrysostom's

235. A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb, Tragedy and Comedy*² (Oxford, 1962), p. 158.
236. John Milton, *Areopagitica,* in *Complete Poems and Major Prose,* edited by M. Hughes (New York, 1957), p. 721.
237. Quintino Cataudella, "Giovanni Crisostomo 'imitatore' di Aristofane," *Atheneum* 18 (1940) 236-43.
238. Lesky, p. 450.

Atticism is often cited: "Chrysostomus ist ein beinahe puristischer Attizist: bei ihm dominiert das reine Attisch."[239] All this might lead one to conclude that Chrysostom studied the plays of Aristophanes, and possibly took the literary form of the *agōn* from there.

Chrysostom also read Euripides, and might have been influenced by the way this poet uses the form of the *agōn* in many of his tragedies. Euripides' thinking was dominated by the sophistic teaching of the *dissoi logoi,* and characterized practically by the art of *disputare in utramque partem.* In his drama, he examines the opposing possibilities of various phenomena and values. The opposing points of view are represented and attack each other in a monologue, or more often in disputatious dialogues between representatives of different opinions. In his later works Euripides also employs the form of small courtroom scenes before the forum of an authoritative arbiter.[240] The forensic imagery is found later on in the diatribe.

In the school of Libanius Chrysostom studied both Aristophanes and Euripides,[241] and so one is permitted to consider a direct influence of these poets upon him.

Use of the Agōn in Oppugnatores

Chrysostom represents his argument in terms of a wrestling match before impartial judges.[242] The text of 1 Cor. 5:12 is given as the rule of the *agōn:*

> I constrain my words like opponents to proceed to examination and engage in combat. I entrust the examination concerning them to impartial judges. The rule of the contest *(agōn)* orders us to strip against the Christian and to contend only with him and demands nothing more from us. "What have I to do with judging those outside," the blessed Paul says (1 Cor. 5:12) ... (*Opp.* 2.1; p. 15, l.35-42)

Chrysostom states that he is so confident of victory in the *agōn* with the

239. Quoted by A. Uleyn, "La doctrine morale de saint Jean Chrysostome dans le commentaire sur saint Matthieu et ses affinités avec la diatribe," *Revue de l'université d'Ottawa* 27 (1957) 17 n. 42.

240. Schmid-Staehlin, 1.3:689.

241. Cf. Foerster-Muenscher, "Libanios", *PW* 12, 1925, 2532.

242. *Opp.* 2.2; p. 15, l. 35-38.

pagan father, that he will use *logos* to render the context more difficult for himself.[243] The comment of M. Croiset is appropriate:

> il a l'air, en plusieurs occasions, de faire la partie trop belle à ses adversaires pour se donner à lui-même le plaisir de la difficulté, tant il est sûr d'en sortir à son honneur, curieux indice d'un goût d'ostentation inconsciente, où se trahit l'influence de la sophistique.

As examples Croiset cites *De sacerdotio* 1.8 and *Opp.* 2, especially chapters two and three.[244]

The influence of the drama is shown in the way Chrysostom presents the pagan point of view. A pagan father appears as the prosecutor (κατήγορος) of the monks in a court room, and expresses all the possible objections against monasticism.[245] Chrysostom is concerned to make the description of the opponent as dramatic as possible.[246] Every conceivable accusation against the monk is placed in his mouth.[247] At the conclusion of the "prosecutor's" speech, Chrysostom says:

> Our prosecutor has been well wrought in order to kindle all who hear, and to persuade (them) to throw over a cliff those who have done such things (i.e., monks). I draw the argument *(logos)* of all the charges to the highest pitch, so that when by the grace of God I have defeated it, even though it was well reasoned, there will be no further argument. When one who combines all these objections has been silenced, one who does not have all this together (and it is impossible for everything to occur together), will easily yield the victory to me henceforth. So let him say this and much more. I shall entreat the judges not to pity this old man now, but (in the future), when I show him mourning for his son who has suffered nothing terrible, but enjoys great goods, beyond which it is impossible to find others. Then truly will he be worthy of pity and tears, since he is unable to comprehend the wellbeing of his child, and is so far from it as to mourn on account of the greatest goods. (*Opp.* 2.3; p. 17, l.47-p. 18, l.11)

243. *Opp.* 2.2; p. 16, l. 12-14.

244. Maurice Croiset, *Histoire de la littérature grecque* (Paris, 1928), 5: 966.

245. *Opp.* 2.2; p. 16, l. 15-37.

246. *Opp.* 2.2; p. 16, l. 37-38.

247. *Opp.* 2.2; p. 17, l. 12-21.

The remainder of book 2 is Chrysostom's response to the pagan father. Book 2 concludes with a final reference to the courtroom and to correct (i.e., philosophic) judgment, which recalls the form of the diatribe.[248]

At the beginning of book 3 Chrysostom returns to the image of the *agōn*.[249] Although the argument against the pagan father suffices, and although Chrysostom prays that none of our brothers (i.e., fellow Christians) need further exhortation, nonetheless Chrysostom will direct a *logos* against the Christian father.

> Accordingly, let our believer be represented such as the unbeliever, and let him resemble him in everything, except his opinion about God. Let him lament the same way, let him prostrate himself before everyone's feet, bring forward his grey hair, old age, loneliness. Let him say all these things, and move the judges to as much anger as he wishes. Rather, our case against him is no longer before men. For he has heard what men filled with the Holy Spirit philosophized among us concerning the fearful and awe-inspiring judgment after death. (*Opp.* 3.1; p. 33, l.41-p. 34, l.2)

In the case of the believer who opposes monasticism, Chrysostom extends the traditional image of the courtroom to the eschatological judgment, where it is not simply a matter of victory in a combat, but terrible punishments are threatened:

> To this judge we must assuredly depart and see that day on which everything is laid bare (cf. Heb. 4:13)—I do not mean deeds or words only, but even thoughts. (3.2; p. 34, l.30-34)

For the believer, judgment is pictured proleptically as not being before men (ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων), but before the heavenly tribunal. Chrysostom expands the traditional image of a courtroom to the supernatural realm, where it assumes the form of a threat. As in book 1 the eschatological perspective is the foremost justification of the monastic life, because the environment and conduct of the monks leads them to a life free of sin: they will be approved at the last judgment.

At this point[250] Chrysostom drops all reference to the image of the

248. *Opp.* 2.10; p. 32, l. 30-35.

249. *Opp.* 3.1; p. 33, l. 12-25.

250. *Opp.* 3.2; p. 34, l. 35.

agōn, and frankly acknowledges that the contents of book 3 are didactic[251]

Phenomenon of Double Ttreatment

Opp. is a treatise *(logos)*[252] comprising one volume (βιβλίον).[253] In terms of its structure as one volume, *Opp.* may be compared to *De virginitate*, which is approximately the same length.[254] What is designated as *liber* 1 in *Opp.* is actually the prologue to the entire work. It corresponds to the structure of *De virginitate*, in which the prologue is seventeen pages long.

Opp. may be described as a βιβλίον containing two *logoi* (arguments): one directed to a pagan father (= book 2), and the other directed to a Christian father (= book 3). The phenomenon of double treatment of the same theme is noteworthy.

It is possible to find a precedent for double treatment of the same theme in Philo, who wrote two works on Abraham, one directed to Jews *(Concerning the Migration of Abraham)* and another to those unacquainted with Scripture, possibly gentiles *(Concerning Abraham)*.[255] These, however, were separate writings. An example of the phenomenon of double treatment in a single work occurs in Augustine, *De Trinitate*, which is divided into arguments based on Scripture (*libri* 1-7) and on reason (8-15).[256]

The reason given for the double presentation in *Opp.* is as follows.

251. Cf. *Opp.* 3.1; p. 33, l. 11: τὸν πιστὸν πατέρα διδάξωμεν.

252. The work *Opp.* is described as a single *logos* several times. E.g., 1.8; p. 13, l. 41-43, αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ καταναγκάσαν ἡμᾶς εἰς τοῦτον καθεῖναι τὸν λόγον. Elsewhere, however, Chrysostom refers to *logoi*. E.g., 3.21 (p. 73, l.30) μετὰ τοὺς μακροὺς λόγους τούτους.

253. Cf. *Opp.* 1.2; p. 3, l.41. In fact, the medieval Georgian version, Collection A, ms. no. 143, divides the entire discourse into nineteen chapters. Chrysostom refers to another ascetical treatise, *De virginitate*, as a βιβλίον (*In* 1 *Cor.* h. 19.6; PG 61, 160). He also designates Athanasius, *Vita Antonii* as τῷ βιβλίῳ (*In Mt.* h. 8.5; PG 57, 89). The *Vita Antonii* is 141 pages in Migne (PG 26, 835-976).

254. *De virginitate* (PG 48, 533-596) is 63 pages; *Oppugnatores* (PG 47, 319-386) is 67 pages.

255. Samuel Sandmel, *Philo of Alexandria: An Introduction* (New York, 1979), pp. 29 f.

256. BA 15 and 16 (Paris, 1955).

Chrysostom cites as the guiding principle (νόμος) of his "inner-church" apologetics Paul's saying in 1 Cor. 5:12: "What have I to do with judging those outside?".[257] To defend monasticism to pagans would be "to urge someone to love a kingdom who does not first wish to acknowledge that it exists." "Animal man does not receive the things of the Spirit, for it is foolishness to him".[258] Although the contest with the pagans is more difficult, Chrysostom would have preferred to write only against them, because of the shame involved in having to write against Christians.[259]

Contrary to his guiding principle of "inner-church" apologetics, which restricts it to believers, Chrysostom states that he will nevertheless direct his argument first against the pagans, because there are many pagan fathers whose sons are becoming monks:

> Since it happens that there are also many unbelieving fathers of children who are being dragged to heaven—although the rule of the contests releases us from battle against them—I shall strip against these first, willingly and with enthusiasm. (2.2; p. 15, 1.42-47)

He is confident that, despite the difficulties, he will be able to convince the pagan fathers, and lead them to accept Christian ethics, as lived by the monks, and Christian dogma, "from which this life has its beginning."

Admittedly, Chrysostom preferred to write book two to a pagan father, because he was ashamed to write to Christians. Book 2 thus seems to be a device which enables him as an apologist to avoid attacking Christians directly for their materialism and other sins, which are imputed to the pagan father in book two. Indeed, Chrysostom states that the mere fact of having to write such a defense to Christians will provide a "handle" to the pagans:

> I am ashamed when I am forced to exert myself about this for him (the believer), and I fear that the Greek might have this alone as a just accusation to cite against me ...

257. *Opp.* 2.2; p. 15, l. 38-42.

258. 1 Cor. 2:14. *Opp.* 2.2; p. 15, l. 47-52.

259. 2.2; p. 16, l. 1-5. Earlier Chrysostom said that he hesitated to write against the opponents of the monks because he would thus expose the evils within the Christian community to the pagan Greeks (1.2; p. 3, l.48-p. 4, l.11). Chrysostom again indicates his unwillingness to write against Christians in *Opp.* 3.1 (p. 33, l.19-21 and l.28-30).

260. *Opp.* 2.2; p. 16, l. 4-7.

The problem is how can Christianity be considered the truth when Christians are the enemies of monasticism, which is synonymous with virtue and philosophy?[261] By writing book 2 to a pagan father, Chrysostom is not only being "inclusive" in his apology to the opponents of the monks, but also taking the focus off the "scandal" in the Christian community, which is otherwise so prominent in *Opp.* 1 and 3.

That the argument in book 2 is considered by Chrysostom equally appropriate to a pagan or a Christian father is shown by the statement of *Opp.* 3.1:

> If earlier it seemed shameful to speak to the Christian about this, much more so now. How will the believer not be ashamed needing advice about that which the unbeliever could not contradict us? (p. 33, l.21-25)

Thus the argument of *liber* 2 suffices for Christian fathers also.

Nevertheless Chrysostom opts to compose a *logos* to the Christian father, whose purpose is "prophylactic":

> If someone could guarantee the future and convince me that no one in the future will dare such (i.e., attacks against the monks), I too would have to be silent and let what is past lie hidden. But since I have no trustworthy guarantor of this, the exhortation of words is necessary in the meantime. (3.1; p. 33, l.26-32)

Chrysostom prays that no Christians will need this advice; "but if that should happen—God forbid—the second voyage (ὁ δεύτερος πλοῦς) will not escape them, as the proverb goes".[262] The paroemiographers say that this expression (δεύτερος πλοῦς) is used

> ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσφαλῶς τι πραττόντων· παρόσον οἱ διαμαρτάνοντες κατὰ τὸν πρότερον πλοῦν ἀσφαλίζονται περὶ τὸν δεύτερον. (CPG I, p. 359 n. 21)

The proverb was used by Plato in the sense of "second-best" or "alternative".[263] In order to understand how the argument of book 3 functions as an "alternative" to that of book 2, it is necessary to examine separately the apologetic method in each book.

261. *Opp.* 1.2; p. 4, l. 1-2.

262. *Opp.* 3.1; p. 33, l. 39-41.

263. E.g., *Phd.* 99c9. *Phlb.* 19c1-2. *Pol.* 300c2.

Logos Adressed to a Pagan Father (= Opp. 2)

Book 2 is addressed to a pagan father, and therefore Chrysostom uses only reasoning (λογισμοί) and examples from pagan literature (παραδείγματα τῶν ὑμετέρων) in the argument.[264] There is no reference in book 2 to any transcendent reality; the perspective is kept this-wordly.

> Do not think that I shall mention the goods in heaven and those after the departure there: we shall make the demonstration from (the goods) at hand. (*Opp.* 2.4; p. 19, l.40-43)

> Not yet do I say to you that he despises all the earth since he has a city in heaveu. (2.5; p. 21, l.21-23).

> According to the true *logos*, when you remove him (the monk) from the earth, then especially will you send him to the fatherland: but this is not yet for you who know nothing more than what is seen. (2.5; p. 21, l.30-33)

> I bypass the help from prayers, which is much greater than all this. I bypass it, since my *logos* is now to you. (2.8; p. 27, l. 47-49)

It is not permissible to refer to the Scripture:

> If you were on our side, I would have narrated to you many and great narratives of this sort, both old and new; since you espouse the cause of the Greeks not even thence shall I be in want of the example. (2.4; p. 20; l.11-15)

Instead, reference is made to pagan myths,[265] history:[266] the trial of Socrates, and even to pagan literature:[267] quotations of *Crito* 45 bc. The examples (παραδείγματα) of Plato, Socrates, Diogenes and other illustrious pagans are cited[268]. All this is in accord with the traditional form of apologetics directed against pagans.[269]

264. *Opp.* 2.5; p. 22, l. 31-33.
265. *Opp.* 2.10; p. 31, l. 32 ff.
266. *Opp.* 2.1; p. 14, l. 40 - p. 15, l. 1.
267. *Opp.* 2.4; p. 20, l. 15-28.
268. *Opp.* 2.5; p. 22, l. 33 f. Cf. 2.6; p. 23, l. 41. Also 2.6; p. 24, l. 33.
269. NAEGELE, "Johannes Chrysostomos und sein Verhältnis zum Hellenismus," pp. 102-105. To Naegele's citations from Chrysostom add *In Tit.* h. 5.4 (PG 62, 693). Cf. JUSTIN, *De res.* 5; ed. OTTO, 3.2: 228. CYR. H., *Catech.* 18.10 (NPNF p. 136). THEODORET, *Cur.* 10.42 (SC 57, p. 374). Cf. among the Latins, TERTULLIAN, *Test.* 1.4; *Apol.* 10.4; *Cor.* 7. LACTANTIUS, *Inst.* 5.4. JEROME, *Ep.* 70.3 (ed. Labourt, 3: 211 212).

In *Opp.* 2 Chrysostom aims to prove that the condition of the monk *in this world* is not to be pitied, but on the contrary is preferable and superior to any other human vocation. Although the demonstration is dedicated, hypothetically, to an unbelieving father, it is also intended, as has been indicated already, for the believing father. It will dissuade him also from mourning over the alleged loss of status and earthly miseries of his son, which are shown to be unreal.

The thesis is clearly the same one which the Stoic-Cynics developed when they presented the philosopher without family, fatherland, fortune, wordly honors, or house; in rags, barefoot, dirty, nourished with bread and water, as the man truly happy, free, noble, powerful and royal.[270]

In the development of this theme John Chrysostom sometimes even manifests the desire to shock traditional *mores* which had characterized certain of his pagan predecessors. For example, in the course of proving that true pleasure (ἡδονή) is found only in the monastic life, he characterizes non-monastic pleasures as follows:

> What is pleasure? Is it not gluttony, and setting Sybaritic tables, and having intercourse with beautiful women like pigs wallowing in filth? (2.9; p. 30, l.26-29)

In the same vein further on he demonstrates that there is no pleasure in sex.[271]

It is necessary to recognize that many of his opinions are taken from the tradition of Stoic-Cynic philosophy, and the reasoning is not always exempt from sophisms. It is an extreme position to maintain that the possession of some riches condemns one to be tormented to possess more (2.3); or to maintain that good fortune causes more sorrow than pleasure (ibid). Chrysostom sees the highest expression of power in a total indifference to all earthly matters (2.7). He proves the nothingness of the pleasures of the senses by saying that they do not last long (2.10).

In addition, he paints the condition of the monk in flattering colors, which aid in forgetting the actual hardships of the monastic life. Not all monks are able by simple request to dispose of the property of their

270. LEGRAND, p. 12. See above, n. 135.
271. *Opp.* 2.10; p. 31, l. 10-14.

friends (2.4). It is an exception, rather than the rule, that a monk will have the ear of the political leadership, and will enjoy, at their side, worldly power (2.7).

The monk is depicted as an idyllic shepherd lying on soft grass in the shadow of beautiful trees (2.5), or as a carefree traveler who roams the countryside, confident that nature and public charity will sustain him. It is hard to reconcile these idealized figures with the real ascetics of Syria, who push their mortifications to the extreme, and whose existence is only recalled discretely.[272]

It is plain that Chrysostom outlines before the pagan father a portrait of the Cynic-Stoic philosopher in the guise of a Christian monk. Most of the arguments of book 2 are traditional themes of the diatribe.[273] But, as Ruiz Bueno points out, Christianity is not Cynicism, and so the point of departure is in a sense false. Chrysostom is trying to console a pagan father, whom he depicts as rich, illustrious and powerful, that his son may abandon the world and undertake the harsh life of the monks by means of reason alone, and reason is naturally insufficient.[274]

In conclusion it may be said that in *Opp.* 2 Chrysostom merely makes an exposition of the "attenuating circumstances" in favor of the monastic vocation. He could not do more, since he is writing an apology, and has placed himself on the opponent's ground. In the opinion of Legrand, the most persuasive part of the second discourse, where the monk is represented as the consoler of the afflicted (2.8), is the part where Chrysostom exceeds the limits he imposed upon himself at the beginning, and lets the spirit of Christianity speak.[275]

Logos Addressed to a Believing Father (=Opp. 3)

It has already been mentioned that Chrysostom conceives of book 3 as teaching: τὸν πιστὸν πατέρα διδάξωμεν.[276] More specifically, Chrysostom characterizes the contents of *Opp.* 3 as "*parainesis*": ἡ τῶν λόγων παραίνεσις,[277] ταύτης τῆς παραινέσεως.[278] *Parainesis* was a subdivi-

272. Legrand, pp. 13 f. See above, n. 135.
273. Uleyn, pp. 99 ff.
274. Ruiz Bueno, p. 56.
275. Legrand, p. 14. See n. 135 above.
276. *Opp.* 3.1; p. 33, l. 11.
277. *Opp.* 3.1; p. 33, l. 31-32.
278. Ibid., l. 38-39.

sion of practical (moral) philosophy according to the Stoics.[279] The term, used in its technical sense, was part of the vocabulary inherited by the church fathers from Posidonius and the Stoic tradition, and refers to the literature of moral exhortation and practical advice.[280]

At the conclusion of book 3 Chrysostom explains the contents of the *parainesis*:

> μετὰ τοὺς μακροὺς λόγους τούτους καὶ τὴν τοσαύτην παραίνεσιν, τήν τε ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων τήν τε σαφεστέραν τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν θείων γραφῶν. (3.21; p. 73, l.30-32)

I.e., the moral admonition *(parainesis)* is based upon (1) facts (πράγματα), and (2) Scripture, which is clearer, he says.

1) The *parainesis* from facts (ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων) seems to refer to the arguments based on the actual conditions of urban life, which Chrysostom mentions in the treatise as grounds for monastic flight. It must refer to the practical (empirical) reasons why it is impossible for chidren, who are brought up and educated in secular society, to be saved, and why monastic ἀναχώρησις is necessary. It includes the facts that parents instill wordly ambitions and materialism in their children,[281] and teach them to disobey the commandments of Christ.[282]

Other societal problems which Chrysostom treats are the resurgence of pederasty and sodomy[283] and the rhetorical system of education. Chrysostom says that it is impossible for a youth brought up in the city to escape the three great dangers of the world: love of money, love of glory and licentiousness, viz., sodomy.[284]

A good example of Chrysostom's empirical admonition (παραίνεσις ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων) occurs in 3.12,[285] where Chrysostom says he is speaking ἀπὸ ψυχῆς "from the heart." He is trying to show that he is sincere

279. Seneca, *Ep.* 95.1. Clement of Alexandria, *Paed.* 1.2.2 (SC 70, pp. 11-14, 110).
280. A. Méhat, "Les ordres d'enseignement chez Clément d'Alexandrie et Sénèque," *Studia Patristica* 2,2, Texte und Untersuchungen vol. 64 (Berlin, 1957): 353. *Parainesis* occurs in the title of other ascetical writings of Chrysostom. For example, the title of *Thdr.* 1 given in ms. B is λόγος παραινετικὸς εἰς Θεόδωρον ἐκπεσόντα (SC 117, p. 80).
281. *Opp.* 3.5-6.
282. *Opp.* 3.7.
283. *Opp.* 3.8.
284. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 148, l. 44-51.
285. *Opp.* 3.12; p. 55, l. 18.

in the statement that he would approve of rhetorical education if a young man's character were already firmly established. He gives an example of a youth who had fled to the desert to practice extreme asceticism, whom he (Chrysostom) brought back to the city to continue to study rhetoric, according to his father's wishes, while living as an ascetic at home in the city.[286]

2) Throughout *Opp.* 3 Scripture is used as the main source of proof, admonitions and examples.[287] The last judgement is described with many quotations from writers "inspired by the Holy Spirit".[288] Sayings of Paul and Jesus are cited to prove that God demands from us our salvation and our neighbors' with the same scrupulousness.[289] The Platonic theme of τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλεια is introduced here, as part of the command to save others.[290] The example of Eli is cited,[291] whose only sin was child neglect.[292]

In 3.5 he uses Scripture to prove that there are differences of rewards, and that all shall not receive the same reward. He implies (but naturally does not state explicitly) that the monk will receive the highest reward.[293]

In 3.14 he demonstrates from Scripture that all Christians must live up to the same standard of righteousness, and the same punishment is decreed for all. At one point in this demonstration he quotes Scripture, and then says that he will add something ἀπὸ λογισμοῦ.[294] The same carefulness in distinguishing the text of Scripture from his own reasoning is manifested again further on in the same chapter.[295]

Chrysostom uses both Scripture and reason in chapter four to prove

286. *Opp.* 3.12; p. 56, l. 29 ff. Cf. *Opp.* 3.11 (p. 53, l.9): Οὔπω γὰρ οὐδὲν πρὸς φιλονεικίαν φθέγγομαι. Here Chrysostom says that he is still arguing practically: if children were morally equipped, he would not urge that they be removed to the desert for their moral education by monks.

287. E.g., *Opp.* 3.20; p. 72, l.8-9: ταῦθ' ὑμῖν ἀμφότερα ἀπὸ τῶν θείων πιστώσομαι γραφῶν. Ibid. (l. 36-37): τοὺς τοιαῦτα ὑποδείγματα ἔχοντας καὶ τοσαύτας παραινέσεις. 3.21; p. 72, l. 43: Τοσαῦτα οὖν ἔχοντες ὑποδείγματα.

288. *Opp.* 3.1; p. 33, l. 49 f.

289. *Opp.* 3.2; p. 34, l. 35-37 ff.

290. *Opp.* 3.2; p. 35, l. 42.

291. 1 Sam. 2:13 ff.

292. *Opp.* 3.3.

293. *Opp.* 3.5; p. 41, l. 54-p. 42, l. 2.

294. *Opp.* 3.14; p. 59, l. 20-25.

295. *Opp.* 3.14; p. 61, l. 10 and 16-17.

that God is concerned about the nurture/education (ἀνατροφή) of children.[296]

On one occasion Chrysostom presents differing arguments corresponding to the varying degrees of faith present in the opponents. This occurs in 3.16,[297] where Chrysostom defends the monastic vocation against the objection that monks cannot have children and therefore the parents of monks will never have grandchildren. Chrysostom makes one defense based on Scripture to the more spiritual (τοὺς πνευματικωτέρους), and another based on reason to the more wordly individuals: φιλοσώματοι καὶ σφόδρα τῷ παρόντι προσηλωμένοι βίῳ.[298] To the more spiritual he argues that monks are able to beget children, "which were born not of blood, not of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God".[299] This is the concept of spiritual paternity, which is widespread in eastern monasticism.[300] To the wordly opponents he uses the commonplaces of the diatribe concerning *molestiae nuptiarum.*[301]

In *Opp.* 3.11[302] Chrysostom uses both pagan and Christians examples to convince the believing father that rhetorical education is unnecessary for a philosopher. He recalls the names of Anacharsis, Crates and Diogenes, and also cites the example of Socrates, quoting *Apology* 17bc. The purpose of the quotation is to show that Socrates considered rhetoric unfitting for the philosopher. For apologetic reasons he gives full value to the evidence of Plato, author of the *Apology*. At the same time he says that such evidence is insufficient for the believer:

> For the unbeliever this suffices; for the believer I must bring
> in illustrations of our own in addition. (3.12; p. 54, l.37-39)

The examples from Christianity which Chrysostom adduces are the apostles, who, though unable to read and without rhetorical training, nonetheless possessed wisdom.

Thus in *Opp.* 3 Chrysostom creates arguments not only from Scripture and from reason illumined by faith, but once even from the literature of the Greeks. The influence of the literary form of the diatribe is

296. *Opp.* 3.4.

297. *Opp.* 3.16; p. 63, l. 32 ff.

298. *Opp.* 3.16; p. 64, l. 9-11.

299. John 1:13.

300. Baus, p. 364.

301. Cf. *Virg.* (SC 125, pp. 37, 57). Above, footnote 63.

302. *Opp.* 3.11; p. 53, l. 53 ff.

also present in the prominence of the imaginary interlocutor, who plays an important role in the development of the argument.

The imaginary interlocutor is one of the most permanent attibutes of the literary form of the diatribe. W. Capelle, in the article, "Diatribe (Nichtchristlich)," in RAC 3:992, states:

> Besonders charakteristisch ist die durch ein ἀλλά oder φησί oder dergl. beliebte Einführung eines fingierten Zwischenredners, den der Sprecher meistens die Ansicht der Masse, die *communis opinio,* vorbringen lässt, um sie alsbald kurz u. bündig, oft in sehr drastischer Form, zu widerlegen.

In his excellent article, "La doctrine morale de saint Jean Chrysostome dans le Commentaire sur saint Matthieu et ses affinités avec la diatribe," A. Uleyn discusses the device of the imaginary interlocutor in the sermons of Chrysostom:

> Tout comme les diatribes, les sermons de Chrysostome ne ressemblent aucunement à des conférences calmes ou à des discours paisibles dans lesquels l'orateur tient continuellement la parole. Par la bouche d'un interlocuteur fictif (τις), l'auditoire est appelé à jouer un rôle actif. Il y a un contact suivi entre l'orateur et ses auditeurs; les objections et les interrogations, les discussions et les apostrophes se succèdent sans cesse. Pour s'interrompre et pour introduire le contradicteur anonyme, notre orateur se sert fréquemment de l'interjection φησὶ *(dices).* Or tous les spécialistes sont d'accord pour voir dans l'usage répété de ce terme une caractéristique indéniable du style diatribique.
>
> Parfois la discussion se fait tellement vive et mouvementée que le φησὶ introducteur disparaît et la partenaire fictif prend la parole sans plus. Cet interlocuteur interprète les réactions spontanées du public. D'habitude elles reflètent les objections d'une mentalité terre-à-terre et hédoniste, et cela souvent sous forme d'un diction populaire. (pp. 8-9)

This description of the use of the diatribe corresponds well with the appearance of the fictitious interlocutor in *Opp.* 3.

In *Opp.* 3 the imaginary interlocutor represents the voice of the believing fathers who are opposed to the monks. He asks important questions, and voices the major objections against the monks, which

Chrysostom then undertakes to answer. A few examples are given below.

> 3.5 "What then? Is it impossible to be saved if one lives in a city, and has a home and a wife?" one says. (p. 41, l.33-34. Cf. 3.7; p. 44, l.26 ff.)
>
> 3.9 "Why do our children need philosophy and a scrupulous life-style?" you say. (p. 49, l.20-21)
>
> Ibid. "What? shall we all philosophize and life will be undone?" (p. 49, l.30-31. Cf. 3.11; p. 52, l.46 ff.)
>
> 3.11 You say: "Let them learn literature first and acquire the power of rhetoric, and then let them be brought to this philosophy (i.e. monasticism): then there will be no one to prevent it." (p. 53, l.1-4)
>
> Ibid. "What? shall we tear down the schools?" you say. (p. 53, l.20-21)
>
> Ibid. "What if we go there (i.e. to the desert), and in addition to having a slower tongue lapse from that virtue?" you say.
>
> 3.13 "Yes, but whence will it be clear to us that he will stand firm, remain and not change? For there are many who have fallen (from the monastic life)." (p. 57, l.54-p. 58, l.2)
>
> 3.14 "It is not the same thing," you say, "for a worldly person to fall and one who has once for all devoted himself to God: both do not fall from the same height, whence their wounds are not equal." (p. 59, l.8-11)
>
> 3.14 "Is the same philosophy demanded of us all?" you say. (p. 61, l.1)
>
> 3.15 "What" you say, "Will all married people perish?" (p. 63, l.6-7)
>
> 3.26 "To whom," you say, "shall we leave our fields, houses, slaves, gold?" And indeed I hear them lamenting this. (p. 64, l.16-19)
>
> 3.17 "What then," you say, "can't one undertake this philosophy (i.e. monasticism) in old age after marriage, after children?" (p. 65, l.19-21)

It is against these objections that Chrysostom develops his thought. Legrand has pointed out that book 3 is more than a refutation of er-

rors.[303] Chrysostom takes the occasion to expound many positive teachings, including a scheme of Christian education. It has already been shown that positive teaching, which edifies the faithful, is a part of Chrysostom's apologetics, and indeed of early Christian apologetics in general.

CONTENT OF THE MAIN APOLOGETIC ARGUMENT IN OPP.

"Philosophy" in the Writings of John Chrysostom

There is hardly a treatise, homily or letter of Chrysostom which does not contain many examples of words belonging to the group *philosophia*.[304] The various usages are examined below, with special reference to the treatise *Opp.*

Philosophia = Pagan Thought[305]

Chrysostom's general attitude towards philosophy is unfriendly.[306] Utterances friendly to philosophers are neither numerous nor significant. They are usually only appreciation of a subordinate teaching or casual judgement of a philosopher. The small recognition is almost always given in homiletic interest.[307] In fact, the only texts in the immense

303. LEGRAND, p. 14.

304. The frequency of the noun φιλοσοφία predominates very much over that of the adjective φιλόσοφος or the verb φιλοσοφεῖν in the works of Chrysostom. ANNE-MARIE MALINGREY, *"Philosophia": Étude d'un groupe de mots dans la littérature grecque dès Présocratiques au IVe siècle après J.-C.* (Paris, 1961), p. 265.

305. In *Opp.* 2 there are many references to pagan philosophy. E.g., *Opp.* 2.1 (p. 14, l.45): τῶν ὑπὲρ φιλοσοφίας ... λόγων. *Opp.* 2.11 (p. 54, l.1) τοῖς ἔξωθεν φιλοσόφοις.

306. K. ELSER, "Der heilige Chrysostomus und die Philosophie," *Theologische Quartalschrift* 76 (1894) 552. Cf. P. R. COLEMAN-NORTON, "St. Chrysostom and the Greek Philosophers," *Classical Philology* 25 (1930) 305: "One need not read far in the works of this most voluminous writer of the Greek Christian fathers to discover the low opinion which he has of Greek philosophy." The article of Coleman-Norton consists of a survey of the strictures which Chrysostom passes upon the Greek philosophers in general and his judgement of individual philosophers.

307. ELSER, p. 564. Thus for example in h. 14.4 on Acts (PG 60, 117-19). Chrysostom explains that "he uses moral maxims from pagan philosophers rather than Scripture, because these are more able to put people to shame. It is the principle

works of Chrysostom, where words of the group *philosophia* are accompanied by favorable adjectives, occur in *Opp.* 2.5 and 3.11.[308]

In *Opp.* 3.11 one sees the usage which Chrysostom makes of Greek philosophy and the choice which guides him. It is insofar as the pagan tradition furnishes suitable examples,[309] and as long as these examples are of men who "spent their entire life in the moral part of philosophy".[310] It is significant that Chrysostom accepts the threefold division of philosophy into logic, physics and ethics. The tripartite division of philosophy seems to go back to Plato.[311] This division was accepted later by Platonists and by the Stoics.[312]

Chrysostom uses this terminology to describe the statements of Christ concerning conduct (βίος). In *Opp.* 1.6[313] he distinguishes between faith and morals (πίστις, βίος), and describes Christ's ethical teaching as "the ethical part of philosophy." Ἆρά σοι δοκοῦμεν μάτην ὑπὲρ βίου πεφοβῆσθαι καὶ πολλὴν τοῦ ἠθικωτέρου μέρους τῆς φιλοσοφίας ποιεῖσθαι σπουδήν;[314] This definition depends on Chrysostom's identification of

in Matt. 5:47. Likewise, Jeremiah used the sons of Rechab as an example to the Jews (chap. 35)." The pagan maxims which he quotes concern not speaking evil of anyone, or returning evil to an abuser.

308. MALINGREY, *Philosophia*, p. 267.

309. These examples, however, are interpreted by Chrysostom in quite dfferent ways in anti-pagan contexts. Cf. for example the treatment of Plato's slavery in homily 33.4 on Matthew (PG 57, 392). Also in *Opp.* 3.12; p. 54, l.51. For a different treatment of the meeting of Diogenes with Alexander see *Pan. Bab.* 2.8 (PG 50, 545). (Parallels in NATORP, "Diogenes," PW 5:767.) The quotation from *Apology* 17bc is used to disparage Plato's literary ability in *In Jo.* h. 2.3 (PG 59, 32 f.).

310. Τὸν ἅπαντα βίον ἐν τῷ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἠθικωτέρῳ διατρίψαντες μέρει: *Opp.* 3.11; p. 54, l. 4-6.

311. Cf. AUGUSTINE, *De civ. dei* 8.4; BA 34, p. 242.

312. The threefold division of philosophy is used by the academic philosopher VARRO (Cicero, *Acad.* 1.2.5-7; Loeb, pp. 414-17). Cf. *Acad.* 1.9.34 where ethics is described as "cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et moribus" (ibid., pp. 442-443). The same division occurs in PHILO, *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 80 (ed. minor, ed. Cohn et Reiter, 6:16): the Essenes are said to practice the ethical part of philosophy by observing the Mosaic laws. Cf. also the prologue of Origen, *Cant.* "Generales disciplinae quas Graeci ethicam, physicam, et theoricen appellaverunt, nos has dicere possumus moralem, naturalem et inspectivam." (PG 13, 75 quoted by MARY ELIZABETH MASON, *Active Life and Contemplative Life: A Study of the Concepts from Plato to the Present,* Milwaukee 1961, p. 23 f. n. 19).

313. *Opp.* 1.6; p. 9, l. 45 ff.

314. *Opp.* 3.6; p. 10, l. 21-33.

Christianity with philosophy, which will be discussed in the next section.

It is significant that Chrysostom commends those philosophers who devoted themselves to ethics, and who paid no attention to rhetoric. These include the Cynic philosophers,[315] Anacharsis,[316] Crates, and Diogenes; Socrates and Plato.[317]

Philosophia= Christian Realitiés

Chrysostom often uses the word *philosophia* without any qualification in a Christian sense. An equivalent term would be wisdom, in the sense of a wisdom impregnated with Christianity which postulates an engagement of the whole man. "Real wisdom and real education is nothing other than the fear of God."[318] It is rare that the word *philosophia* designates a purely intellectual aggregate composed of truths to be understood.[319] In order to emphasize the idea that the faith of Christians ought to inform their life, Chrysostmom uses the cognate accusative: οὗτοι μάλιστά εἰσιν οἱ τὴν ἀρίστην ἡμῖν φιλοσοφοῦντες φιλοσοφίαν.[320] He attaches the greatest value to what he calls "philosophy by actions." In *Stat.* 17.2[321] he describes the monks as οἱ διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἀληθῶς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιδεικνύμενοι.

For Chrysostom the interior word must be uttered in order to gain all its force; he does not conceive of a meditation which would not be

315. Cynicism was one of the three leading philosophical sects in the fourth century (AUGUSTINE, *Acad.* 3.19.42). There were Cynic philosophers at Antioch, who evidently enjoyed the esteem of the masses (Chrysostom, *De statuis* h. 17.2; PG 49, 173 f.). Emperor Julian compared the Cynics with Christian monks, and was opposed to both groups (*Or.* 7.224b; ed. A. ROCHEFORT, Paris 1963, p. 70). Libanius also detested the Cynics (Petit, p. 196). Cynicism and monasticism were closely related (EDUARD ZELLER, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung,* Leipzig 1923, 3,1: 803 ff.).

316. Anacharsis is mentioned only here by Chrysostom. The *Letters of Anacharsis,* a Hellenistic composition, uses the mythical Scythian prince as a mouthpiece for Cynic diatribes. Cf. OCD², p. 57.

317. *Opp.* 3.11; p. 53, l. 53 - p. 54, l. 29.

318. *Opp.* 3.12; p. 55, l. 1-3. Cf. Prov. 1:7. Sir. 1:14.

319. MALINGREY, p. 277. The work of Malingrey is of sufficient importance to be cited at length and in full.

320. *Stat.* h. 19.1; PG 49, 189, with reference to Syriac speaking peasants. HERBERT WEIR SMYTH, *Greek Grammar* (Cambridge, 1959), p. 355.

321. PG 49, 174.

directly oriented to the putting into practice of the truths being contemplated. One meets many cases where the verb φιλοσοφεῖν means both "to meditate on a Christian truth" and "to hand it on". For example, *Opp.* 3.1:

> For he heard what men filled with the Holy Ghost philosophized among us concerning the fearful and and awe-inspiring judgement after death (p. 33, l. 49-50)

The verb φιλοσοφεῖν also refers to the teaching action of every Christian who acts in the middle of the community by word and example.[322]

The noun *philosophia* is often accompanied by other words which specify it. E.g., the combination of *philosophia* and πολιτεία has considerable importance in his works. It represents the putting into action of Christian principles of conduct, which Chrysostom always preaches. For example, *Anom.* h.12.5:

> καὶ τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας φιλοσοφίαν τῇ τῶν δογμάτων ὀρθότητι συνυφαίνετε ... πολιτείαν δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίαν οὐδὲν οὕτως ὡς ἡ ἐνταῦθα ποιεῖ διατριβή. (PG 48, 811).

This shows the narrow relation which Chrysostom wishes to establish between the two terms "philosophy" and conduct.[323]

In *Opp.* 3.14 Chrysostom uses the group φιλοσοφία καὶ μακροθυμία to comment on a text of Paul.[324] Here μακροθυμία is the essential notion and if the term "philosophy" is not merely rhetorical, it is there to insist on the practice of the aforementioned virtue.[325]

In passages which concern moral life one is tempted to translate *philosophia* by "virtue." But that would make it a synonym of ἀρετή. It is better to distinguish between "desire for perfection" *(philosophia)* and "perfection" (ἀρετή). Thus in *Opp.* 3.3[326] he says that Christians have need of much greater philosophy than people in the Old Testament.[327]

In the totality of his work Chrysostom uses the word *philosophia* to describe the practice of Christian virtue.[328] Apart from his early

322. MALINGREY, p. 280. See n. 319 above.

323. Ibid., p. 281.

324. Eph. 4:26, Rom. 12:21.

325. *Opp.* 3.14; p. 60, l. 19. Cf. MALINGREY, p. 282.

326. *Opp.* 3.3; p. 38, l. 24 f.

327. MALINGREY, p. 283. See n. 319 above.

328. STEPHANUS BEZDEKI, "Ioannes Chrysostomus et Plato," *Ephemeris Dacoromana* 1 (1923) 324 f.

ascetical treatises, he addresses himself to the entire Christian community. In his homilies, religious problems are envisioned in the way they occur in the societal milieu. However, even in *Opp.* Chrysostom states that the same philosophy is demanded of all Christians, monks and laymen:

> All must ascend the same height, and what has upset out entire world is that we think that only the monks need greater scrupulousness, and the rest may live carelessly. This is quite incorrect.
> "Is the same philosophy demanded of us all?" I would say so definitely; or, rather, not I, but he who is to judge us. (*Opp.* 3.14; p. 60, l.49—p. 61, l.3)

Chrysostom is saying here that there can be no higher philosophy than the ethical requirements of Christianity; monks and lay people may differ in their mode of life, but the ethical demands, of which the highest is love, are the same for both. The picture of the true philosopher which Chrysostom sketches in many places is that of a Christian.[329]

Monasticism Identified with Philosophy by John Chrysostom

General

Following Eusebius and the Cappadocians, John Chrysostom identified monasticism with philosophy.[330] According to Baur [331] Chrysostom designated monasticism as philosophy especially with reference to its contents; the goal of monasticism is perfection (ἀρετή). The monastic life is the best way of life (πολιτεία)[332] to achieve the goal of Christian perfection. Philosophy can find its fulfillment in the monastic life. In *Thdr.* 1.18,[333] Chrysostom describes the son of Urbanus, who returned to the monastic life, thus:

329. Malingrey, p. 285. Elser, pp. 567-568.

330. *Comp.* 1 and 4 (PG 47, 387 f., 391). *Thdr.* 1.18 (SC 117, p. 196). *Compunct.* 1.9 (PG 47, 408). *Stat.* h. 17.2 (PG 49, 173 f.). *In Mat.* h. 55.6 (PG 58, 548 f.). *In Ac.* h. 15.4 (PG 60, 124). *In 2 Cor.* h. 15.5 (PG 61, 511). h. 24.2 (PG 61, 565).

331. Chrysostomus Baur, "Der Weg der christlichen Vollkommenheit nach der Lehre des hl. Johannes Chrysostomus," *Theologie und Glaude* 20 (1928) 29.

332. Cf. e.g., *Opp.* 3.10 (p. 51, l.34 f.): τῆς ἀρίστης ταύτης πολιτείας.

333. SC 117, pp. 197 f.

> καὶ νῦν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν βαδίζων ὁδόν, πρὸς αὐτὸ λοιπὸν τὸ τέλος ἔφθασεν τῆς ἀρετῆς.

In homily 38.3 on Matthew[334] he refers to monks as τῶν εἰς ἐκείνην φθασάντων τὴν κορυφὴν τῆς φιλοσοφίας. The only real philosophers who still exist are to be found among the monks. That is what Chrysostom says in homily 21.3 on Ephesians:[335]

> For if a set of Greeks, men worthless as they are, and dogs, by taking up that worthless philosophy of theirs, (for such the Grecian philosophy is), or rather not itself but only its mere name, and wearing the threadbare cloak, and letting their hair grow, impress many: how much more will he who is a true philosopher? If a false appearance, if a mere shadow of philosophy at first sight so catches us, what if we should love the true and pure philosophy? Will not all court it, and entrust both houses, and wives, and children, with full confidence to such men? But there is not, no there is not such a philosopher existing now. And therefore it is not possible to find an example of the sort. Amongst recluses, indeed, there are such, but amongst people in the world no longer. And that amongst recluses there are such, it would be possible to adduce a number of instances. ... And now would ye have me exhibit examples of secular men? At present, indeed, we have none; still there are perhaps even secular men who are excellent, though not arrived at the highest philosophy. (NPNF pp. 155 f.)

Elsewhere in this same vein Chrysostom calls monasticism τὴν φιλοσοφίαν τὴν ἀληθῆ.[336] This phrase, reminiscent of Plato, was coined by Clement of Alexandria, who used it to refer to the moral life of Christians.[337] It also occurs in the title of *Comparatio regis et monachi.*[338]

In Oppugnatores

In *Opp.* Chrysostom identifies monasticism with philosophy, i.e.,

334. PG 57, 432.

335. PG 62, 153.

336. *Sac.* 1.2; SC 272, p. 62.

337. *Pedagogue,* 2.11. Malingrey, pp. 138 f.

338. PG 47, 387 f. Chrysostom's disciple, Nilus of Ancyra, also described monastic life as the true philosophy taught by Christ. Quasten 3:499.

with the ethical part of philosophy. In the following passages the word "philosophy" means "monasticism," and "to philosophize" means "to live as a monk."

2.1 (p. 14, 1.21) τοῖς φιλοσοφεῖν αἱρουμένοις
2.1 (p. 14, 1.35) ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ τῶν παίδων ἀγομένων
2.5 (p. 21, 1.4) ὅσον πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν πλέον ὠθεῖς αὐτὸν
3.12 (p. 56, 1.38 f.) τὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας φυτά

Monasticism is often described as "*this* philosophy":

2.8 (p. 28, 1.6 f.) ἐπὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ταύτην ἐλθόντες
3.12 (p. 56, 1.30 f.) τὴν μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν τῆς φιλοσοφίας ταύτης
3.12 (p. 57, 1.24 f.) τὸν θεὸν οὕτω κοῦφα τῆς φιλοσοφίας ταύτης ἐνθέντα τῷ παιδὶ τὰ πτερά
3.13 (p. 58, 1.48) τῆς καλῆς ταύτης φιλοσοφίας
3.20 (p. 72, 1.2) οἱ ταύτης ἐπειλημμένοι τῆς φιλοσοφίας

The accomplishments of the monks are described as τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὰ κέρδη:

> Then you will know the profit of philosophy, when they (the young men who have become monks) heal people of incurable diseases,[339] when they are hailed as common benefactors, patrons and saviors, when they walk among men on earth as angels, when they are esteemed by everyone; or rather, whatever I say, I shall not say anything like what you can know by experience and in reality.

Following Eusebius, P.e. 12.29.1, Chrysostom calls monasticism the "lofty philosophy," and, like the Stoics,[340] distinguishes the monastic life from a lower level of morality suitable to the multitude:

> οὔπω γὰρ τὴν ἄκραν τίθημι φιλοσοφίαν ἀλλὰ τὴν πολλοῖς ἐφικτὴν (*Opp.* 3.19; p. 49, 1.40 f.)

339. *Opp.* 3.18 (p. 68, 1.35-36): ὅταν θεραπεύσωσιν ἀνθρώπους ἀνίατα νοσοῦντας νοσήματα is the only reference in the discourse to miracles worked by monks. This is in stark contrast to the *H. rel.* of Theodoret, which abounds in miracles performed by the Syrian monks. E.g., *H. rel.* 2; PG 83, 1317B-21D (cf. Festugière, p. 251). *H. rel.* 6; 1360D, 1365A7 f., 1380CD. Also *H. rel.* pp. 1475D, 1472D (cf. Festugière, p. 304).

340. A. Grilli, *Il problema della vita contemplativa nel mondo greco-romano* (Milan, 1953), p. 310 n. 2. (Author's Note: in the author's view the writings of Grilli are significant and therefore the author has cited and referred to Grilli in depth.)

The same phrase ἄκρα φιλοσοφία (= monasticism) is employed in h. 55.6 on Matthew,[341] ana h. 21.3 on Ephesians.[342]

The identification of monasticism with philosophy is surely an apologetic device, and constitutes the basic presupposition of the entire discourse. It shoulu be recalled that in early Christianity the comparison with philosophy

> is almost exclusively confined to the Christian apologetic and polemic. Christians never doubted, indeed, that their doctrine was really the truth, and therefore the true philosophy. But then it was infinitely more than a philosophy. It was the wisdom of God. They too were different from mere philosophers; they were God's people, God's friends. It suited their polemic, however, to designate Christianity as philosophy, or "barbarian" philosophy, and adherents of Christianity as "philosophers."[343]

In the treatise *Opp.* the point of the identification with philosophy seems to be to show that, appearances to the contrary, the uneducated monks[344] are the true representatives of Greek culture in its highest form (philosophy), and that their way of life, which is truly the Christian way of life, is the way to achieve the highest good of man *(aretē)*.

The type of existence which the monks led might appear to their opponents to be the absoute negation of the ancient Hellenic concept

341. PG 58, 547.

342. PG 62, 153. Cf. Malingrey, p. 275. On Eusebius, cf. p. 203.

343. Adolf Harnack, *The Mission and Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries,* translated and edited by James Moffat, 2nd ed. (New York, 1961), pp. 254 f. When speaking against the Greeks elsewhere, Chrysostom says that faith (πίστις) is superior to wisdom (σοφία): *In* 1 *Cor.* h. 4.2 (PG 61, 32).

344. Cf. e.g., Chrysostom's description of the monk Julianus. Οὗτος ἦν ἀνὴρ ἄγροικος, ταπεινὸς καὶ ἐκ ταπεινῶν· οὐδὲ ὅλως τῆς ἔξωθεν παιδείας ἔμπειρος, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀπλάστου φιλοσοφίας πεπληρωμένος. *In Eph.* h. 21.3 (PG 62, 153). Cf. also Theodoret's description of the monk Macedonius: παιδείας μὲν ἁπάσης ἀμύητος ἀγροικίᾳ δὲ τεθραμμένος (*H. rel.*; PG 82, 1404D7 f.). In *Opp.* 3.12 (p. 54, 1.39; p. 55, 1.1) Chrysostom cites the example of the apostles, who lacked not only rhetorical education, but also the ability to read (ἀγράμματοι καὶ ἰδιῶται: Acts 4:13). Cf. *In* 1 *Cor.* h. 3.4 (PG 61, 27). However, the monks in and around Antioch were literate and spent time reading books, including Scripture and other writings, on the basis of which they philosophized about God and creation (*In Mt.* h. 68.4; PG 58, 646).

of virtue *(aretē)*.[345] It did so to Julian[346] and Libanius. Chrysostom, however, argues otherwise. Not only does he identify monasticism with philosophy, but he states that monasticism is the best way to educate a human being, i.e., to produce one preeminent in virtue, in human excellence *(aretē)*. In contrast to rhetorical education, in monastic education

> only one thing is needed, a noble and good purpose. If this is present, there is nothing to prevent one from coming to perfect virtue. (3.13; p. 58, l.22-25)

A young person is not able to become virtuous by himself:

> First of all the youth is not sufficient by himself to acquire virtue. If he should actually engender some excellence, it will immediately be choked by a deluge of your words before it sprouts. (3.6; p. 44, l.14-18)

Furthermore, it is not possible to achieve complete virtue while living in society:

> If you say that it is possible for one living in the world to accomplish all virtue —and (if) you say this seriously and not as a joke—do not hesitate to teach me this new and strange doctrine.[347] I do not wish to have so much trouble without purpose nor to abstain from so many things in vain.[348] But I cannot learn it, and in fact you forbid it, contradicting this judgement by what you say and do and teaching the opposite: as if eager to destroy your sons on purpose, you order them to do everything which makes it impossible for them to be saved. (3.7; p. 44, l.26-37)

Chrysostom states that his main concern is:

> that we may not demolish the edifice of virtue and bury the soul alive. (*Opp*. 3.11; p. 53, l.22-23).

345. Cf. Pierre Canivet, *Histoire d'une entreprise apologétique au Ve siècle* (Paris, 1957), pp. 92 ff.

346. William J. Malley, *Hellenism and Christianity: The Conflict between Hellenic and Christian Wisdom in the Contra Galilaeos of Julian the Apostate and the Contra Julianum of St. Cyril of Alexandria* (Rome, 1978), p. 123.

347. This statement shows the extent of the penetration of the ascetic ideal into Christian thinking.

348. A rare personal statement by Chrysostom concerning his own ascetical labors.

> Indeed, if we all accepted this view, and before all else led them (young men) to virtue, considering this our task and the rest secondary, there would be so many good results that if I mention them I will seem to be boasting. (*Opp*. 3.18; p. 69, l.8-13)

From these passages it becomes apparent that Chrysostom is utilizing the ancient Hellenic concept of *aretē*. He states that *aretē* is both the goal and the fruit of monastic philosophy.[349]

Only once in the entire treatise does Chrysostom allude to the supernatural basis of Christian perfection.

> You will see this also with your son, and will know by experience that I am not lying. I shall keep silent at this point, asking only this: wait a year or less—(our virtue does not need much time since *it grows by divine grace*)—and you will see everything I have said demonstrated in very deed. Not only will you praise what has happened, but if you are willing to be roused even a little, you will quickly arrive at the same zeal as he, having your son as your teacher of virtue (ἀρετῆς). (*Opp*. 2.10; p. 32, l.52 - p. 33, l.8)

Aretē therefore is not a natural excellence of man, but needs divine grace to grow: οὐ γὰρ δεῖται πολλῶν ἡμερῶν ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρετή, ἅτε δὴ θείᾳ βλαστάνουσα χάριτι.[350] In accord with writing an apologetic discourse Chrysostom mentions the dogmatic aspect, i.e., the need for divine grace, only once in a cursory manner.[351] His aim in *Opp*. is apologetic, namely, to insert monasticism into the traditional (Hellenic) value system of the opponents of the monks. Except for the above mentioned remark that Christian *aretē* "grows by divine grace," there is no attempt to harmonize the Hellenic ethical tradition and its ideal of *aretē* with the Christian concept of grace.[352] This is similar to the earlier Christian apologies of the second century, in which there is little doctrinal development.[353]

349. Opp. 2.9 (p. 29, l. 4 f.): τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι πρὸς ἄκρον ἥκοντα τῆς ἀρετῆς. 2.9 (p. 29, l.29-30): ὑπ' αὐτῆς χειροτονηθέντα τῆς ἀρετῆς. 2.10 (p. 32, l.38): πολλὴν ἐπιδείξηται τὴν ἀρετήν.

350. *Opp*. 2.10; p. 33, l. 2-4.

351. Cf. Justin, 2 *Apol*. 13.6 and *Apol*. 10.2.

352. The reconciliation of Greek and Christian ethics began with Paul, according to Werner Jaeger, "Tyrtaeus on True *Arete*," in *Five Essays*, trans. Adele M. Fiske (Montreal, 1966), p. 142.

353. The absence of Christian doctrines in the early apologies is usually explained

Contest Between Philosophy and Rhetoric as the Best Form of Education

There is another important aspect of the apologetic argument by which monasticism is identified with philosophy. This is the way in which monasticism is presented as the best system of education in terms of the traditional debate between philosophy and rhetoric. The rivalry between philosophy and rhetoric in their claim on the education of youth began with Plato and Isocrates in the fourth century.[354] Indeed Chrysostom explicitly refers to Plato's negative appraisal of rhetoric in *Opp.* 3.11.[355] Though the meaning of philosophy had shifted in certain cases from epistemology towards ethics, the contest was very much alive in the second, third and fourth centuries of our era, as evidenced by the writings of Aristides,[356] Porphyry, the Neoplatonists,[357] emperor Julian,[358] and Themistius.[359] The discourse *Opp.* may be placed within the context of this perennial dissension.

Opp. contains an attack upon rhetorical education. Chrysostom states that the prevailing system of rhetorical education does *not* educate character (τρόπων ἐπιείκειαν). It is harder to teach morals than eloquence:

> Φιλοσοφία γὰρ ψυχῆς λόγων παιδεύσεως τοσούτῳ δυσκολώτερόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐργωδέστερον, ὅσῳ τοῦ λέγειν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ῥημάτων ἔργα ἐστὶν ἐπιπονώτερα. (3.8; p. 49, l. 16-19)

The basic problem of society is that education in philosophy (i.e., ethics and character), is neglected.

> It is this which has destroyed everything, that a thing so necessary, which maintains our life, seems to be superfluous and secondary. (3.9; p. 49, l.21-24)

by the *disciplina arcani* or strict secrecy concerning Christian beliefs and practices. Paul Monceaux, *Histoire littéraire de l'Afrique chrétienne depuis les origines jusqu'à l'invasion arabe* (Paris, 1901), 1:257. Cf. Origen, *Contra Celsum* 1.66.

354. Lesky, p. 506.

355. *Opp.* 3.11: p. 53, l. 53; p. 54, l. 36.

356. J. Katz, *The Text of To Plato on Rhetoric by Aristides in Vat. gr.* 1297, Ph. D. dissertation, Saint Louis University, 1978.

357. Wilhelm von Christ, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*[6] (Munich, 1961) 2,2:705 and note 3.

358. Malley, p. 117.

359. Glanville Downey, "Education in the Christian Roman Empire: Christian and Pagan Theories under Constantine and His Successors," *Speculum* 32 (1957) 59.

Chrysostom discusses the difficulties involved in rhetorical education, and contrasts the relative ease of (monastic) education in virtue (philosophy).

> Among monks a few out of many failed; in rhetorical studies a few from the multitude succeeded. (3.13; p. 58, l.7-9)

Rhetorical education destroys the soul of the pupil:

> What profit is there in sending them (children) to teachers, where they will learn evil rather than rhetoric, and wanting to gain the lesser (eloquence) will lose the greater—all the soul's strength and vigor. (3.11; p. 53, l.17-20)

However, Chrysostom says that he is not legislating children to be ignorant. If someone could assure him that virtue would be taught (which is necessary), he would not hinder children from being instructed in rhetoric "abundantly":

> Let no one think that I am enacting a law that children should be ignorant. But if someone would allow me to be confident about necessities (virtue) I would not choose to prevent it (rhetoric) from being taught superabundantly. When the foundations are shaking and the entire building is in danger of falling down, it is extreme folly and madness to run to the plasterers and not to the builders; so again it is untimely contentiousness, when the walls are standing securely and firmly, to hinder one who wishes to plaster. (3.12; p. 55, l.3-12)

Thus rhetorical education is a luxury, whereas education in philosophy (ethics) is a "necessity."

In *Opp.* Chrysostom also states that in place of rhetorical education young men should be educated in monasteries until they develop virtue.

> Accordingly we should not bring home our sons from their study in the desert before the proper time, but let their studies be fixed in them and the plants be rooted; even if they must be reared in the monastery ten or twenty years, we should not be disturbed or unhappy. The longer time he spends in the gymnasium, the more strength will he acquire. (3.18; p. 67, l. 34-41)

The best education, which transpires in the monasteries, is that which renders human nature inaccessible to evil.

> The best teaching is not that which allows evil first to prevail, and later seeks how we are to expel it—but that which does and undertakes everything to make our nature inaccessible to it. (3.18; p. 69, l.1-5)

If this point of view were accepted, and priority were given to the moral education of the young, then society would be perfected.[360]

In *Opp.* Chrysostom sees monasticism as the preferred form of education in comparison to rhetoric.

> If it (moral education) is sound, no loss will accrue from ignorance of rhetoric; but if it (moral education) has been corrupted, there will be very great harm, even if the tongue is very polished—and there will be more harm as that power (eloquence) increases. For when wickedness acquires practice in speaking, it creates much worse evil than ignorance. (3.11; p. 63, l.23-29)

The choice between the two forms of education is easy:

> Let a twofold choice be set before us: if he goes to (secular) teachers, let his struggle be about learning (μαθήσεως); if he goes to the desert, let his struggle be about his soul. Where is it better to prevail, tell me? If (success) occurs in both areas, that is my desire also; but if failure occurs in one area, it is better to choose the more excellent. (3.13; p. 57, l.48-54)

It is no longer simply a matter of learning (μάθησις) but a question of preserving one's soul. The Platonic concept of education as "care of the soul" blends here with Christ's question: "What shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" Chrysostom sees attendance at the rhetorical schools and all other concomitant evils of city life as causing the destruction of the soul.

In terms of the classical debate between philosophy and rhetoric, as to which was the better form of *paideia* for the young, Chrysostom in *Opp.* obviously opted for "philosophy." Of course, he identified philosophy with monasticism, and stated that young men should be educated in monasteries.[361] One outstanding reason which Chrysostom gives for

360. *Opp.* 3.18; p. 69, l. 8-39.

361. Cf. Bezdeki, pp. 323, 335, 337. Bezdeki sees Chrysostom as a rhetor who

transferring the education of youth from schools of rhetoric to monasteries was the pederasty which prevailed in the culture of the city (see above). Obviously, this argument was not part of the traditional material of the debate between philosophy and rhetoric, since pedagogic pederasty, either in the form of disinterested affection or of physical relations, was an accepted practice among Greek philosophers.[362] At this point Chrysostom parts company with the classical notion of *paideia*, and introduces a new consideration into the argument, which derives from Judeo-Christian ethics.[363]

Monasticism Identified with the Contemplative Life

Plato

The concept of the contemplative life goes back to Plato.[364] In the *Gorgias* Plato develops the notion of the ἀπραγμοσύνη of the philosopher, i.e., his refusal to take part in public life. The true contemplative is the true philosopher in Plato's myths.[365] The picture of the philosopher in the *Theaetetus* is that of a recluse who "does not know the way to the ἀγορά" (173 cd.). The same ideal of βίος θεωρητικὸς is found in the *Protreptic* of Aristotle: renunciation of the world in favor of an ecstasy outside it.[366] The final stage of this development is represented by the Neoplatonists, who totally opposed πρᾶξις and θεωρία and identified philosophy exclusively with contemplation.[367]

Philo, De vita contemplativa

In this connection it is worth considering Philo's work, *De vita*

condemns all philosophers. But Chrysostom is also an enemy of the rhetors, as the evidence cited by Bezdeki, exclusive of *Opp.*, indicates (pp. 319 f.).

362. Festugière, p. 195.

363. E.g., the polemic against pederasty in Philo, *De vita contemplativa*, 7.

364. Mason, p. 12.

365. E. R. Dodds, *Plato: Gorgias, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary* (Oxford, 1959), p. 383. Cf. pp. 272, 275.

366. Grilli, p. 345. See note 340 above.

367. T. Špidlík, "La *theoria* et la *praxis* chez Grégoire de Nazianze," in *Studia Patristica* 14, Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur 117 (Berlin, 1976): 360-361.

contemplativa.[368] In its identification of (Jewish) monasticism (called "Therapeutic") with philosophy and contemplation (θεωρία) this treatise is a predecessor of *Opp.* The type of mystical contemplation in which the Therapeutae are engaged is Platonic:

> τὸ δὲ θεραπευτικὸν γένος βλέπειν ἀεὶ προδιδασκόμενον τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θέας ἐφιέσθω καὶ τὸν αἰσθητὸν ἥλιον ὑπερβαινέτω .... ὑπ' ἔρωτος ἁρπασθέντες, καθάπερ οἱ βακχευόμενοι καὶ κορυβαντιῶντες, ἐνθουσιάζουσι μέχ ις ἂν τὸ ποθούμενον ἴδωσιν. (V. c. 11-12)

The meals of the Therapeutae are identified with the *symposia* of Plato and Xenophon, which, however, are severely criticized (chaps. 40-63).

This treatise represents the efforts of diaspora Judaism to bring about a fusion of Mosaic religion with Greek philosophy.[369] The author of *De vita contemplativa* pursues exclusively apologetic and polemic tendencies. How successful he was is shown by the fact that Eusebius interpreted this work as an apology in favor of Christianity, and cited the treatise as evidence of earliest Christianity in Egypt.[370]

By Philo's time Jewish apologetics in the Greek speaking diaspora was fully developed. Wendland believes that Philo reflects the fixed forms of an apologetic literature developed before him.[371] According to Geffcken, *De vita contemplativa* is the type of all subsequent Christian apologies.[372] It constitutes an interesting parallel to *Opp.*, by its identification, for apologetic purposes, of a sect of Jewish "monks" with the Platonic tradition of contemplation. The work also contains a critique of city life.

> πᾶσα γὰρ πόλις, καὶ ἡ εὐνομωτάτη, γέμει θορύβων καὶ ταραχῶν ἀμυθήτων, ἅς οὐκ ἂν ὑπομεῖναι τις ἅπαξ ὑπὸ σοφίας ἀχθείς.

This constitutes a defense of the choice of solitude by the Therapeutae.[373] Likewise in *Opp.* Chrysostom states that the evils of city life are the basic justification for the existence of monasteries in the desert.[374]

368. On authorship and authenticity see PHILO, with an English translation by F. H. COLSON, Loeb Classical Library (London, 1960), 9: 104-111.

369. FRIEDLAENDER, p. 265.

370. EUSEBIUS, *H.e.*, 2.17.

371. Cited by FRIEDLAENDER, p. 266.

372. JOHANNES GEFFCKEN, "Die altchristliche Apologetik," *Neue Jahrbücher für das klassische Altertum* 1, 9 (1905): 627, 632.

373. *Vita Cont.* 19-20.

374. *Opp.* 1.7; p. 10, l. 46-50; 1.8; p. 12, l. 21-27.

The ascetic life of Anthony and of the Coptic monks in the deserts of Egypt was hardly apt soil to receive and absorb any contacts with the higher philosophic culture of the Greeks. However, the great bishop Athanasius succeeded in introducing Hellenic thought into the monastic movement. He intervened to regulate and at the same time to unite the monastic tendency with Greek secular culture. Athanasius saw in Anthony the ideal monk and recorded his life in a work *(Vita Antonii)*, which would serve as a model for others who sought perfection in the monastic life.[375]

In the *Vita Antonii* monastic life is placed in the (Platonic) tradition which identifies contemplation and perfection.

> Ἀντωνίου δὲ μόνον ἡ εὐχὴ καὶ ἡ ἄσκησις ἧς ἕνεκεν ἐν τῷ ὄρει καθήμενος, ἔχαιρε μὲν τῇ τῶν θείων θεωρίᾳ. (PG 26, 961)

According to K. Holl the idea of the *Vita Antonii* remained u nchanged throughout the centuries in the Greek church as the ideal of the true monk.[376]

In the article, "Érémitisme en orient," in *Dictionnaire de Spiritualité ascétique et mystique*, the author states:

> Lorsque la vie monastique est définie comme la poursuite de l'hésychia et qu'elle est rangée dans le courant spirituel qui identifie contemplation et perfection chrétienne, la vie érémitique ou hésychaste y apparaît comme le degré suprême.[377]

The understanding of monastic perfection as contemplation became the main doctrine of oriental monasticism. According to the fourth canon of the council of Chalcedon (451), every monk ought to tend to ἡσυχία. A solitary tends there more intensely than other monks (cenobites), because he joins to the ἡσυχία of the soul that of the body. The ἡσυχία of the body or the ἀναχώρησις is essentially the separation from the world. The ἡσυχία removes the anchorite from the world to establish him in the spiritual world.[378]

The *Vita Antonii* with its ideal of contemplation, which evidently derived from Greek philosophy, was known to Chrysostom, and there-

375. GRILLI, pp. 309-10. See note 340 above.

376. Quoted by LIALINE, p. 949.

377. Vol. 4.1: 949.

378. LIALINE, pp. 937-938.

fore could have affected Chrysostom's conception of the monastic life.

Monasticism Identified with the Contemplative Life
In Opp.

In *Opp.* "philosophy" is equivalent to βίος θεωρητικός as already in secular writers of the preceding centuries. However in this treatise *vita contemplativa* is nothing else but monasticism.[379] Praise of monks and of monasticism appears throughout the discourse, often with a reference to pagan thought. *Opp.* 2.5 tries to demonstrate that even among the heathen the greatest philosophers followed the contemplative, i.e., monastic life;[380] and that the greatest political figures lived a "monastic" life style:

> Therefore you must first learn this, that neither the desert makes one dishonored, nor the palace makes one brilliant and illustrious. And before coming to the reasons, I shall free you of the suspicion by examples—examples not ours (i.e., Christian) but yours (i.e., pagan).
>
> You have probably heard of Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, and again you have heard of Plato, son of Ariston. Tell me, who is more illustrious? Who is famous and in the mouth of all? Is not the philosopher rather than the tyrant? And yet the one (Dionysius) was ruling all the earth, and was living in luxury and continued to live with great wealth, bodyguards and ostentation; the other (Plato) occupied himself in the grove of the academy, watering, planting and eating olives, and setting a cheap table, without all that ostentation. What is more amazing is that when (Plato) became a slave, and, according to the will of the tyrant (Dionysius) was sold—so far from appearing more dishonorable than him on this account, (Plato) appeared venerable even to the tyrant himself because of it.
>
> Such is virtue: by what it does and by what it suffers, it does not permit itself or those who mistreat it to be hidden or escape.
>
> What about Socrates, his teacher? How much more illustrious

379. Grilli, p. 310. See n. 340 above.

380. Τὸν ἰδιωτικὸν ἑλόμενοι βίον καὶ ἀπράγμονα, *Opp.* 2.5; p. 23, l. 22. Cf. Plato, *Resp.* 620c6-7.

> was he than Archelaus? And yet he (Archelaus) was a king who lived in great wealth; whereas (Socrates) passed his time in the Lyceum and had no more than one garment, and was clothed in it alone both winter and summer and all the seasons of the year. (Socrates) went continually unshod, and fasted the entire day. He ate only bread, which was his fish and relish. This table he did not set at home, but received it from others and so lived with extreme poverty. And (Socrates) was so much more illustrious than the king that although (Archelaus) invited him many times, (Socrates) did not wish to leave the Lyceum and go to his (Archelaus') poverty.
>
> Moreover the reputation which prevails now reveals the past: for their names (i.e., the philosophers') are known to many, but theirs (i.e., the kings') to no one.
>
> Another philosopher, the one of Sinope (Diogenes), was much more wealthy than these and other kings. Thus the son of Philip, the Macedonian, (Alexander), while leading an expedition against Persia, dropped everything when he saw (Diogenes), and went and asked personally whether (Diogenes) needed anything. (Diogenes) answered: "nothing."
>
> Are these enough examples for you or do you wish me to mention others? These (philosophers) are more illustrious than those in the palace, and even than the emperor himself, although they have chosen the private and apolitical life and not wished to enter civic life.
>
> Moreover, in civic life itself you will see that the illustrious ones are not those living in wealth, luxury and abundance, but those in poverty, economy and a humble life. For example, the Athenian Aristides, whom the city buried, was more distinguished than Alcibiades the ruler in wealth, ancestry, luxury, eloquence, bodily strength, noble birth and all else, to the degree that a great philosopher is more distinguished than a humble child. Among the Thebans Epaminondas—a man who was called to the assembly and unable to go because his garment was being washed and he did not have another to wear—was more notable than all the generals who were on the spot.
>
> Do not speak to me of the desert or of the palace. Brilliance and distinction are not in places nor in garments, rank or power,

but in virtue of soul and philosophy alone. (2.5; p. 22, l.29 - p. 23, l.40)

The theme of the superiority of the philosopher over the great personages of the world is taken from the diatribe,[381] and constitutes an elevation of the contemplative over the active life.[382] In *Opp.* 2.9,[383] the monastic life is described as ὁ ἀπράγμων βίος. Monks are described as leading those who are willing ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἀπραγμοσύνης λιμένα.[384]

The concept of ἀναχώρησις, which appears in *Opp.*,[385] is basic to the mentality of Christian monasticism. However, ascribing the necessity for monasteries to the lack of εὐνομία in the city[386], whence the search for refuge in solitude,[387] combines the practical reality of life in the city of Antioch[388] with the Stoic theme of the sage who leaves political life because lack of perfection in the state can only harm him.[389]

The discourse *Opp.* is rich in elements of the diatribe. The language of Cynic *ascēsis* runs throughout it. The Cynic sage and the monk are placed on the same level, endowed with the same virtue and the same privileges. In *Opp.* 2.7[390] appears the Epicurean and Stoic paradox κἂν στρεβλωθῇ ὁ σοφός etc. The theme in this form appears frequently in Epictetus. Another theme extensively developed in the diatribe, παρρησία towards the powerful, occurs in the same chapter.[391]

The connection between the Christian monk and the Stoic-Cynic sage is evident when Chrysostom says of the monk: ἐκεῖνος δὲ διὰ πάσης τῆς αὐτοῦ πορεύσεται γῆς, and the entire earth offers him food and drink.[392] Democritus had said that the entire world is accessible to the

381. Festugière, p. 194.

382. Grilli, p. 314.

383. *Opp.* 2.9; p. 29, l. 40 f.

384. *Opp.* 3.9; p. 50, l. 19. *Inertia* (scorn of public life) was an accusation against Christians in the early centuries. E.g., Tertullian, *Apol.* 42. Gustave Bardy, *La conversion au Christianisme durant les premiers siècles* (Paris, 1949), pp. 231, 236 f.

385. E.g., *Opp.* 1.8; p. 12, l. 17-19.

386. *Opp.* 1.7; p. 10, l. 49.

387. Τῆς εἰς τὴν ἔρημον καταφυγῆς: *Opp.* 1.7; p. 10, l. 50. Cf. 1.8; p. 12, l. 27-31.

388. Cf. emperor Julian, *Mis.* 368a: Antioch lacks εὐνομία (ed. C. Lacombrade, Paris 1964, p. 195).

389. This theme appeared already in Chrysippus (SVF 3:690), cited by Grilli, p. 312.

390. *Opp.* 2.7; p. 26, l. 8-11.

391. *Opp.* 2.7; p. 26, l. 40-42. Grilli, p. 314 n. 2. See n. 340 above.

392. *Opp.* 2.5; p. 21, l. 18-21.

sage (B 247 DK). The Cynics said that the sage has need of nothing, because all nature offers him whatever is essential. Chrysostom blends and adapts these two themes with reference to the monk. As if using the words of Democritus, which continue: "all the world is the fatherland of a noble spirit," Chrysostom takes the Stoic conception of the philosopher as κόσμου πολίτης to the point of correcting it. The true monk will never be driven from his homeland.[393] But naturally only a Christian can succeed in thinking of the next life as the true fatherland.

It is in the contemplative life that ἀδιαφορία and ἀπάθεια exist. No one is able to harm the monk, who is superior to all things, to riches, to fatherland, to glory. Nothing can touch his soul: neither physical injury to his body, nor passions of the soul which do not suceed in making him their victim. He is ἀχείρωτον καὶ ἀνάλωτον.[394] Πόσης ἁλουργίδος τοῦτο τὸ κτῆμα, πόσης ἀρχῆς, πόσης δόξης οὐ τιμιώτερον.[395]

The word which Chrysostom uses most frequently to characterize the contemplative life is ἡσυχία. In *Opp.* 1.8 the words φιλοσοφία and ἡσυχία occur together (hendiadys): βουλόμενος ἀπαλλάξαι ἐρημίας καὶ φυγῆς, φιλοσοφίας παρασκευάσω καὶ ἡσυχίας πάσης ἐκπεσεῖν.[396] The enemies of monasticism are described as οἱ τοῖς βουλομένοις ἡσυχάζειν ἐνοχλοῦντες, καὶ πανταχόθεν ἕλκοντες καὶ σπαράττοντες, i.e., as enemies of the contemplatives.[397]

Monasticism is presented as contemplation by means of the familiar image of seafaring. Monks are described as οἱ τῆς ζάλης ταύτης καὶ τῆς ταραχῆς τοὺς σωθῆναι βουλομένους ἐξάγοντες, καὶ πρὸς τὸν τῆς ἡσυχίας ὁδηγοῦντες λιμένα.[398] Children who go to monasteries are described as τῶν τὰ κλυδώνια φυγόντων ... τῶν ἐπὶ τὸν λιμένα σπευδόντων. Those who remain in the world to be educated are designated τῶν ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι καὶ τῇ ζάλῃ κυλινδουμένων.[399] Using such nautical imagery Chryso-

393. *Opp.* 2.5; p. 21, l. 28-32. Also Seneca had developed the idea that the sage is a citizen of the world, of the μεγαλόπολις, in order to contemplate it (*Ot.* 4.1-2). Cited by Grilli, p. 314. See n. 340 above.

394. *Opp.* 2.7; p. 26, l. 26.

395. *Opp.* 2.7; p. 26, l. 18-20. Cf. 2.7; p. 25, l. 51-54.

396. *Opp.* 1.8; p. 12, l. 29-31.

397. *Opp.* 3.10; p. 50, l. 31-32.

398. *Opp.* 1.7; p. 10, l. 54 - p. 11, l. 2.

399. *Opp.* 3.5; p. 62, l. 48-51.

stom argues for monastic life because it is a safer and easier way to be educated:

> Shipwrecks occur there (in the world) more quickly because there are more annoyances, and those who are to resist them are more slothful. But here (in the monastery) there are no such waves, but great calm, and the zeal of those who will resist is greater. For this reason I too draw people to the desert, not simply so that they may wear sackcloth, or put on (iron) collars, or bestrew themselves with dust—but so that above all they may flee evil and choose virtue. (3.15; p. 62, 1.51 - p. 63, 1.5).

Not the monks who are rescuing people ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ταραχῆς πρὸς τὴν γαλήνην ἐκείνην τοὺς ἐν μέσῳ χειμαζομένους ἀνθρώπους, but those who are causing the shipwreck, deserve to be reproached.[400]

The new word which indicates Christian *otium* (ἡσυχία) is only a station on the road towards God. The goal of contemplation is repose (ἀνάπαυσις), a concept which Chrysostom derives from the gospel: καὶ εὑρήσετε ἀνάπαυσιν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑμῶν.[401] The monk's perspective is eschatological: ἀπὸ πόνων προσκαίρων ἀρξάμενον πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν ἄπειρον τελευτᾶν.[402] For the monk the attitude towards death is necessarily changed; death is seen as the fulfillment of the *vita contemplativa:*

> Πρὸς γὰρ ἑτέραν αὐτὸν πέμπει ζωὴν τὴν ποθουμένην αὐτῷ καὶ δι' ἣν ἅπαντα πράττει καὶ πραγματεύεται· ὥστε τοῦτο ἀπαλλαγὴ πόνων ἐστί, καὶ οὐ τιμωρία, ἀλλ' ἱδρώτων λύσις καὶ ἀνάπαυλα. (2.7; p. 26, l. 3-6).

In this respect especially the monk is shown to be superior to the pagan philosopher. The monk is able to comfort a father who has lost his only son in the prime of youth.[403] Thus the contemplative life of the monk is a demonstration «by deeds» (διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων) of the doctrine of the resurrection.

To the Christian concept of true repose in the next world, Chrysostom adds a theme found in Greek philosophy: ὁ γέρων καθάπερ ἐν

400. *Opp.* 1.7; p. 11, l. 17-19.
401. Matt. 11:28 quoted in *Opp.* 3.14; p. 61, l. 38.
402. *Opp.* 2.10; p. 32, l. 4-5.
403. *Opp.* 2.8; p. 27, l. 25-32.

λιμένι τῷ γήρᾳ καθώρμικε (Epicurus).[404] Chrysostom combines the concept of repose with this Greek concept of old age, and applies both to the monk: 'Εκεῖνος δὲ τότε ἀναπαύσεται μάλιστα, ὅταν γηράσῃ, ἅτε εἰς λιμένα ἐπειγόμενος ἐλθεῖν.[405]

It is, however, children, who need to be maintained ἐν γαλήνῃ διαπαντὸς καὶ ἡσυχίᾳ:

> Is he young and weak? Therefore he needs greater security. Since he needs security he will also need more attention. Such a one (i.e., a child) should be in continuous calm and tranquillity. He should not be involved in business affairs or public life, where there is much noise and confusion. You, however, drag into the center those for whom the battle is more difficult on account of their youth, weakness, inexperience and evil environment, as if they were already victorious and strong. You do not allow them to depart and practice in the desert. It is just as if one should order a (soldier) who is able to set up countless trophies quietly to practice war exercises, and then command an inexperienced person, who is not even able to peep at a battle, to enter the fray, thereby placing greater obstacles in the way of an action in which it is hard to achieve success. (3.17; p. 66, 1.12-27)[406]

This is the connection which Chrysostom seeks to establish between the contemplative life of monks and the education of youths. Children are vulnerable,[407] and not equipped to live well in a corrupt society *(= vita activa);* if they are not to be overwhelmed by the viciousness of society, and even of their own parents, they must be withdrawn to the desert and educated there in tranquility *(= vita contemplativa).*

404. Grilli, p. 316 n. 2, See n. 340 above.
405. *Opp.* 2.9; p. 30, l. 17-18.
406. Likewise in *De sacerdotio* Chrysostom compares a person who becomes a priest *(= vita activa)* without proper preparation in the contemplative (i.e., monastic) life, to a youth who is appointed to command an army without any experience in military affairs. The mere sight of the battlefield would overwhelm him. *Sac.* 6.12 (SC 272, pp. 350-356).
407. Chrysostom's thinking on the vulnerability of children is quite modern in this regard. Cf. Wordsworth, *Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood.* Marie Winn, "What Became of Childhood Innocence," in *The New York Times Magazine,* January 25, 1981, pp. 15-17, 44-46, 54-55, 58, 68.

If children were morally equipped, Chrysostom would command them to remain in the city, and would condemn those who led them out into the desert on evangelical grounds—because they were removing the "lights" from the city. Evidently, he is concerned with the scriptural objection to the monastic procedure of ἀναχώρησις because he states that if young men possessed moral strength it would be wrong to lead them out, which would "put out their light",[408] and deprive the remaining inhabitants of the city.[409] In fact, Chrysostom does not advocate that every young man should leave the city, but only the weak. The strong should be permitted to stay and receive their education in the pagan schools. Chrysostom gives the example of a pious youth, guided by a monk as a pedagogue, who influenced many of his peers while studying rhetoric in the city:

> Therefore if someone could show me such a soul and provide such a pedagogue, and promised to manage all the rest in a similar manner, I would pray for this more passionately than the parents. Assuredly our prey would be more, on account of the conduct, age, and constant intercourse of such as are able to catch their comrades. But there is no one who will promise this or do it. Since there is no one, it would be infinitely cruel to permit the public slaughter of one who cannot defend himself, but lies wounded and receiving many wounds, making the rest weaker. It is necessary to remove him from the battle. Likewise one would reproach a general for removing from the line of battle those who are able to fight, while ordering the wounded, sick and others causing confusion to be placed continually in the center. (3.12; p 57, 1.26-42)

Apparently, Chrysostom would have preferred for evangelical reasons to have Christian youths living in the city. If Christian youth could be educated in the city, they would influence their fellow students and convert them. But unfortunately, there is no one who is willing or able to do this; the monk who acted as a pedagogue was an exception.

Chrysostom despairs of the salvation of a child educated so as to allow its soul to become dominated by φιλαργυρία and δοξομανία.[410]

408. Cf. Luke 11:33. Phil. 2:15.
409. *Opp.* 3.11; p. 53, l. 10-16.
410. *Opp.* 3.6; p. 43, l. 13-15.

When fathers exhort their sons to study rhetoric, it is to inspire these two evil passions: that of riches and vainglory.[411] A parent must be content if a child enjoying the opposite teaching (of philosophy in a monastery) escapes evil. Contrariwise, for children formed in the city, where possessions are set up as the reward and foul men as the models—what hope is there of salvation?[412] Salvation therefore depends upon *paideia* and true *paideia* is only to be found ἐν μοναστηρίῳ.[413] The relationship existing between *vita contemplativa* and education is clear.

Monasticism Presented as Societas Perfecta

In *Opp.* 3.11 Chrysostom contrasts the communal life of monks in the mountains around Antioch with the life in the city. Ruiz Bueno considers this the most beautiful passage in the whole treatise.[414] The Greek text, which is found on p. 52, l.9-54, is translated below:

> Nothing of all this is seen in the monasteries. Although such a storm has arisen, they sit in a calm harbor in great security, as if viewing the shipwrecks from heaven. And in fact they chose a life-style fit for heaven and live no worse than angels. Just as among (angels) there is no inequality, nor are there some in prosperity and others in most miserable circumstances, but all are in one peace, joy, glory, so it is here: no one reproaches poverty, no one takes pride in wealth; "mine" and "thine," which upset and destroy everything, have been banished. "They have all things common" (Acts 4:32), table, dwelling, clothing. And is that strange, where all have one and the same soul? (cf. Acts 4:32) All are noble, all are slaves, all are free in the same fashion. There all have one wealth, the true wealth; one glory, the true glory: their goods are not in name, but in reality. All have one pleasure, one desire, one home. Everything has been measured perfectly as if from one ruler and line, and there is no inequality, but order, proportion, harmony and great precision of concord, and continual grounds for tranquillity (εὐθυμίας). Wherefore everyone does and

411. *Opp.* 3.5-6; p. 42, l. 30-48.
412. *Opp.* 3.6; p. 43, l. 15-19.
413. *Opp.* 3.18; p. 67, l. 38-39.
414. Ruiz Bueno, pp. 55 f.

suffers everything so that they may be tranquil (εὐθυμῶσί) and rejoice. There alone and nowhere else is it possible to see this happening perfectly, not only because they despise the present things and every ground of discord and quarrel has been extirpated and they have bright hope concerning the future, but also because they think the distressing events and good things that happen to each common to all. For despondency (ἀθυμία) disappears easily when all help to carry the burden, as one (cf. Gal. 6:2). They have many grounds of tranquillity (εὐθυμίας), not only rejoicing at their own goods, but at those of others no less than at their own. How then will our society perish, if everyone imitates them? Now it is ruined and corrupted on account of those who have been trained far from this life-style (πολιτείας). If, however, you declare the opposite, you are the same as someone who says that a well tuned lyre injures music, but one out of tune, broken and ruined by excessive tightening and loosening, is fit for playing and delighting an audience. This statement would be sufficient proof of the ignorance of the one who makes it, and a clear sign of envy and inhumanity.

In this passage, Chrysostom, rather than describing a reality, is creating an ideal. The praise of the monastic life is introduced in a way which recalls the imagery of Lucretius:

> ἀλλὰ ἐν τοῖς μοναστηρίοις καίτοι χειμῶνος ἠρμένου τοσούτου, μόνοι κάθηνται ἐν γαλήνῃ καὶ λιμένι καὶ ἀσφαλείᾳ πολλῇ, καθάπερ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοποῦντες ναυάγια (3.11; p. 52, l. 10-13).

With this may be combared Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 2.1-2:

> Suave mari magno turbantibus aequora ventis,
> *e terra* magnum alterius spectare laborem.

According to Grilli, the elements in this comparison appear sufficiently significant to authorize one to conclude that a close relationship exists between the two texts.[415] It is interesting to observe how ἐξ οὐρανοῦ is substituted for *e terra* in order to establish the Christian perspective.

415. Also compare *Opp.* 2.5; p. 22, l.3-15, with Lucretius 2.29-33. Cf. p. 22, l.14 καὶ ταραχῆς καὶ θορύβου πόρρω καθήμενον with Lucretius 2.18 f.: "mensque fruatur/iucundo sensu cura semota metuque." Cf. n. 340 above.

Another traditional element of the picture derives from the teaching of the Stoic philosopher, Panaetius, probably mediated through Plutarch or another source, on εὐθυμία (tranquillity). Panaetius (ca. 185-109 B.C.), pursuing the idea of Democritus, modified the notion of βίος θεωρητικός into that of a superior internal equilibrium (εὐθυμία), which enabled one to live in the world at peace with oneself and with one's fellow human beings.[416] In this passage Chrysostom says that monastic community provides

> διηνεκὴς εὐθυμίας ὑπόθεσις. Διὸ πάντες πάντα ποιοῦσι καὶ πάσχουσιν, ἵνα εὐθυμῶσί τε καὶ χαίρωσιν ..., Ἥ τε γὰρ ἀθυμία ἀφανίζεται ῥᾳδιον ... τῆς τε εὐθυμίας πολλὰς ἔχουσι τὰς ὑποθέσεις (3.11; p. 52, l. 29-41)

Obviously, this is a picture which is, in part, idealized. Chrysostom is not describing Syrian monasticism as it appears in contemporary accounts like the writings of Jerome and Theodoret. Chrysostom has discarded all the eccentricities and ascetical feats as well as miraculous phenomena. There are, however, other references in *Opp.* to the realities of monastic life. For example, in 3.12 Chrysostom distinguishes moderate (σύμμετρον) from extreme (ἐπιτεταμένης) asceticism[417]. The former can be practised at home; the latter belongs to the desert. In another place Chrysostom says that he leads people to the desert not simply to engage in ascetical practices (sackcloth, collars [κλοιά] dust), ἀλλ' ἵνα πρὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων φύγωσι μὲν κακίαν, ἕλωνται δὲ ἀρετήν.[418] However, Chrysostom does refer to the squalid physical appearance of the monk with approval: ἀλουσία is given as a proof of μεγαλοψυχία of the monk.[419] In *Opp.* 3.12 Chrysostom marvels at a youth who lived as a monk, but did not look like one on the outside: οὔτε γὰρ ἦθος εἶχεν ἠγριωμένον καὶ ἀπεσκληκὸς οὔτε ἐξηλλαγμένην στολήν· ἀλλ' ἦν κοινὸς καὶ τῷ σχήματι καὶ τῷ βλέμματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν.[420]

In order to establish that monks form the perfect society Chrysostom also uses the theme of the angelic life: καὶ γὰρ πολιτείαν οὐρα-

416. Grilli, pp. 323-346. See above n. 340.
417. *Opp.* 3.12; p. 56, l. 21-22.
418. *Opp.* 3.15; p. 63, l. 1-5.
419. *Opp.* 2.6; p. 24, l. 4-6 and 15-18.
420. *Opp.* 3.12; p. 56, l. 54 - p. 57, l. 3. The monastic habit *(schēma)* goes back even before Anthony. D. J. Chitty, *The Desert a City* (London, 1965), p. 9. Cf. *Opp.* 2.8 (p. 27, l.9): a monk will be able to console people ἀπό τε τοῦ σχήματος.

νῷ πρέπουσαν εἵλοντο, καὶ ἀγγέλων οὐδὲν χεῖρον διάκεινται.[421] In the earliest monastic writings and in other patristic literature, the theme of the angelic life is developed, with special reference to *ascēsis,* prayer and worship, and an emphasis on virginity and chastity.[422] It is significant that here Chrysostom gives an interpretation of this theme *(vita angelica)* which is different from the rest of the tradition, and possibly uniquely his own.[423] Here Chrysostom equates angelic life with the absence of social inequality (ἀνωμαλία: p. 52, l.15).[424] In the ideal of the monastic republic there is no Mine and Yours.[425]

Auf der Maur is surprised that Chrysostom makes the comparison with the angels in terms of community, rather than of virginity and contemplation.[426] There is a parallel passage in *Catech.* 8.4,[427] where Chrysostom is also describing an "ideal" society, this time that of Syriac speaking peasants who live in the environs of Antioch. Occasionally, angelic lifestyle is also applied by Chrysostom to people in the world.[428] In *Opp.* 3.11 there is a close connection with Acts 4:32, which was, of course, the proof text used frequently by the church fathers to defend the institution of monasticism.[429]

421. *Opp.* 31.1; p. 52, l. 13-14.

422. Jean Leclerg, "Monasticism and Angelism: A False Problem," in *Aspects of Monasticism,* trans. Mary Dodd, Cistercian Studies Series, no 7. (Kalamazoo, Michigan, 1978), pp. 152-155.

423. Cf. Ritter, p. 94 n. 15: "Wenn S. Frank moniert, dass in 'den bisherigen Darstellungen zum ἀγγελικὸς βίος ... dieser Punkt fast unberücksichtigt' geblieben sei, so dürfte das einfach die Quellenlage widerspiegeln. Denn soweit ich sehe, ist die *Funktionalität* des 'engelgleichen Lebens' in der Mönchsliteratur nirgends so klar ausgesprochen wie bei Chrysostomus." The work referred to is S. Frank, 'Αγγελικός Βίος (Münster, 1964).

424. ἀνωμαλία also = social inequality in *Hom. Clem.* 19.23.

425. This famous phrase of Chrysostom's is applied to monastic society in h. 72.3 on Matthew (PG 58, 671): οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν ἀλλ' ἐξώρισται τοῦτο τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ μυρίων αἴτιον πολέμων. Also *In 1 Tim.* h. 14.3 (PG 62, 575). Cf. *De beato Philogonio* 6.1 (PG 48, 749): ὅτε τὸ ἐμὸν καὶ τὸ σὸν οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ ψυχρὸν τοῦτο ῥῆμα, καὶ πάντα εἰς τὴν ζωὴν ἡμῶν εἰσάγον τὰ δεινά, καὶ τοὺς μυρίους γεννῆσαν πολέμους (concerning the next world).

426. Auf der Maur, p. 20 n. 2.

427. SC 50bis, pp. 249f.

428. Auf der Maur, p. 72 n. 1.

429. Cf. Chrysostom, h. 11.3 on Acts (Pg 60, 97). Luc Verheijen, *St. Augustine's Monasticism in the Light of Acts* 4:32-35, The Saint Augustine Lectures 1975 (Villanova, 1979). Gerhart B. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform: Its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the Age of the Fathers* (New York, 1967), p. 128 n. 58.

At the end of the text in question (*Opp.* 3.11), Chrysostom compares monastic society to a well-tuned lyre, and secular society to one out of tune. Anyone who does not appreciate the superior πολιτεία of the monks is to be considered guilty of ἀμουσία, βασκανία and μισανθρωπία. The example of the lyre goes back to Plato, *Resp.* 349e. The accusation of ἀμουσία is akso found there (*Resp.* 403c. Cf. 349d).

Possible Influences of Plato on Chrysostom's Scheme of Education in Opp.

In the fourth century there occurred an unprecedented return to the sources of Greek thought, which had not been read for centuries. The Neoplatonist philosopher Iamblichus (c. 250-325) offers an interesting example. Scholarly research has brought to light in the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus a large number of passages from Aristotle's *Protreptic,* which certainly had not been read for a long time. Similarly, there is an Basil and John Chrysostom a revival of the teaching of Panaetius on εὐθυμία, which is truly significant.[430]

Chrysostom read the dialogues of Plato in the school of Libanius.[431]

Of Plato's writings Chrysostom knew at least the *Apology, Republic, Crito, Timaeus,* and *Theaetetus.* He cites these more than thirty times. His treatise on the education of children. *De inani gloria et de educandis liberis,* was influenced by Plato's doctrine of the soul. Plato also affected Chrysostom's teaching on the three slaveries.[432]

The treatise *Opp.* contains quotations from Plato and echoes of his language and thought. These include:

2.4 (p. 20, l.15-18) quotation of *Cri* 45bc
2.7 (p. 26, l.21 f.) φιλοσώματος *Phd.* 68c
2.8 (p. 27, l.29) μελετῶντα τὴν τελευτὴν *Phd.* 67a, 81a.
2.10 (p. 31, l.33 f.) rivers of the underworld. Cf. *Phd.* 113c.
2.10 (p. 31, l.54 - p. 32, l.2) quotation of Pindar from *Resp.* 330d.
3.2 (p. 35, l.42) and 3.7 (p. 46, l.13 f.) τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλειαν *Ap.* 29e.

430. Grilli, pp. 307-308. See n. 340 above.

431. Cf. Foerster-Muenscher, "Libanios," 2530. Hieronymus Markowski, *De Libanio Socratis defensore,* Breslau, 1910; reprint, Hildesheim, 1970.

432. Stephan Verosta, *Iohannes Chrysostomus: Staatsphilosoph und Geschichtstheologe* (Graz, 1960), pp. 88-89.

3.11 (p. 52, l.26) οὐ γὰρ ἐν ὀνόμασιν ἀλλ' ἐν πράγμασιν Cf. *Cra.* 391b, 436a.
3.11 (p. 54, l.9 ff.) Plato excelled all philosophers in the art of rhetoric.
3.11 (p. 54, l.13 ff.) quotes *Ap.* 17bc.
3.16 (p. 64, l.10-12) φιλοσώματοι ... τῷ παρόντι προσηλωμένοι βίῳ ... ἄδηλον εἰ Cf. *Phd.* 68c, 83d. *Phdr.* 232e.

In addition to these explicit references, there are other seeming parallels to Plato's thought, particularly in Chrysostom's scheme of monastic education.

The idea that there is a close connection between Plato's concept of education and Chrysostom's is not new and has been most recently pointed out by Danassis.[433] Chrysostom understands education in the Socratic sense of giving inner form to pupils, the forming of the soul (τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιμέλεια: Xenophon, *Mem.* 1.2.4). He compares the soul to a statue, which must be gilded: τὸ δὲ πάντων τιμιώτερον ἄγαλμα ἡ ψυχὴ ὅπως γένηται χρυσή.[434] This comparison also occurs in 3.12[435] concerning a young man who was being trained by a monk disguised as his pedagogue:

> Ἔχων γὰρ οἴκοι διαπαντὸς τὸν ῥυθμίζοντα, καθάπερ ἄγαλμα συνεχῶς ἀπολαῦον τῆς τοῦ τεχνίτου χειρός, οὕτω προσθήκην καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἐλάμβανε τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν κάλλους.

In an effort to give a scriptural basis for the Platonic conception, Chrysostom quotes 1 Tim. 5:8:

> "But if any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." What do you think "provide" means here? The supply of bodily necessities? I think that it means the care of the soul. (3.2; p. 35, l.38-42)

To neglect this, is to enslave the soul and hand it over to evil and fierce demons and their passions.[436] It is interesting to observe here the blending of the Socratic conception of *paideia* with Christian demonology.

433. Antonios Danassis, *Johannes Chrysostomus: Pädagogisch—psychologische Ideen in seinem Werk* (Bonn, 1971), pp. 35 f.
434. *Opp.* 3.7; p. 46, l. 16-17.
435. *Opp.* 3.12; p. 56, l. 49-52.
436. *Opp.* 3.3; p. 38, l. 32-35.

Using the rhetorical device of μερισμός, Chrysostom shows that the neglect of children's moral and spiritual well-being is "the very pinnacle of evil".[437] The example of Eli is cited, whose only sin was child neglect.[438]

> Since (Eli) did not care for his children scrupulously, he perished very pitiably, and the sin of this negligence, like a great stormy wave (cf. Jude 13), prevailed over all this and covered all his works: what penalty will seize us who live in times which demand much more philosophy—we who fall short of his virtue, and not only do not care for our own children, but even plot and war against those (monks) who wish to do this? (3.3; p. 38, l.19-28)

The cause of child neglect is, according to Chrysostom, materialism:

> The perversion of children occurs for no other reason than the madness concerning material things (τῆς περὶ τὰ βιωτικὰ μανίας). By only paying attention to these and being unwilling to prefer anything to them, people are forced to neglect their own soul and their children's. (3.4; p. 41, l.11-15)

This theme is the subject of Chrysostom's treatise on education *(De inani gloria et de educandis liberis)*, and seemingly goes back to Socrates. For example, Plato (?) writes:

> Socrates, that ancient philosopher, was wont to say, that if he could get up to the highest place in the city, he would lift up his voice and make this proclamation thence: What mean you, fellow-citizens, that you thus turn every stone to scrape wealth together, and take so little care of your children, to whom, one day, you must relinquish all? (*Clit.* 407a)[439]

According to Chrysostom, materialism necessarily involves many sins:

> For those who love possessions must be envious, malicious, swearers of many oaths, perjurers, arrogant, impudent, thieves, shameless, bold, ungrateful and everything evil. (3.6; p. 43, l.19-22)

437. *Opp.* 3.3; p. 35, l. 51-52.
438. 1 Sam. 2:12-4:18.
439. Quoted by Plutarch, *De liberis educandis* 7; trans. William W. Goodwin, in *Plutarch's Morals* (Boston, 1871), 1:10-11.

A soul which is formed in a materialistic society will perish:

> As a body which does not partake of heathful food, but is nourished on unwholesome fare, cannot survive even for a short time, so a soul which is educated in such a way cannot ever conceive of anything excellent or great. Such a (soul), weak and wasted, continuously afflicted by evil as by consumption, must end in Gehenna and the destruction there. (3.6; p. 44, l. 18-25)

The children who remain at home, instead of going to the desert for their education, will therefore perish.[440]

Since a system of education will logically be conditioned by the final result which it is intended to produce, it is useful to describe the sort of men that Plato and Chrysostom have in mind as the finished products of their respective systems. In the *Republic* the ultimate goal of *paideia* is the philosopher-king. The system of education developed in the *Republic,* therefore, is aimed at the formation of the select few who are to be its rulers; the cardinal point is that they are to be men capable of grasping the highest reality, the form of the good, and from the contemplation of this model they are to make practical conclusions as to the good in practical (i.e. political) affairs.[441] The first thing to be considered, then, in a comparison of the educational theories of Chrysostom and Plato, is whether there is anything in *Opp.* to correspond with the philosopher-king of the *Republic.* It does not appear farfetched to say that there is such an ideal in the persons of the monks, who are called saints (ἅγιοι), and the children educated by them.

In the *Republic* Plato's education is for future rulers; Chrysostom has in mind that the children educated in the desert were to be the eventual leaders of society:

> In a word, if we were willing to form our children from the beginning, and hand them over to people who wish to educate them, it would be likely that they would be in the front rank of the army. God would not have overlooked such enthusiasm and zeal, but would have given his hand and touched the statue. If that hand were working, it is impossible for any of what happens to fail. Rather, it is impossible not to come

440. *Opp.* 3.21; p. 73, l. 38-39.
441. *Resp.* 7.540a4-b7.

> to the height of brilliance and glory, on the condition that our own efforts should follow. (3.19; p. 70, l.45-54)

In a protreptic which constitutes the final chapter of *Opp.,* Chrysostom states that children who are educated in monasteries (and possibly become monks) will be leaders both on earth and in heaven; true education, here identified with piety, will equip a person to serve well and to excel in both realms, present and future.

> Let us prepare ministers and trustworthy servants for God. If one who nurtures athletes for cities, or trains soldiers for kings, will be rewarded with great honor, how great a gift shall we probably receive, rearing such noble and great men, rather, angels, for God. Let us make every effort so as to leave to them the wealth of piety, which remains and travels with them, and which is able to benefit them greatly not only here, but also there. For material (wealth) will not travel with them, and will perish here first, and many times will first destroy those who have it. But this (wealth) will be steadfast both here and there, and will preserve those who possess it with great security. And indeed it is so. The one who prefers earthly to spiritual things will be deprived of both the former and the latter. The one who desires heavenly things will also by all means obtain earthly things. And this is not my saying, but his who is able to supply these. "Seek the kingdom of heaven and all these things shall be added unto you." (Matt. 6:33). What could be equal to this honor? "Give thought to spiritual things, and give up all your (material) things to me," is what he is saying. God is just like an affectionate father, who undertakes the care of the house and charge of the servants and all the rest, and exhorts his child to devote himself to philosophy alone. Therefore let us obey, and seek the kingdom of God, and in this way we shall see our children everywhere approved, and we ourselves with them shall be esteemed, and shall enjoy present things, if only we desire future and heavenly things. (3.21; p. 72, l.43 - p. 73, l.19)

Therefore the perspective of monastic *paideia* is necessarily eschatological, but includes the present world as well.

In *Opp.* Chrysostom also appears to be an emulator of Plato, in-

sofar as Plato put education before legislation.[442] In *Opp.* 3.18[443] Chrysostom places education above compulsion as the best way to perfect society:

> This is what legislators ought to do, if what is necessary were to occur; not to brandish fears to the youths when they have become men, but while they are children to train and form them, and there would be no need of threats afterwards. What occurs now is as if a physician should say nothing to a patient who is weak, or show him none of the means by which he will be freed from his disease, but should lay down countless laws when he is incurably afflicted. And indeed legislators educate us when we are perverted. But not so Paul, who from the beginning and in earliest youth sets teachers of virtue, forbidding evil to enter (cf. Eph. 6:4). For the best teaching is not that which allows evil first to prevail, and later seeks to expel it, but that which undertakes everything to make our nature inaccessible to it. Wherefore I exhort you, not to hinder those who wish to do this (i.e., monks), but to help and save the ship, and allow it to sail with a fair wind.

Chrysostom believes that such a system of education would transform society, and produce the heavenly society on earth[444]:

> Indeed, if we all accepted this view, and before all else led them to virtue (considering this our task, and the rest subordinate),[445] there would be so many goods that if I mention them I will seem to be boasting. If someone wants to know, he will easily recognize from the facts, and will confess much gratitude to us and, before us, to God—when he sees the heavenly society flourishing upon earth, and the doctrines of future goods and of resurrection being accepted here already even among unbelievers ... If we planted this fruit in the cities, and order took some beginning in law, and we taught our children before everything to be friends of God, and we taught spiritual teachings in place of all else and before all the rest—everything painful would have departed, and the present life would have been delivered from countless evils, and what is said concerning the future life (that pain and grief and sighing is fled) we would have reaped here. If neither a passion for possessions nor vainglory entered into us, and we did not consider suffering evil as injury, but as greatest profit, we would not be warred upon by our own passions or those of others, but the race of men would be close to the angels themselves.

442. Ruiz Bueno, p. 60. Cf. Lesky, pp. 528, 537.
443. *Opp.* 3.18; p. 68, l. 43 - p. 69, l. 8.
444. *Opp.* 3.18-19; p. 69, l. 8-39.
445. Cf. Plato, *Leg.* 766a.

Obviously, and especially in light of Chrysostom's other statements on the subject, in such a society there would be no war.[446]

Another resemblance between *Opp.* and the *Republic* of Plato is the way Chrysostom envisions a *return* to the city of the children who have been educated in monasteries. His theory is that children should be educated in a monastery for ten or twenty years, or until moral virtue is firmly rooted.

> Accordingly we too should not bring home our sons from their study in the desert before the proper time, but let their studies be fixed in them and the plants be rooted; even if they must be reared in the monastery ten or twenty years, we should not be disturbed or unhappy: the longer time he spends in the gymnasium, the more strength he will acquire. Or rather, if it seems good, let us not define a time, but let that be the limit only which brings to prime the fruits planted in him, and then let him return from the desert, but not earlier. For we shall gain nothing more from this hastiness than him never being mature. The one who is deprived of nourishment in the root, will not be useful in the future when the crisis comes. So that this does not happen, let us endure this separation, and not only let us not urge, but even prevent them if they wish to come (home) before it is time. When he is perfect he will be a common benefit to father, mother, home, city, and nation; but if he arrives less highly developed, he will be ridiculous and disgraceful, and dangerous to himself and others.

There is a parallel here to Plato's doctrine of the contemplative life in the *Republic*. According to Festugière:

446. Gerardo Zampaglione, *The Idea of Peace in Antiquity*, trans. Richard Dunn (South Bend, Indiana, 1973), pp. 274-276.

> The central problem of the *Republic* is to fit the philosopher into the city. The reason is that in Plato's time a truly "just" life still cannot be lived apart from the city. Individual and social justice are closely connected. Pure contemplation is not currently acceptable. The contemplative returns to the cave for the salvation of his brothers. And the purpose of the Academy is precisely to form such contemplatives as are capable of serving, and preserving, the city. Perhaps it was not without some regret that, having tasted its joys, Plato renounced pure θεωρία ... [Nevertheless] for Plato the contemplative life, properly understood, remains always that life most useful to the city.[447]

According to Leroux, the distinction between action and contemplation is totally foreign to Chrysostom's thought.[448] For Chrysostom the opposition is between those who attempt to secure their own salvation egotistically, and those who, following Christ, cooperate in the salvation of humanity and the diffusion of the kerygma. Chrysostom does not admit a difference of nature between the lay ideal and the monastic ideal, but in his eyes it is a matter of the multiform expression of the same Christian ideal, according to different modalities.[449]

> You are very much deceived and in error if you think that one thing is demanded of the worldy person, another of the monk. The difference between them is in being married and not being married, for everything else they undergo the same judgment.

The distinction between a monk and a lay person is not scriptural, but is the product of human thought:[450]

> (Jesus) does not use the name of lay person or monk, but this distinction has been introduced by human thought. The Scriptures know nothing of it, but wish all to live the life of the monks even if they happen to have wives.

447. A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon*², Le Saulchoir Bibliothèque de philosophie II (Paris, 1950), p. 40 n. 1, quoted and translated by Mason, p. 14.

448. I.e., setting aside for the moment those instances where Chrysostom employes the distinction between *vita activa* and *vita contemplativa* for apologetic purposes, as in *Opp.* and *De sacerdotio.*

449. Cf. *Opp.* 3.14; p. 59, l. 11-15.

450. *Opp.* 3.14; p. 59, l. 41-45.

In this perspective Chrysostom does not sacrifice any of the essential characteristics of monasticism: virginity, detachment, prayer, interior solitude. He does not repudiate exterior solitude, but it is a matter of an external modality of monasticism which must be subordinated to the imperatives of the apostolate and the service of the church.[451] And therefore in *Opp.* the monks are called upon to educate the youth, who will then return to society and reform it:

> Then let us call them, when they become strong and are able to benefit others. Only then let us drag them so as to become the common light, so that their lamp is placed on the lampstand (cf. Luke 11:33). (3.18; p. 68, l.29-33)

Chrysostom states that he wants children to return to the paternal home—but not immediately (3.18; p. 67, l.16-20). The contemplative (i.e. monastic) life is justified as the best way to educate youths, who are at the most vulnerable time of their lives and unfit for *vita activa*.[452]

The "Opponents" of the Monks Are Identified As the Enemies of Philosophy in Opp.

Throughout the discourse *Opp.* the opponents of the monastic life are depicted as enemies of philosophy, both implicitly (because the monks are identified with philosophy) and explicitly. Thus in *Opp.* 1.2[453] Chrysostom says that there are certain among the Christians who are so hostile to virtue and philosophy (ἀρετὴν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν) that they not only withdraw from all effort in behalf of these, but cannot even bear to hear about them, and have reached the point of madness (μανία) that if someone else (i.e., a monk) recommends, or discusses these topics, they persecute him. Chrysostom fears that if certain of the Greeks learn this, they will not consider Christians human, but beasts, monsters, destructive demons, and enemies of the human race.[454] Elsewhere in the discourse Chrysostom says that both the pagan father and

451. Leroux, p. 183.

452. *Opp.* 3.17; p. 65, l. 33-39.

453. *Opp.* 1.2; p. 3, l. 53 - p. 4, l. 9.

454. This last accusation was made against the monks by their opponents: ἀλαζόνας καὶ λυμεῶνας ὄντως καὶ τῆς φύσεως ἁπάσης ἐχθρούς. (2.1; p. 15, l.31 f.). In 3.10 (p. 52, l.5 f.). Chrysostom again turns the accusation against the opponents of the monks, who are called "universal enemies" of mankind (κοινοὺς ἐχθρούς).

the Christian father try to keep their children away from "philosophy," viz., monasticism:

2.9 (p. 29, l.47-48) Τί οὖν καὶ τὸν υἱὸν κωλύεις γενέσθαι ταύτης φιλοσοφίας ἐγγύς;

3.6 (p. 44, l.10-14) Ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τἀναντία παρακαλεῖς, φιλοσοφίας μὲν οὐδὲ ὄναρ μεμνῆσθαι συγχωρῶν, ἄνω δὲ καὶ κάτω τὸν παρόντα βίον καὶ τὰ τούτου στρέφων, μειζόνως κλυδωνίζεσθαι παρασκευάζεις.

In another place Chrysostom, states that the opponents of the monks are opposed to "heavenly" philosophy—which constitutes an explicit (unambiguous) reference to Christianity.[455]

In *Opp.* 3.12[456] Chrysostom tells the story of a monk whom he met in the mountains, who was acting as a pedagogue of a youth, whose mother wanted him to become a monk against the wishes of his father:

> The boy's father (he said) is harsh and brutal and desirous of material things; his mother is humble, chaste and virtuous, and concerned only with heaven. Now (the father), inasmuch as he was a military hero, wishes to bring his son to the paternal rank; but his mother does not want or desire this, but is very much against it; she prays and desires to see him illustrious in the society of the monks. (3.12; p. 55, l.25-33)

This provides an illustration of the influence on the part of women in favor of Christianity and monasticism, which is mentioned by emperor Julian and Libanius. There was, Chrysostom says, apprehension that the father would attack the monk if his son became one:

> And indeed there was fear that if (the father) uncovered the plot prematurely by his zeal, he would initiate a terrible war against his (i.e., the son's) mother, pedagogue and monks everywhere. For if the father became aware of this flight (to the desert), he would not have shrunk from doing everything to to drive away those saints (ἁγίους), not only the ones who harbored him, but all others. (3.12; p. 56, l.23-29)

Another example occurs in *Opp.* 2.10[457]: Chrysostom mentions a friend

455. *Opp.* 3.18; p. 67, l. 26-27. Malingrey, p. 275.
456. *Opp.* 3.12; p. 55, l. 13 - p. 57, l. 25.
457. *Opp.* 2.10; p. 32, l. 40-52.

of his, whose father, a pagan, first opposed his monastic vocation. In this case the father eventually became reconciled.

The attitude of the opponents of the monks is characterized as disregard for the well-being of the human soul. They not only neglect the souls which are being "raped" by demons,[458] but war upon those who put their hands into the gullet of the beast (Satan) to rescue those which have already been devoured.[459]

One notices that here Chrysostom is introducing a Christian theme (demonology). Chrysostom says that Satan has launched an attack upon secular society. Human affairs are in a worse condition than a tyrannized city. An evil demon has burst in upon the souls of men, and not only breaks up marriages, steals, murders, but removes souls from their association with God and surrenders them to his impure satellites. Demons possess the souls of those living in cities.[460] Moreover, the demons instituted sodomy, one of the chief vices of the city.[461]

In book 3, chapters 9-10, Chrysostom explains who it is that are responsible for persecuting the monks. At this point in the discourse he is attempting to prove that "philosophy" (i.e. monasticism) benefits the present social system, whereas "unphilosophic" behavior injures it. The entire passage is worth quoting.

> "Why do our children need philosophy and a scrupulous life-style?" you say.
>
> It is this which has destroyed everything—that a thing so necessary, which preserves out life, seems to be superfluous and secondary. If someone saw his son sick in body he would not say: "Why does he need sound and perfect health?" He would make every effort that such bodily vigor would be his and that the disease would never return. But when the soul is

458. The image of the rape of the soul by demons is already found in Origen, *Hom. in Ezech.* 8.3. Cited by Jean Daniélou *Gospel Message and Hellenistic Culture,* trans. John Austin Baker, A History of Early Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea, Vol. 2 (London, 1973), p. 441.

459. *Opp.* 1.7; pp. 11-12. Cf. Eusebius, H.e. 5.2.6 (NPNF p. 218): image of Satan as a devouring beast (also H.e. 5.21.2, p. 239: wild beast persecutes). Chrysostom also uses the image of the gullet of the wild beast (= Satan) in Hom. 2.4 *concerning demons* (NPNF p. 189).

460. *Opp.* 1.7; p. 11, l. 20-52.

461. *Opp.* 3.8; p. 47, l. 16-18.

sick, they say that it needs no remedy, and they dare to call themselves fathers after these words.

"What? shall we all philosophize, and life will be undone?"

Not "philosophy" my good man, but "not philosophizing" has destroyed and corrupted everything. Tell me, who injures the present system: those who live modestly and virtuously, or those who invent new and unlawful forms of luxury? Those who are eager to acquire everyone's property, or those who are content with their own? Those who have contingents of servants, and lead around swarms of flatterers and parasites, or those who consider that only one servant suffices for them? (I do not lay down as yet the highest philosophy, but that which is accessible to many.) The humane and the gentle, who do not need honor from the crowd, or those who demand it from their fellow man more than every debt, and wreak countless evils because a certain person did not rise or address him first, or bow or show servility? Those who are practiced in being ruled, or those who desire power and office, and will endure doing and suffering everything for it? Those who say they are better than everyone and for this reason consider that they are permitted to say and do everything, or those who number themselves with the least and thus repress the irrational power of the passions? Those who build splendid houses and set expensive tables, or those who seek for nothing more than the necessary food and shelter? Those who appropriate thousands of acres of land for themselves, or those who think that they do not have to possess even one lump? Those who collect compound interest, and travel every road of unjust commerce, or those who tear up these unjust contracts, and aid the needy from their possessions? Those who have observed the vileness of human nature, or those who do not wish to know it, and because of excessive pride have lost sight of their humanity? Those who maintain harlots and outrage other people's marriages, or those who abstain from their own wife?

Do not the ones (i.e., the "unphilosophic") grow on the societal system like tumors on the body and fierce winds on the sea, and by their incontinence annoy those who are able to be saved by themselves? Do not the others (i.e. the philosophic) like

bright lights in deep darkness call those who are shipwrecked in the midst to their own security, and having lit their torches of philosophy on high from afar, so lead those who are willing to the harbor of tranquillity?

Is it not because of the former (i.e., the unphilosophic) that there are revolutions, wars, battles, destructions of cities, kidnappings, slavery, captivity, murder and countless evils of life, not only the things inflicted by men on men. but also everything from heaven, like drought, deluge, earthquakes, disasters, flooding of cities, famines, plagues, and all the rest which comes upon us from there?

Therefore it is these (i.e. the unphilosophic) who are upsetting the system and injuring the commonweal; who are the cause of countless evils to others; *who are vexing those who wish to live as monks, and everywhere dragging them and attacking them.* On account of them (i.e., the unphilosophic) are there courts, laws, retribution, and different modes of punishment. And just as in a house, where the sick are many and the healthy are few, and you can find drugs and many physicians who have entered, so also in the world there is no nation, no city, where there are not many laws, rulers, and punishments. The drugs by themselves are not sufficient to raise up the sick, but people are also needed to apply them; that is what judges are, who force them to receive treatment willingly and unwillingly. But nevertheless the disease prevailed to such an extent that it overpowered the art of the physicians and attacked the judges themselves.

It is as if someone afflicted by fever and dropsy, and countless other worse suffering, should not overcome his own problems, and try to deliver others caught in the same evils. The stream of evil, like some torrent, broke all hindrances and streamed vehemently into the souls of men.

And why do I say the subversion of *society?* The plague carried by these evil people is liable to banish the *doctrine of divine providence* from humanity: so it (i.e. the plague) advances, spreads and hastens to overcome everything, and has made everything topsy-turvy, and now attacks heaven itself, arm-

ing men's tongues no longer against their fellow servants but against the Lord and ruler of all. Tell me, whence comes the manifold *teaching about fate?* Why do people ascribe what happens to the irrational course of the stars? Why do certain people worship chance and accident? Whence do they think that everything takes its course at random and without purpose? Because of those who live temperately and virtuously or, because of those whom you say "maintain the system," but I have demonstrated are the universal corruption of the world. Clearly because of the latter. No one is vexed when a certain person philosophizes, or because a certain person is virtuous, temperate, chaste, and disdains the affairs of the present world. It is because a person is rich, lives in luxury, is covetous and steals; because although he is evil and abounds in countless wrongdoings he is illustrious and successful.
Those who disbelieve in God accuse and censure this; the common people stumble at this. They would not say anything of the kind on account of those who live virtuously, but would condemn themselves rather than the providence of God. And if all or most wished to live so (i.e., virtuously), they would not have thought up this doctrine (i.e. fate), nor would the height of this evil have appeared, to seek whence comes evil. If no evils existed or appeared, who would be led to seek the cause of evil and open up countless heresies from the inquiry? Indeed, Marcion, Manes, Valentinus, and most Greeks took their beginning from here.[462] If all philosophized, there would be no need to investigate this, but if from nowhere else, at least from their excellent life-style, all would have learned that we live under God the king, and he administers and governs our affairs according to his wisdom and understanding. He moves (the universe) even now, but does not appear accessible owing to the great mist which these (i.e., the unphilosophic) have spread over the whole earth. If it were not for this, the providence of God would have appeared to everyone as if at high noon and in a glassy calm. If there were no courts, accusers, informers, tortures, punishments, prisons, retribution confisca-

462. Eusebius, *H.e.* 5.27 says that the origin of evil is "the question so much discussed among heretics."

tion of property, fines, fear and danger, hostility, treachery, abuse, hatred, famine, plagues, nor any other evil which has been recounted, but everyone lived with proper virtue, what living creature would have doubted concerning the providence of God? No one. It is as if when a storm befalls, the pilot should do his part and save the ship, but the precision of his knowledge should not appear to the passengers because of disturbance, fear and tension from the impending evil. God governs this universe even now, but does not appear to do so an account of the storm and tumult of circumstances, which (the unphilosophic) in large measure cause. Therefore they (the unphilosophic) do not only *destroy society*, but also *harm religion;* one would not be wrong in calling them universal enemies, who live against the salvation of others, sinking those who sail with them by their foul opinions and impure lives.

In other words, according to Chrysostom, "unphilosophic" people are the cause of all societal and natural (i.e. heaven-sent) evil. Not only do "unphilosophic" individuals destroy human society (πολιτεία), but they also destroy religion (εὐσέβεια), by causing the doctrine of divine providence to be challenged. In addition to all this, and most important for discovering the identity of the opponents of monasticism, it is the "unphilosophic," who are "vexing those who wish to live as monks, and everywhere dragging them and attacking them".[463]

CONCLUSION

It has been shown that Chrysostom in the discourse, *Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae,* undertook the defense of the monks by identifying monasticism with philosophy and the contemplative life, and by characterizing its opponents as "unphilosophic". The monks are viewed as heirs of the Greek philosophers, and representatives of the highest ideal of Hellenic culture. The institution of monasticism is justified in a way that would lead to its acceptance by educated pagans and Christians of the fourth century.

It is interesting to find a corroboration of Chrysostom's apologetic

463. Οἱ τοῖς βουλομένοις ἡσυχάζειν ἐνοχλοῦντες καὶ πανταχόθεν ἕλκοντες καὶ σπαράττοντες: *Opp.* 3.10; p. 50, l.31-32.

thought in the *Misopogon* of emperor Julian, also written at Antioch, approximately a decade earlier. The subject of *Misopogon* is the opposition between emperor Julian's philosophic life and the pleasure loving life of the Antiochene population,[464] which, according to Julian, is the ἦθος of Antioch.[465] Julian gives a historical demonstration of the "unphilosophic" temperament of the city of Antioch in *Misopogon* 17-18. This document, written by a leading member of the pagan opposition, constitutes evidence that the apologetic argument in *Opp.* was not merely literary, but did apply to a real situation. In the case of the *Misopogon,* the conflict was between the apostate emperor and the Christian population of Antioch. However the opposition to the pagan emperor's ascetic lifestyle, symbolized by the philosopher's beard, which suggested the title of the work *Misopogon,* evidently derived from the same spirit as the opposition to the monastic life.[466]

464. *Mis.* 14.345d; ed. Lacombrade, p. 163.

465. *Mis.* 16.347a; p. 169.

466. The mosaics of Antioch supply further evidence of the "unphilosophic" tastes of Antiochenes. Cf. Festugière, *Antioche païenne et chrétienne,* p. 227. Emperor Julian states that ὑγρότης βίου ("wanton life") was the ideal of the Antiochenes. *Mis.* 20.351a; p. 174.

CONCLUSION

COMMON FEATURES OF APOLOGETICS IN THE SEVERAL DISCOURSES

APOLOGETIC METHOD

Rational

Chrysostom generally characterizes the apologetic enterprise as ἀπόδειξις (rational demonstration). The demonstration may be made by empirical facts (ἡ διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἀπόδειξις, ἀπόδειξις διὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῶν). Otherwise the demonstration is made from inspired Scripture, which Chrysostom calls the declaration (ἀπόφασις) of God. Chrysostom unequivocally maintains that the Scriptures constitute more powerful evidence than empirical reality.

Chrysostom uniformly employed various methods of approach, depending upon what group or segment he was addressing. In addressing the pagan world, he uses reasoning (λογισμοί) and examples from pagan literature—the traditional literary stance towards pagans in early Christian apologetics. To non-believers Chrysostom similarly uses certain empirical arguments, e.g., the empirical proof for the existence of providence. To heretics, Chrysostom uses Scripture. Towards believers Chrysostom uses Scripture and empirical demonstration, and occasionally examples from pagan literature, where appropriate.

To describe apologetics Chrysostom uses medical terminology, whose origin is to be found in Stoicism and even earlier in Greek thought.[1] In his use of medical imagery in connection with apologetics

1. E.g., philosophers were designated as doctors by Plato and Antisthenes. Edward Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (reprint, Hildesheim, 1963) 2,1: 332 n. 4. See further Pedro Laìn Entralgo, *The Therapy of the Word in Classical Antiquity,* ed. and trans. L. J. Rather and John M. Sharp (New Haven, 1970). Pierre Canivet, *Histoire d'une entreprise apologé-*

Chrysostom was preceded by Eusebius.[2] The accusation of madness (μανία) against heretics and the pagan opponents of the monks also seems to derive ultimately from Stoic philosophy. Madness is synonymous with folly in Stoicism.[3]

Pragmatic

The posture which Chrysostom adopts in his apologetic discourses is that of ἐπιείκεια (reasonableness, civility), πραότης (restraint) and προσήνεια (kindness). Since the opponents are depicted as "ill" or "insane", it is fitting that such mildness should be the guiding principle of their therapy. The concept of πραότης (restraint) in apologetics goes back to 1 Peter 3:16. According to Chrysostom, in his apologetics he aims at the restoration rather than the destruction of the opponents. In *Opp.* he states that the idea of recovering those in error was suggested to him by an unnamed acquaintance.

Spiritual

For Chrysostom apologetics is not merely a literary or academic undertaking, but involves spiritual inspiration. God's aid (ῥοπή) and prayer[4] are needed. In a general way this accords with prevailing writing practices in the early church.[5] Chrysostom states that he has a moral obligation to compose apologetics, so as to avoid condemnation at the last judgment. The ecclesiological basis of Chrysostom's apologetics directed to within the community is his practical interpretation of Paul's doctrine of the church as the body of Christ.

tique au Ve siècle (Paris, 1957), pp. 116 f. The concept of the healing power of God's word is found in the Bible (Ps. 107:20, Wisdom 16:12. Cf. also Prov. 16:24).

2. THEOPH. 4.37; trans. Lee, p. 284. Cf. also GREGORY OF NYSSA, *Or. catech.* proem (p. 2, l.11, ed. Srawley: θεραπεία of truth as remedy against error). BOETHIUS, *Cons.* 1.4: image of doctor used in apology for providence.

3. Cf. HORACE, *Sat.* 2.7: discourse on the Stoic paradox that all men except philosophers are insane. Also *Sat.* 2.3 πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται. ZELLER, 3.1: 257 f.

4. The need for prayer in apologetics is already mentioned by JUSTIN MARTYR, 2 *Apol.* 15 and *Dial.* 7.

5. Cf. E. F. OSBORN, "Teaching and Writing in the First Chapter of the *Stromateis* of Clement of Alexandria," *Journal of Theological Studies* n.s. 10 (1959): 335 ff.

CONTENT

Chrysostom Defends the Three Categories of Patristic Theology

The comprehensive nature of Chrysostom's apologetics is remarkable and noteworthy. It has already been shown that the church fathers divided theology into three major categories *(theologia, oikonomia,* and *praxis).* Chrysostom composed apologetics in support of aspects of these three major areas of patristic thought. As already has been observed he placed equal, if not greater emphasis on the practical part of theology. His defense of the monks, *Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae,* is the longest of the four works studied here.

Relation of Chrysostom's Apologetic Thought To His Theology as a Whole

On the subject of the difficulty of truly ascertaining Chrysostom's thought, the present writer concurs with the excellent article by the Chrysostom scholar, Robert Carter, on the subject: "The Future of Chrysostom Studies: Theology and *Nachleben*," wherein Carter, discussing the difficulties of Chrysostom's thought, states that:

> The more satisfying scholarship will be that which relates Chrysostom's thought on a given subject to something else. The first something else could be Chrysostom's other theological concerns. In this way Chrysostom's basic insights emerge as they are seen in his treatment of many different topics. The coherence (and perhaps occasional inconsistency) of his total view gradually becomes apparent.[6]

Apologetics is an important part of theology for Chrysostom, and certain topics defended in the four discourses studied here reappear in his other works. Following the suggestion of Robert Carter, it will be illuminating to compare the argumentation of the four discourses under consideration here with Chrysostom's thought in general.

Divine incomprehensibility

Chrysostom, in his humility, was prompted to emphasize the theme

6. Συμπόσιον. *Studies on St. John Chrysostom,* p. 131.

of divine incomprehensibility. In the five homilies *De incomprehensibili* Chrysostom demonstrates the inherent incomprehensibility of God; in *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt* he argues in support of the incomprehensibility of God's economy (providence). Also in *De incomprehensibili* Chrysostom argues that nature is incomprehensible for the most part.

In *De incomprehensibili* and elsewhere Chrysostom applies the concept of incomprehensibility to other supernatural realities, including:

the union of two natures in Christ (*In Jo.* h. 26.1; PG 59, 154);[7]
virgin birth of Christ (ibid.);
resurrection of Christ (*Incomp.* h. 2.6; PG 48, 716 f.);
general resurrection (*Res. mort.* 7; PG 50, 429);
prophecy (*In Is.* h. 6.1; PG 56, 136);
rapture of Paul (*In* 2 *Cor.* h. 26.1; PG 61, 576).

The emphasis on divine incomprehensibility also appears in the Chrysostomus anaphora.[8]

It is well known that Chrysostom did not get involved in theological controversy, and was opposed to speculative theology.[9] The "mystical" outlook of John Chrysostom was probably developed in reaction to the extreme rationalism of the Anomoeans, who denied the mystery of the Christian religion.[10]

Monasticim

In *Opp.* Chrysostom pleads the case of monasticism in such a way as to make it acceptable and even desirable (protreptic) to its opponents. Of necessity he offers only a limited treatment of monasticism, which partially conceals its true nature. By describing it as "philosophy", and identifying it with the contemplative life, Chrysostom tries to make monasticism credible to its opponents, who evidently were imbued with the traditional values of Greek culture. Furthermore, by equating monasticism with the ethical part of philosophy, Chrysostom attempts to convince the opponents that Greek *paideia* should be transferred from the schools of rhetoric to the monasteries.

7. Quoted by BAUR, 1:358.

8. GEORG WAGNER, *Der Ursprung der Chrysostomusliturgie* (Münster, 1978), pp. 75-78.

9. In Jo. h. 4.2; PG 59, 48. Quoted by BAUR 1:355 f.

10. In 1 Cor. h. 7. 1-2; PG 61, 53 ff.

Puech has noted that in no other work (other than *Opp.*) does Chrysostom repeat the idea that children should be educated in monasteries.[11] Evidently, Chrysostim's ideas were modified by experience. In his treatise, *De inani gloria et de educandis liberis* 19, Chrysostom says:

> Raise up an athlete for Christ: I do not mean by this, hold him back from wedlock and send him to desert regions and prepare him to assume the monastic life. It is not this that I mean. I wish for this and used to pray that all might embrace it; but as it seems to be too heavy a burden, I do not insist upon it. Raise up an athlete for Christ and teach him though he is living in the world to be reverent from his earliest youth. (trans. Laistner)

Marrou believes that here Chrysostom is expressly repudiating what he said in *Opp.* concerning monastic education.[12] In his commentary on this passage from *De inani gloria,* Exarchos cites other statements of Chrysostom, which seem to represent this later evolution of his thought.[13] In homily 21.1 on Ephesians Chrysostom says that a child should be taught the Scriptures at home:

> Never say, this is the business of monks. Am I making a monk of him? No. There is no need he should become a monk. Why be so afraid of a thing so replete with so much advantage? Make him a Christian. For it is of all things necessary for laymen to be acquainted with the lessons derived from this source; but especially for children. (NPNF p. 154)

In this passage Chrysostom assumes that the young man will be going to the pagan schools, where he will be reading pagan literature, and the Scriptures are to function as an antidote. The homilies on Ephesians were delivered in Antioch, and reflect Chrysostom the pastor rather than Chrysostom the apologist.

11. AIMÉ PUECH, *St. Jean Chrysostome et les moeurs de son temps* (Paris, 1891), pp. 132-133.

12. H. I. MARROU, *A History of Education in Antiquity,* trans. George Lamb (New York, 1964), p. 442.

13. Including *In Eph.* h. 21.1 (PG 62, 150 f.), *In Gen.* h. 43.1 (PG 54, 395), and *In Mt.* h. 55.6 (PG 58, 548). BASILEIOS K. EXARCHOS, *Johannes Chrysostomos Über Hoffart und Kindererziehung* (Munich, 1955), pp. 45-46.

While identifying monasticism with the highest ideals of Greek culture, Chrysostom in *Opp.* did not dwell upon many details of monastic life, especially the hardships and ascetical feats. More important, he omitted almost all reference to the "counsels" of perfection (virginity, voluntary povery), which seem to constitute the essence of monasticism as a way of life. Chrysostom presents the monk and the lay person as subject to similar rules and obligations (except for marriage), and he denies that a stricter standard is applicable to the monks.

LITERARY GENRE

According to Ritter, an analysis of the literary genres employed by Chrysostom is a desideratum of modern scholarship, because only in this way can individual statements of his thoughts be evaluated.[14] Chrysostom composed works in many varied literary genres, which reflect the influence of the second sophistic.[15] In this connection one recalls that Libanius praised emperor Julian for having written in many literary genres.[16]

In the case of his apologetic writings Chrysostom employs a variety of literary genres. The demonstration of divine incomprehensibility is in the form of five homilies. However, these homilies contain a single argument *(logos)*, which Chrysostom refers to as λόγος περὶ ἀκαταλήπτου. According to Socrates,[17] Chrysostom when he was a deacon composed a treatise on incomprehensibility consisting of more than one book (συνέταξε τοὺς περὶ ἀκαταλήπτου [λόγους]). This treatise is not extant. It is possible that Chrysostom reproduced the argument of this written treatise in his homilies, *De incomprehensibili*, which were delivered from the pulpit at a later date. The logical structure of the argu-

14. RITTER, pp. 20 f.

15. Chrysostom's relation to Hellenism is shown "in der Wahl, Anlage und Ausführung der verschiedenen Gattungen von Reben und Schriften, wie sie jeder Sophist pflegte und auch von einen Chrysostomus in manchen Briefen, Trostreden und Trostschriften, nach alter Rhetorenart gehandhabt wurden." ANTON NAEGELE, "Chrysostomus und Libanios," in *Chrysostomika* (Rome, 1908), pp. 140 f. On Chrysostom's theoretical stance towards sophistic rhetoric see THOMAS E. AMERINGER, *The Stylistic Influence of the Second Sophistic on the Panegyrical Sermons of St. John Chrysostom* (Washington, D.C., 1921), pp. 20-28.

16. *Or.* 18.302, 24.37.

17. *H.e.* 6.3 (PG 67, 669).

ment of these five homilies may reflect the fact that Chrysostom was using material from a previously completed treatise.

The defense of providence is made in two written works of different literary genres. The literary genre of *Quod nemo laeditur* seems to be a diatribe; its structure and contents adhere to the "rules" of this genre. Chrysostom uses the pseudo-Stoic paradox, that no one is injured except by himself, as a defense of divine providence, which would be accepted by the educated society of his day, including both Christians and pagans. In this work Chrysostom answers two major accusations against divine providence, namely, that people are treated unjustly and injured every day, and that the good are mistreated and the evil flourish. The answer to both these objections is the demonstration of the paradox that "no man can be injured by another, but suffers this from himself." In regard to the absence of authentic Christian thoughts, *Quod nemo laeditur* may be compared with Boethius' *Consolatio*. The theme of *Quod nemo laeditur* reappears in the *Consolatio* 1, prose 5, where it says that nobody can be exiled from the kingdom of philosophy except by his own decree.[18]

Hitherto the literary genre of *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt* has appeared problematical. Anne-Marie Malingrey, editor of the critical edition in Sources Chrétiennes, concluded that the discourse belongs to no known genre of early Christian literature, but is the spontaneous witness of an inner experience. The present writer has attempted to demonstrate on the basis of the title, theme and structure, that *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt* is an apologetic treatise in defense of divine providence.

The purpose of *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt* is to heal those afflicted with the disease of "scandal". With a turn from the objective to the subjective, Chrysostom removes the scandal from the events themselves (Chrysostom's deposition and exile and the persecution of his followers), to the curiosity (περιεργία) of the scandalized. Using the medical imagery of the Stoics, Chrysostom implies that scandal is a disease of the soul,

18. MARTIN SCHANZ, CARL HOSIUS and GUSTAV KRUGER, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur* (reprint, Munich, 1959), 4,2:164. The subject matter of the *Consolatio* of Boethius parallels that of the two discourses of Chrysostom under consideration here: *Consolatio* 2-3 on happiness parallel *Quod nemo laeditur; Consolatio* 4-5 on providence parallel *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt.* Theodicy characterizes prison exile literature in antiquity, e.g., Dracontius, Ovid. E. K. RAND, *Founders of the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1929), pp. 159 f.

and proceeds to heal all persons scandalized throughout the world by the remedy of *logos*. The *logos* consists of a demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) of the existence of divine providence, followed by other arguments to cure scandal, which presuppose belief in providence. The basic problem which Chrysostom addresses is the undeserved sufferings of the just, the scandal that challenges faith. Chrysostom undertakes to justify the afflictions of the saints by reason.

Adversus oppugnatores vitae monasticae is an apologetic treatise. The entire discourse, divided into nineteen chapters in the Georgian version, constitutes one book, whose structure as one βιβλίον is given below:

Prologue (= book 1)
Logos (argument) to a pagan father (= book 2)
Logos (argument) to a Christian father (= book 3)

The phenomenon of double treatment of the same theme, divided into arguments based respectively upon reason and Scripture, is noteworthy. As in many other early Christian apologies, the conclusions to the arguments of books 2 and 3 are eschatological. The influence of the diatribe is shown by the heavy use of the device of the imaginary interlocutor, who plays an important part in the development of the argument.

PROBABLE SOURCES OF CHRYSOSTOM'S APOLOGETICS

Bible

Scripture is an important source of Chrysostom's apologetic thought. His apology directed towards heretics (Anomoeans) is entirely based upon Scripture; his concept of divine incomprehensibility, which encompasses God, nature and providence, is justified by an appeal to Scripture. The demonstration of the existence of divine providence, and defense of the monastic life addressed to Christian father, are partially based on Scripture.

Extra-Biblical

In *Opp.* 1 Chrysostom evidently makes use of apocryphal sources in the tradition which he recounts concerning the Samaritans. Also he uses apocryphal sources when he says that the principal cause of Paul's martyrdom was the conversion made by the apostle of a mistress

of Nero.[19] Another bit of extra-Biblical tradition occurs in *Opp.* 3.20:[20] Anna mocked by Phennana.[21]

Josephus

In *Opp.* 1.5 Chrysostom quotes Josephus, B.J. 6.192-214. This section of Josephus, describing the cannibalism which ensued during the seige of Jerusalem, is also quoted by Eusebius, H.e. 3.6.20-31. Chrysostom may have cited the passage from Eusebius, since the interpretation is similar (punishment of the Jews for rejecting Christ). It is also possible that Chrysostom cited it directly from Josephus, to whom he refers frequently.[22]

Christian Tradition and Other Church Fathers

Geffcken has pointed out that Greek Christian apologists were far less original than the Latins, and employed traditional literary forms, style and arguments.[23] In his apologetic writings Chrysostom seems to make use of arguments from other church fathers and from Christian, specifically Antiochene, tradition, without, however, citing his sources by name.

For his doctrine of divine incomprehensibility Chrysostom seems to be indebted to the following works:

Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* 9, also found in the manuscripts attributed to Basil under the name of "On God as incomprehensible."[24]

Athanasius, *Ep. Serap.* 1.18 (SC 15, pp. 114 f.). Using Hebrews 11:6 as a proof text Athanasius distinguishes the mode of

19. *Opp.* 1.3; p. 6, l. 4-6. See Amédée Fleury, *St. Paul et Sénèque: Recherches sur les rapports du philosophe avec l'apôtre* (Paris, 1853) 2:86 n. 1. J. Rougé, "Néron à la fin du IVe et au début du Ve siècle," *Latomus* 37 (1978) 82-84.

20. *Opp.* 3.20; p. 71, l. 9 ff.

21. Also at p. 71, l. 15 f., Chrysostom says that Anna exhorted Samuel not to enter the paternal home.

22. See P. R. Coleman-Norton, "St. Chrysostom's Use of Josephus," *Classical Philology* 26 (1931) 85-89. To Chrysostom's references to Josephus cited there add: *In 1 Thess.* h. 8.4 (PG 62, 444).

23. Geffcken, pp. 658, 660.

24. *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church,* second series, 7:51-56.

God's existence from the fact that he exists. Only the latter can be known by man. The *Ep. Serap.* was written ca. 359, and the argument is reproduced in Basil, *Ep.* 234 in 376.

Gregory of Nazianzus, *Theological orations* (SC 250).

Basil, *Adversus Eunomium* (PG 29, 497-669).

Gregory of Nyssa, *Contra Eunomium*, ed. W. Jaeger (Berlin, 1931).

The general dependence of Chrysostom homilies *De incomprehensibili* upon these five works has been recognized by scholars; the exact relationship has not yet been established.[25] It has been stated that Philo's influence on Chrysostom was indirect, mediated through the Cappadocians.[26]

In *Scand.* Chrysostom uses Christian tradition as a source of his argument in support of divine providence. The demonstration of providence *ex operibus* (chapters 7-8) evidently depends on the liturgy, specifically, the great prayer of thanksgiving of the anaphora, in which thanks are given for the cosmos and for salvation history. Also in defense of providence in *Scand.*, Chrysostom uses the two ages doctrine, which belonged to Antiochene theology and was utilized by Theodore of Mopsuestia.[27]

In *Opp.* Chrysostom is in accord with Eusebius and the Cappadocians in identifying monasticism with philosophy and contemplation. There is a general (presumably accidental) similarity between *Opp.* and Philo, *De vita contemplativa:* both are apologies for the monastic life, in which monasticism is identified with the classical philosophical tradition of contemplation. In *Opp.* also Chrysostom has adopted the tradi-tional apologetic theme of the θεομάχος and applied it to those within the Christian community who are "resisting God" by persecuting the monks.

25. JEAN DANIÉLOU, Introduction to SC 28 bis. Cf. PANAGIOTIS C. CHRISTOU, "'Ο 'Ιωάννης Χρυσόστομος καὶ οἱ Καππαδόκαι," in Συμπόσιον. *Studies on St. John Chrysostom,* pp. 13-22.

26. AMAND DE MENDIETA, Συμπόσιον. *Studies on St. John Chrysostom,* p. 40.

27. Greer, pp. 189-192. Cf. Chrysostom, *Res. mort.* 1 (PG 50, 419). *Pan. Juln.* 1 (PG 50, 667 f.), *Delic.* 3 (PG 51, 349-350). The two ages doctrine ultimately goes back to Jewish apocalyptic (e.g., 2 Esdras). Cf. also 2 Clement 5-8, 20.1-4. The two ages doctrine is also implied in the eschatological argument in favor of divine incomprehensibility in *Incomprehens.*

Classical Greek

Chapter I. Although Chrysostom says that one must empty his mind of secular culture (ἡ ἔξωθεν παίδευσις) in order to receive God's word faithfully, nevertheless there appears to be a deep and pervasive influence of classical Greek thought in Chrysostom's homilies, *De incomprehensibili.* These classical Greek ideas include the concept of measure,[28] self-knowledge,[29] and Plato's idea of twofold ignorance.[30] These classical Greek elements in Chrysostom's thinking may have been mediated through the Cappadocians, and may also have come through Chrysostom's own study of pagan literature in the school of Libanius, where many of the great pagan texts were read, including Demosthenes and Plato.

It should also be noted that in *De incomprehensibili* Chrysostom acknowledges the superiority of the ideas of pagan philosophers over those of heretics. This favorable comparison of pagan philosophers to heretics is in accord with the tradition of the Syrian church. The *Apostolic Constitutions* describe heretics as οἱ καὶ 'Ιουδαίων δυσσεβέστεροι καὶ 'Ελλήνων ἀθεώτεροι.[31] This point of view indirectly ascribes to pagan thought a certain validity.

Chapter II. *Quod nemo laeditur* and *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt,* both written during exile and shortly before Chrysostom's death (406-407), show the influence of Stoic philosophy. It has already been observed by Paul Albert that Stoicism is the one school of philosophy which Chrysostom did not condemn.[32] The degree of influence upon *Quod nemo*

28. Nowak, pp. 180-182. A. J. Festugière, *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile* (Paris, 1932), pp. 18, 24-25. A related concept is that of ἀπόνοια, unmeasured estimation of oneself. R.-A. Gauthier, *Magnanimité. L'idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne* (Paris, 1951), p. 431 n. 2. Another prominent concept of Chrysostom's apologetics which may be related is that of ἀκαιρία, unfitness of times, unseasonableness. This is an accusation which Chrysostom makes against the Jews and Judaizers. J. Malkowski, "The element of *akairos* in John Chrysostom's Anti-Jewish Polemic," *Studia Patristica* 12 (1975) 222-231. "St. John Chrysostom's Homily on the Protopaschites: Introduction and Translation," in *The Heritage of the Early Church,* p. 173 n. 24. *In Tit.* h. 3.2 (PG 62, 679). Judaizing is inopportune (παρὰ καιρόν).

29. Martin P. Nilsson, *Greek Piety,* trans. H. J. Rose (New York, 1969), pp. 47-52.

30. The commentators on Plato refer to the not knowing that you do not know as the double ignorance. Malley cites Proclus, *In Cratyl.* c. 65 (p. 35, n. 131).

31. 6.18.3; ed. FUNK, p. 343. Funk compares IRENAEUS, *Haer.* 2.9.2., and *Opus imperf. in Matt.* 12.45. Cf. also Chrysostom, *Virg.* 8 (SC 125, p. 116). TERTULLIAN, *Carn. Chr.* (CSEL 70, p. 229, 1.32-33).

32. PAUL ALBERT, *St Jean Chrysostome considéré comme orateur populaire* (Paris

laeditur and *Ad eos qui scandalizati sunt* is such that one could call it a world view: cosmology, teleology, providence and natural law; anthropology; and ethics. It is remarkable that Seneca, during the early years of his exile in Corsica (41), also composed two discourses on nearly the same themes:

Ad Serenum, nec iniuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem (De constantia sapientis);
Ad Lucilium, quare aliqua incommoda bonis viris accidant cum providentia sit (De providentia).[33]

The preoccupation with theodicy speaks for the common influence of Stoic philosophy upon both men.

Chapter III. In *Opp.* Chrysostom again reveals the pervasive influence of Greek culture upon his apologetic thought. Following Eusebius and other church fathers Chrysostom identifies monasticism with philosophy and contemplation.[34] He interprets monastic vocations of youth in terms of *paideia*, an important category of the Greek intellectual tradition,[35] and develops an educational theory which shows certain resemblances to Plato in the *Republic* and *Laws*. Moreover, in his conception of the contemplative life, Chrysostom, like Basil, was influenced by Panaetius's doctrine of εὐθυμία.

The reputation of John Chrysostom rests on inherited tradition,[36] and has to be investigated. Investigation does and will reveal the essence and nature of that greatness. The present study has been illuminating, but points to further work to be done on Chrysostom's apologetics.[37]

33. Latin text and French translation in René Waltz, *Sénèque Dialogues*, 4 (Paris, 1965). The *De Providentia* is available in English translation by Moses Hadas, *The Stoic Philosophy of Seneca* (New York, 1958), pp. 27-45.

34. Gregorio Penco, "La vita ascetica come 'Filosofia' nell' antica tradizione monastica," *Studia Monastica* 2 (1960) 79-93.

35. Werner Jaeger, "The Place of the Greeks in the History of Education," Introduction to *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, trans. Gilbert Highet (Oxford, 1965) 1:xiii-xxix.

36. Since the beginning of the fifth century the surname Chrysostomus occurs. Baur 2: 474 n. 12.

37. Albert says that Chrysostom's partial attacks on paganism and philosophy in his homilies would merit a separate study (p. 186). Actually almost all Chrysostom's homilies could be studied individually or in groups to isolate their apologetic material. Other topics concerning apologetics which would merit study include: Manichaeanism (cf. SC 272, p. 254 n. 4), and the homily *Contra ludos et theatra* (PG 56, 263-270), which deserves a separate study according to H. Delehaye, *Les origines du culte des martyrs*² (Brussels, 1933), p. 113 n. 4.

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